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THE GLOBAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN BRITAIN: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT?

Damon Lee Perry

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Student Number: 1142640

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School of Social Science & Public Policy
King's College London

The Global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: A Social Movement?

Damon Lee Perry

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Abstract

‘Non-violent Islamist extremism’ has become an important political issue in Britain in recent years. Since 2011, with the government’s counter-radicalisation strategy, *Prevent*, non-violent Islamist groups have been considered as a security risk for spreading a divisive ideology that can lead to violence. Concerns with these groups intensified in 2014 for their alleged role in providing the ‘mood music’ for the radicalisation of British Muslims joining the Islamic State’s insurgency. Yet, terrorism isn’t the only concern regarding non-violent Islamists in Britain. In the last few years, the government has expressed concerns about their impact on social cohesion and civil liberties, including women’s rights. It has also voiced concerns regarding non-violent Islamist extremism and entryism within key British institutions. In 2015, it created the Extremism Analysis Unit—the first official body dedicated to study violent and non-violent extremism—and published its first ‘Counter-Extremism Strategy’. The key protagonists of non-violent Islamist extremism allegedly include groups and individuals associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami. Some analysts describe them as part of the ‘global Muslim Brotherhood’, but do they constitute a singular phenomenon, a social movement? Adopting a conceptual approach informed by New Social Movement theory and the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, this thesis answers this question affirmatively, detailing how such groups and individuals are networked organisationally, bonded through ideological and cultural kinship, and united in a conflict of values with the British society and state. Using original interviews with prominent movement leaders, as well as primary sources, this thesis shows how it is not so much ‘Islamist’, in aspiring for an Islamic state, but concerned with institutionalising an Islamic worldview and moral framework throughout society. Its conflict with the government does not simply concern the control of state institutions, but the symbolic authority to legitimise a way of seeing, thinking and living.

Introduction

The Global Muslim Brotherhood and 'Non-Violent Islamist Extremism' in Britain

This thesis is the first sustained analysis of one particular strand of 'Islamist' activism in Britain. Islamism of various hues in Britain has been the topic of many studies in recent years, but none has explored in such detail the organisational and ideological connections of the groups and individuals associated with 'participationist' Islamism. Moreover, none has explicitly raised the question as to whether and how these individuals and groups collectively comprise a movement in Britain. Lorenzo Vidino's book from 2010, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, provides the most explicit conceptualisation and detailed analysis of such a movement in Europe and America, but the sole chapter dedicated to Britain, whilst informative, is relatively limited and already somewhat dated. Studies of participationist groups in Britain have appeared in various articles and think tank reports, and they provide some valuable insights for this thesis, but this is the first study to analyse such groups so comprehensively and to do so with specific focus on their collectivity.

Participationist Islamism, it should be said at the outset, is a term borrowed from a taxonomy provided by Jeffrey Bale.¹ It is also shared more widely by Vidino and others.² Characterising Islamism in fairly typical terms as a 'political ideology' that insists on the establishment of an Islamic world order or Islamic state,³ Bale divides Islamists between those who reject and those who accept participation within

¹ Jeffrey Bale, 'Militant Islamist Networks in the West', National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism website. December 21, 2009.
<http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/militant-islamist-networks-west>.

² Vidino (2009b), pp.165–176, and Vidino (2010), pp.15-16. See also McRoy (2006) and Quilliam (2010).

³ Bale (2009), pp.79, 80.

democratic political systems.⁴ The ‘rejectionists’ are sub-divided into violent jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda, and ‘ostensibly non-violent groups’, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. Both, he says, ‘openly disparage the institutions and values of Western host societies’, which they ultimately aspire to destroy.

Separate from these are the ‘participationists’, who are understood to seek an Islamic world order or state through non-violent means. These include groups and individuals alleged to have historical and ideological connections with the Egyptian organisation founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* (The Society of the Muslim Brothers), and the organisation established in colonial India by Abu al-A’la Mawdudi in 1941, *Jama’at-i-Islami* (The Party of Islam). Since al-Banna and Mawdudi considered the purpose of their work as the revival of Islam’s pre-eminence and glory, the Ikhwan, Jama’at and the groups associated with them are also referred to as ‘Islamic revivalists’.

This thesis uses both terms, ‘participationists’ and ‘revivalists’. The former is used mainly because this is how many observers refer to the individuals and groups associated with the Ikhwan and Jama’at. It correctly describes their preference for engagement in democratic politics and thus distinguishes them from Muslim activists that reject involvement in what they see as corrupt and forbidden ‘man-made’ systems of government. The term ‘revivalists’ is also used, since this is how the individuals and groups in question tend to see themselves. This thesis tends to use this term more frequently, since it assumes less about the importance of the Islamic state as a goal than the term ‘participationist’ does. In itself, ‘participationist’ merely reflects a chosen approach to activism, but it derives from a taxonomy of Islamism, described briefly above but elaborated upon in Chapter 2, in which all protagonists are deemed to be striving for an Islamic state. The term ‘revivalist’, however, leaves open the question of the extent to which the conceived revival of Islam is directed to a political state of affairs—an Islamic government—or a society infused with Islamic values.

⁴ Jeffrey Bale, ‘Militant Islamist Networks in the West’.

‘Non-violent extremism’: a conveyor belt to terrorism?

Over the last few years, the relevance of this thesis has become more evident as the British government has become increasingly concerned about non-violent forms of Islamism in Britain. Although the government does not distinguish between rejectionist and participationist non-violent Islamism, it nevertheless sees a significant problem in what it calls ‘non-violent Islamist extremism’. The government’s concern is primarily driven by security interests. Although not universally shared amongst government officials, the notion that non-violent Islamist extremism may act as a pathway to violent extremism, i.e., terrorism, has been officially endorsed by the current Conservative government.⁵ Some senior government leaders, including Prime Minister David Cameron and Home Secretary Theresa May, have expressed a broader concern regarding the detrimental effects of such extremism upon community cohesion and human rights, yet the over-riding pre-occupation with it relates to its potential radicalising influence upon British Muslims who may end up involved in planning, preparing or conducting terrorist attacks.

In February 2011, at the Munich Security Conference, Cameron identified a spectrum of Islamist extremism, stretching from non-violent to violent ideological orientations. He declared:

Islamist extremism is a political ideology supported by a minority. At the furthest end are those who back terrorism to promote their ultimate goal: an entire Islamist realm, governed by an interpretation of Sharia. Move along the spectrum, and you find people who may reject violence, but who accept various parts of the extremist worldview, including real hostility towards Western democracy and liberal values.⁶

He added that the ‘radical beliefs’ of many convicted terrorists were initially influenced by ‘non-violent extremists’. The Munich speech marked a significant shift in government security policy. Several months later, the government launched

⁵ ‘PM’s speech at Munich Security Conference’, British Government website, February 5, 2011. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference.>; ‘Extremism: PM speech’, British Government website, July 20, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech.>

⁶ ‘PM’s speech at Munich Security Conference’.

its revised counter-radicalisation strategy, *Prevent*, which emphasised the importance of targeting the ideology shared by both violent and non-violent Islamist extremists. For the first time, it provided a definition of extremism as ‘the vocal or active rejection of British values’.⁷

Heightened fears regarding the dangers of non-violent Islamism in Britain have been stoked more recently by several international developments. The first is the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. From mid-2014, non-violent Islamist groups in Britain, including those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and the rejectionist Hizb ut-Tahrir, came under heightened scrutiny for their alleged role in providing the ‘mood music’ for the radicalisation of British Muslims joining IS’s insurgency.⁸ The gruesome beheadings of British and American journalists and aid workers by a British IS jihadist, Mohammed Emwazi, beginning with that of James Foley in August 2014, increased concerns about the possible radicalising influence of these groups. Such concerns were intensified by estimates that hundreds of Britons had joined the ranks of IS in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, fears of the return to Britain of substantial numbers of British jihadists to conduct acts of terrorism, supported by direct threats to Britain issued by British IS members,⁹ led the government to elevate the terrorism threat level from ‘substantial’ to ‘severe’, the second highest of five levels.¹⁰

The second international development to stimulate concern over non-violent Islamists in Britain was the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ and its ousting from office almost a year later. In April 2014, reportedly prompted by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Cameron ordered an internal review of the Muslim Brotherhood to understand the group’s

⁷ Home Office (2011), p.107.

⁸ See Haras Rafiq, ‘London has been primed for decades by Muslim Brotherhood extremists’, *The Express*, August 24, 2014. <http://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/502795/London-has-been-primed-for-decades-by-Muslim-Brotherhood-extremists>. See also Sarah Ann Harris, ‘As officials try to identify US journalist’s killer – how do Britons become IS murderers?’, *The Express*, August 21, 2014. <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/501621/After-James-Wright-Foley-s-murder-how-do-Britons-becomes-IS-killers>.

⁹ Dipesh Gadher, ‘We’ll fly black flag of jihad over London’, *The Sunday Times*, June 15, 2014. http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Defence/article1422787.ece.

¹⁰ Tom Whitehead and Steven Swinford, ‘Britain facing “greatest terrorist threat” in history’, *The Telegraph*, August 29, 2014. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11065167/Britain-facing-greatest-terrorist-threat-in-history.html>.

‘philosophy, activities, impact and influence on UK national interests, at home and abroad’.¹¹ After a considerable delay, a summary of the review’s main findings was published in December 2015.¹² The full report has been withheld from publication. In addition to the organisation headquartered in Cairo and its offshoots abroad, the review also considered British groups associated with Jama’at-i-Islami, indicating that the government sees the Brotherhood in Britain as a broad-based ideological movement. Supporting this interpretation, the summary document clusters Ikhwani- and Jama’ati-associated groups together in what it calls ‘the UK Brotherhood movement’.¹³

The review appears to have been commissioned amidst concerns that the Brotherhood may be harmful for social cohesion and even linked to terrorism.¹⁴ Indeed, although the main findings summary states that the Muslim Brotherhood ‘has not been linked to terrorist related activity in and against the UK’, and ‘has often condemned [Islamist] terrorist related activity in the UK’, it notes that ‘Muslim Brotherhood-related organisations and individuals in the UK have openly supported the activities of Hamas’.¹⁵ More importantly, it cautions that ‘aspects of Muslim Brotherhood ideology and tactics, in this country and overseas, are contrary to our values and have been contrary to our national interests and our national security’.¹⁶

The view that non-violent Islamists pose a problem for national security and social cohesion has long been expressed by Quilliam, a London-based think tank. In 2010, Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain of Quilliam wrote to Charles Farr, the director general of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, providing an extensive analysis of what they referred to as ‘the UK’s counter-extremism strategy’ with a view to ‘mak[ing] it more effective both at preventing terrorism and at fostering

¹¹ ‘Government review of the Muslim Brotherhood’, British Government website, April 17, 2014. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-review-of-the-muslim-brotherhood>.

¹² House of Commons (2015).

¹³ Ibid., para.28, p.5.

¹⁴ Lorenzo Vidino, ‘For too long, London has been a hub for the Muslim Brotherhood’, *The Telegraph*, October 2014. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/11171454/Lorenzo-Vidino-For-too-long-London-has-been-a-hub-for-the-Muslim-Brotherhood.html>.

¹⁵ House of Commons (2015), paras.36-37, pp.6-7.

¹⁶ Ibid., para.39, p.8.

greater integration and national cohesion'.¹⁷ The 'non-violent, yet extremist, ideology' of groups related to the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i-Islami, they suggested, has been 'increasingly recognised as a root cause of Islamist extremism and terrorism'.¹⁸ The kick back against *Prevent* by such groups, they claimed, was attributable to this recognition.

Quilliam appears to have an influential role advising the British government. Nawaz claimed credit for helping draft Cameron's speech delivered in Birmingham in July 2015, in which the prime minister reiterated the view that non-violent extremism serves as a possible precursor to involvement in terrorism. 'I'm proud to have helped with UK PM Cameron's speech that names and isolates Islamism,' Nawaz wrote. 'Our work is taking root'.¹⁹ Quilliam's influence may be significant, though Cameron had expressed similar views prior to becoming prime minister. In 2008, he warned against the 'extremist mindset that gives succour to terrorists by excusing their actions', noting the role of non-violent apologists for terrorism, including government officials and academics.²⁰

Quilliam is not the only voice outside government suggesting that there is a relationship between non-violent extremist groups and terrorism. In 2011, Michael Whine of the Community Security Trust similarly contended that the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i-Islami in Britain promote 'extremism' and act 'as a conveyor belt or springboard that enable some activists to become terrorists'.²¹ This view has been expressed more recently by Samuel Westrop of Stand for Peace. The role of non-violent extremists 'within the conveyor belt', he has argued, is not equivalent to the influence of a single preacher, activist or group,

¹⁷ Quilliam (2010), p.1 (note: pages references for this document refer to the page numbers of the pdf file, which includes several unnumbered pages for a covering letter, and not those as they appear on the document itself).

¹⁸ Ibid., p.7.

¹⁹ David Shariatmadari, 'Maajid Nawaz: how a former Islamist became David Cameron's anti-extremism adviser', *The Guardian*, August 2, 2015.
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/aug/02/maajid-nawaz-how-a-former-islamist-became-david-camerons-anti-extremism-adviser>.

²⁰ 'David Cameron: Speech to the Community Security Trust', Conservative website, March 4, 2008.
<http://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/599684>.

²¹ Whine (2011), p.17.

but is found in the production of ‘a culture of extremist Islamic thought’ perpetuated by a network of schools, mosques and other social institutions.²²

For the government to tackle non-violent extremism, it is surely important for it to identify which groups and individuals to be concerned about. Yet, at least to the public, the government usually talks of non-violent Islamist extremism in general terms, rather than singling out particular groups or individuals. There have been some exceptions. In 2007, for example, Cameron advocated the banning of Hizb ut-Tahrir, as had former prime minister Tony Blair two years earlier.²³ He reiterated this call a year later, describing the group in unequivocal terms as ‘a conveyor belt to terrorism’.²⁴ In 2011, however, David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, told Parliament that he does ‘not recommend changes to the system for proscription’ that would allow Hizb ut-Tahrir to be banned.²⁵ The group continues to operate legally in Britain, although other rejectionist groups have been banned under the Terrorism Act 2000, including al-Muhajiroun and Islam4UK.²⁶

The notion of non-violent Islamist extremism serving as a conveyor belt to terrorism, as well as the singling out of Hizb ut-Tahrir as an exemplary group to be proscribed, has met with some criticism. Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazer, for example, state, ‘Approaches that emphasize specific forms of Islamic ideology or theology as causal “mood music” for terrorism are, at best, existentializing red herrings that are prone to miss the point, no matter how politically faddish’.²⁷ They note that ‘ideology, whether defined rather broadly as one of “Islam under threat” or more specifically as a “Salafi-jihadi” orientation, is present in a variety of cases where individuals don’t become terrorists. It is therefore illogical and dangerous to assume that identity issues and/or ideology in and of

²² Samuel Westrop, ‘How to Radicalize an Entire London Borough’, The Gatestone Institute, May 5, 2015. <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5677/tower-hamlets>.

²³ Jonathan Freedland, ‘Free speech: reason to hope’, *The Guardian*, July 6, 200. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/jul/06/freespeechreasontohope>.

²⁴ ‘David Cameron: Speech to the Community Security Trust’.

²⁵ Shiv Malik, ‘Watchdog recommends Tory U-turn on banning Hizb ut-Tahrir’, *The Guardian*, July 18, 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/jul/18/watchdog-tory-uturn-hizb-ut-tahrir-ban>.

²⁶ See Raymond (2010).

²⁷ Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010), p.899.

themselves are causing terrorism’.²⁸ Similarly, Arun Kundnani writes, ‘the official narrative implies that, once an individual has adopted an extremist religious ideology, terrorism will result, irrespective of the political context or any calculation on the part of an organisation or social movement’.²⁹ Rather than a religious ideological outlook, Kundnani argues that the factors that lead to terrorism are political, the most important being grievances such as those relating to the American and British ‘occupation’ of Iraq.

Critics of the notion that non-violent extremism leads to violence, including the leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, Abdul Wahid, also point to leaked classified papers prepared in 2010 for the Cabinet’s home affairs committee. One of these papers reportedly stated:

It is sometimes argued that violent extremists have progressed to terrorism by way of a passing commitment to non-violent Islamist extremism, for example of a kind associated with al-Muhajiroun or Hizb ut Tahrir ... We do not believe that it is accurate to regard radicalisation in this country as a linear ‘conveyor belt’ moving from grievance, through radicalisation, to violence ... This thesis seems to both misread the radicalisation process and to give undue weight to ideological factors.³⁰

Such criticisms are part of a complex debate on non-violent Islamism in Britain. It would be an oversimplification to portray this debate as one between the government and its detractors. Within government there are some officials who endorse the view shared by Cameron’s critics. In 2010, for example, Robert Mason, a senior official of the Department for Communities and Local Government, wrote a ‘restricted’ memorandum to Communities Secretary Eric Pickles, asserting that the papers mentioned above present ‘a clear assessment that individuals do not progress through non-violent extremist groups to violent groups’.³¹ He added, ‘Extreme groups may also provide a legal “safety valve” for extreme views’.

²⁸ Ibid., pp.894-895.

²⁹ Kundnani (2015), p.15.

³⁰ Andrew Gilligan, ‘Hizb ut Tahrir is not a gateway to terrorism, claims Whitehall report’, *The Telegraph*, July 25, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/7908262/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-is-not-a-gateway-to-terrorism-claims-Whitehall-report.html>.

³¹ Ibid.

And there are others outside government—academics and journalists—who, like Cameron, see non-violent Islamist groups as playing a significant role in radicalisation and terrorism. Whine, Westrop, and Nawaz have already been mentioned. Peter Neumann and Brooke Rogers of King’s College London have also expressed concern regarding Islamist ‘gateway organisations’ that they say ‘form part of a “conveyor belt” through which people are primed for their later involvement in terrorism’.³² According to Neumann and Rogers, such organisations provide individuals with ‘the ideological framework—the mindset—which leads to involvement in violence’, as well as the ‘social networks with violent extremists’ that enable violent action.³³ They identify three gateway organisations in Britain—Tablighi Jama’at, Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun—all of which are rejectionists, not participationists.

Participationist groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood have not featured as prominently in the debates concerning non-violent Islamism in Britain as rejectionists have. This is probably because the primary concern with non-violent Islamism is with its potential for radicalising Muslims and thus its function as a way station for Islam-inspired terrorism. There is no hard data regarding terrorism arrests and convictions in Britain that compares the number of terrorists’ linked with rejectionist groups to the number linked with participationists. But it is likely that far more terrorists are linked to rejectionist than participationist groups. According to Raffaello Pantucci almost half of the terror plots carried out or foiled by police in Britain in the last two decades have been connected to al-Muhajiroun.³⁴ Brotherhood-associated groups in Britain, whilst supporting the terrorism campaigns of Hamas in Israel and other insurgencies they consider as defensive in nature, generally condemn terrorism in the West and refrain from openly promoting hostility between Muslims and secular, Western culture.

Although some analysts, such as Whine, have expressed concerns regarding Brotherhood-linked groups’ potential for radicalising Muslims in Britain, such concerns are less pronounced compared with those regarding groups that openly

³² Neumann and Rogers (2007), p.31.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Pantucci (2015).

reject Muslim political participation, publicly affirm Britain's future status as part of a global Islamic caliphate, and—without believing they need an intermediary role with government—have less to lose by stridently denouncing government policy.

‘Non-violent Islamism’, social cohesion and entryism

The government's concerns regarding non-violent Islamism may have centred on radicalisation and terrorism, and the debate on the role of non-violent Islamism as a precursor to violence may have focused more on rejectionist groups than participationists. But in the last few years, the government has begun to express serious concerns about non-violent Islamism's impact on social cohesion and civil liberties, including women's rights. It has also begun to express the need to safeguard against non-violent Islamist extremism and entryism within key British institutions. It is in relation to these concerns that participationist groups and individuals have played their most significant role in the debate on non-violent Islamism in Britain.

In December 2013, a government report identified schools, universities and prisons as institutions vulnerable to ‘the ideology of Islamist extremism’.³⁵ Building on the findings of this report, a new statutory duty came into force on July 1, 2015, requiring all public bodies, including schools, prisons and local councils ‘to take steps to identify and tackle radicalisation’.³⁶ The ‘*Prevent* duty’, as it is known, has its legal basis in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, which came into effect in February 2015.³⁷ Official guidance notes for this duty state that the staff of the ‘specified’ public institutions ‘need to know what measures are available to prevent people from becoming drawn into terrorism and how to challenge the extremist ideology that can be associated with it’.³⁸

³⁵ Cabinet Office (2013), p.1.

³⁶ ‘PM statement on Tunisia and European Council’, British Government website, June 29, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-tunisia-and-european-council>.

³⁷ See *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015* (c. 6). Available online at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/pdfs/ukpga_20150006_en.pdf. See also, ‘Counter-Terrorism and Security Act’, British Government website, February 12, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-and-security-bill>.

³⁸ HM Government (2015b), p.4. The ‘specified authorities’ are listed in Schedule 6, *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act*, pp.63-65.

Extremism in British schools has been a special concern of the government. New teachers' standards were introduced in 2012, stipulating that 'teachers must not undermine fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect, and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs'.³⁹ Prior to November 2014, all schools were required to 'respect' these values. Now, however, they have a responsibility to 'actively promote' them, as a bulwark against extremism and for the 'spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils'.⁴⁰ Whilst the *Prevent* duty focuses on vigilance and the prevention of radicalisation, this responsibility to promote 'British values' in schools is geared to the more positive task of ensuring knowledge of and identification with democratic, progressive culture.

One event that encouraged the government to introduce these changes was the 'Trojan Horse' scandal in Birmingham, where a government-commissioned inquiry found city schools had been targeted by a 'co-ordinated, deliberate and sustained' campaign to introduce 'an intolerant and aggressive Islamic ethos'.⁴¹ Of particular controversy was the central involvement of a senior member of Britain's largest Muslim umbrella group, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), who has now been banned from any involvement in British schools.⁴²

This 'plot'—and the problem of a rejection of British values within religious supplementary schools—was mentioned by Home Secretary Theresa May in a speech she gave in March 2015.⁴³ Calling for a partnership between government and civil society to combat extremism, she identified the problems with non-violent extremism in universities, charities, local government and religious arbitration

³⁹ Department for Communities and Local Government (2011), p.17.

⁴⁰ 'Guidance on promoting British values in schools published', British Government website, November 27, 2014. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/guidance-on-promoting-british-values-in-schools-published>.

⁴¹ Jonathan Walker, 'Trojan Horse: Schools will have legal duty to fight extremism', *The Birmingham Mail*, November 25, 2014. <http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/trojan-horse-schools-legal-duty-8166069>.

⁴² 'Direction: Tahir Alam barred from managing independent schools', Government website, September 9, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/direction-tahir-alam-barred-from-managing-independent-schools>.

⁴³ 'Theresa May speech A Stronger Britain, Built on our Values: A New Partnership to Defeat Extremism', Conservatives website, March 23, 2015. <http://press.conservatives.com/post/115395299770/theresa-may-speech-a-stronger-britain-built-on>.

tribunals. Specifically, she identified the discrimination against women in *shari'a* courts across the country as a problem to be investigated by an independent commission. This follows similar concerns raised in three separate reports produced by the think tank Civitas, the advocacy group One Law for All, and the former deputy speaker of the House of Lords, Caroline Cox.⁴⁴

In her speech, May also singled out the London Borough of Tower Hamlets for 'allegations of corruption, cronyism, extremism, homophobia and anti-Semitism'. These allegations were made in several high profile investigations by *The Telegraph*, which confirmed the infiltration of the Labour Party within the borough by the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE), as well as its covert involvement in Lutfur Rahman's successful campaign to become the borough's mayor in 2010. The newspaper's Andrew Gilligan also exposed the extremist orientations of IFE. Based in the Jama'at-i-Islami-associated East London Mosque, which has a record of hosting speakers expressing views clearly antagonistic to liberal democratic values,⁴⁵ the organisation came under the spotlight when Gilligan revealed IFE literature describing its commitment to change the 'very infrastructure of [British] society, its institutions, its culture, its political order and its creed ... from ignorance to Islam'.⁴⁶ Furthermore, several IFE activists were recorded by an undercover reporter for Channel 4's *Dispatches* programme as stating that the organisation had 'a lot of influence and power in the council, councillors, politicians'.⁴⁷ Thus, it was perhaps unsurprising when, in November 2014, the government's chief inspector of schools stated that hundreds of children in six of the borough's Islamic schools were

⁴⁴ See MacEoin (2009b); Namazie, Atasheen and Waters (2010); and Cox (2015).

⁴⁵ Hasan Afzal, 'Extremism in Abdul Bari's Mosque', *The Huffington Post*, September 21, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hasan-afzal/extremism-in-abdul-baris-_b_971232.html.

⁴⁶ Andrew Gilligan, 'Inextricably linked to controversial mosque: the secret world of IFE', *The Telegraph*, February 28, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/labour/7333487/Inextricably-linked-to-controversial-mosque-the-secret-world-of-IFE.html>.

⁴⁷ Andrew Gilligan, 'Radicals with hands on the levers of power: the takeover of Tower Hamlets', *The Telegraph*, February 28, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/labour/7333537/Radicals-with-hands-on-the-levers-of-power-the-takeover-of-Tower-Hamlets.html>.

recognised by the government of being at risk of ‘extremist influences and radicalisation’.⁴⁸

In July 2015, Cameron delivered a key speech outlining the government’s new counter-extremism strategy. Indicating a concern regarding non-violent extremism beyond its potential pathway to violence, Cameron emphasised the importance of combatting ‘[i]deas which are hostile to basic liberal values such as democracy, freedom and sexual equality ... [and] which actively promote discrimination, sectarianism and segregation’.⁴⁹ Communal segregation is a theme he has touched on before; in 2008, speaking at the Community Security Trust, he identified ‘the fostering of community divisions which push people into mutually antagonistic blocs’ as a threat to British society, in addition to terrorism.⁵⁰ The July speech, however, consolidated the view within government policy that ‘extremist ideology’ posed not just the risk of terrorism but also a threat to Britain’s liberal democratic culture.

This could not have been put in plainer terms than those expressed by Theresa May in the foreword to the new *Counter-Extremism Strategy*, published in October 2015. She wrote that ‘the threat posed by extremists is not limited to violence’.⁵¹ The strategy aims to address several concerns she had expressed in her March 2015 speech—namely, entryism into key British institutions, including schools, and the discrimination against women in *shari’a* courts—plus other issues alleged to stem from ‘extremist ideology’, such as ‘isolated communities’, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation. A new body in the Home Office, the Extremism Analysis Unit, will play a key role in developing this strategy.

The understanding that participationist groups bring their own set of problems to British society independent from their potential radicalising influence has been expressed by some observers outside Whitehall. Quilliam, for instance, has warned

⁴⁸ Michael Wilshaw, ‘Advice note from Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector, Sir Michael Wilshaw, to the Secretary of State for Education, Rt Hon. Nicky Morgan MP, on school inspections in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets’, November 21, 2014. Available online at: <http://tiny.cc/wilshawadvicenote21112014>.

⁴⁹ ‘Extremism: PM speech’.

⁵⁰ ‘David Cameron: Speech to the Community Security Trust’.

⁵¹ ‘Home Secretary Foreword’, HM Government (2015a), p.7.

that engagement with organisations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i-Islami, such as MCB and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), 'threatens integration and national cohesion by encouraging the spread of a supremacist ideology'.⁵² A few others have described the problem of participationists as one of cultural subversion. Whilst Cameron has described 'Islamist extremism' as a 'subversive doctrine',⁵³ the elaboration of 'non-violent subversion' has been left for a small number of journalists and analysts.⁵⁴ Charles Moore, the former chairman of the think tank Policy Exchange, for example, in discussing the Birmingham Trojan Horse plot, asserts:

All Islamist schools of thought are hostile to democratic processes, many explicitly so. They strive to create a global society in thrall to their version of Islamic law. As we learnt when Islamists educated in British comprehensive schools blew themselves up and killed 52—mainly their fellow citizens—in July 2005, some use violence to try to bring this about. *Most don't, but they do work to subvert—that is the right word—the institutions that we all need.* They are organised in schools and universities. They infiltrate local government and public administration. They are expert at getting public money under false pretences. They are not 'negligible', but still we neglect the threat they pose.⁵⁵

Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton, in a report published by Policy Exchange that discusses the 'challenge posed by political Islamists who ostensibly eschew violence', suggest that the British intelligence services 'need to recover some of their intellectual inheritance in relation to developing a definition of "subversion"' fit for such a challenge.⁵⁶ According to Patrick Sookhdeo, 'a careful and deliberate strategy by certain Muslim leaders' to subvert British society was presented decades ago at a conference in 1978 organised by the Islamic Council of Europe. This strategy, he writes, urged Muslims to resist assimilation and organise themselves

⁵² Quilliam (2010), p.12.

⁵³ 'Extremism: PM speech'.

⁵⁴ Charles Moore, 'Why Islamist extremism perplexes our security services', *The Telegraph*, November 29, 2014. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11260855/Why-Islamist-extremism-perplexes-our-security-services.html>.

⁵⁵ Charles Moore, 'A weak establishment is letting Islamists threaten British freedoms', *The Telegraph*, April 18, 2014, emphasis added. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10775118/A-weak-establishment-is-letting-Islamists-threaten-British-freedoms.html>.

⁵⁶ Maher and Frampton (2009), p.68.

according to Islamic principles: ‘The ultimate goal of this strategy is that the Muslims should become a majority and the entire nation be governed according to Islam.’⁵⁷

Contrary to these fears of non-violent Islamist ideology in Britain as either a disseminator of social discord or a conduit for terrorism, some observers have in recent years argued that the new leaders of some of the key organisations of concern are evolving innovative and self-critical reformulations of their religious tradition.⁵⁸ Such an analysis, as provided by Sophie Gilliat-Ray and Seán McLoughlin, supports the view that, far from being a subversive threat, the leaders of these organisations advocate a political vision inspired by Islam that is compatible with liberal democratic values. Such a vision, it is alleged, is shared by politically active Muslims across Europe.⁵⁹ Jytte Klausen, for example, states, ‘Europe’s Muslim leaders are not aiming to overthrow liberal democracy and to replace secular law with Islamic religious law, the shariah. Most are rather looking for ways to build institutions that will allow Muslims to practice their religion in a way that is compatible with social integration’.⁶⁰

The question of a ‘participationist’ Islamist movement in Britain

This apparent disagreement between critics of these groups and their more sympathetic observers lies at the heart of local community and national security policy conundrums. It is also the starting point for this thesis. Put succinctly, it concerns the nature of the politics of the organisations and individuals of concern: Do they constitute a subversive Islamist brotherhood that inculcates socially divisive values, whilst seeking the gradual imposition of *shari’a* law and ultimately an Islamic state? Or do they form a progressive Islamic movement at home in Britain’s liberal democratic culture that merely seeks social justice for Muslims as equal citizens? Underlying this question, however, is the arguably more fundamental

⁵⁷ Patrick Sookhdeo, ‘The Islamization of Europe’, *Virtueonline*, August 11, 2005, <http://www.virtueonline.org/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2872#.UqkiaGQW1mF>.

⁵⁸ McLoughlin (2005), Gilliat-Ray (2010).

⁵⁹ See Mandaville (2003), Cesari (2004).

⁶⁰ Klausen (2005), p.3.

one—largely absent in the academic and think tank literature—that concerns whether and how they comprise a movement at all:

Do the individuals and groups in Britain that are commonly identified as non-violent ‘participationist’ Islamists comprise a social movement? And if so, what is distinct about this movement?

The initial objective of this study, stemming from an interest in the question of the potentially subversive nature of political Islam in Britain, was to identify and elucidate the political goals and strategies of the ‘non-violent Islamist’ movement in Britain. Yet preliminary research, including the conduct of a number of interviews with Muslim activists, prompted a step back to enquire as to whether such a movement exists in Britain in the first place. This step is important because the accuracy and usefulness of the term ‘Islamist’ in relation to individuals and groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami in Britain—and the assumption, if not the explicit claim, that they comprise a movement—has long been something taken for granted, particularly in think tank and news media discourse.

Hence, it must be emphasised, the starting place of the thesis is with a cluster of individuals and the organisations that they are involved in, not with non-violent Islamism *per se*. The question is not simply whether there is a certain kind of Islamist movement in Britain. It is, to be more precise, whether the individuals and the organisations that are explicitly or tacitly considered to comprise such a movement comprise a movement at all, whether it may accurately be called ‘Islamist’ or otherwise. This thesis is concerned with these actors precisely because they are usually considered as Islamists since, by definition, Islamism presents interesting and serious challenges to any liberal democratic society or state. But it tries to minimise the assumptions regarding their political orientations.

Rather than simply interrogate whether they aspire for an Islamic state—as all Islamists are by definition assumed to do—it more openly seeks to fathom whether and how they are bonded by a worldview and an associated set of values, regardless of its specific characteristics. It happens that they are bonded in such a way, but the

Islamic state does not feature as prominently as might be expected, and thus the applicability of the moniker ‘Islamist’ is found wanting.

In order to answer the research question posed above, this thesis undertakes two preliminary tasks. The first is the elucidation of a concept of social movement required to gauge whether or not the individuals and groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami may be considered as a movement. The second is the identification of these individuals and groups, in order to know to whom the concept will be applied. These two necessary steps are undertaken, respectively, in Chapters 1 and 2, which comprise Part I of the thesis. They are outlined below.

There is a vast body of literature to turn to for a potentially suitable concept of social movement. Much of this work, referred to as social movement theory, falls between two broadly recognised ‘paradigms’, the political process (PP) and new social movement (NSM) approaches. Chapter 1, which reviews both, reveals several key flaws in the PP approach that render it inappropriate for the task at hand: Not only does it inadequately accommodate matters of culture, it also problematically relies upon a ‘rational actor’ model that assumes the existence of a movement. This is unfortunate, since most treatments of religious and Islamic activism take a PP perspective. A much more suitable starting point is offered by the NSM approach because of its appreciation of the cultural stakes in social movement struggles, its emphasis upon latent networks beneath the level of public protest, and its eschewal of the movement as an *a priori* given.

The NSM approach views social movement struggles as having a symbolic dimension, in which cultural codes—normative ways in which the world is seen and described—comprise both vehicles for change and the very objects of change. For Alberto Melucci, movements ‘do not fight merely for material goals, or to increase their participation in the system. They fight for symbolic and cultural stakes, for a different meaning and orientation of social action’.⁶¹ They present a ‘symbolic challenge to the dominant patterns’ in society, exhibited in ‘different way[s] of

⁶¹ Melucci (1985), p.797.

naming the world'.⁶² Yet, the NSM perspective has a limited conception of the inherently political nature of symbolic conflict. It fails to appreciate that power is not only contested 'externally' with the dominant political and social institutions, but also 'internally' where the collective solidarity of a movement is a key stake in its struggle. Pierre Bourdieu's work on symbolic power helps to address this shortcoming. Bourdieu recognises that a constitutive element of social conflicts are struggles over the authority to classify not only the social order but group identity, over the authority to elicit an unquestioned way of seeing not only social and political reality but also a sense of one's place within it as distinct from that of others.

The concept of social movement presented and elaborated in Chapter 1, it may be put here, is of an organised network of individuals connected by the bonds of cultural solidarity and a conflict of values with institutional authority. This concept may be broken down into three elements, which any social movement may be thought to possess. Accordingly, the recognition of individuals and groups as comprising a social movement may be enabled by the recognition of them as possessing three characteristics: Firstly, they have to be collectively engaged in purposive work, that is, they have to be networked organisationally. Secondly, they need to share cultural solidarity, including a shared way of seeing and evaluating the world. This involves a shared understanding of who they are as a distinct community and the meaning of their work. Thirdly, they have to be organised in opposition to political authority, not merely for equal rights or justice but for a transformation of the very values that underpin the social and political order. These three elements serve, respectively, as the prisms through which the actors of interest are viewed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, which make up Part II of the thesis.

The second preliminary task is the identification of the individuals and groups that form the object of this study. This is enabled by a review of the academic and think tank literature that is concerned with understanding participationist Islamists and their politics. This literature, which is reviewed in Chapter 2, contains two broadly opposing views of these actors, as mentioned, as either Islamist subversives or Islamic reformists. Despite this divergence of views, however, there is general

⁶² Ibid., p.801.

agreement regarding who these actors are: They include individuals involved in the founding of groups associated with either the Muslim Brotherhood or Jama'at-i-Islami, individuals currently working in such groups, and the groups themselves.

This thesis also turns to this body of literature to evaluate the extent to which the question of a participationist movement in Britain has already been answered. It finds, in fact, that the question has not explicitly been raised, although some kind of collectivity is usually assumed in the classification of these groups as non-violent Islamists. Whilst these groups are typically described as constituting two 'streams of Islamist ideology'⁶³ with their respective origins in the Brotherhood and Jama'at, they are also considered as part of a singular movement or network because these two streams, as described in a recent Pew report, are alleged to share the same 'political ideology ... that calls for the establishment of a distinctly Islamic system of government'.⁶⁴

Whilst the notion of a participationist Islamist movement in Britain is tacit in most analyses, in several analysts' work such a movement is explicitly referenced. As already noted, Vidino uses the term the 'New Western Brotherhood' to refer to such a phenomenon. Similarly, Stephen Merley refers to the 'global Muslim Brotherhood', which is adopted in the title of this thesis. But whilst Vidino and Merley provide many insights into the activities of the relevant individuals and groups, their work does not fully answer the question as to whether such a movement exists in contemporary Britain. As already noted, Vidino's treatment of participationist Islamism in Britain is somewhat limited and dated, and Merley, whilst having written several incisive reports on the Brotherhood, has not produced an analysis dedicated to the Brotherhood in Britain. Furthermore, whether tacitly assumed or explicitly articulated, the notion of a participationist movement isn't adequately theorised in the literature. Typically relying upon the notion of ideology as the main identifying factor, it would certainly benefit from a clarification of this notion.

⁶³ Whine (2005), p.52

⁶⁴ Pew Forum (2010), p.20.

The literature that problematises the understanding of these actors as Islamists does so in several ways. One line of argument is that they are engaged in a process of reform in line with Europe's liberal democratic values, as mentioned earlier.⁶⁵ Another is that, as a result of the Arab Spring, the doctrinaire orientations of Islamists have diluted to the point of being unrecognisable.⁶⁶ A third line of argument doubts the political continuity between al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood and its Western offshoots.⁶⁷ Such analyses, however, do not amount to a coherent, direct or effective counter-argument. Whilst some prominent figures may have abandoned Islamist aspirations for a society and state infused with *shari'a* principles, or abandoned Britain's shores in pursuit of political aspirations in the post-'Arab Spring' Middle East, the network of revivalist individuals and groups has not diminished as a result. Klausen claims that 'Muslim organizations that link faith with political advocacy are often described as the offspring of the 'Muslim Brotherhood', but the label lumps together groups and individuals who have little in common'.⁶⁸ Yet, as this thesis demonstrates, this claim does not stand up to scrutiny.

Part II of the thesis is structured by the three elements of the concept of social movement introduced in Chapter 1. The first of these elements is the focus of Chapter 3, which seeks to confirm the existence of the organisational network of the individuals and groups in Britain identified in the previous chapter. This analysis builds on the literature presented in Chapter 2, which illustrates some of their organisational relationships. But it incorporates additional insights gleaned from interviews with some of the Muslim leaders within the network. This enables a far more complete picture of the organisational dimensions of this network than is currently provided in any open sources.

Chapter 3 describes some of the numerous interpersonal and inter-organisational relationships comprising the network, as evident in collaborations and affiliations, but most importantly in various inter-locking leadership structures, formal and informal. These include MCB, the country's largest Muslim umbrella group, and

⁶⁵ McLoughlin (2005), Gilliat-Ray (2010).

⁶⁶ Brandon and Pantucci (2012).

⁶⁷ Klausen (2005).

⁶⁸ Ibid., p.12.

numerous overlapping leadership clusters apparent in the multiple senior positions that key individuals have in various groups. These leadership structures also include a semi-formal group comprised of key leaders of Jama'at- and Ikhwan-associated organisations, the Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations. This committee, which is absent from all of the academic and think tank literature on Islamism in Britain, was revealed in an interview with Abdullah Faliq, an experienced Muslim activist involved in numerous organisations, including the Islamic Forum of Europe and the Cordoba Foundation.⁶⁹

Chapter 4 shows how the individuals comprising the network identified in Chapter 3 share cultural solidarity, particularly in terms of how they classify themselves as a community, how they conceive of their relationship to the environment in which they live, and how they understand their work and its purpose. Of all five chapters, this one has drawn the most heavily upon the interviews conducted with prominent figures from the revivalist network. It regards their conception of communal identity through specific Islamic concepts, such as the Muslim *umma*, and Islamic moral principles implicit to their work, including that of 'Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Wrong'. Their sense of distinction as a group is expressed in their perception of non-Muslims as part of the broader community of humanity to which they have a duty to deliver Islam. It is also expressed in their perception of other Muslims as mistaken in isolating themselves from Britain's non-Muslim mainstream, or in integrating themselves seamlessly within it, or in placing the goal of an Islamic state prior to the attainment of a society infused with Islamic beliefs and values. Whilst noting some variation in the way in which these individuals understand their collective identity and certain Islamic concepts through which they understand their work, this chapter shows that there are nevertheless grounds to assert that the network embodies cultural solidarity characteristic of a social movement.

One of the key contributions of the thesis is a novel and nuanced understanding of what other analysts may refer to as the 'ideology' of Islamic revivalists. This includes their ideas and thinking but, underlying this, their way of perceiving and evaluating the world. Of particular significance is the concept and importance of the

⁶⁹ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

Islamic state in the revivalist worldview and value system. These actors, it is shown in Chapter 4, are connected by their understanding of themselves as Islam's vanguard within British society, but their understanding of the Islamic state—contrary to their classification by critics as 'Islamists'—is not as a goal to be strived towards. It is, rather, a reward for widespread piety. Their key aspiration is not, strictly speaking, an Islamic mode of governance but a society in which Islam is willingly embraced. This shows that what distinguishes them from rejectionist Islamists, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun, is not simply a choice of strategy but an important aspect of their worldview. This finding has emerged from a number of interviews with prominent leaders of revivalist groups.

The key figures and groups comprising the revivalist network have a conflictual relationship with the British political authorities. They are engaged in a cultural and political struggle concerning perspectives, values, and a way of life, as well as the authority to determine them. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, this conflict has both practical and symbolic dimensions. The practical dimension of the conflict concerns the institutional and legal structures that regulate peoples' lives. It is evident in the fields of political advocacy and local governance, as well as education and arbitration, particularly where Muslim communities are concerned. Concerns regarding Birmingham's Trojan Horse affair and *shari'a* courts, as expressed by Theresa May, point to key examples. Connected to the practical dimension of this conflict, there is also a symbolic or cognitive dimension. This is evident in competing efforts to classify—and to command the authority to classify—the 'correct' understanding of what fundamental social values are, what counts as 'extremism' and what Islam is.

The stakes of this conflict are thus twofold: On one hand, they include the institutionalisation of competing worldviews and related values—Islamic and liberal democratic—within civil society structures, government policy and state legislation. On the other hand they include the institutionalisation of competing worldviews and related values within the minds of people, including policymakers, British Muslims and the general public. As Chapter 5 shows, these two dimensions overlap, particularly in revivalist groups' efforts to undermine the government's counter-extremism strategy both symbolically, where concepts such as 'extremism' are

contested, and practically, where changes in government policy are sought through protest, advocacy or testimony. In presenting this multifaceted conflict, this chapter shows how the network meets the third criterion for a movement as specified in Chapter 1. In doing so, it presents arguably the most comprehensive, nuanced, and up-to-date analysis of the political and cultural fault lines between Islamic revivalists and the British authorities.

A note on methodology

The research presented in this thesis was conducted using a qualitative methodology. This involved conducting and analysing interviews with many of the leaders of the relevant Muslim organisations. Most interviewees were identified from a thorough examination of the literature on Islamism in Britain, including academic works, think tank reports and news media reports. A few were identified by their colleagues or peers who had already agreed to be interviewed.

Arranging interviews was fairly straight-forward in some cases but difficult in others. In some cases, individuals who were interviewed subsequently helped to arrange interviews with others who were difficult to establish direct communicative channels with. In the case of one prominent Islamic institution, the person originally requested by the thesis author for an interview was substituted by the institution for another member of staff. This was explained by the institution as a precautionary measure against hostility of the kind that it had apparently experienced in certain media reports after granting interviews with other researchers. Nonetheless, it enabled face-to-face meetings with other staff members, one of whom was interviewed at a later date.

Most interviews were held in the offices of the organisations in which the interviewees have a formal role. Some were held in public places, including a bookshop café and a park. One was held in the home of the interviewee. The interviews, which lasted between one and two hours, were semi-structured with a list of key questions and themes centred on the role of Islam in their work. At the same time, they allowed for a free discussion of concepts, issues and concerns deemed relevant. In all but one case, the interviews were audio recorded and then fully transcribed. The transcriptions were then compiled, which allowed for a

thematic analysis. Recurrent themes and issues were identified and the relevant key terms—such as *shari'a*, *da'wa*, and the Islamic state—were then searchable and comparable between the notes for different interviewees.

Significantly, representatives from almost all of the key participationist organisations were interviewed, including senior figures from MCB, MAB, IFE, the Islamic Foundation, the Cordoba Foundation, the Islamic Sharia Council, the East London Mosque and Muslim Aid. Interviews were also conducted with several individuals who have played important roles within this network, but who are not currently associated with any group in it. These include, most notably, Dilwar Hussain and Mohammed Abdul Aziz. The complete list of interviewees and their biographical information is provided in Appendix 1.

The thesis author undoubtedly would have benefitted from being able to interview more leaders (or former leaders) of Muslim groups of interest. Certain prominent individuals either did not respond at all to requests for an interview or responded but declined. The relevance of other individuals within the network only became apparent after the time allocated for interviews had elapsed. However, key figures representing most of the key organisations were interviewed and the collection of interviews conducted for this thesis amounts to a unique and valuable body of data. As the first sustained analysis of this particular strand of Islamic activism in Britain, this thesis has drawn upon interviews with more prominent participationists than any other piece of work in the currently available literature.

Supporting the data obtained from interviews, the research for this thesis also involved the analysis of primary source material published by the relevant individuals and organisations. Such material included books, magazines, newsletters, brochures, and online articles, as well as speeches given by some of these figures that were sourced on the Internet at websites such as YouTube. Some interviewees provided the thesis author with literature recently published by the organisations they work for. As with the interview data, the primary source material was particularly useful for Part II of the thesis.

It might be charged that Chapters 3, 4 and 5—the main part of the thesis—does not focus on exactly the same individuals and groups, that they each give some attention

to certain actors that don't appear so prominently in the other chapters. This may be true, but only to some extent. It has not been possible, in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, to account for the ways in which all the figures and groups mapped out in Chapter 3 possess cultural solidarity and conflictual relationships with institutional authority. But there is sufficient overlap in the attention given to the various figures and groups to provide a clear enough image of what this thesis affirms as a social movement.

§

This thesis concludes that the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain *is* a social movement. It presents an understanding of this movement that is important both academically and politically. Although there is much more to be learned about the individuals and groups that comprise the movement, as well as their collective nature, this thesis presents some valuable insights into their organisational connections, their worldview and values, and their conflict with Britain's liberal democratic culture, as well as the political authorities that seek to protect it. In identifying and elucidating some of the distinct features of participationist Islamism—what this thesis also refers to as Islamic revivalism—it contributes to a more nuanced understanding of what the government sees as 'non-violent Islamist extremism' in Britain. This may be helpful not only for policymakers seeking to refine an approach to what Cameron has called 'the struggle of our generation'.⁷⁰ It may also be helpful to expand and refine the academic study of Islamic activism in the West and social movements. One specific and valuable contribution to this body of work is a novel concept of social movement as presented in Chapter 1, which uniquely synthesises NSM theory with aspects of Bourdieu's political sociology.

⁷⁰ 'Extremism: PM speech'.

PART I

Chapter 1

Conceiving Social Movements: Social Movement Theory and Bourdieu

This thesis concerns the existence of a ‘participationist’ Islamist movement in Britain. It therefore requires a concept of social movement for assessing whether characterisations of certain British-based individuals and groups as comprising such a movement are accurate. The task of this chapter is to present such a concept. It does so in the course of reviewing the body of literature known as *social movement theory*, where various concepts of social movement have been developed.

The two most dominant approaches within social movement theory are the *political process* (PP) and *new social movement* (NSM) approaches. Since movement theorists consistently refer to these approaches in the literature as the two main ‘paradigms’ of social movement theory, this thesis considers the usefulness of both for the task at hand. Resource mobilisation theory is often referred to separately in the literature, but is widely considered as having been subsumed within the PP approach.¹

The PP approach is of limited analytical use because of its inadequate conceptualisation of culture and its problematic reliance upon a ‘rational actor’ model that assumes what this thesis seeks to ascertain, namely, the existence of a movement. This is unfortunate because most treatments of religion within social movement theory, including that of Islam and Islam-inspired activism, take a PP perspective.

The NSM approach, however, because of its appreciation of the role of culture in the constitution of social movements, as well as its rejection of the concept of movement as an *a priori* given, offers a more suitable starting place for the analysis of social movements, especially for the apprehension of one that is the subject of speculation

¹ Morris (2000), p.446; Jasper (2010), p.966.

due to its allegedly clandestine nature. The NSM approach, particularly as articulated in the works of Alberto Melucci and Alain Touraine, rightly emphasises the importance of the cultural stakes in social movement struggles. It observes that social movement challenges to normative social values and practices have a symbolic dimension, where codes and meanings comprise both vehicles for change *and* the very objects of change.

However, the NSM approach fails to appreciate that the identity of a given movement is *itself* constituted by ongoing symbolic struggles. These include competition for the legitimacy to represent an oppressed population, both within this population as its vanguard and in the wider public field as its interlocutor. Inseparable from this struggle for legitimate leadership is one for the legitimacy to define this population as a constituency. Insights from Bourdieu's work, particularly on symbolic power, help to address this shortcoming in NSM theory and round out a useful conceptual framework for identifying and understanding social movements.

Accordingly, this chapter introduces the two main approaches of social movement theory, including their limited application to Islamic movements. It explains the problems of the PP approach that prompt its rejection for the purposes of this thesis and highlights some of the useful elements of the NSM approach. It also presents some of the key concepts from Bourdieu's political sociology and explains how they can be fruitfully brought together with aspects of NSM theory to arrive at the novel concept of social movement adopted in this thesis.

Firstly, however, it is worth briefly presenting this concept up front. It will be elaborated in greater detail later in the chapter, but presenting it here will help guide and make more meaningful this chapter's navigation through PP and NSM theory, as well as the salient aspects of Bourdieu's work.

Social movements are understood as collectively mobilised networks of individuals connected in a struggle against institutional power with both political and cultural stakes. The recognition of a given movement, in this formulation, is contingent upon the possibility of recognising organised networking between individuals, shared cultural solidarity between them, and a conflict of values at the heart of their collective struggle. But this involves a recognition of the symbolic struggles of

classification that determine, on one hand, collective identity, and, on the other, the ‘legitimate vision of the social world’.²

1. The ‘Political Process’ approach to social movements

Most contemporary academic treatments of social movements lie within the PP tradition. The PP approach, developed by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and others, describes social movements as an example, but not the only type, of ‘contentious politics’.³ Movements are characterised in relation to the state, assumed as the gatekeeper to political and social change. According to this approach, movements typically take the shape of one kind or another of public protest against the government in the name of ‘constituencies lacking formal representation’.⁴

Studies of social movements within the PP paradigm are typically historical. They begin with a social movement already identified (and named) and then look for the factors that account for its emergence, success or failure. The PP model ignores the question of the origination of social movements in favour of the question of their ‘mobilisation’. It does not perceive the *coming-into-being* of social movements, since it pre-loads into the analysis an *a priori* agent that ‘does’ the mobilising. Since this thesis seeks to know whether a specific set of agents amounts to a social movement or not, it cannot adopt such an approach. For this task, in the words of Alberto Melucci, ‘the existence of a movement is *precisely* what needs to be explained’.⁵

The PP approach is unhelpful for any inquiry into the existence of an alleged movement, one that is not assumed from the beginning of an analysis, especially when it is considered to be wholly or partly clandestine, as with the global Muslim Brotherhood. It is also unhelpful for an inquiry into contention beyond political antagonism with the state. The PP model, unlike that of NSM theory, does not accommodate the possibility of cultural fields of contention where a concerted struggle for an alternative way of life is played out. The model even restricts political

² Bourdieu (1989), p.22.

³ Tilly and Tarrow (2007).

⁴ Tilly (1984), p.306.

⁵ Melucci (1989), p.30, emphasis added.

contention to public protest against centralised state power. Contention with governmental and non-governmental power distributed across and within different social spheres—in education, business, media and law, for example—is absent.

1.1. The PP approach and ‘rational actor’ model

The PP concept of social movement is of a rational agent situated within a political environment, driven by calculated political interests and objectives. This concept emerged in reaction to mid-twentieth century accounts of collective behaviour—including crowds, riots and fads—which characterised such behaviour as irrational. It relies upon a rejection of this earlier characterisation of collective action and, in doing so, perpetuates a false dichotomy between the rational and irrational. The rational actor assumption at the heart of PP models prompts some analysts to elevate the issue of whether social movements are rational or irrational, as Quintan Wiktorowicz does in his eschewal of ‘popular perceptions of radical Islamic groups as irrational, “crazy,” or deviant’.⁶ But this obfuscates the more important and complicated issue of how to understand the rationality of social movements—described by Wiktorowicz in terms of cost/benefit calculation—as situated and produced within social activity, rather than in the heads of individuals.

The philosophical objection to the rational actor assumption at the heart of the PP approach—that it begs the question of the movement’s existence—is complemented by a scientific objection. Recent studies in cognitive science—completely ignored in all streams of social movement theory—show that human behaviour is neither fundamentally nor exclusively guided by rational consciousness, as assumed both in the traditional psychological sciences and in the public imagination. John Bargh and Ezequiel Morsella note a marginal but growing body of scientific research that demonstrates ‘the existence of several independent unconscious behavioral guidance systems: perceptual, evaluative, and motivational’.⁷ Bargh and Morsella observe that, far from being irrational, ‘unconscious processes not only adapt us to the present situation, but they also influence the tracks we lay to guide our future behavior’.⁸

⁶ Wiktorowicz (2004b), p.20.

⁷ Bargh and Morsella (2008), p.73.

⁸ Ibid., p.77.

Ruud Custers and Henk Aarts similarly note a significant body of research which shows that even goal-pursuit is primarily unconsciously driven.⁹

These ‘unconscious behavioral guidance systems’ are strikingly equivalent to the socially and historically inherited ‘schemata of perception, appreciation, and action’—the *habitus*—that Bourdieu says unconsciously guide and give sense, in a very practical way, to human behaviour.¹⁰ ‘The habitus,’ Bourdieu writes, ‘is a spontaneity without consciousness or will, opposed as much to the mechanical necessity of things without history in mechanistic theories as it is to the reflexive freedom of the subjects “without inertia” in rationalistic theories’.¹¹

Yet, noteworthy about the habitus is that it is constructed socially. In Bourdieu’s words, it is a ‘socialized subjectivity’.¹² The unconscious ‘systems’ or ‘schemata’ for perceiving, judging and orienting action that make up the habitus are individually embodied but necessarily social. They originate within, and are shaped by, specific social and economic conditions experienced collectively. Habitus, Bourdieu asserts, manifests in groups in the largely unconscious, taken-for-granted cultural practices, as well as related competences and desires, which are shared by individuals. They are also inseparable from particular arenas of struggle that he calls *fields*.

Thus, the rationality of groups including social movements cannot adequately be conceived in terms of conscious, cost-benefit calculation. It has to be seen in relation to what the rational actor model ignores—and what makes conscious calculation possible—namely, the unconsciously-held perceptions, attitudes and orientations of the habitus, which are produced and contested socially. Individuals come to identify and act *as* a group, including politically organised ones, not as the result of them each rationally calculating the costs and benefits of ‘joining’—the notion of which assumes the group *a priori*. They do so, at least in part, because they have a similar habitus that enables them to perceive the same grievances, collaborate organisationally with the same ‘logic of practice’, and share a language of solidarity

⁹ Custers and Aarts (2010).

¹⁰ Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), p.16.

¹¹ Bourdieu (1990), p.56.

¹² Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), p.126.

in both words and deeds. The habitus—in which certain beliefs and practices, as distinct from others, are inculcated and reproduced—presents a potential or virtual group.

Such a group has its own historically and socially cultivated ‘rationality’, its own way of making sense of the world and manner of making decisions. One of the key stakes in social movement struggles is precisely the establishment of one particular way of making sense of the world over another, more dominant one. Thus, rationality is far from a mere tool to establish the best way of achieving one’s goals. If we must talk of social movement goals, then as a strategic capacity for evaluating and acting the world, one that is in contention with alternatives, rationality itself may also be considered as a goal. It is perhaps more accurate, however, to say that the establishment of an alternative rationality underlies social movement struggles.

1.2. ‘Cultural framing’ and symbolic struggles

The PP approach views social movements in terms of three conceptual elements, which are worth regarding briefly prior to an examination of NSM theory. The first element, ‘mobilising structures’, refers to the formal and informal ‘vehicles’ through which people participate in collective action. These include ‘informal networks, preexisting institutional structures, and formal organizations’.¹³ The second, ‘political opportunity structure’, refers to the opportunities and constraints within the political environment affecting the emergence, dynamics and success of social movements.¹⁴ The third, ‘cultural framing’, refers to the efforts of movement participants to engage with ‘the cultural reservoir of possible symbols’ and generate meaningful ‘frames’ of reference that can attract potential movement members.¹⁵ The key types of frames, proponents argue, are diagnostic, which explain the problem to which the movement is geared to address; prognostic, which propose the actions

¹³ Morris (2000), p.446.

¹⁴ Tarrow (1998), p.20. See also Tilly (1978), Tarrow (1994 and 1998), McAdam et al. (1996), and Morris (2000).

¹⁵ Tarrow (1998), p.109.

required to remedy the problem; and motivational, which attempt to rouse support and mobilisation.¹⁶

These elements provide a potentially valuable way of understanding social movements, but this is obscured since they are all viewed instrumentally rather than constitutively: Organisations and networks, political opportunities and symbolic frames are all ‘used’ for the purposes of mobilisation by an already-existing movement.

Movements do not just *use* networks, however, since they *are* networks. Movement leaders may capitalise on their networks, employing what Bourdieu calls ‘social capital’. But they do so from their position within them, not from an instrumental position external to them. Far from simply manipulating networks, movement leaders act within them where their power to do so depends on the recognition given to them from the individuals comprising the network. Such recognition is dependent upon an aligned manner of perceiving grievances, as well as shared trust in the authority of an elite. The building of such trust cannot be taken for granted in any study of collective action, since the authority of leaders and the solidarity that emerges in networks are key stakes in movements’ struggles.

Movements do not just *exploit* opportunities in the political environment, either. Opportunities, like networks, may be capitalisable, but they also shape social movements in important ways. Situations facing movements are never simply resources or tools to advance a programme definable independently from movement actors. Opportunities, as well as constraints, not only depend upon such actors’ ability to perceive and value them as such; they also help constitute social movements’ struggles.

The symbolic aspect of social movements’ struggles are particularly important for identifying movements, as this thesis will show. But claims that movement activists use frames to garner movement support fail to acknowledge that framing is not simply something that ‘frame articulators’ do. The construction of frames—symbolic structures through which the world is seen, evaluated and presented—is never simply the product of conscious design, as this view implies. Movements do not just *use*

¹⁶ Snow and Benford (1988).

frames, since frames form the *medium* in which activists think and, as such, are not entirely transparent to consciousness. As Marc Steinberg has observed, ‘collective actors are partly captives within the discursive fields that they seek to manipulate’.¹⁷

Any approach to movements that views symbolic action strictly in terms of the instrumentalisation of symbolic resources—‘using’ theology to attract members, for example—fails to grasp the extent to which movements are produced through symbolic conflict. Such a view fails to grasp the way in which movements are the products of symbolic contention with rivals both internally and externally: Internally, concerning the identity of the constituency served by the movement, and externally, concerning the social order that the movement is geared to change. Reducing symbolic framing to a tool for attracting members, furthermore, fails to comprehend that the symbolic aspect of movements’ struggles is inherently political. This is because such struggles concern not merely the acceptance of certain ideas and values, but also the power to institutionalise and naturalise them in practice.

A religious movement, for example, may not merely struggle for the teaching of certain subjects in state schools—Islamic creationism, for instance. It may also struggle to consolidate the power to determine what is and what is not taught (intelligent design rather than evolution, for example); how it is taught (Islam mainstreamed in all subjects rather than a separate subject, for example); when it is taught (around prayer, for example); where it is taught (at school, at the mosque or in the home, for example); and to whom it is taught (boys only in a sex-segregated environment, for example).

In short, symbolic framing is not simply ‘designed’ to win recruits through a process of mental ‘conversion’. It is an expression of classificatory struggles that concern not just the recruitment of members to a cause, or the conveyance and acceptance of certain ‘truths’, but the power over the practical means of establishing and protecting what passes as true. It is never simply a matter of the rational assent to knowledge and the consciously calculated acceptance of values. It is, rather, a matter of the control over the institutions that determine the nature of knowledge, as well as produce it. It is a matter of the command of the institutions that inculcate values

¹⁷ Steinberg (1999), p.772.

within the largely unconscious and unquestioned patterns of individual and social practice.

1.3. Political process treatments of religious and Islamic movements

The treatment of religion in social movement theory is relatively scant. The studies of Islamic social movements within this theoretical oeuvre are even fewer. As Charles Kurzman has written, ‘Over the past generation, the fields of social movement theory and Islamic studies have followed parallel trajectories, with few glances across the chasm that has separated them’.¹⁸ But the treatments of Islam that do appear in the literature, which mostly occur within the PP tradition, tend to be limited to religiously inspired political activism in Muslim majority countries¹⁹ or violent, militant movements such as al-Qaeda.²⁰ There is a dearth of sources in English that apply social movement theory to non-violent Islamic activism in Europe and North America. There is certainly none that relate social movement theory to participationist Islamism in Britain. Nonetheless, it is worth briefly reviewing several key PP treatments of religion and Islam that highlight some of the problems this thesis needs to avoid.

Zald, Snow and Marshall, and Kurzman: Religion sidelined as a tool

The earliest application of social movement theory to religion was by Mayer Zald in 1982. In this article Zald adopts a *resource mobilisation* approach, which he describes as ‘helpful in understanding both the growth of religious movements and the use of religious organizations and resources in the political process’.²¹ The bottom-line unit of analysis for Zald is the organisation. In the same way that religious organisations are treated as givens, the existence of religious movements is likewise posited unproblematically. The analysis is thus limited to treating pre-

¹⁸ Kurzman (2004), p. 289.

¹⁹ For example, Burke and Lapidus (1988), Alexander (2000), Munson (2001), Wiktorowicz (2004a), Bayat (2005), Beck (2009), and Tugal (2009).

²⁰ For example, Sutton and Vertigans (2006), which considers both PP and NSM approaches, and Snow and Byrd (2007).

²¹ Zald (1982), p.322.

existent organisations and their role in helping readily acknowledged, named ‘movements’, some of which happen to be other organisations.

Zald’s classical resource mobilisation perspective shares with the broader PP approach the fundamental premise of the rational actor. It also shares with it the conception of theology as a factor in movement mobilisation in strictly *instrumental* terms and not as a field of contention. Religious ideas and beliefs are merely resources to be mobilised: ‘Transformation of theology and ideology provides a base for justifying social movement activity ... The transformation of the role of the Catholic church in Latin America and the role of Islam in Iran can only be understood by attention to these changes in theological justifications’.²²

Reflecting a general shift in the literature towards the greater incorporation of belief as a factor in movement mobilisation, Snow and Marshall attempt to offer a more systematic attempt to understand religion by placing grievances and ideology on a more level footing to resource mobilisation.²³ In the first explicit treatment of social movement theory and Islam, the authors identify three conditions for the mobilisation of religious movements: the existence of a strain or grievance, a mobilising ideology and resource mobilisation.

Snow and Marshall emphasise the importance of cultural imperialism, rather than just the economic variety dominant in Marxist-inspired analyses, as a key determining factor for the emergence of religious movements. Western cultural imperialism in the Muslim world is cited as the precipitating ‘strain factor’ in the emergence of Islamic movements, such as the Sudanese Mahdist rebellion against Britain in the late 1800s and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The authors state that the success of a movement’s mobilisation in response to cultural grievances critically depends upon possession of a mobilising ideology and an organisational network, effectively two kinds of religious resource. The agency of the movement, by virtue of pre-existing ideology and institutional embodiment, is, as with Zald’s, posited unproblematically. This does not provide any assistance for the task of identifying a

²² Ibid., p.325.

²³ Snow and Marshall (1984).

given movement from within a field of social action, since it assumes foreknowledge of movements' existence.

Anticipating Snow's later work on framing, in which its diagnostic, prognostic and motivational functions are analysed, Snow and Marshall define 'mobilising ideology' as 'an interconnected set of ideas and beliefs that provide both a call to and guide for action by defining what is wrong, attributing blame and responsibility, and by addressing the Leninesque question of "What is to be done?"'.²⁴ Consistent with Zald's treatment of theology as instrumental, Snow and Marshall refer to religious ideology as a tool to be 'used' for assisting movement mobilisation. The means of using this tool, they claim, are the networks of religious institutions and organisations, such as mosques and madrassas, through which ideology can be disseminated. 'Islam,' the authors state, 'provides what might be termed a latent mobilization structure that, given the right set of strains and grievances, can be *tapped or activated for revolt*'.²⁵

This view of Islam as a tool for movement mobilisation recurs in the work of Charles Kurzman.²⁶ He conceives the social movement as a rational agent calculating resource value and converting potential resources into real ones. In his analysis of the Iranian Revolution the movement theoretically *pre-exists* this act of conversion in the form of the 'revolutionary ruhanis [who] needed to convert Islam from a potential resource into an actual one'.²⁷

The concept of social movement as articulated by Kurzman, Snow and Marshall, and Zald shares the basic premises of the PP approach: Movements are rational actors who mobilise resources, including ideological frames, for the attainment of specific political goals. Islam, according to these accounts, is reduced to a tool for the purposes of movement mobilisation and is thus not taken seriously as a constitutive factor in the grievances of movements, or as something over which movements struggle. Religiously inculcated dispositions and attitudes that underlie the

²⁴ Ibid., p.138.

²⁵ Ibid., p.141, emphasis added.

²⁶ Kurzman (1994).

²⁷ Ibid., p.63.

perception of grievances—key to understanding how movements emerge—are absent in this analysis. Also lacking is an appreciation of the religious dimension of political goals and, therefore, the role of religion at the heart of social movement contention. This is a significant failure of the PP approach to understand religiously-inspired social movements.

Wiktorowicz, Tuğal and ‘Islamic activism’

The first collection of essays explicitly dedicated to the convergence of social movement theory and Islamic studies, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, was edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz.²⁸ Wiktorowicz’s academic standing as an authority on this disciplinary convergence, his role as a policy adviser in the U.S.’s National Security Council, and his apparently intimate knowledge of Islamist networks in Britain, make his views on social movements and Islam worthy of a brief assessment.²⁹

Wiktorowicz defines Islamic activism as ‘the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes’.³⁰ Consistent with the PP approach, he identifies the factors determining such mobilisation as ‘structural strain’ and discontent; organisational resources and ‘mobilising structures’; external ‘structures of opportunity and constraint’; and the construction of identity and meaning through framing processes. Also consistent with the PP approach, Wiktorowicz adopts a rational actor perspective of Islamic social movements. This is evident in his description of social networks, including mosques and student societies, as well as cultural symbols and language, strictly in terms of their use-value for recruitment and mobilisation. In an article entitled *The Rationality of Radical Islam* he explicitly endorses rational actor theory to support his view of ideology as a strategic means for Islamists to fulfil their spiritual goal of salvation.³¹

²⁸ Wiktorowicz (2004a).

²⁹ Dina Temple-Raston, ‘New Terrorism Adviser Takes A “Broad Tent” Approach’, *NPR*, January 24, 2011. <http://www.npr.org/2011/01/24/133125267/new-terrorism-adviser-takes-a-broad-tent-approach>.

³⁰ Wiktorowicz (2004b), p.2.

³¹ Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler (2006).

For Wiktorowicz, ‘contention’—as with networks and symbolic frames—is something to be mobilised for the achievement of movement goals and is thus sidelined from its constitutive role in the formation of both the movement and its causes. Islamic social movements and ‘Muslim causes’ both analytically *pre-exist* struggle. Likewise, frames—to which ‘[m]uch of the work of Islamic activism is devoted’—are ‘*designed* to mobilise participants and support’ and, therefore, reduced to a cognitive, instrumental function.³² Organisational forms and ideologies are subordinated to an unquestioned, unproblematised social movement: As selected instruments for a deliberative rational agent, they play no role in its construction.

Wiktorowicz’s book, whilst pioneering in bringing together social movement theory and Islamic studies for the first time, omits to address the issue of Muslim activism in Muslim minority countries or contexts, so is of little direct use for a study of Islam-inspired political activism in Britain. Although Melucci is mentioned in passing several times in the collection of essays, the book as a whole fails to mention Touraine and other NSM theorists’ work altogether. One reference to Melucci is worth quoting fully, however, since it touches upon a key matter for this thesis, namely, the relationship between culture and politics, between society and state. Wiktorowicz writes:

While a great deal of research has focused upon politicized movements that seek to create an Islamic state, the core imperative of Islamic movements is a desire to create a society governed and guided by the shari’a (Islamic law). Control and reconstruction of state institutions may be an effective instrument for accomplishing this transformation, but it is only one of many routes for change. In other words, the state is a means for the production of meaning, not an end. In fact, most Islamic struggles are waged through society and cultural discourse rather than state institutions or government decision-making bodies. Such efforts challenge dominant cultural codes and create networks of shared meaning about the proper functions of society, groups, and the individual (Melucci 1996).³³

Wiktorowicz is right to question one of the core assumptions in the literature on groups often described as ‘Islamist’, namely, that they are primarily driven by

³² Wiktorowicz (2004b), p.15, emphasis added.

³³ Ibid., p.16.

political aspirations for an Islamic state. In this sense, he expresses an interesting departure from the PP approach's emphasis on the state as the prime target of social movement activism. But Wiktorowicz's remarks are problematic since they pre-determine the question of the political dimension of Muslim collective action. Curiously, Wiktorowicz does not deny the existence of political groups that call for an Islamic state.³⁴ But his claim that the 'core imperative' of such groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun, is not really a matter of political governance dogmatically separates the political aspects of social movement contention from its cultural aspects, subordinating politics to culture: The Islamic state is not desired as an end in itself, but is just a means to the goal of a religious, cultural transformation.

Wiktorowicz's approach sets up a false choice between politics and culture in terms of the goal-orientedness of Islamic movements. It inhibits the recognition that cultural goals, such as a transformation of social values and practices within a given locality, are inherently political in containing within them transformations in the institutional structures of the state. These transformations in governance structures, however, do not merely facilitate transformations of social values and practices, since they help to *constitute* them. In such instances, the state cannot be treated as a mere means, since it is inseparable from the social transformation desired. Given that Islam, as understood by some Muslim activists, includes a requirement under certain social conditions for the state to be governed by *shari'a*, it is especially difficult to separate the notion of 'a society governed and guided by the *sharia*' and that of an Islamic state.

Suhaib Hasan, the secretary and judge of Britain's Islamic Sharia Council, for example, states that, although the Islamic state is not strictly an objective for Muslims, if Muslims became the majority population in the country and desired to be governed by *shari'a*, then their leader—the amir or caliph—would be obliged to ensure society is governed by *shari'a* through the authority of the state.³⁵ In this view, the Islamic state is not considered as a means to *achieve* an Islamic society, since it is a manifestation *of* such a society—if anything, it is a means to *maintain* an Islamic society. The Islamic state marks a critical juncture in the emergence of an

³⁴ Ibid., p.2.

³⁵ Interview with Suhaib Hasan, February 9, 2012.

Islamic society. It marks the consummation of such a society. The goal of having Islamic values and principles practiced throughout society, as conceived by Hasan and many others, is far from an alternative to the goal of an Islamic state, since Islamic culture—insofar as there is a Muslim majority—*includes* the way in which people organise and govern themselves politically.

A less dogmatic approach to understanding the relationship between politics and culture within Islamic activism than that expressed by Wiktorowicz is found in the work of Cihan Tuğal.³⁶ He contends that if we want to understand Islamist movements, we not only need to acknowledge the shift ‘from disruptive public confrontation with authorities to the challenging of dominant codes and creation of new meanings’—as emphasised in NSM theory—we also need to acknowledge the constitutive role of the state in the processes of cultural transformation.³⁷

Criticising the predominant focus of PP theory upon public protest, Tuğal argues that in Turkey, ‘the Islamist movement generally shies away from challenging the state directly’, but is nevertheless engaged in political contention.³⁸ Such contention, he writes, occurs in a ‘molecular’ sphere of social action that is both political *and* cultural: The ‘terrain of struggle encompasses society and state’.³⁹ Tuğal’s illustration of Islamic activism in Turkey shows how political institutions can be part and parcel of a struggle over identity and values, but also ‘how daily life can be part and parcel of political struggles’.⁴⁰ He argues that the political structures of society do not merely enable social change, since they are constitutive of social change.

Tuğal describes institutional change, for example, in the official enforcement of prayer breaks in the workplace, not merely as the facilitation of cultural change, but as a part of it. State regulatory structures enable religious observance, but also further the production of it, and the generation of religious dispositions—which he describes in terms of Bourdieu’s *habitus*—demand further institutionalisation. Likewise, the naturalisation or institutionalisation of everyday practices in the public domain

³⁶ Tuğal (2009).

³⁷ Ibid., p.425.

³⁸ Ibid., p.423.

³⁹ Ibid., p.430.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.452.

cannot be seen as a mere instrument for the Islamist movement, since it helps constitute the movement by producing greater religiosity and thus new demands for the further institutionalisation of religious practice. In Sultanbeyli, he observes, ‘the mosque is not only a “resource” for Islamism; it is a primary site for the construction of Islamism *as a movement* and the production of Islamist subjects’.⁴¹

Tuğal’s analysis describes demands for the Islamisation of political institutions and the political institutionalisation of Islam within one social movement. This shows that Wiktorowicz’s either/or choice between the goal of an Islamic state and the goal of an Islamic society governed and guided by *shari’a* is an unnecessary one:

The goal of the Islamist movement is the production of subjects who will have different daily conducts, different rituals, and therefore different ‘internalized political programs’ than the secularist officials. The Islamist residents of the district share this vision with the Islamist administrators and believe that only practicing people are really fit to rule. Hence, the creation of an Islamist identity in Sultanbeyli is not separate from envisioning a different state. These observations suggest that social movement studies can benefit from focusing on how institutions constitute actors and how the reorganization of their daily life acts back upon the state.⁴²

1.4. Some implications for identifying movements

PP theory can provide a useful approach to understanding social movements if the question of movement origination is absent from the analysis. It cannot be of much use prior to the acceptance of a given movement’s existence. Without an *a priori* social movement to mobilise resources, to design frames and to attract recruits, the task of explaining the mobilisation of movements becomes inseparable from understanding their *coming into being*. This is only possible without considering movements as rational actors and by acknowledging the unconscious or pre-conscious strategic dimension of collective action.

To recognise a social movement requires an understanding of networks not as mere ‘vehicles’ for recruitment or mobilisation, but as constitutive features. It requires an

⁴¹ Ibid., emphasis added.

⁴² Ibid.

appreciation of the cultural dimension of movement solidarity present in what Melucci terms as ‘latent networks’ from which movements emerge. To identify a movement requires a reconsideration of political opportunities as partly constituted by the shared perceptual and evaluative dispositions of social movement agents. It also requires an understanding of symbolic frames beyond an instrumental function, of how symbolic systems constitute both a currency of power—Bourdieu’s ‘symbolic capital’—and a key stake in social movement struggles. To recognise a social movement also requires an appreciation of contention beyond the political field. It needs to be able to see a far more complex terrain from within which social movements emerge and a far more complex set of fields within which the stakes of their struggles are formed.

2. The New Social Movement approach to social movements

An alternative paradigm to the PP approach, new social movement (NSM) theory, emerged in Europe in the 1980s from continental traditions of social theory and political philosophy.⁴³ The key themes highlighted in NSM theory that are relevant to this thesis include the centrality of collective identity and solidarity to social movement formation; the formative role for movements of submerged, latent and temporary social networks; the cultural, as well as the political, stakes of movement struggles; and the symbolic dimension of movement activism.⁴⁴

Typical of the NSM approach, Alain Touraine asserts that, ‘The new social movements call into question, far more directly than their predecessors did, the values of culture and society’.⁴⁵ Alberto Melucci concurs with this, asserting:

Contemporary social conflicts are not just political, since they affect the system’s cultural production. Collective action is not carried out simply for exchanging goods in the political market or for improving the participation in the system. It challenges the logic governing production and appropriation of social resources.⁴⁶

⁴³ Buechler (1995), p.441.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp.442-443.

⁴⁵ Touraine (1988), p.136.

⁴⁶ Melucci (1985), p.798.

Melucci contends that the basis of contemporary conflicts has shifted to ‘the production of meaning’.⁴⁷ Although movements cannot totally be divorced from politics—since they ‘confront political systems when they choose public mobilization’⁴⁸—they are involved in forms of action that may be ‘*pre-political*’ because they are rooted in everyday life experiences’ or ‘*meta-political*’ because political forces can never represent them completely’.⁴⁹

Social movements may also be seen to be engaged in ‘meta-politics’ if they can be seen to be challenging the basic values upon which the political system rests. Such a transformation may be conceived by its advocates as a pre-requisite for a transformation in the political system. In the words of Greg Johnson, an American white nationalist writer, ‘The promotion of political change through the transformation of consciousness and culture is what we call *metapolitics*. Metapolitics refers to what must come *before* the foundation of a new political order’.⁵⁰ In this sense, what Melucci terms as ‘pre-political’ and ‘meta-political’ action may be considered as one and the same. Johnson elaborates upon the kind of activities that constitute meta-politics for white nationalism:

Metapolitics breaks down into two basic activities. First, there is *education*: articulating and communicating forms of white nationalism tailored to the interests and outlooks of the full array of white constituencies. This includes not just ivory tower theorizing but also artistic expression, topical cultural and political commentary, and the whole range of media by which they are communicated. Second, there is *community organizing*, meaning the cultivation of real-world communities that live according to our vision in the present and may serve as the seeds of a New Order to come.⁵¹

Education and community organising can be seen as two types of activities that can—at least from the perspective of movement activists—pave the way to deep systemic political change. Such change, however, may be understood not merely as

⁴⁷ Melucci (1989), p.71.

⁴⁸ Melucci (1985), p.813.

⁴⁹ Melucci (1989), p.72.

⁵⁰ Greg Johnson, ‘New Right vs. Old Right’, Counter-Currents Publishing Blog, May 11, 2012. <http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/05/new-right-vs-old-right/>.

⁵¹ Ibid.

facilitated by a transformation in consciousness and cultural values, but constitutive of it. Cultural values may not merely fulfil the function of ushering in a new mode of politics, since they may find also their expression in it. The political system may at once be an expression of cultural values and an institutional structure that reproduces them.

2.1. A ‘relational’ concept of social movement

The NSM approach, particularly as outlined in the work of Melucci, has a number of features that make it an appropriate starting place for an investigation into the existence of an Islamist movement in Britain or elsewhere. In addition to viewing social movement struggles as cultural and not merely political, as mentioned above, the NSM approach crucially does not assume the movement as given. Melucci, for example, states, ‘The empirical unity of a social movement should be considered as a result rather than a starting point, *a fact to be explained* rather than evidence’.⁵² He elaborates:

Not taking collective action as a given reality and questioning what is usually taken for granted—namely, *the existence of a movement as a homogeneous empirical actor*—are what analysis is about. To understand how a social movement succeeds or fails in becoming a collective actor is therefore a fundamental task for sociologists.⁵³

This chimes with Bourdieu’s assertion—highly relevant to this thesis—that ‘the question with which all sociology ought to begin [is] that of *the existence and mode of existence of collectives*’.⁵⁴

Melucci and Touraine both rightly reject a rational actor model of social movements that defines movements in terms of goals or intentions, such as those to secure political rights. Both Melucci and Touraine reject the notion that movements may be identified in terms of the rational calculation and conscious expression of goals. For Melucci, ‘It is never the simple expression of actors’ intentions’.⁵⁵ He states, ‘The

⁵² Melucci (1995), p.43.

⁵³ Ibid., p.55

⁵⁴ Bourdieu (1985), p.741, emphasis added.

⁵⁵ Melucci (1989), p.27.

meaning of the action has to be found in the *action itself* more than in the pursued goals'.⁵⁶ For Touraine, 'A social movement is not an affirmation, an intention ... A social movement can never be defined by an objective'.⁵⁷

This is because, in their view, making goals and intentions the key criterion by which to identify social movements overlooks the matrix of social relations in which movements ought to be discerned: on one hand, within fields of contention with adversarial powers, and, on the other, in what Melucci terms as 'latent cultural networks'. In Melucci's words:

Currently one speaks of a 'movement' as a unity, to which one attributes goals, choices, interests, decisions. But this unity, if any, is a result rather than a point of departure; otherwise one must assume that there is a sort of deep 'mind' of the movement, instead of considering it as a *system of social relationships*.⁵⁸

Highlighting the importance of dynamic social relationships, Melucci and Touraine both propose a concept of social movement as a form of collective action comprised of three interrelated elements. With some refinements, these will be utilised in the approach adopted in this thesis, as will be made clear by the end of this chapter. Melucci outlines the three elements of social movements as follows:

First, a social movement is a form of collective action which involves *solidarity*, that is, actors' mutual recognition that they are part of a single social unit. A second characteristic of a social movement is its engagement in *conflict*, and thus in opposition to an adversary who lays claim to the same goods or values ... Conflict presupposes adversaries who struggle for something which they recognize as lying between them. Third, a social movement *breaks the limits of compatibility of a system*. Its actions violate the boundaries or tolerance limits of a system, thereby pushing the system beyond the range of variations that it can tolerate without altering its structure.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Melucci (1985), p.809, emphasis added.

⁵⁷ Touraine (1981), pp.80, 84, emphasis added.

⁵⁸ Melucci (1985), p.793, emphasis added.

⁵⁹ Melucci (1989), p.29, emphasis added.

For Melucci, cultural solidarity and engagement in conflict are sufficient to characterise collective action, but what makes such action a *social movement* is engagement in a conflict that transgresses the dominant logic of the ‘system of social relationships’ in which the conflict occurs.⁶⁰ Movements, he remarks, ‘transgress the norms that have been institutionalized in social roles, which go beyond the rules of the political system and/or which attack the structure of a society’s class relations’.⁶¹ Melucci appears reluctant to describe the ‘systemic’ change targeted by social movements as *political*, preferring to describe it in terms of a transformation in the ‘dominant codes upon which social relationships are founded’. Movements, he claims, primarily present symbolic challenges to the prevalent ‘cultural codes’—different ways of ‘perceiving and naming the world’—whose notable feature is in ‘rendering power visible’.⁶²

This strikes a chord with Bourdieu’s more sophisticated analysis of power, which places classificatory struggles at the heart of social life. For Bourdieu, however, symbolic contention is inherently political: ‘The categories of perception, the schemata of classification, that is, essentially, the words, the names which construct social reality as much as they express it,’ he asserts, ‘are *the stake par excellence of political struggle*’.⁶³

Melucci’s concept of social movement broadly resonates with Touraine’s. Social movements, writes Touraine, are a ‘type of conflict ... defined by a clear interrelation between conflicting actors and the stakes of their conflict’.⁶⁴ For Touraine, as for Melucci, a social movement is not an isolated entity but a relational one that has to be considered in connection with ‘an adversary and [with] what is at stake’. Accordingly, the three dimensions of the social movement, which resound with Melucci’s dimensions outlined above, are *identity*, *opposition* and *totality*. ‘Identity’ refers to a ‘committed population’ in whose name the struggle is waged; ‘opposition’ refers to an adversary against which the struggle is waged; and ‘totality’

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.38.

⁶¹ Melucci (1980), p.202.

⁶² Melucci (1989), p.76.

⁶³ Bourdieu (1989), pp.20-21.

⁶⁴ Touraine (1985), p.760.

refers to the sphere in which the struggle is waged and the stakes of the struggle therein. These stakes, Touraine argues, amount to control of the dominant ‘set of cultural patterns—epistemic, economic, and ethical’—which he calls *historicity*.

Beyond ‘regressive utopias’ and ‘anti-movements’

Melucci and Touraine do not consider religious movements in their work. This is because they both conceive of social movements as necessarily progressive and see religious movements as a kind of movement of the past. Whereas Melucci describes religious movements in terms of ‘regressive utopias’, Touraine describes them in terms of ‘anti-movements’.⁶⁵ Melucci writes, ‘Unlike their predecessors, contemporary actors are not guided by a universal plan of history; rather, they resemble “nomads who dwell within the present”’.⁶⁶ Such movements’ conceptions of social change in reference to ‘divine rule, natural law, or historical evolution’, writes Touraine, severely limits the possibilities of contesting historicity.⁶⁷

On these accounts, it would appear that there is no space for a contemporary religious social movement that appeals to a ‘metasocial principle’—such as *shari’a*, conceived as divine law—for the transformation of social practices, ethical principles, scientific culture and the political system. However, there is no reason that a contemporary religious movement may not be guided by such an appeal, inclusive of a ‘universal plan of history’. It is not difficult to see how the bottom-line stakes Touraine and Melucci allot for the new social movements—historicity, the capacity to produce ‘a new definition of nature and man’,⁶⁸ or ‘the production and quality of human existence’⁶⁹—may also be shared by a contemporary religious movement, however much it may invoke ‘metasocial principles’.

The notion of religious movements as regressive is based upon the assumption that contemporary social movements must be driven by a progressive impulse. This is wedded to the dubious notion that history is programmed to proceed progressively

⁶⁵ Melucci (1980), p.222.

⁶⁶ Melucci (1985), p.55.

⁶⁷ Touraine (1985), p.779.

⁶⁸ Touraine (1985), p.778.

⁶⁹ Melucci (1989), p.86.

towards the globalisation of universal human rights and liberal democratic government. Fortunately, the NSM approach of Melucci and Touraine provides sufficient theoretical latitude to be able to develop the conceptual elements of ‘social movement’, including collective identity and solidarity, into a useful approach for mapping the putative global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain.

2.2. Collective identity and solidarity

For Melucci and Touraine, the central aspect of their broadly shared tripartite concept of social movement—the ‘identity’ component for Touraine—may be characterised in terms of solidarity based upon social networks. Touraine describes it as the shared consciousness of the movement self-reflexively perceived as an historical actor. He elaborates on this when he states that a movement ‘starts when the denunciation of misery goes along with a moral appeal to the dignity of everyone and the solidarity of all’.⁷⁰ Only after this may an opponent become identified, a conflict emerge and the movement become more clearly recognised. Similarly, for Melucci, what marks the movement in his tripartite model is ‘solidarity, that is, actors’ mutual recognition that they are part of a single social unit’.⁷¹ ‘Solidarity,’ Melucci states, ‘is the capability of an actor to share a collective identity, that is, the capability of recognizing and being recognized as a part of the same system of social relationships’.⁷²

These definitions emphasise the conscious awareness of belonging to a group, but do not necessarily underplay the role of unconsciously shared cultural practices and dispositions in the formation of social movements. Melucci’s emphasis upon the role of ‘latent’ or ‘submerged’ social networks in comprising movements implies that solidarity—or at least a germinal form of it—pre-exists the formation of a social movement in loose webs of interaction between individuals and groups, which may subsequently be given a representative form and reinforced as a struggle materialises between the emerging movement and adversarial powers. This is implied in Melucci’s contention that collective identity is articulated in a language that is

⁷⁰ Touraine (2001), p.447.

⁷¹ Melucci (1989), p.29.

⁷² Melucci (1985), pp.794-795.

‘incorporated in a given set of rituals, practices [and] cultural artifacts’ by a portion or the whole of the group.⁷³

However, Melucci offers little to help explain how collective solidarity may emerge from social networks. As mentioned above, he describes solidarity as ‘the capability of recognizing and being recognized as a part of the same system of social relationships’. But, as with Touraine, he does not address the dynamics and function of *recognition* in the construction of group solidarity. Nor does he address how individuals may be ‘part of the same system of social relationships’ *prior* to recognition. Bourdieu helps to fill these gaps. Bourdieu doesn’t explicitly address the self-reflexive solidarity of social movements, but does offer a way of seeing the pre-conscious, cultural basis of such solidarity, as well as the kind of ‘symbolic mechanisms’ inherent to its emergence.⁷⁴

2.3. The habitus and symbolic power

Bourdieu views the basis of solidarity in all social networks in terms of unconsciously shared cultural affinities—dispositions, practices—which he refers to as habitus. The group habitus, he says, ‘results from the homogeneity of the conditions of existence’, and is ‘what enables practices to be objectively harmonized without any intentional calculation or conscious reference to a norm and mutually adjusted *in the absence of* ... explicit co-ordination’.⁷⁵ For Bourdieu, a given habitus cannot be understood outside specific *fields*, which may be described as arenas of social conduct and conflict, each having distinguishable if not rigidly distinct forms of logic at play. He sometimes likens fields to games or markets, each demanding and inculcating a distinct ‘feel-for-the-game’. Bourdieu talks about politicians having solidarity from their shared commitment to the ‘rules of the game’ of the political field, from their shared investment in this field’s legitimacy. This is no more apparent, he says, than when it is attacked, such as when dissenters draw attention to the apathy of the working class.⁷⁶

⁷³ Melucci (1995), p.44.

⁷⁴ Bourdieu (1991), p.30.

⁷⁵ Bourdieu (1977), p.80.

⁷⁶ Bourdieu (1991), p.180.

The largely unconscious solidarity between individuals with the same or similar habitus—expressed in the practical understanding they have and distinctions they make in their routine social interactions—may be understood as a requirement for the emergence of social movement solidarity. It may be considered as a source of ‘latency’, to use Melucci’s term, of the becoming-conscious of the group *as a group*. But, following Bourdieu, the transformation of such ‘practical solidarity’ into social movement solidarity—where individuals recognise themselves as part of a given collective—needs to be understood in terms of symbolic struggles over the power to classify, and thus determine the reality of, the social world. Group identity is one of the stakes in such struggles.

Melucci, noting the importance of recognition for the creation of social movement solidarity, states: ‘A collective actor cannot construct its identity independently of its recognition (which can also mean denial or opposition) by other social and political actors’.⁷⁷ Yet, he falls short of explicating what Bourdieu highlights numerous times in his work, namely, the role of symbolic power in the construction of group identity.

Collective identity, for Bourdieu, is a particular stake in symbolic conflicts that lie at the heart of social existence. Individuals’ recognition of themselves as part of a collective is an outcome of, and an ongoing stake in, ‘struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to *make and unmake groups*’.⁷⁸ Individuals’ recognition of themselves as members of a collective is not a rational consent to belong to it, even though it involves the capacity to consciously identify with it, since it is primarily tacit and practically embodied. The conscious ‘choice’ to be part of a collective does not, strictly speaking, determine whether or not an individual belongs to it, since it is the habitus that makes this choice possible in the first place. But the expression of belonging, in words and deeds, contributes to the creation of the collective as a possible movement.

⁷⁷ Melucci (1995), pp.47-48.

⁷⁸ Bourdieu (1991), p.221.

According to Bourdieu, individuals' recognition of themselves as part of a collective—and, thus, social movement solidarity—crucially depends upon a symbolic 'labor of enunciation', typically during a time of cultural strain. This is undertaken by a cadre of dedicated professionals who, from previous struggles, have accumulated prestige or reputation, otherwise referred to as 'symbolic capital'.⁷⁹ Their capacity to elicit collective solidarity depends upon the recognition of their authority to generate 'a consensus on the meaning of the social world' that group members can relate to and locate themselves within.

This 'symbolic power' is political, not only because it results from former struggles, but also because it is continually contested. It may be contested within a group, where rival conceptions of group identity are expressed along with a display of the credentials of those expressing them. *Takfirism*, the Muslim practice of declaring other Muslims to be 'apostates', exemplifies this kind of symbolic struggle. A less obviously hostile example lies with revivalist Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), making pronouncements on the 'correct' understanding of Islam or *shari'a*. This will be elaborated upon in Chapters 4 and 5. Symbolic power may also be contested between a group and 'out-group' adversaries, including representatives of the state as 'the ultimate source of symbolic power'.⁸⁰ This kind of symbolic conflict, as Chapter 5 shows, may be seen in British government officials' pronouncements on Islam as a 'religion of peace' and MCB's dismissal of the government's authority to speak at all on matters of Islamic theology.

By acknowledging the symbolic power struggles in the formation of collective identity, we are prompted to consider within the features of a social movement not just individuals' recognition of themselves as part of a collective—as Melucci does—but also a conflict over the identity of the collective, which implicitly involves a struggle for the power to determine this identity and command recognition of it. Social movement struggles involve classificatory conflicts over collective identity, but such conflicts involve more than a clash over the distinguishing features of the collective. They also involve a clash of the authority of the individuals enunciating these features. Thus, our recognition of a social movement involves a recognition of

⁷⁹ Bourdieu (1987), p.14.

⁸⁰ Swartz (2013), p.141.

struggles over the power to identify the collective and classify the social world within which it is situated.

2.4. Networks and organisation

Melucci writes that contemporary movements may be traced on two levels: In addition to the visible level of mobilisation, movements can also be traced at the latent level of everyday social networks, 'in the capacity and will to reappropriate space and time, and in the attempt to practice alternative life-styles. This dimension is not marginal or residual. Rather, it is the appropriate response to new forms of control that no longer correspond solely to state action'.⁸¹ Thus, social movements do not simply utilise networks, since they *are* networks. Movements are not just networks, however. They are networks of cultural solidarity, as outlined above, and they are organised.

For a movement to attain a minimum level of 'integration' and for a conflict to take shape, states Touraine, the individuals comprising it must become organised.⁸² Struggles over self-determination and the power to shape the social world in accordance with the collective habitus, after all, involve a relation with an organised or instituted power. Moreover, a collective struggle waged in the name of a group, in which the group's identity is a key stake, requires some degree of organisation since it requires collaborative work. For the practical, pre-movement solidarity of a cultural network to develop into a mobilised or mobilisable movement representing a constituency with which individuals can politically identify and champion, a collective effort through durable operational structures is required.

This does not mean that movements *are* organisations, however. In some of the early social movement studies, particularly in the resource mobilisation literature, movements are almost synonymous with organisations. But a social movement, a kind of collective action, ought not to be equated with one possible culminant form of collective action.

⁸¹ Melucci (1989), p.71.

⁸² Touraine (1981), p.85.

Neither does this mean that movements have to be comprised *of* organisations. Whilst organisations most certainly provide a structure for networking between social movement activists, it ought not be thought that organisations are the default building blocks of movements. Although this is how Islamism in the West is typically written about, it fails to see the operative networks of individuals cutting *across* organisational lines that possibly comprise a movement, particularly clandestine movements or movements-in-the-making. It suffices here to say that focussing discussion on the issue of whether a certain organisation is ‘Islamist’—which may be unresolvable where there is a genuine diversity of political orientations and commitments amongst key staff—risks obscuring the more difficult task of mapping the transversal networks that might form a movement. This will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3, which regards the organisational network of the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain.

2.5. Fields of contention

Unlike theorists of the PP approach, Touraine and Melucci both understand social movements beyond the level of public confrontation with the state and even the sphere of institutional politics. Such an approach is useful for any inquiry into nascent movements or alleged movements whose existence, possibly because of their putative clandestine character, is in question. It is useful since it points to a wide range of possible sources of movement emergence ‘beneath’ public protest and political campaigning, to social networks where individuals are interconnected through shared social practices and a sense of solidarity that pre-exists political consciousness.

Such an approach also opens up the possibility of seeing movements involved in conflicts within various spheres of social life, and in relation to a range of governmental and non-governmental institutions, where control over social norms and practices are key stakes. Like the PP theorists, however, Melucci and Touraine lack a sufficiently sophisticated way of conceiving the multiplicity of arenas for struggle. Bourdieu’s theory of fields helps to address this shortcoming.

According to Bourdieu, social struggles occur not just at the level of the ordinary judgments and mundane activities of everyday life. They also occur within ‘the

specialized fields of cultural production, such as art, science, religion, and the media ... wherein authoritative representations of the social world are produced and disseminated'.⁸³ For Bourdieu, *fields* are the sites of the unequal distribution of various kinds of capital, as well as of the struggle for their accumulation. In addition to economic capital (material wealth in the form of money or property), he identifies two other kinds of capital, cultural capital (knowledge, skills and other cultural acquisitions, for example educational qualifications) and social capital (connections available from being part of a social network). Each form of capital—a currency of power—can be converted into other kinds under certain conditions.

Some academics, such as Nick Crossley, have recognised the usefulness for social movement research to incorporate this concept of different fields, since it recognises the site-specific dynamics, unspoken rules and currencies of power at play in the multiple sites of struggle within and across which social movements may mobilise. Crossley writes:

Many movements will struggle in the media, in parliament, in the courts, in the fields from which they originally emerge, and in each case they will encounter a different 'game' which demands different dispositions and resources from them. Media struggles demand a whole different set of resources and skills to legal struggles and both are different again from academic struggles.⁸⁴

In the context of Islamic activism in Britain, it might be added to these the fields of education, law, finance and politics, each of which require a different kind of 'know-how' to navigate and operate within them. Demonstrating the intimacy between habitus and fields, certain dispositions and practical competencies are not only required to navigate such fields, they are also produced within them, for example, in the form of training. This helps 'inculcate the practical mastery of the immanent logic' of the given field and a 'de facto submission to the values, hierarchies and inherent censorship mechanisms' within it.⁸⁵

⁸³ Wacquant (2013), p. 276.

⁸⁴ Crossley (2002), p.183.

⁸⁵ Bourdieu (1991), p.176.

One of the most important fields for the study of Islamic activism is education. This is because education plays a powerful role in the social dissemination of knowledge—including the unquestioned, tacitly held categories of thought that make knowledge possible—as well as in the inculcation of social values. Key amongst these values for social movement struggles are those relating to social divisions whereby group identity is formulated and contested. As Bourdieu notes, the state plays an important role in the provision of education. In the words of David Swartz, ‘The fundamental assumptions and cognitive classifications we bring to our understanding of the modern social world are for the most part ... imposed by the state, particularly through the educational system’.⁸⁶ Chapter 5, which regards the conflictual relationship between Islamic revivalists in Britain and the state, includes a focus on education as a key field of contention.

2.6. Conflict and the state

The NSM approach to social movements characterises movements as involved in conflicts concerning not merely political rights or reforms, as the PP approach does, but also a cultural transformation of meaning and values. However, it doesn’t acknowledge the role of embodied power, principally the state, in the regulation and naturalisation of everyday cultural practices. Culture, as Tuğal’s aforementioned analysis of Islamism in Turkey illustrates, depends on political power for its institutionalisation within the social fabric. Accordingly, this thesis posits that social movements are concerned with cultural transformation, as Melucci and Touraine assert. But it also recognises that immanent to this concern is a struggle that inevitably involves political power, if not in the political field proper—where the stakes include access to governmental resources and influence over policy—then in other fields, such as education, where issues of authority and legitimacy are inextricable from symbolic struggles to determine the nature of the social order.

Melucci and Touraine both characterise movements as conflictual and in relation with an adversary, one that is possibly the state but by no means synonymous with it. Touraine, for example, asserts that an adversary ‘may be represented by a *social group* even if, as often occurs, it is defined in more abstract terms, as capitalism or

⁸⁶ Swartz (2013), pp.140-141.

the state'.⁸⁷ In this sense, their approach is less restrictive than that of the PP theorists, for whom the adversary of a social movement is incumbent government. However, in wishing to see social movement struggles beyond the field of institutional politics, it actually underplays the role of the state in an important sense, since it fails to acknowledge the symbolic power that the state wields in a diverse range of fields *beyond* the strictly political.

The kind of adversary that distinguishes social movements from other kinds of collective action, according to the NSM approach, may be understood with a grasp of the *stakes* between the collective and the adversary: The key stake for a social movement, according to Touraine, 'is the social control of the main cultural patterns, that is, of the patterns through which our relationships with the environment are normatively organized'.⁸⁸ Touraine suggests three main kinds of such cultural patterns—'a model of knowledge, a type of investment, and ethical principles'—which correspond to the scientific, economic, and ethical bases of social organisation. Touraine terms this key stake, the social control of which pits a given movement against an adversary, *historicity*. Touraine does not highlight the authority wielded by the state as a stake in movements' struggles, but it is difficult to ignore the fact, noted by Bourdieu, that the state is the key 'agent' that controls historicity.

Building on the classical definition of the state provided by Max Weber, Bourdieu describes the state as the institution that 'claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and *symbolic* violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population'.⁸⁹ Bourdieu describes *symbolic violence* as the unconscious complicity of the dominated in the imposition upon them of 'schemes of perception, appreciation and action' by the dominant. Such complicity lies in the practical, tacit recognition that the dominated give to the authority of those in dominant positions *vis-à-vis* symbolic power. It is expressed in the unquestioned ways of seeing, judging and behaving, in accordance with the prevailing social order,

⁸⁷ Touraine (1981), p.85, emphasis in original.

⁸⁸ Touraine (1985), pp.754-755.

⁸⁹ Bourdieu (1994), p.3, emphasis in original. However, state monopoly over symbolic classifications is never complete. Bourdieu stresses that 'the holders of bureaucratic authority never establish an absolute monopoly' because 'there are always, in any society, conflicts between symbolic powers that aim at imposing the vision of legitimate divisions'. See Bourdieu (1989), p.22.

throughout which the state wields considerable symbolic power. Through an array of official and legal classifications that become practical, taken-for-granted understandings of the social world, the state is largely responsible for the creation of a political and social *doxa*, an accepted ‘natural order of things’.

This thesis posits that social movements challenge not just certain doxic beliefs or normative practices, but also the source or legitimacy of the symbolic power that maintains them. Social movement conflicts, it is suggested, bring into contention not just certain ways of seeing, judging and behaving, but also the institutions and authorities that naturalise and sustain them. From the converse perspective, it can be said that these conflicts bring into contention not just certain institutions and authorities, but also the ways of seeing, judging and behaving from which they derive their recognition and legitimacy.

The kind of conflict in which social movements may be identified, as Melucci sees it, does not concern group privileges or concessions within the accepted ‘rules’ of the political apparatus or of the prevailing culture. They do not concern advocacy or reform. They concern, rather, the very system of ‘rules’ itself. Going beyond Melucci, we may note that this inevitably involves a concern with the sources of legitimacy for such a ‘system’. This is not to say that social movements are necessarily geared to undermining or capturing political power in the form of the state, even though some movements may indeed be revolutionary. It is, rather, to recognise that the primary concern of movements lies with the appropriation of the *symbolic* power that enunciates, codifies and legitimises the way the social world is organised both subjectively in perceptions and objectively in perceivable reality. Such power is predominantly, though never completely, held by the state.

3. Conceiving and recognising social movements

The foregoing navigation through the theoretical terrain of both the PP and NSM approaches to social movements leads to the following concept of social movement that may be useful for tracing social movements, particularly those in the process of becoming. It also allows for a more inclusive view from which social movement may be seen as one mode of collective action.

3.1. The dual stakes of movement struggles

This thesis conceives of social movements as organised networks of individuals in conflict with institutional authority in which there are two key stakes: the identity of the group for which the movement is champion, and a ‘model’ society that provides the objective conditions for the group to exist and prosper.

A key feature of a social movement, this thesis contends, is the symbolic struggle for the recognition of a group, both subjectively in the self-identification of the group and objectively from the wider social environment. Yet, this symbolic struggle for recognition is entwined with a struggle for an alternative perception and understanding of social and political reality, underpinned with values and principles different from the prevailing ones. The vision of the group is never entirely separable from a vision of its place in the world, and, hence, a vision *of* the world. Social movements, as this thesis conceives them, endeavour to protect or establish and maintain a way of seeing, evaluating and living in the world. This aspect of the conflict can be traced in multiple fields of contention, each with its own dynamics and logic. These fields of contention may include those of politics, law, economics and education, as well as media, depending on the specific milieus in which social practices and cultural identity are perceived at risk. The envisioned way of life, however, cannot be seen separately from the vision of the group.

In other words, social movements are comprised of two inter-linked collective struggles. On one side, there is a struggle relating to the basic, normative principles that structure *social life*, including political and economic organisation, ethical and aesthetic judgement, and scientific knowledge. These principles may be explicitly conceived in the course of struggle, but, fundamentally, they unconsciously guide perceptions and practices. On the other side, there is a struggle relating to *group identity*. Again, this struggle concerns the unconscious perceptions and practices of the group, though these may become explicitly conceived in the course of the struggle. These two struggles, or two aspects of a singular struggle, are connected: Group identity is contested with reference to the specific obstacles presented by social structures; and the contention of a model society is enacted with reference to the specific challenges to the group’s cultural and political identity.

3.2. The two aspects of authority contested by movements

Social movements are concerned with both *symbolic* and *practical* authority. Implicit to the concept of social movement adopted in this thesis is not just a conflict regarding particular ways of seeing, evaluating and acting in the world, but a challenge to the legitimacy of the authority that determines and regulates them. Social movements, in this sense, do not merely resist and seek to change certain perceptions, judgements or practices, whether in relation to a specific group or society at large. They also challenge and tend towards the appropriation of the power structures that legitimise and naturalise them. This contestation targets the symbolic and practical authority held by governmental institutions, national or local. But as Tuğal demonstrates, it may also operate more subtly within the fabric of civil society in relation to other institutions, quasi- or non-governmental, targeting more molecular forms of authority.

The state wields considerable symbolic power through an array of official classifications to impose a practical, taken-for-granted understanding of the social order. This is evident, for example, in the often unquestioned categories of ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ that are used in everyday, think tank and academic discourse, but which obviate more objective understandings of the phenomena of concern. However, symbolic struggles also occur within and between the different bureaucratic fields that comprise the state. The use of the terms ‘Islamist’ and ‘jihadist’, for example, each have their own particular and recent history of contention (incorporating initial rejection followed by qualified acceptance) within and between different governmental agencies in Britain, as well as in the mainstream broadcast media.

Bourdieu observes that authority—whether held by the state, an organisation or another kind of collective, or an individual—is only effective insofar as it is *recognised*, that is, practically incorporated into the cognitive and bodily dispositions and actions of individuals and groups. Thus, the authority challenged by social movements is not just constituted by the institutions of government and civil society over a diverse range of fields. It is also constituted by the recognition given to such institutions, manifest in the regular ways of understanding and acting in the world that these institutions inculcate. Thus, any collective attempt to transform the taken-

for-granted social and political *doxa*, including the way in which groups (for example, communities or nations) are classified and incorporated into it, confronts and challenges both the authority of the ‘external’ social and political institutions that perpetuate the doxic order *and* the concomitant ‘internal’ schemes of perception, evaluation and action upon which such authority depends.

As Melucci says, social movements ‘challenge the dominant logic on a symbolic ground. They question definition of codes, nomination of reality’. But they seek to do this not just by challenging *specific* social classifications or practices—whether a given group is officially recognised and catered for in law or education, for example—but by challenging the very *basis* upon which classifications are made and by which practices are incorporated into social life. Social movements, as this thesis conceives them, are not equivalent to advocacy campaigns that seek change *within* existing social structures—for example in a given political, economic, legal or educational system. But neither are they necessarily revolutionary in seeking to overthrow such systems. Fundamentally, social movements are geared towards change that is inseparable from a transformation *of* existing social structures.

Social movements, in this sense, are characteristically *subversive*. But, as Bourdieu reminds us, ‘political subversion presupposes *cognitive* subversion, a conversion of the vision of the world’.⁹⁰ This resonates with the words of Frank Kitson, who, in 1971, wrote: ‘Wars of subversion and counter-subversion are fought, in the last resort, in the *minds* of the people’.⁹¹ Whether in the first or last resort, this thesis begins with the position that social movements are subversive and must be understood in relation to the cognitive and social order against which they struggle.

3.3. Social movements and other modes of collective action

A social movement is a dynamic network comprised of social relationships that, as Melucci describes, persist beyond any particular instance of publicly visible mobilisation. All social movements are networks. But not all networks are social

⁹⁰ Bourdieu (1991), p.128. emphasis added.

⁹¹ Kitson (1971), p.78.

movements because a movement is never *simply* a network. It is a network with the following features.

Firstly, a social movement is a network that is *organised*. Social movements are constituted by and emerge from loose, informal social networks, but they require organisational structures through which professionals work for social change in the name of the groups they speak for. Social movements are not equivalent to organisations, including what have been described as ‘social movement organisations’, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although they may be partly comprised of organisations—or of cross sections of them—movements are more open-ended and lack formal integration. As Emmanuel Karagiannis notes, movements may be comprised of multiple alliances of independently working groups.⁹² Social movements are not organisations, but they are organised.

This criterion distinguishes movements not just from organisations; it also distinguishes them from networks whose members may identify themselves as belonging to a distinct group, but which lack representative organisation and, thus, the potential to collectively mobilise. For a network to be a movement, there has to be a practical and symbolic division of labour in the representation of the individuals and groups comprising it. But the movement’s organisational structure—the extent to which it is centralised or hierarchical, for example—ought not to be pre-empted, since this depends upon the structural and institutional form of the power it confronts and defines itself against. The institutionalised power a movement confronts, even the state as its typical adversary, is not necessarily restricted to the political field and may be dispersed across numerous fields, and so its organisational structure may reflect that dispersal.

Secondly, a movement—an organised network—expresses *collective identity* or what Melucci refers to as a ‘specific solidarity’.⁹³ This criterion separates movements from other forms of collective action, such as coalitions. Coalitions are organised networks, but they lack the collective identity that pertains to movements, which endures beyond the specific campaigns that coalition groups come together to work

⁹² Karagiannis (2009).

⁹³ Melucci (1980), p.202.

on. An example is the Stop the War Coalition comprised of the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP), which, in 2002 and 2003 organised street protests against the allied invasion of Iraq. Whilst both groups campaigned together to influence British foreign policy, the interests of both groups in averting British involvement in the Middle East were related to different stakes and struggles, as well as divergent perceptions of human rights and social justice. Put succinctly and somewhat crudely, the solidarity between MAB and SWP was political, not cultural. It was issues-based, not identity-based. It was short-term, not long-term.

Advocacy groups are similar to coalitions in the sense that the individuals comprising them share what might be termed as *political*, rather than cultural, solidarity. This kind of solidarity undoubtedly involves a shared understanding of certain political issues that need redress—for example, specific rights or legislation to be granted by the state—but is not necessarily driven by a shared cultural identity in terms of which individuals perceive themselves and, thus, the social world at large. The solidarity of individuals comprising a social movement, to the contrary, transcends all specific political rights issues, since it is inextricable from an alternative vision of the social and political order in which they perceive themselves to collectively belong. Examples of advocacy groups whose members share political, rather than cultural, solidarity include the various environmental pressure groups that lobby for changes in international or national law for the regulation or prohibition of certain practices, such as fishing, or for the protection of natural resources and habitats.

Thirdly, a movement—an organised network of individuals with cultural connections—is *conflictual*. It is engaged in a conflictual relationship with political and cultural authority not just for extracting certain concessions in the name of its constituency, but over the power to determine an alternative social and political reality. Such power is both practical and symbolic, that is, it concerns both the capacity to regulate action, but also to shape perceptions and dispositions.

This criterion separates movements from collective action that seeks representation *within* existing political or social structures without fundamentally altering them (see Table 1 below). Some identity based rights groups—for example, those concerned

with gender, sexuality or race—are not conflictual, as such, since they seek greater inclusion *within* existing systems. Others, however, that see the stakes of their struggle as bound up with a transformation *of* existing systems—those engaged in *metapolitics*—are conflictual in the sense described here. Ethno-nationalist groups, who envisage an alternative world order divided into separate territories based upon ethnic solidarity, exemplify this kind of conflict, at least in terms of their thinking if not their actual practices.⁹⁴

	Organisation	Solidarity		Conflict	
	Organisational collaboration	Political solidarity	Cultural solidarity	Conflict <i>within</i> social/political system	Conflict <i>affecting</i> social/political system
Social movement	○	○	○	○	○
Identity / advocacy movement	○	○	○	○	
Issues-based movement / coalition	○	○		○	

Table 1: Modes of collective action

So, the question as to whether a network of individuals is a social movement—the question posed by this thesis regarding the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain—seeks knowledge not only of the networked nature of the individuals of concern, for it also seeks knowledge as to whether the network has a cultural basis and an organisational structure engaged in contentious collective action. Put succinctly, the recognition of a given movement depends upon the possibility of recognising *organisational collaboration* between the individuals and groups alleged to comprise

⁹⁴ Although separatist groups, such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain's Basque region and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, are commonly understood as 'ethnic nationalist' groups, ethno-nationalism may also be viewed as a form of political movement that seeks political autonomy not just within the accepted boundaries of a given state—in Spain or Sri Lanka, for example—but irrespective of contemporary political geography. Greg Johnson, a white nationalist, describes ethno-nationalism as 'the idea that every distinct ethnic group should enjoy political sovereignty and an ethnically homogeneous homeland or homelands'. For him and others, ethno-nationalism entails a *transformation* of the global political order. See Greg Johnson, 'Frequently Asked Questions, Part 1', Counter-Currents Publishing Blog, June 5, 2012. <http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/06/frequently-asked-questions-part-1/>.

the movement; shared *cultural solidarity* between them; and a *conflict of vision and values* with institutional authority. The key stakes of this conflict are the determination of, on one hand, collective identity, and, on the other, the 'legitimate vision of the social world'.⁹⁵ The recognition of a movement depends upon recognising a struggle in which a transformation of social and cultural values are, in the final analysis, indistinguishable from a transformation of the political system.

⁹⁵ Bourdieu (1989), p.22.

Chapter 2

Introducing the Global Muslim Brotherhood: Between Political Subversion and Religious Reformism?

The ‘global Muslim Brotherhood’ in the title of this thesis refers to a transnational network of organisations and individuals associated with *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* (The Society of the Muslim Brothers), established in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, and *Jama’at-i-Islami* (The Party of Islam) established in colonial India in 1941 by Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi. This chapter assesses the academic and think tank literature, as well as the relevant news media, that supports the view that the cluster of individuals and groups associated with these two groups amounts to a social movement with a presence in Britain. It also assesses the literature that denies or problematises the existence of such a movement.

The chapter begins with an examination of the relevant literature on the organisations and individuals associated with the Ikhwan and Jama’at in the West. This provides a useful view upon how they are understood as a trans-continental network bonded by a shared ideology. Although the Ikhwan and Jama’at are typically deemed to be two distinct movements, they are often considered as forming a more general, overarching movement. The main reason for this, as a recent Pew Forum report contends, is that they are bonded by a ‘political ideology ... that calls for the establishment of a distinctly Islamic system of government’.¹ This is consistent with the original aspirations and methodologies of al-Banna and Mawdudi. The groups associated with the Ikhwan and Jama’at in Britain, as this chapter shows, are similarly clustered. Although most analyses do not explicitly refer to a singular movement in Britain, they imply one in the way that they jointly classify these groups and individuals within the same Islamist taxonomy.

¹ Pew Forum (2010), p.20.

This literature observes that over the last half-century, activists linked to the Ikhwan and Jama'at have become increasingly interconnected in Europe and North America. Free from the particular challenges and historical contexts of their points of departure, and acknowledging that their presence in the West is long term, these individuals have established numerous organisations dedicated to pursuing their political ambitions in the Muslim-minority West. These organisations are viewed critically by many observers who see them as non-violent but 'extremist' or subversive.

Other analysts more sympathetic to these groups contend that the new cultural and political terrain in the West has affected the continuity of al-Banna and Mawdudi's ideals and aspirations for an Islamic state. Decades within the new Muslim-minority environment, they claim, has transformed Islamist goals into a more modest desire for social equality and has provoked a radical reinterpretation of the al-Banna and Mawdudi's Islamist political programme.

This chapter assesses both of these streams of analysis. It finds that most analysts who explicitly or tacitly affirm the existence of an Islamist movement comprised of Brotherhood- and Jama'at-related organisations and individuals do so without sufficient reflection on how the movement is constituted as a whole greater than its constituent parts. The clustering of these actors as 'Islamists' typically assumes a shared political ideology that remains unexamined to any level of sufficient detail. Much of the literature on Islamism in Britain is somewhat out of date. But along with the work on Islamism in the West, it provides the historical context important for identifying the relevant groups and individuals in Britain. Its account of the organisational networking of these actors serves as a useful starting point for an in-depth study of participationist Islamism in Britain as presented in this thesis.

The chapter also argues that the analysts who argue the case for a reformist or progressive Islam practiced in the West and Britain by Brotherhood- and Jama'at-related groups highlight some important trends in Muslim activism, but that these do not amount to a coherent, direct or effective counter-argument against the existence of an Islamist movement in Britain.

1. The global Muslim Brotherhood in the West

The individuals and groups associated with the Ikhwan and Jama'at, in Britain and further afield, have been collectively referred to in various ways. Each classification has its own history and nuances, but all assume some measure of connectedness between the individuals and groups to which they apply. Some prominent Muslim activists and intellectuals, including those linked to Brotherhood- or Jama'at-related groups, refer to the 'Islamic revivalist movement' or, more simply, 'the Islamic Movement'. The defining feature of the Movement for them is the collective dedication to what they view as a restoration or revival of Islam to the forefront of social and political life.

Academic observers and critical bystanders tend to emphasise the political aspect of Islamic revivalism in referring to these groups and individuals as 'Islamists' of a certain kind. These appellations include 'non-violent Islamists' (which emphasises their eschewal of violent methods in the West), 'gradualist Islamists' (which emphasises their incremental approach through institution building), and 'participationists' (which emphasises their willingness to participate in electoral, democratic politics).

Lorenzo Vidino describes these actors in Europe and North America as the 'New Western Muslim Brotherhood'. Steven Merley refers to them as the 'global Muslim Brotherhood'. Both Vidino and Merley, as this chapter shows, contribute valuable insights to the understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood as a global phenomenon, but they disagree on the extent to which this is formally structured. What is less uncertain, from their work and that of others, is that for many decades dedicated activists with connections to the Ikhwan and Jama'at have established an extensive network of organisations in the West, including Britain, that transcend ethnic and nationalist lines.

1.1. Historical origins and contemporary conceptions

The Brotherhood and Jama'at are sometimes described as separate movements due to their particular historical origins and the national and ethnic composition of their original membership. But they are often grouped together, by both Muslim and non-

Muslim commentators alike, as one overarching movement with a global presence. As mentioned above, some prominent Muslim figures sometimes refer to this as ‘the Islamic Movement’. Muhammad Abdul Bari, former chairman of the East London Mosque and former secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain, for example, describes the Islamic Movement as

a generic term for groups that do not restrict religion to personal piety but see Islam having its own unique social and political message. Examples include the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-e-Islami in South Asia. They are described by their detractors as ‘Islamist’ or ‘fundamentalist’. Their off-shoot groups in Europe have been active in community work, establishing mosques and research centres, publishing houses and journals.²

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egypt-born Muslim scholar and cleric best known for his popular Al Jazeera television programme ‘*ash-Shari’a wal-Hayat*’ (‘*Shari’a* and Life’), defines the Islamic Movement as

the organised and collective work that is undertaken by the people, to restore Islam to the leadership of society and to the helm of life ... The Islamic Movement has come into existence to *revive* Islam [*tajid al-Islam*] and *reinstate* it at the helm of life once again, after removing its obstacles from its path.³

Al-Qaradawi distinguishes the Islamic Movement from the Muslim Brotherhood. The Movement, he asserts, is more ‘general and all-embracing’; the Brotherhood is one movement within the Movement.⁴

Revivalist visionaries: al-Banna and Mawdudi

The goal of reviving Islam ‘to the helm of life’ was expressed by Hasan al-Banna and Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi, the two most important figures of the Islamic Movement. Both al-Banna and Mawdudi, despite being focused on their respective countries of origin, aspired for an Islamic world order. Both emphasised a gradual, non-violent

² Abdul Bari (2013), p.11.

³ al-Qaradawi (2002), pp.1, 6, emphasis added.

⁴ Ibid., pp.xxii-xxiii.

strategy through education and institution-building that would culminate in Islam's triumph over non-Islamic values, ideas and practices.

Al-Banna, a schoolteacher, established the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 to address what he saw as the corruption of Islam in his native Egypt. Al-Banna diagnosed the poor predicament of Muslims in Egypt and elsewhere not just as a result of the abolition of the caliphate or of Western colonialism. More fundamentally, he claimed, its demise was owed to the abandonment of Islamic values, and governance based upon those values, after the period of the first four caliphs (632-661).⁵ Al-Banna declared the ultimate goal of the Brotherhood as the re-creation of a global Islamic order based on the *shar'ia*.⁶ He also believed firmly in, and taught, the importance of *jihad*, in line with the predominant classical (and juridical) conception of warfare for the hegemony of Islam.⁷ *Jihad*, asserted al-Banna, is a duty incumbent upon all Muslims for Islam to reach its zenith. He also extolled the rewards of martyrdom in the path of *jihad*, as expressed in a pamphlet he wrote in the late 1930s.⁸ Al-Banna believed the basis for Islamic supremacy, and *jihad* as its means, was 'supported in Qur'anic texts, the Traditions [hadiths], and the four schools of [Islamic] law'.⁹

Al-Banna's exaltation of *jihad* was not an empty formula. One of the few constants in the structure of the organisation, according to Richard Mitchell, was 'the enrolment of members in various kinds of armed formations trained to perform espionage and to commit violence'.¹⁰ The Brotherhood initiated attacks against Egypt's Jews and Copts; bombed secular cinema theatres and restaurants; and assassinated judges, businessmen, intellectuals and government officials, including

⁵ The first four caliphs were Abu Bakr (r. 632-634), Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634-644), Uthman ibn Affan (r. 644-656), and 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (r. 656-661).

⁶ Mitchell (1993), p.234.

⁷ al-Banna (1978). For a comprehensive treatment of the juridical doctrine and historical practice of *jihad*, see Cook (2005).

⁸ See al-Banna (1978).

⁹ Mitchell (1993), p.207.

¹⁰ Mitchell (1993), p.206.

the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi.¹¹ Amir Taheri notes that al-Banna's 'campaign of terror was to become a model for future fundamentalist movements'.¹² These include Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian Territories; al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad in Egypt; Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; as well as the Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat in Algeria.¹³ Perhaps most importantly, Brotherhood members also played a key role in the birth of al-Qaeda.¹⁴

Despite its history of violence, the most important aspect of the Brotherhood's work was, and remains, its commitment to the gradual Islamisation of society from below using non-violent means. At the organisation's 5th conference in 1939, al-Banna stated that the official focus of the Ikhwan was 'the reform of society', since before they could be ready for political power, 'there must be a period during which the principles of the Brothers are spread'.¹⁵ The guiding thought was that 'when the people have been Islamized, a truly Muslim nation will naturally evolve'.¹⁶ To this end, al-Banna introduced a seven-stage strategy comprised of upwardly cascading goals:

The first step is to educate and 'form' the Muslim person. From there the Muslim person would spread Islam and help 'form' a Muslim family. Muslim families would group together to form a Muslim society that would establish a Muslim government. The government would then transform the state into an Islamic one governed by *Shari'ah*, as voted by the Muslim society. This Islamic state would then work to free 'occupied' Muslim lands [from apostate Muslim regimes] and unify them together under one banner, from which Islam could be spread all over the world.¹⁷

¹¹ See Kramer (1996), p.144; Gold (2003), pp.55-56; and Taheri (1987), p.52. In retaliation to the murder of Nuqrashi, al-Banna was assassinated by Egyptian government agents the following year, in 1949.

¹² Taheri (1987), p.51.

¹³ See Phares (2005), p.65; and Rachel Ehrenfeld and Alyssa A. Lappen, 'The Truth About the Muslim Brotherhood', *Front Page Magazine*, June 16, 2006. <http://www.alyssaalappen.org/2006/06/16/the-truth-about-the-muslim-brotherhood/>.

¹⁴ Filiu (2009).

¹⁵ Mitchell (1993) p??

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Investigative Project on Terrorism (2008), p.7.

Mawdudi also advocated a bottom-up approach to the achievement of an Islamic society in the Indian subcontinent. His political life, as with al-Banna's, began with a struggle against British colonial rule. He was a member of the pan-Islamic Khilafah movement, which combined support for the Ottoman caliphate with anti-colonial agitation.¹⁸ But like al-Banna, Mawdudi's anti-colonialism was hitched to a higher purpose, the revival of Islam and its eventual global supremacy. In his early work, Mawdudi expressed his vision of an Islamic revival in strident revolutionary terms. In his first book, *Jihad Fi Sabillillah (Jihad in Islam)*, written in the late 1920s, he wrote:

Islam requires the earth—not just a portion, but the whole planet ... because the entire mankind should benefit from ... 'Islam' which is the programme of well-being for all humanity ... Islam does not intend to confine this revolution to a single state or a few countries; the aim of Islam is to bring about a universal revolution.¹⁹

The achievement of the Islamic world system, he stated, requires Muslims to 'press into service all [the] forces which can bring about a revolution ... [The] composite term for the use of all these forces,' he asserted, 'is "*Jihad*"'.²⁰ These forces include 'the power of the sword', physical exertion, the expenditure of one's wealth, and also the potency of speech and writing. Mawdudi viewed the 'ideological' *jihad* as the means to change people's outlooks culminating in 'a mental revolution' that would signify Islam's triumph over non-Islamic values, concepts and ideas. Such a triumph is especially pertinent given Mawdudi's concept of the Islamic state as 'an ideological state', as opposed to a nation state.²¹ The ideological state, for Mawdudi, is defined by its acceptance of the *shari'a*, whose sphere of activity is not restricted to politics, or even law, but 'coexistent with the whole of human life'.²²

In 1941, Mawdudi established Jama'at-i-Islami to realise his vision of an Islamic state on the Indian subcontinent as a prelude to an Islamic world order. Through Jama'at, he sought to produce a cadre of 'Muslim administrators, Muslim managers,

¹⁸ For an interesting study of the Khilafah movement, see Qureshi (1999).

¹⁹ Mawdudi (1980), p.22, emphasis and italics added.

²⁰ Ibid., p.7, italics added.

²¹ Bukay (2008), p.164.

²² Mawdudi, quoted in Karsh (2006), p.208.

Muslim scientists, Muslim philosophers, Muslim economists, Muslim bankers, and jurists ... [that would] act as the vanguard of the movement for the reconstruction of modern thought ... [leading] the struggle against the prevailing secular ideologies and power structures'.²³ As Mumtaz Ahmad observes, although Mawdudi described the goal of an Islamic world order in revolutionary terms, the bottom-up means he advocated were rather more 'evolutionary'.²⁴

After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, which Mawdudi opposed, he became more pragmatic in approach and under his leadership Jama'at embraced Pakistani electoral politics. This reflected similar developments in the Ikhwan in Egypt, where some of its leaders, such as Umar al-Tilmisani, began to publicly eschew violence and adopt an accommodationist position regarding secular politics.²⁵ From the 1960s, thousands of party activists and sympathisers were appointed in the civil service and educational institutions, exerting a mild influence on the Pakistani government and, under General Zia ul-Haq, its programme to Islamise the state and society.²⁶ This included the 1974 state declaration of the Ahmadi sect as non-Muslims and Zia's decree, ten years later, prohibiting the Ahmadis from describing themselves as Muslim and chanting the call to prayer.²⁷

Both the Ikhwan and Jama'at-i-Islami have failed to make in-roads in their respective countries as their founders had hoped for. Since President Nasser's clampdown on the Ikhwan in the mid-1950s, the group has suffered state repression for decades. After the 2011 'Arab Spring', the Ikhwan's political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, won the country's first democratic elections with Mohammed Morsi elected as president. But, in 2013, on the back of public protests against the Morsi's rule, the military ousted Morsi and the Ikhwan is once again subject to harsh state repression. Jama'at-i-Islami has periodically been repressed by the Pakistani government, but

²³ Ahmad (1991), p.488.

²⁴ Ahmad, *ibid.* See also Ahmed (1994), pp.669-706.

²⁵ Vidino (2010), p.25.

²⁶ Hussain (2007), pp.18-19.

²⁷ The Ahmadis are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) who, in 1889, founded a religious order in modern-day India. Ahmad assumed the title of *al-Mahdi*, the divinely guided one, a messiah promised in Shi'ite eschatology to restore Islam's righteous place in the world. For more on the Ahmadis, see Valentine (2008).

when it has participated in elections, it has failed to capture the popular vote.

Nonetheless, the success of the Ikhwan and Jama'at lies in their resilience and expansion beyond their respective home bases. The Ikhwan now has a global presence. According to Mohamed Mahdi Akef, a former Supreme Guide of the Egyptian Ikhwan, it is active in 70 countries.²⁸ Jama'at, whilst less expansionary, has a significant presence in South Asia. Both have played a key role in establishing Islamic networks across Europe and America comprising mosques, charities, advocacy groups, and other organisations.

'Participationist' and 'rejectionist' Islamists

Western observers of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i-Islami, and their legacy groups in the West, tend to refer to them not in terms of the Islamic Movement, but as *Islamists*. In doing so, they emphasise the political aspect of al-Banna and Mawdudi's shared long-term vision of an Islamic social order. Typically, Western analysts consider the Ikhwan, Jama'at and their associated groups in the West as Islamists in aspiring for a global Islamic state, but distinguish them from other Islamists by the different means that they adopt to accomplish this goal. Patrick Sookhdeo, for example, writes,

What sets non-violent Islamists apart from the violent groups is their doctrine of gradualism, which includes a tactical willingness to work within the legal system of their countries in order to further their strategic goals. Their tactical goals include the Islamization of Muslim societies at the grass-roots level, the building of a committed vanguard of elites and the mobilisation of the masses. Gradualist movements advocate a comprehensive multi-faceted system of *jihad*, which includes struggle on all fronts—economic, cultural, political—in order to mobilise Muslims and gather Islamic strength for the final struggle, which might include the use of force.²⁹

Sookhdeo refers to the Muslim Brotherhood as an example of the 'gradualist mainstream'.

²⁸ 'Speech of Mr. Mohamed Mahdi Akef, Ramadan Iftar Party', *IkhwanWeb*, July 6, 2007. <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=911>.

²⁹ Sookhdeo (2012), p.23.

Other analysts prefer a tripartite taxonomy. They divide Islamists between those who reject participation within democratic political systems and those, like the Muslim Brotherhood, who are willing to participate in them. They place violent Islamists firmly within the ‘rejectionist’ camp and split non-violent Islamists between ‘rejectionists’ and ‘participationists’. Jeffrey Bale, for example, distinguishes between the Islamist groups operating in the West as follows:

1. ‘Rejectionists’ that openly disparage the institutions and values of Western host societies ... [whose] ultimate aims [are] to destroy those societies. These rejectionist groups can be further subdivided into a) ostensibly non-violent groups (like Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, which is awaiting the restoration of the Caliphate before initiating ‘offensive jihad’), and b) violent jihadist groups [transnational, such as al-Qaeda, or nationally focused—at least in terms of immediate strategic priorities—such as Hamas], whether these are linked to wider networks or are so-called ‘self-starter’ cells; and
2. Non-violent ‘participationist’ groups that engage in lobbying, organizing, and publishing and at times even run for elections (such as the representatives of groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, South Asian Mawdudist networks, and Turkish groups linked to the AKP such as Milli Goruş).³⁰

Bale’s taxonomy builds upon the work of Anthony McRoy³¹ and resonates with the work of Lorenzo Vidino,³² as well as with that of the London-based counter-extremism think tank, Quilliam.³³ According to Bale, ‘it is not violence-prone jihadist groups that constitute the primary long-term threat to the West, but rather non-violent Islamists’ including those linked with the Ikhwan and Jama’at-i-Islami. Such activists, he asserts, present a threat to the social cohesion and national security of Western states.³⁴ Although they do not present a direct threat of violence, these

³⁰ Jeffrey Bale, ‘Militant Islamist Networks in the West’, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, December 21, 2009. <http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/militant-islamist-networks-west>.

³¹ See McRoy (2006), pp.194-6, 198, cited in Jeffrey M. Bale, ‘Hiding in Plain Sight: “Londonistan” as an Example of Islamist “Bases” in the West’, an unpublished, undated paper provided by Bale to the thesis author. This paper is an extended version of Bale (2007).

³² Vidino (2009b), pp.165–176, and Vidino (2010), pp.15-16.

³³ Quilliam (2010).

³⁴ Bale, ‘Militant Islamist Networks in the West’.

groups may foster radicalisation, which can lead to terrorism, through the inculcation within Muslim communities of separatist values and a perception of a war on Islam.

An ideological movement or a covert organisation?

The notion of a participationist or revivalist Islamist movement in the West has been most explicitly conceived and written about most extensively by Lorenzo Vidino. In his view, such a movement exists ‘composed of the networks that trace their roots to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups [including Jama’at-i-Islami] that, while publicly purporting to support democracy and the integration of Muslim communities within the European mainstream, quietly work to radicalise Europe’s Muslim population’.³⁵ Vidino acknowledges that the ‘legacy groups’ of Jama’at-i-Islami have a distinct cultural and historical trajectory from those of the Muslim Brotherhood, but argues that they have been integral to the Ikhwan’s transformation from a nationally-focused organisation based in Cairo to ‘an informal transnational movement’ with a presence throughout Europe and North America.³⁶

In order to distinguish this movement in the West from the original Egyptian organisation, and to identify it as ‘an ideological movement that transcends formal affiliation’, Vidino refers to it as the ‘New Western Muslim Brotherhood’.³⁷ He cites the statements of various Brotherhood leaders to support his view of the global Muslim Brotherhood as an ideological movement rather than an international organisation.³⁸ Youssef Nada, formerly the Brotherhood’s chief finance officer, for example, describes the Brotherhood as a ‘common way of thinking’.³⁹ Mohammed Akef, a former *murshid* of the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood, states, ‘We do not have an international organization; we have an organization through our perception of things’.⁴⁰

³⁵ Vidino (2009b), p.165.

³⁶ Vidino (2010), pp.41-53, emphasis added.

³⁷ Ibid. p.41. See also Vidino (2011).

³⁸ Vidino (2010), p.52.

³⁹ Ibid., p.42.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Vidino argues that ‘there is no formal Muslim Brotherhood organization in the West ... The idea of creating a global movement rather than a formally structured organisation has been present since the early days’.⁴¹ The groups under the movement’s broad umbrella, he claims, ‘work according to a common vision but in complete operational independence’.⁴² He elaborates his understanding of the movement as follows:

There are consultations and constant communication, but each is free to pursue its goals as it deems appropriate. Therefore the international Muslim Brotherhood is today most properly identified not as a group or even a loose federation, but simply as an ideological movement, in which different branches choose their own tactics to achieve their short-term goals in complete independence. What binds them together is a deep belief in Islam as a comprehensive way of life that, in the long term, they hope to turn into a political system using different methods in different times and places.⁴³

This characterisation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a global movement has been criticised by Steven Merley, founder and editor of *The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch*. Merley sees no evidence for the assertion that the Brotherhood is simply an ideological movement whose entities operate completely independently. ‘[T]he Brotherhood,’ he counters, ‘is, at it heart, *a covert organization* and their [sic] are few reasons to accept and many reasons not to accept their statements about themselves at face value. Where actual evidence exists, it points to a far more sophisticated organizational structure than admitted to by the Muslim Brotherhood itself.’⁴⁴

The evidence that Merley refers to includes documents written in Arabic released as part of the Holy Land Foundation terrorism financing trial in the United States,

⁴¹ Ibid., pp.38-39.

⁴² Ibid., p.40

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ *Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report*, ‘ANALYSIS: The Global Muslim Brotherhood Is No ‘Myth’’, March 6, 2011, emphasis added. <http://globalmbreport.org/?p=4047>.

which ended in 2008 with the conviction of five prominent American Muslim Brotherhood leaders.⁴⁵ He argues,

Prior to the release of the documents, it was clear that the various organizations and individuals comprising the U.S. Brotherhood were networking extensively with each other but the existence of leadership structures could only be the subject of speculation. Now however, three of the documents shed light on such structures, at least as they existed at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s.⁴⁶

These leadership structures, Merley asserts, are comprised of both covert and public entities. The covert entities include the position of a General Guide for the entire U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, a Shura Council (advisory body) and various committees.⁴⁷ These appear in a document dated December 1988, entitled *Preliminary vision for preparing future leadership*, along with a list of organisations, which Merley says includes ‘almost all of the known Brotherhood organizations such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) and the Muslim Student Association (MSA)’.⁴⁸ Together, these covert and public entities are listed in the document as the ‘Apparatuses’, which, Merley says, is ‘a common word used by the Brotherhood for its organizations’.⁴⁹

Another of the documents Merley refers to, written by Mohamed Akram and dated May 22, 1991, is entitled *An Explanatory Memorandum, On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America*. It contains a similar list of organisations, explicitly referred to as belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood or the Brotherhood’s ‘friends’. These are acknowledged in the document as part of ‘the global Islamic Movement’ working towards the goal of a ‘global Islamic state’.⁵⁰ It also describes a strategy for the Brotherhood in North America to attain this goal in terms of a

⁴⁵ *Investigative Project on Terrorism*, ‘HLF Founders Sentenced to Long Prison Terms,’ May 27, 2009. <http://www.investigativeproject.org/1046/hlf-founders-sentenced-to-long-prison-terms>.

⁴⁶ *Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report*, ‘ANALYSIS: Holy Land Documents Point to Covert Muslim Brotherhood Structure In The U.S.’, August 29, 2007. <http://globalmbreport.org/?p=184>.

⁴⁷ *Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report*, ‘ANALYSIS: The Global Muslim Brotherhood Is No “Myth”’.

⁴⁸ *Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report*, ‘ANALYSIS: Holy Land Documents Point to Covert Muslim Brotherhood Structure In The U.S.’.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Akram (1991), pp.7, 5, emphasis added.

‘Civilization-Jihadist Process’ for establishing Islam as a ‘civilization alternative’. It states:

The Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] must understand that their work in America is *a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within* and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion [Islam] is made victorious over all other religions.⁵¹

Seemingly in support of Merley’s contention, this document states that the ‘heart and core’ of the Brotherhood’s strategy for the United States is a shift from the prioritisation of ideas to that of organisations.⁵² But the claim that these documents demonstrate a covert leadership structure to the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States or globally is not as evident as Merley maintains.

Akram’s memorandum makes a clear distinction between, on one hand, a desired structure of organisations, including specific roles for each organisational component, and, on the other, already existing public Brotherhood organisations—referred to as ‘seeds’—which may or may not come to function within this desired structure as its components in their respective roles. The document concedes that ‘the global Movement has not succeeded yet in “distributing roles” to its Branches’ and acknowledges that the Brotherhood organisations are *not* working ‘according to one plan’. As such, the strategy outlined for non-violent *jihad* in America resembles not so much an executable programme for an established organisational entity—a ‘covert organization’—than an expression of desire for the construction of *precisely* such an entity, referred to in the document as a ‘Group of organizations’.

1.2. The ‘westward expansion’ of the Muslim Brotherhood

Merley’s claim that the global Muslim Brotherhood is a covert organisation may not be supported by the evidence he presents. But this does not undermine the notion of the Brotherhood as a movement since, as this thesis will argue, the struggle to establish a vanguard to promote an alternative vision of society is a key stake in

⁵¹ Akram (1991), p.7, emphasis added.

⁵² Ibid., pp.6, 11-12.

social movement conflicts. Additionally, a high degree of organisation and coordination dating back to the early 1970s between cadres from the Ikhwan and Jama'at in Europe and North America, resulting in the creation of numerous institutions, supports the view of a movement in the West. This trans-ethnic networking, the plans that were produced through such networking, the consistency of the goals and methods these plans expressed, and the fruits of such plans, all testify to the emergence of the global Muslim Brotherhood movement across the United States and Europe, including Britain.

Johnson provides the most illuminating account of this networked 'westward expansion' of the global Muslim Brotherhood, incorporating Jama'at-i-Islami, in a series of articles and a book, *A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the CIA and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West*.⁵³ The first meeting dedicated to 'forming a framework for Islamism in Europe',⁵⁴ he observes, was held in London in 1973. Present at this meeting was Ghaleb Himmat, the newly appointed head of the Munich mosque—which Johnson says was to become 'the most important Muslim Brotherhood mosque in Europe'—and Khurshid Ahmad, a senior figure in Jama'at-i-Islami Pakistan who, in the same year, established one of Britain's most prominent Islamic institutions, the Islamic Foundation.

In 1977, a follow up meeting was held in Lugano, Switzerland, to 'set up a structure to guide the growth of political Islam in Europe and the United States'.⁵⁵ Amongst the 30 or so Islamist figures attending the meeting alongside Himmat and Ahmad, Johnson notes, were Yusuf al-Qaradawi, widely considered as the spiritual guide of the Brotherhood, Youseff Nada and Ismail Faruqi. To give the nascent Western Brotherhood movement some 'ideological firepower', Johnson says, the group

⁵³ See Ian Johnson, 'Islamic group's ties reveal Europe's challenge', *The Wall Street Journal*, December 29, 2005. <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05363/629642.stm>; Ian Johnson, 'Big Brotherhood is Watching', *Foreign Policy*, May 26, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/26/big_brotherhood_is_watching; Johnson (2008); and Johnson (2010).

⁵⁴ Johnson (2010), p.41.

⁵⁵ Johnson (2008), p.77. See also Johnson (2010), pp.195-196, and Vidino (2010), pp.34-35.

quickly established a number of Islamic think tanks, the most important being the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), established by Faruqi in 1981.⁵⁶

Vidino writes that during the 1970s, building on the initial organisational efforts of the Mawdudists in the 1960s and early-1970s, an Islamic revivalist network transcending ethnic lines began to form across Britain and continental Europe.⁵⁷ In 1973, the same year that the Islamic Foundation was established, Europe's first 'umma-centric' Islamist organisation was created in London, with the support of Saudi Arabia and other Muslim states: the Islamic Council of Europe (ICE). Several years later, in an early sign of collaboration between Ikhwani and Jama'ati activists, Ahmad served on the executive board of ICE alongside Hasan al-Banna's son-in-law, Said Ramadan. Further consolidating the relationship between the Ikhwan and Jama'at groups, in 1982, Ahmad and another Jama'at activist and Islamic Foundation colleague, Khurram Murad, joined the governing council of the Brotherhood-dominated Munich mosque, which Johnson says played a key role in the growth of the European Brotherhood network.⁵⁸

David Rich, in a 2010 article entitled *The Very Model of a British Muslim Brotherhood*, observes that ICE organised a number of meetings and conferences throughout the 1970s to bring Islamist thinkers and activists of various nationalities together to create, in ICE leader Salem Azzam's words, a 'theoretical basis for an Umma-wide political movement'.⁵⁹ For some analysts, the basis of this movement consisted not merely in the theoretical justification for the global politicisation of Islam, but also in the development of practical plans for the 'Islamisation' of the West, beginning with the insulation of Muslim communities. Patrick Sookhdeo, for example, notes that in July 1978, ICE organised a conference on Muslim minorities in non-Muslim states where 'a careful and deliberate strategy by certain Muslim leaders' was presented that urged Muslims to resist assimilation and organise themselves according to Islamic principles. Sookhdeo states, 'The ultimate goal of

⁵⁶ Johnson (2008), p.78.

⁵⁷ Vidino (2010), pp.32-34.

⁵⁸ Johnson (2008), pp.72, 76; Johnson (2010), p.197; and Vidino, *ibid.*, p.34.

⁵⁹ 'Salem Azzam (1924-2008)', *The Muslim Weekly*, February 22, 2008, p.15, cited in Rich (2010), p.118, emphasis added.

this strategy is that the Muslims should become a majority and the entire nation be governed according to Islam.’⁶⁰

Some observers, such as Alyssa Lappen, note a continuity of such strategies for Islam’s conquest of the West, including a plan detailed in documents seized by the Swiss police in November 2001 from the home of Nada in Lugano, where he was director of the Brotherhood-created al-Taqwa Bank.⁶¹ Self-described as ‘a global vision of a worldwide strategy for Islamic policy’,⁶² *The Project*, as it became known in counter-terrorism circles, dates back to 1982.⁶³ It amounts to a fairly comprehensive blueprint for ‘civilisational’ *jihad* with the long-term goal, expressed in its own words, of ‘establish[ing] an Islamic power [government] on the earth’.⁶⁴ Consistent with the Brotherhood’s gradualist approach, as described by Sookhdeo above, this document states that its goal of establishing an Islamic state must be worked towards ‘in parallel with gradual efforts aimed at gaining control of local power centers through institutional action’.⁶⁵

The Project’s contents resonate with both the 1991 document and with al-Qaradawi’s writings, particularly a treatise published in 1990 entitled *Priorities for the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*, which Vidino describes as ‘the most recent manifesto of the Islamist revivalist movement’.⁶⁶ In this document, al-Qaradawi calls for a reinstatement of the Islamic caliphate and introduces a *modus*

⁶⁰ Patrick Sookhdeo, ‘The Islamization of Europe’, *Virtueonline*, August 11, 2005, <http://www.virtueonline.org/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2872#.UqkiaGQW1mF>.

⁶¹ Lappen (2010).

⁶² Patrick Poole, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood “Project”’, Scott Burgess (trans.), *FrontPageMagazine.com*, May 11, 2006. <http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=4476>.

⁶³ It wasn’t until October 2005, with the publication of Sylvain Besson’s *La conquête de l’Occident: Le projet secret des Islamistes (The Conquest of the West: The Islamists’ Secret Project)*, that *The Project* was finally made public. The first English translation appeared a year later in 2006.

⁶⁴ Quoted from *The Project* in Patrick Poole, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood “Project” (continued)’, Scott Burgess (trans.), *FrontPageMagazine.com*, May 11, 2006, <http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=4475>.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Vidino (2006), p.22. This is indeed an important treatise, but a more recent manifesto for Islamic revivalism, and one that is more relevant to Britain, is Zahid Parvez’s ‘*Building a New Society: An Islamic Approach to Social Change*’, published in 2007 by the Islamic Foundation. For more on this, see Chapter 4.

operandi for the movement, which includes strengthening the *umma* intellectually and politically towards this long-term goal.

Al-Qaradawi is considered by many observers, including Vidino and Merley, as the most important intellectual figure of the global Muslim Brotherhood. Vidino describes him as ‘the undisputed spiritual leader of the global and Western Brotherhood’.⁶⁷ ‘[C]onsistent ideological references and any organizational link to him,’ writes Vidino, ‘are good indicators of an affiliation’ to the movement.⁶⁸ For al-Qaradawi, Muslim settlement in the West is a religious necessity and obligation for the global ‘Islamic Movement’, leading to the unification of the *umma* and, ultimately, the global supremacy of the *shari’a*. An organised voice, he urges, is important to convince Western leaders that Muslims in Muslim-majority countries have a right to live by *shari’a* values and tenets.⁶⁹ But settlement in the West, for al-Qaradawi, is not just a vehicle for the ‘true’ Islamisation of Muslim-majority countries—it is also a vehicle for the Islamisation of the relatively new host societies.

The ultimate goal of al-Qaradawi’s strategy in Muslim-minority lands, to which Vidino refers, is nothing less than Islamic conquest.⁷⁰ ‘We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America,’ the cleric exclaims, ‘not through the sword but through Dawa. Dawa will work through Islamic groups set up by Brotherhood supporters.’⁷¹ Al-Qaradawi does not merely advocate the ‘preservation’ of Muslim identity and influence upon Western governmental policy in the interests of the *umma*. He calls for a new kind of *jihad* relevant to the predicament of Muslims living as minorities in the West, making it clear that no form of *jihad*, including the non-violent type, can be detached from the overall effort to universalise the *shari’a*.⁷²

⁶⁷ Vidino (2011), p.11

⁶⁸ Vidino (2010), p.50.

⁶⁹ al-Qaradawi (2002), p.159.

⁷⁰ Vidino (2010), p.92. See also Vidino (2009b), p.165.

⁷¹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, MAYA Conference, 1995, Toledo, Ohio, U.S., cited in Emerson Vermaat, ‘Dutch Security Service warns against Muslim Brotherhood’s clandestine infiltration tactics,’ *Militant Islam Monitor*, December 19, 2007. <http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/3293>.

⁷² ‘*Jihad*,’ proclaims al-Qaradawi, ‘may be educational, journalistic, social, economic, or political *jihad* as much as military *jihad*. We must remember that in all kinds of *jihad*, the essential condition is

Vidino and Johnson characterise the Muslim Brotherhood in the West as pragmatically focused on its short- and medium-term goals of, in Johnson's words, 'dominat[ing] the West's Muslim communities', rather than its long-term goal of 'Islamiciz[ing] mainstream society', since the latter is simply 'too ambitious a task at this point'.⁷³ Its primary means to do this, they argue, has been through institution building.

Indeed, what appears to demonstrate the existence of the global Muslim Brotherhood as a movement in the West is not just an uncanny continuity in aspirations and methods expressed in *The Project*, in al-Qaradawi's *Priorities* and in Akram's 1991 memorandum. It is also the recognisable correspondence between what these documents advocate and what has actually taken place on the ground in Europe and North America in recent decades. Vidino notes that the aforementioned plans 'seem to perfectly describe what has been the *modus operandi* of the New Western Brotherhood over the last twenty to thirty years'.⁷⁴ He observes that the Brothers have 'created a sprawling network of Islamic organizations devoted to all the possible needs of the Western Muslim population, from the purely religious to the more mundane'.⁷⁵ The most important of these in Europe include the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe—widely considered as the Brotherhood's key institution in the West—as well as the European Council for Fatwa and Research, led by al-Qaradawi, which dispenses legal guidance for Muslims living in the Muslim-minority context of today's Europe.

2. The global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain

Some of the key literature that addresses participationist Islamism in Britain refers to two separate but related movements associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i-Islami. Michael Whine, for example, identifies two 'streams of Islamist

that *the action helps make God's word supreme on earth ...* The most important form of *jihad* today is *serious, purposive organized work to re-build the Islamic society and state and to implement the Islamic way of life in the political, cultural, and economic areas ...*' See al Qaradawi (1999), pp.76, 70, emphasis added.

⁷³ Johnson (2010), p.200.

⁷⁴ Vidino (2010), p.80.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

ideology' related to these groups as having the most active foreign influence upon 'British Islam'.⁷⁶ In a 2009 Policy Exchange report critical of the British government's engagement with certain Muslim organisations, its authors Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton analyse Islamism in Britain along similar lines:

Broadly speaking, Islamist groups currently operating in Britain originate from two major revivalist networks that emerged in the early twentieth century: the Muslim Brotherhood, which started in Egypt, and the Jamaat-e-Islami, whose origins lie in colonial India.⁷⁷

Maher and Frampton identify a number of organisations in Britain as part of each movement. Under the heading of Jama'at-i-Islami, they include the Islamic Foundation, which they say was established by Jama'at activists to promote 'Islamist ideas throughout the West' and support 'the Jamaat's global political activism'.⁷⁸ They also include the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE), which they describe as operated by the Foundation to 'develop the Jamaat's political ideas'.⁷⁹ Under the heading of the Muslim Brotherhood, Maher and Frampton include the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), established in 1997 by the former Brotherhood spokesman in Europe, Kamal al-Helbawy; the Cordoba Foundation, established in 2005 and directed by former MAB secretary general, Anas Altikriti; and the British Muslim Initiative, formed in 2006 by a group of former MAB leaders, including Altikriti.⁸⁰

Whine, Maher and Frampton are not alone in dividing Islamism in Britain into two streams. Other observers similarly observe the historical and organisational connections between certain actors in Britain and the Ikhwan or Jama'at. These observations are detailed below. Following this is an examination of the extent to which these two distinct streams of Islamist activism comprise one, overarching movement in Britain. For, some analysts have recognised the collaboration between individuals and organisations across Ikhwan-Jama'at lines as indicative of a singular

⁷⁶ Whine (2005), p.52.

⁷⁷ Maher and Frampton (2009), p.19.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.22.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.23.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp.20-21.

movement. Although such a movement comprised of Ikhwan- and Jama'at-associated activists and groups is not commonly written of in explicit terms, it is at least suggested in how these groups are jointly classified.

2.1. The Mawdudists

Jørgen S. Nielsen identifies four British Muslim organisations as developed by Jama'at-i Islami. In addition to the Islamic Foundation, these are the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), founded in 1962; the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), created by UKIM in 1966; and Young Muslims UK (YM), an offshoot of the Foundation, established in 1984.⁸¹ Gilles Kepel similarly describes the Islamic Foundation, UKIM and YM as 'belonging to Mawdudi's Jama'at-i Islami movement' in Britain.⁸² Nielsen describes the four organisations as 'Jama'at-related' to emphasise a lack of formal ties to the Pakistani parent organisation.⁸³

Ron Geaves supports this view, adding, 'These organizations have close informal links with Jamaat-i Islami in the [Indian] sub-continent but their allegiance is increasingly given to the "Islamic Movement" worldwide', which he recognises as being comprised from both Jama'at-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood.⁸⁴ In addition to those listed by Nielsen, Anthony McRoy describes the 'Mawdudist network in Britain' as including the East London Mosque, which Vidino describes as the network's headquarters;⁸⁵ the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB); Islamic Forum Europe (IFE); and the Young Muslims Organisation (YMO).⁸⁶ Each of these individual organisations has been described by political observers as Islamist or having Islamist connections.

UKIM, for example, has been described by McRoy as the 'parent Mawdudist group in Britain',⁸⁷ and by Vidino as the 'original embryo of the Mawdudist network'.⁸⁸

⁸¹ Nielsen (1989), p.232, cited in Geaves (1995), p.195.

⁸² Kepel (1997), p.131.

⁸³ Nielsen (1992), p.136, cited in Geaves (1995), p.187.

⁸⁴ Geaves (1995), p.195.

⁸⁵ Vidino (2010), p.117.

⁸⁶ McRoy (2006), p.166.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.167.

Kepel refers to the organisation's literature in describing its goals and methods: UKIM, he notes, defines itself as 'an ideological organization. It believes that Islam is a comprehensive way of life which must be translated into action in all sphere of life'.⁸⁹ The purpose of UKIM, according to its constitution, he observes, is 'to establish [an] Islamic social order in the United Kingdom'.⁹⁰ Geaves acknowledges the practical constraints upon the organisation to transform Britain into an Islamic state and suggests that for this reason it focuses upon education and *da'wa* within Muslim communities aimed at the preservation of Muslim identity.⁹¹

In order to widen its appeal, Kepel writes, UKIM established MET and the Islamic Foundation. Geaves observes that MET 'is the oldest national Muslim educational organization in Britain dealing with the concerns of Muslims in regard to the education of their children'.⁹² Kepel describes MET as engaged in the 'Islamization' of education in state schools.⁹³ MET has been active in providing teachers for Islamic studies in state schools, producing literature for use by teachers around the world. 'Its many publications,' Kepel writes, 'define the content and form of education designed to perpetuate a specific Islamic cultural identity and to prevent the assimilation of Muslim children into British society'.⁹⁴ MET is led by Ghulam Sarwar, who Kepel recognises as devoting 'his energies to the propagation of Islam throughout the world'.⁹⁵

Kepel describes the Islamic Foundation as the 'secular arm' of 'the Islamist movement inspired by Mawdudi's Jama'at-i Islami' and as 'one of the most important centres for the propagation of militant Sunni Islamist thinking in the world'.⁹⁶ The Foundation—in addition to housing MIHE, which offers degrees and

⁸⁸ Vidino (2010), p.116.

⁸⁹ Kepel (1997), p.131.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Geaves (1995), p.197.

⁹² Ibid., p.205.

⁹³ Kepel (1997), p.122.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.110.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 130, 132-133.

diplomas as an Associate College of the University of Gloucestershire—incorporates a think tank, The Policy Research Centre, which aims to shape government policy on matters relating to Muslims in Britain, and a publishing house, currently incorporated as Kube Publishing Ltd. Since 1976, the Foundation has also housed an Islamic Economics Unit for the promotion of Islamic economics, finance and banking as both a topic of academic study and as a commercial practice.

The Foundation's production and dissemination of pro-Mawdudi and pro-Qutb material, Kepel asserts, has exerted a significant influence on the development of Muslim identity in Britain, particularly amongst Muslim youth.⁹⁷ Following Kepel, Vidino describes the Foundation as the 'crown jewel' of the 'Mawdudist network' and 'a beacon for the spread of Islamist thought in the West'.⁹⁸ Whine writes in similar terms of the Foundation as 'the UK center' for Jama'at-i-Islami.⁹⁹ Kepel remarks that the training courses provided by the Foundation for public officials, 'constitute a vital element in the [Islamist] movement's strategy aimed at achieving hegemony in the Islamic field'.¹⁰⁰ He notes that the first two directors—including Khurshid Ahmad—were officers of Jama'at-i-Islami. Today, Ahmad is Vice President of Jama'at-i-Islami Pakistan and remains the chair of the Foundation. As noted above, he is seen as a key figure in the development of the global Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.

Another key figure of the Islamic Foundation recognised in the literature as having played a significant role in the development of Islamism in Britain and Europe is the late Khurram Murad, referred to by Vidino as a 'Brotherhood dawa strategist',¹⁰¹ and by McRoy as 'the main ideologue of da'wah in Britain'.¹⁰² In 1978, Murad, became the director general of the Foundation, which, he asserted, 'perpetually aims at Islamic resurgence in the world'.¹⁰³ He is considered to have written some of the

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.122, 132-133

⁹⁸ Vidino (2010), p.117.

⁹⁹ Whine (2006), p.34.

¹⁰⁰ Kepel (1997), p.133.

¹⁰¹ Vidino (2010), p.92.

¹⁰² McRoy (2006), p.118.

¹⁰³ Interview with Khurram Murad, cited in Ali (1996), p.84.

most important works on Islam's place in Europe, including *The Islamic Movement in the West: Reflections on Some Issues* and *Dawah Among Non-Muslims in the West*.¹⁰⁴

According to Nina Wiedl, Murad shared with the Muslim Brotherhood an understanding of *da'wa* as an 'inherently political activity ... leading to the eventual establishment of an Islamic state'.¹⁰⁵ She observes Murad's description of *da'wa* as having two objectives. These are, she writes, firstly, to preserve Muslim identity in a secular society whose values are deemed threatening to Islam as a 'way of life', and, secondly, to spread Islam beyond Muslim communities to the West's native non-Muslim population.¹⁰⁶ Wiedl recognises the broad correspondence between these two objectives and al-Qaradawi's vision for the West. These objectives also align with the two-stage strategy for Muslims in Europe expressed by M. Ali Kettani at the ICE conference held in 1978, referred to by Patrick Sookhdeo as a plan for the Islamic control of Europe's social structures.¹⁰⁷

In the words of Zahoor Qureshi, Murad established YM as the vehicle to carry out the mission of 'present[ing] Islam to the British population as an alternative way of life'.¹⁰⁸ Its founding committee, McRoy notes, was trained at the Islamic Foundation.¹⁰⁹ McRoy observes from the organisation's own literature that it supports *jihad*, seen as a war against the *kuffar*,¹¹⁰ in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir and Palestine, as well as the restoration of the caliphate.¹¹¹ YM's national leader was

¹⁰⁴ See Murad (1981) and Murad (1986).

¹⁰⁵ Wiedl (2009), p.120.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. pp.124-125.

¹⁰⁷ See Kettani (1980), pp.96-105.

¹⁰⁸ Qureshi, 'Building Foundations in the West', *Q-News*, No. 251-254 February 1997, p.21, cited in McRoy (2006), p.119.

¹⁰⁹ McRoy (2006), p.119-120.

¹¹⁰ *Kuffar* (singular: *kafir*) is the most common word in Arabic used for non-Muslims within the Quran. Mawdudi explains the significance of the root word, *kufir*, as follows: '*Kufr* literally means "to cover" or "to conceal." The man who denies God is called *Kafir* (concealer) because he conceals *by his disbelief* what is inherent in his nature ... [O]ne who disobeys God and resorts to *Kufr* is the person who perpetrates the greatest injustice.' See Abul Ala Mawdudi (1980), quoted in Bat Ye'or (2002), p.197.

¹¹¹ McRoy (2006), p.168.

Murad's son, Farooq, a founding member of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), of which he was director general between June 2010 and June 2014.

The Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) was created in 1988, by the Bangladeshi wing of Jama'at-i-Islami.¹¹² Journalist Andrew Gilligan describes IFE a 'secretive, fundamentalist political network.'¹¹³ The blog *Harry's place* refers to IFE as the 'British section' of Jama'at-i-Islami.¹¹⁴ Located at the East London Mosque, IFE is a politically active organisation and, as revealed by Gilligan, was instrumental in Respect Party George Galloway's 2005 election in the London Borough of Bethnal Green and Bow.¹¹⁵ Gilligan claims to have obtained IFE documents that explicitly state its strategic objective as 'the establishment of a global society, the Khilafah [caliphate] ... comprised of individuals who live by the principles of ... the Shari'ah.' In these documents, IFE states that it is dedicated to changing the 'very infrastructure of [British] society, its institutions, its culture, its political order and its creed ... from ignorance to Islam.'¹¹⁶

IFE's 'parent organisation', the East London Mosque (ELM), is also considered by numerous analysts as a key institution within the Mawdudist stream of the global Muslim Brotherhood. It was the meeting place for the Mawdudist intellectuals who formed the first Islamist organisation in Britain, UKIM.¹¹⁷ In recent years it has courted controversy over its invitation of radical preachers, including the now-deceased al-Qaeda ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki.¹¹⁸ It is one of a number of mosques

¹¹² Bowen (2012), p.112.

¹¹³ Andrew Gilligan, 'Inextricably linked to controversial mosque: the secret world of IFE', *The Telegraph*, February 28, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/labour/7333487/Inextricably-linked-to-controversial-mosque-the-secret-world-of-IFE.html>.

¹¹⁴ Lucy Lips (pseud.), 'Islamic Forum Europe Calls for the Eradication of Israel', *Harry's Place*, November 16, 2012. <http://hurryupharry.org/2012/11/16/islamic-forum-europe-calls-for-the-eradication-of-israel/>.

¹¹⁵ Andrew Gilligan, 'The infiltration of Labour', *The Telegraph*, February 28, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/labour/7333470/The-infiltration-of-Labour.html>.

¹¹⁶ Gilligan, 'Inextricably linked to controversial mosque: the secret world of IFE'. For more on this, see Chapter 4.

¹¹⁷ 'The Founding Mission', *emel*, Issue 99, December 2011, http://emel.com/article?id=108&a_id=2894.

¹¹⁸ Hasan Afzal, 'Extremism in Abdul Bari's Mosque', *The Huffington Post*, September 21, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hasan-afzal/extremism-in-abdul-baris-b_971232.html.

allegedly controlled by the Mawdudist movement, which Vidino claims to host sermons and lectures proclaiming ‘the superiority of Islam and the need to turn Britain, as well as the rest of the world, into an Islamic state’.¹¹⁹

Arguably the most important Muslim organisation in Britain, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), was established in 1997 in the wake of the Rushdie affair. Designed, in founder Iqbal Sacranie’s words, to present ‘a united Muslim voice’, MCB was embraced by Conservative Home Secretary Michael Howard and, after Labour’s victory in 1997, his successor Jack Straw as the key interlocutor for Muslims in Britain.¹²⁰ McRoy states that it is not accurate to designate MCB as a ‘pro-Jama’at front’ due to the diversity of its affiliates.¹²¹ However, its formation, he writes, should be seen as the ‘means to secure the dominance of Mawdudist ideology in British Islam’.¹²² Vidino concurs, noting that ‘the leadership of the organization has traditionally been dominated by individuals from the Mawdudist network whose political and organizational skills have allowed them to overshadow other trends’.¹²³

Other analysts agree. Journalist Martin Bright, for example, writes that the MCB leadership and some of its affiliates ‘sympathise with and have links to’ Jama’at-i-Islami.¹²⁴ Bright quotes Abdul-Rehman Malik, contributing editor of Muslim magazine *Q-News*, as saying that, ‘Many of the affiliates of The Muslim Council of Britain are inspired by Maududi's ideology’.¹²⁵ In written evidence submitted to the Home Affairs Select Committee, The Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank, states that the MCB is ‘closely aligned’ to Jama’at-i-Islami.¹²⁶ It also refers to a Communities and Local Government document from March 2009, which asserts that

¹¹⁹ Vidino (2010), p.118.

¹²⁰ Iqbal Sacranie, quoted in Vidino, *ibid.*, p.122.

¹²¹ McRoy (2006), p.173.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p.121.

¹²³ Vidino (2010), p.122.

¹²⁴ Martin Bright, ‘Radical links of UK’s “moderate” Muslim group’, *The Observer*, August 14, 2005. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/aug/14/religion.immigrationpolicy>.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Henry Jackson Society (2012), p.Ev108.

Jama'at-i-Islami 'helped to create and subsequently dominate the leadership of the MCB'.¹²⁷

2.2. The Ikhwanis

Similarly to how Britain's 'Mawdudist movement' is written about independently from key Arab Muslim figures and their associated organisations, the Muslim Brotherhood in Britain is sometimes written about as an Arab Islamist movement distinct from the Mawdudists, albeit connected to them, comprised of specific organisations. This is a narrower concept of the Brotherhood than that of Vidino's 'New Western Brotherhood', for it emphasises connections to the original organisation of the Ikhwan in Cairo.

According to Michael Whine, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood operates through 'a series of interlocking companies' of mainly Arab origin. These, he says, include the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), the Muslim Welfare Trust, Interpal, the Palestine Return Centre, and the Institute of Islamic Political Thought (IIIT).¹²⁸ Whine describes MAB as the most important of these organisations. He also refers to MAB as 'in effect *the* MB [Muslim Brotherhood] of Britain'.¹²⁹ Vidino prefers to describe MAB as 'a quintessentially New Western Brotherhood organization in its origins, connections and ideology', which highlights its operational independence from the original organisation whilst acknowledging its historical and ideological relationship with it.¹³⁰ He notes that MAB is a 'key member' of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE), 'the Western Brothers' Brussels-based pan-European organization'.¹³¹

MAB's founders and leading figures are recognised by Whine, Vidino, and others as related to the original Muslim Brotherhood organisation, including its founder and first president, Kamal al-Helbawy. Described by one young activist as the 'grand sheikh of the Islamic movement in the UK', al-Helbawy arrived in Britain in 1994 to

¹²⁷ Department for Communities and Local Government (2009), p.40.

¹²⁸ Whine (2006), p.38.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.35, emphasis added.

¹³⁰ Vidino (2010), p.140.

¹³¹ Ibid., p.141.

establish a media and communications centre for the Cairo-based group.¹³² According to John Ware, al-Helbawy came with a political vision, which he expressed in typical Islamist terms, stating, ‘This religion that is Islam shall govern the whole universe, the Islamic civilisation should rule and govern and direct people in every walk of life, but not be governed by others.’¹³³ After a disagreement with the Ikhwani leadership in Egypt, al-Helbawy abandoned the media centre project to establish MAB, which David Rich says ‘has retained a strong Arab influence and has come to be regarded as the British branch of the MB [Muslim Brotherhood] in all but name’.¹³⁴ Rich writes that, through MAB, al-Helbawy has done more than any other to push the Brotherhood ‘into the public arena’.¹³⁵ One of the MAB’s most commonly acknowledged successes was its role, as part of the Stop the War Coalition, in the organisation of public protests in 2002 and 2003 against the allied invasion of Iraq.

Another of MAB’s former leaders is Anas Altikriti, the son of Omar Altikriti, a prominent Ikhwan leader in Iraq. As Maher and Frampton observe, during Altikriti’s tenure as president of MAB in 2004, MAB issued a statement that acknowledged its respect for the ‘humane notions and principles of the Muslim Brotherhood, who [sic] has proven to be an inspiration to Muslims, Arab and otherwise for many decades’.¹³⁶ The statement also acknowledged MAB’s independence from the ‘opinion and line of the Muslim Brotherhood’ organisation. In line with Vidino’s notion of the global Muslim Brotherhood as an ideological movement, Maher and Frampton stress that whilst MAB and other groups do not follow the orders of ‘an Islamist equivalent of the Comintern’ centred in Cairo, they may nevertheless be considered as ‘in step with a *broader movement*, which adheres to Islamist ideology’.¹³⁷ Rich concurs with this view, writing:

¹³² Bowen (2012), p.115.

¹³³ John Ware, ‘Time to Wise Up to the Muslim Brotherhood’, *Standpoint Magazine*, July/August 2013. <http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5082/full>.

¹³⁴ Rich (2010), p.121.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ ‘MAB Responds To Vile Attack’, Islamic Human Rights Commission website, August 13, 2004. <http://www.ihrc.org.uk/show.php?id=1216>.

¹³⁷ Maher and Frampton (2009), p.21, emphasis added.

They are not yet at the state advocated by Kamal Helbawy of operating as an open organization under the MB [Muslim Brotherhood] name, but there is little attempt to disguise the fact that MAB, BMI, and other similar groupings are aligned with the MB *school of thought*, although not, it is often stressed, under its organizational direction.¹³⁸

Altikriti established and currently directs the Cordoba Foundation, described by David Cameron in March 2008 as a ‘front for the Muslim Brotherhood’.¹³⁹ Merley describes Altikriti as a ‘UK Muslim Brotherhood leader’.¹⁴⁰ *The Telegraph*’s Andrew Gilligan refers to Altikriti as ‘the key political lobbyist for the Muslim Brotherhood in Britain’.¹⁴¹ Cameron, Merley and Gilligan’s characterisations invoke a concept of the Brotherhood in the West that is more formally structured than that of the Brotherhood as ideological movement shared by Vidino and Maher and Frampton. In any case, the Cordoba Foundation is conceived as Islamist in negative, critical terms: Gilligan describes it as an ‘extremist’ group that seeks ‘the creation of an Islamic dictatorship, or caliphate, in Europe’.¹⁴² Maher and Frampton describe the organisation less dramatically as an ‘Islamist pressure group’.¹⁴³

Journalist Innes Bowen writes that ‘the Muslim Brotherhood’s British story’ is a ‘tale of how a group of mainly Arab Islamist intellectuals attempted to win the leadership of Britain’s predominantly South Asian, working-class Muslim population’.¹⁴⁴ Again, the Muslim Brotherhood is conceived as an organisational actor with its own historical trajectory, rooted in the politics of Arab North Africa, separate from but connected to Jama’at-i-Islami.

¹³⁸ Rich (2010), p.131, emphasis added.

¹³⁹ ‘David Cameron: Speech to the Community Security Trust’, Conservative website, March 4, 2008. <http://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/599684>.

¹⁴⁰ *The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch*, ‘UK Human Rights Center Tied To UK Muslim Brotherhood Holds Meetings At Parliament’, November 25, 2013. <http://www.globalmbwatch.com/2013/11/25/uk-human-rights-center-tied-uk-muslim-brotherhood-holds-meetings-parliament/>.

¹⁴¹ Andrew Gilligan. ‘Terror-link group met in parliament’, *The Telegraph*, November 23, 2013. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10470307/Terror-link-group-met-in-parliament.html>.

¹⁴² Andrew Gilligan. ‘Terror-link group met in parliament’.

¹⁴³ Maher and Frampton (2009), p.6.

¹⁴⁴ Bowen (2012), p.111.

It is worth mentioning, as Bowen notes, that prior to the creation of MAB, the Cordoba Foundation and other Arab-led organisations in the 1990s and 2000s, the first generally-acknowledged Brotherhood organisations in Britain were established decades before. These include the Muslim Students Society, established in 1961 and the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS), formed the year after. Both still exist today. Said Ramadan, writes David Rich, was a regular visitor to FOSIS in the 1970s. The organisation, he asserts, ‘has been courted constantly’ by the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁴⁵ James Brandon and Raffaello Pantucci, citing FOSIS’s website, state that Ramadan co-founded the organisation.¹⁴⁶

2.3. Islamism in Britain: two streams, one movement

Although the Brotherhood and Jama’at are sometimes written about independently as two distinct movements, ideological and organisational connections are often drawn between the individuals and groups associated with them. Vidino explicitly conceives of a movement in such terms. According to Vidino, these connections, forged in the new milieus of Europe and North America, constitute the two movements into one overarching, ‘multiethnic’ movement that has become deterritorialised from the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent.¹⁴⁷ The Jama’at-i-Islami network, he writes, acts ‘in close cooperation, if not almost complete symbiosis’ with the European Brotherhood, of which, he asserts, it is a ‘fully-fledged member’.¹⁴⁸ A similar view is expressed in the summary document of the British government’s review of the Muslim Brotherhood, which clusters Ikhwani- and Jama’ati-associated groups together in what it calls ‘the UK Brotherhood movement’.¹⁴⁹ The document doesn’t elaborate beyond this passing comment, however. In contrast—because of his view of the global Muslim Brotherhood as a covert organisation rather than an ideological movement—Merley describes the

¹⁴⁵ Rich (2010), p.118.

¹⁴⁶ Brandon and Pantucci (2012), p.19.

¹⁴⁷ Vidino (2012), p.63

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p.64

¹⁴⁹ House of Commons (2015), para.28, p.5.

Mawdudist organisations such as the Islamic Foundation and MCB in terms of ‘acting in concert *with*’ the global Brotherhood.¹⁵⁰

In other analysts’ work, the notion of a singular, participationist Islamist movement is not explicitly conceived, but ideological and organisational links between individuals and groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami are often referred to, implying an overarching movement. Whine, for instance, acknowledges an ‘alliance’ between these two ‘ideological streams’ as ‘a major influence on the Muslim community’.¹⁵¹ Maher and Frampton, after a discussion of the two strands of Islamism, imply a singular movement in their evaluation of the British government’s engagement with MCB and MAB: ‘At the heart of *the* Islamist strategy,’ they write, ‘is a clear agenda: to mould the future direction of British Islam and the Muslim community in Britain.’¹⁵² Bowen, despite placing Arab Islamists as the central protagonists of ‘the Muslim Brotherhood’s story in Britain’, as just mentioned, writes of ‘the Islamic Movement’, invoking an Islamist collective incorporating both the Mawdudist-dominated MCB and the predominantly Arab MAB.¹⁵³ The Henry Jackson Society similarly clusters MCB and MAB, since they both ‘espouse a narrow form of political Islam inspired by the Islamist parties JI and MB’.¹⁵⁴

Supporting the view of an Islamist movement in Britain beyond specific associations with Mawdudi or al-Banna’s original organisations, Gilles Kepel cites Ashan Manazir, the long-time director of the Islamic Foundation, as stating, ‘We belong to *the international Islamic movement*, neither to Jamaat nor to Ikhwan nor to the Refah Party in Turkey—but all of them are our friends.’¹⁵⁵ Manazir played a key role in the two precursor organisations to MCB, firstly, the United Kingdom Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA), which lobbied Thatcher’s government to ban Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses*. Following UKACIA’s dissolution after

¹⁵⁰ See, for example, *The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch*, ‘Muslim Council of Britain’, undated, emphasis added. <http://www.globalmbwatch.com/muslim-council-of-britain/>.

¹⁵¹ Whine (2005), p.50.

¹⁵² Maher and Frampton (2009), pp.24-25, emphasis added.

¹⁵³ Bowen (2012), p.120.

¹⁵⁴ Henry Jackson Society (2012), p.Ev108.

¹⁵⁵ Kepel (1997), p.133, emphasis added.

the Rushdie affair, he was also involved in the group that sprang from it, the National Interim Committee on Muslim Unity (NICMU), which met in 1994 with the explicit intention of creating ‘an organization that Whitehall might find appealing’.¹⁵⁶

Alongside Manazir in NICMU, as a founding committee member, was a young activist, Abdullah Faliq, who today plays a leadership role in a number of allegedly Islamist organisations, including IFE and the Cordoba Foundation. Faliq’s role as head of research for Altikriti’s organisation, as well as his involvement in al-Helbawy’s Centre for the Study of Terrorism, is an example, writes David Rich, of collaboration between the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami, whose activities, he says, ‘often complement each other or *merge into one in Britain*’.¹⁵⁷

According to Vidino, trans-ethnic networking is a key characteristic of the global Muslim Brotherhood movement, as described in the European context earlier. Additional examples in Britain include al-Helbawy’s involvement in helping establish MCB, and his status as a trustee of the Islamic Foundation.¹⁵⁸ Bowen notes that in the 1980s and 1990s, al-Helbawy led a group called the ‘Coordination Committee between Islamic Movements’ and worked closely with the Islamic Foundation’s Khurshid Ahmad ‘to bring together leading representatives of the Islamic Movement from around the world’.¹⁵⁹ From 1988 to 1994, al-Helbawy also worked as an adviser at Ahmad’s Institute of Policy Studies in Islamabad.¹⁶⁰ A more recent example is former MAB leader and Palestinian activist Azzam Tamimi’s tenure as lecturer at the Markfield Institute of Higher Education from 2000 to 2004.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ Malik (2009), p.127.

¹⁵⁷ Rich (2010), p.132, emphasis added.

¹⁵⁸ Vidino (2010), p.140.

¹⁵⁹ Bowen (2012), p.115.

¹⁶⁰ Al-Helbawy biography on the website of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism, of which he is Chairman. <http://www.cfsot.com/index.php?thm=staff>.

¹⁶¹ Azzam Tamimi biography, Institute of Islamic Political Thought website. <http://www.iitpt.com/reviews/Dr%20Azzam%20Tamimi.pdf>.

Not only have certain individuals worked across ethnic divides within the network of Islamist organisations in Britain and abroad. Certain organisations have too. The Brotherhood's European body, the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, was located for some years with the Islamic Foundation at Markfield, 'the UK centre' for Jama'at-i-Islami.¹⁶² This appears for some observers as further evidence of the blurring of the Brotherhood and Jama'at movements in the West into one. 'In this fashion,' writes Whine, 'the two organizations have advanced the ideological link made between them after the Second World War by [Brotherhood ideologue] Said Qutb and Mawlana Maududi.'¹⁶³

3. Religious reform and 'post-Islamism'

Contrary to the notion that a participationist Islamist movement exists in Britain, some academics and other observers of Islam-inspired activism in Britain contend that the organisations often said to comprise the movement are undergoing a transformation in values, ideology and goals. This, they claim, is a result of exposure to the liberal democratic political and social environment in which they have developed for decades. It is particularly evident, they say, in a generational shift as young activists begin to take leadership positions in these organisations, replacing (or working alongside) the founder members who were (or are) more attached to the Islamist politics of the Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, from where they came. One variant of this line of reasoning postulates a development in Muslim politics termed 'post-Islamism'. Another refers to the creation of a 'European Islam' or 'British Islam' in line with the continent's liberal democratic values.

There are several other lines of thought that appear to undermine the notion of an Islamist movement in Britain. These include one that sees a fragmentation of Islamist groups and a dilution of doctrinaire orientations resulting from the Arab Spring. They also include one that doubts the political continuity between al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood and the contemporary organisations typically considered as its offshoots. Another considers such organisations as comprising an ethical, rather than a political, movement.

¹⁶² Whine (2006), p.34.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

3.1. The indigenisation of Islam and a transformation in values

Sara Silvestri claims that ‘Europe’s Islamist groups, which were once focused on their home country or region, are becoming ever more Europeanised and engaged in a process of integration.’¹⁶⁴ She acknowledges the existence of a Muslim Brotherhood network in Europe, embodied by the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE), which she says, is seriously engaged in a ‘process of “Islamising” European culture, though without erasing it’.¹⁶⁵ Citing FIOE’s call for full Muslim participation within European social and political life, as expressed in its Muslims of Europe Charter of 2008, Silvestri claims that

the types of activity initiated by the European branch of the network in this first decade of the new millennium seem to mark a new direction for the movement’s presence in Europe ... it seems as if the original political ideology of the movement lost its significance once it had been transplanted to an alien environment, and needed to be re-elaborated in the light of the new context of Muslims being citizens of Europe.¹⁶⁶

From this hesitant position on the effects of the European environment on the ideology of the Brotherhood, Silvestri makes the point more assertively, stating, ‘there is no doubt that thirty years of the Muslim Brothers’ presence in Europe have ... modified the views and the objectives of the organisation’.¹⁶⁷

Silvestri’s contention connects to a debate on the emergence of a distinctly European Islam, a concept originally expressed by Bassam Tibi in 1992.¹⁶⁸ Tibi advocates a secularised, ‘progressive’ form of Islam, compatible with the West’s liberal democratic culture and institutions. This idea of a European Islam relates to that of a ‘British Islam’, for underlying both concepts is the notion that Islam, in a Muslim-minority environment, is in the process of adapting to liberal, democratic values. It should be said that the literature is important here *not* insofar as it raises the question

¹⁶⁴ Silvestri (2010), p.267.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p.278.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p.284

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p.285.

¹⁶⁸ Tibi (1995).

of a general trend within Islamic doctrine or practice in Britain—there are plenty of interesting examples of ‘progressive’ Islam. It is important, rather, inasmuch as it relates to the extent to which allegedly Islamist organisations in Britain—specifically those who are considered to comprise an Islamist movement—have transformed their values and strategies.

For instance, a recent Pew report states that in Britain,

two groups that were originally inspired by the Jama’at-i Islami—the Islamic Society of Britain and its youth wing, Young Muslims UK—are now, at least to some extent, its rivals. These newer organizations strive to promote a distinctly ‘British Islam’ that combines mainstream civic engagement with, as they see it, a robust and confident Muslim public identity.¹⁶⁹

This notion of a ‘British Islam’ is supported by McRoy. He states that the ideologies of the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), Islamic Forum Europe and their youth wings, as well as Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) ‘originally derive from the teachings of the Jama’at-i-Islami and the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood)’, but adds that ‘their ideologies have been contextualised for the British situation’.¹⁷⁰

ISB, McRoy states, ‘has played a major role in the indigenisation of Islam in the UK’.¹⁷¹ The evidence he provides to substantiate this claim is rather thin, but goes some way to illuminate what he means by contextualisation. He cites the organisation of a convention ‘which proposed a way of harmonising Islam with British life’ and the brochure for it that quotes the Tunisian émigré, Rashid al-Ghannushi on the compatibility of Islam with democracy and on the need for Muslim participation in the British political system.¹⁷² McRoy applies the same perspective to MAB:

Many MAB founders were connected to the *Ikhwan* [Muslim Brotherhood], but they have contextualised their beliefs and praxis for the UK situation. It is vital to

¹⁶⁹ Pew Forum (2010), p.24.

¹⁷⁰ McRoy (2006), p.3.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p.169.

¹⁷² Ibid.

recognise this to understand their policy and strategy ... MAB has a dynamic attitude to ideology that is also governed by its concern to contextualise Islam in the British sphere.¹⁷³

McRoy supports this contention by citing a MAB statement, signed by then-chairman Anas Altikriti, which distances itself from the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Said Qutb. He also cites the work of the former MAB leader and Hamas spokesman, Azzam Tamimi. McRoy describes the ‘current strategy’ of the Muslim Brotherhood, in Tamimi’s words, as the ‘gradual reform of society and state’. It is one, Tamimi asserts, that ‘considers democracy compatible with Islam, and accepts the principle of power sharing’.¹⁷⁴ McRoy omits to mention Tamimi’s contention that Islam cannot be secularised and that ‘Islam loses its purpose’ without ‘shari’ah, the body of laws and regulations’.¹⁷⁵

Along similar lines, Sophie Gilliat-Ray suggests that in recent years the Islamic Foundation, as part of the Islamist movement in Britain, has adopted a more progressive and liberal stance. In 2010, Gilliat-Ray claimed that in the past decade there has been ‘a gradual transition towards a “reformist Islamism”’ resulting from generational changes in the staffing of institutions such as the Foundation’.¹⁷⁶ To support her contention, she refers to an article of Seán McLoughlin, who asserts, ‘Islamic intellectuals and activists in the West are increasingly evolving innovative, cosmopolitan and self-critical reformulations of their tradition.’¹⁷⁷ McLoughlin’s statement is, in fact, a summary of Peter Mandaville’s position, which is based upon interviews with staff members of the Islamic Foundation. McLoughlin cautions that, ‘Mandaville perhaps overstates the widespread acceptance of such a trend in Britain, for any transformations at the IF [Islamic Foundation] are still, in my opinion, very much in transition.’ Nevertheless, he argues—without qualification—that ‘a critical

¹⁷³ Ibid., pp.160, 161.

¹⁷⁴ Azzam Tamimi, ‘Fundamentalism & violence: An Islamic viewpoint’, Institute of Islamic Political Thought website, 2001. <https://web.archive.org/web/20060621094429/http://www.iitpt.com/web/papers/view.htm>.

¹⁷⁵ Azzam Tamimi, ‘Can Islam be Secularized?’, Institute of Islamic Political Thought website, November 2002. <https://web.archive.org/web/20060626002606/http://www.iitpt.com/web/articles/Can%20Islam%20be%20Secularized.htm>.

¹⁷⁶ Gilliat-Ray (2010), p.102.

¹⁷⁷ McLoughlin (2005), p.64. This quotation is partially cited in Gilliat-Ray (2010).

mass hospitable to such perspectives has undoubtedly begun to emerge at the institution'.¹⁷⁸

McLoughlin notes the recognition in the academic literature of the Foundation's transition from being inspired by 'first generation' Islamism, i.e. by the ideas of Mawdudi and Jama'at-i-Islami, to 'the values and experiences of a "second generation" more aware of the global interdependency of "Islam" and the "West"', such as that allegedly expressed by the Foundation's director general, Khurshid Ahmad. He adds that it is necessary to talk of a "'third generation" of (diasporic) intellectual-activists'. These are the "'thirty somethings" of, British-Asian heritage' and converts to Islam, he says, that are particularly visible in the Foundation's research units. For these young activists, he writes, 'concepts such as "the Islamic movement" and "*da'wa*", are all now "up for grabs"', though how this is manifest within the organisation, strategically or operationally, is not explored in McLoughlin's work.¹⁷⁹

McLoughlin acknowledges that 'unlike many of his younger colleagues, Ahmad is still committed to "Islamization from below" and does not exclude the non-Muslim state from such transformation'.¹⁸⁰ In terms typical of Mawdudi and al-Banna's strategic vision, Ahmad, notes McLoughlin, sees the route to the transformation of the state 'through the individual, community and civil society'.¹⁸¹ But Ahmad's view, McLoughlin argues, is increasingly forced to inhabit the same space as views to the contrary. In the 1990s and 2000s, McLoughlin, observes, the Islamic Foundation began to de-emphasise 'its original concern for *da'wa* and counter-cultural Islamization'.¹⁸² This was evident, he writes, in the launch of the Markfield Institute of Higher Education and in the conduct of 'a Home Office-endorsed cultural awareness training programme on Muslims in Britain for non-Muslim professionals'.¹⁸³ But McLoughlin does not explain how education and training

¹⁷⁸ McLoughlin (2005), p.64.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p.65.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid., p.64.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

couldn't possibly be, or be seen as, instruments for '*da'wa* and counter-cultural Islamization'.

According to McLoughlin, the Islamic Foundation is experiencing a transition from 'counter-cultural *da'wa*' to what Gerd Baumann calls 'multicultural convergence', that is, seeking 'same point of agreement [with others]; but ... from its own point of origin, and by its own route'.¹⁸⁴ This is exemplified, McLoughlin says, in a document produced by Nadeem Malik, an ISB member and former Citizen Organising Foundation trainer based at the Foundation. Malik, McLoughlin notes, draws upon Islamic principles and concepts to promote 'civic consciousness and active citizenship by British Muslims', and the 'common' (rather than the 'communal') good, emphasising 'common' (rather than 'Islamic') values.¹⁸⁵ Although McLoughlin's view of the changes within the Islamic Foundation is admittedly modest, the value he places upon Malik's document as a measure of the transformation of values in the organisation is certainly overstated.

The former president of ISB, an associate of Malik, is Dilwar Hussain. Seemingly supporting the aforementioned Pew report and McRoy's claim that ISB has undergone a transformation away from Islamism, Innes Bowen notes that Hussain 'describes a drift towards what he describes as "post-Islamism"'.¹⁸⁶ Whereas, in the 1990s, Hussain found the works of Qutb inspiring, he came to find them dangerous after 9/11. Bowen also notes that in 2009, when it was drawn to ISB's attention that six years previously the organisation had hosted the al-Qaeda-linked cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, it was quick to acknowledge the preacher's increased 'extremism' and disown him.

Hussain is also cited by James Brandon and Raffaello Pantucci as an example of a 'post-Islamist' for his expressed rejection of formerly-held Islamist positions on matters such as the need for an Islamic state. They refer to Hussain's writings, where he calls for 'a shift towards a post-Islamist paradigm among activists in the West'.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Baumann (1999), p.126, cited in McLoughlin (2005), p.66.

¹⁸⁵ McLoughlin (2005), p.65.

¹⁸⁶ Bowen (2012), p.123.

¹⁸⁷ Dilwar Hussain, 'Beyond Islamism', *emel*, Issue 88, January 2012.
http://www.emel.com/article?id=94&a_id=2569. Cited in Brandon and Pantucci (2012), p.38.

In addition to his former role at ISB, Hussain was the long-time director of the Policy Research Centre at the Islamic Foundation (2007-2013). Perhaps McLoughlin's work on the Foundation would have benefitted from including Hussain's shifting political perspective. In their 2009 report for Policy Exchange, Maher and Frampton note that senior government officials have suggested to the think tank that Hussain's 'positive comments represent a gradual, generational shift within the Islamic Foundation'.¹⁸⁸

3.2. The 'Arab Spring' and the fragmentation of British Islamism

According to Brandon and Pantucci, for Hussain and other 'post-Islamists', such as Muslim convert Sarah Joseph, 'doctrinaire Islamism has become increasingly diluted by pragmatic considerations and influenced as well by a range of secular, liberal and democratic ideas, sometimes to the point of no longer being recognizably Islamist'.¹⁸⁹ One of the key catalysts for this transformation within British Islamism, write Brandon and Pantucci, has been the so-called Arab Spring. For Hussain, they observe, the Arab uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East—and the practical need to accommodate a plurality of political voices in the new governmental arrangements—were a sign of the demise of Islamism and its inherent, long-held objective of an Islamic state. They also quote Inayat Bunglawala, former spokesman for MCB, who, in response to the events in Egypt and Tunisia, wrote, 'An "Islamic state" which does not respect the human rights of all its people including freedom of religion and gay rights would necessarily be an unjust state.'¹⁹⁰

Brandon and Pantucci portray an 'increasing trend toward moderation' in Britain encouraged by the Arab uprisings, particularly amongst 'post-Islamists', but they make the broader point that the events of 2011 have 'shak[en] Islamist ideas and sharpen[ed] divisions within the Islamist movement' in Britain: '[T]he Arab uprisings have clearly shaken up the often stagnant waters of British Islamism, catalyzing change and accelerating existing trends; sometimes triggering new

¹⁸⁸ Maher and Frampton (2009), p.83.

¹⁸⁹ Brandon and Pantucci (2012), p.37.

¹⁹⁰ Inayat Bunglawala, 'Terror in Nigeria: Why an "Islamic State" is not the answer', *Inayat's Corner*, January 21, 2012, <http://inayatscorner.wordpress.com/2012/01/21/terror-in-nigeria-why-an-islamic-state-is-not-the-answer/>. Cited in Brandon and Pantucci (2012), p.39.

moderation and pragmatism, in other instances reinforcing existing extremist views.’¹⁹¹ By ‘Islamist movement’, it should be said, they include not just organisations or individuals linked with the ‘participationist’ Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami, but also those associated with the ‘rejectionist’ Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun. It is, thus, unsurprising to note that the divisions in the movement that the authors describe in terms of diverse reactions to the Arab uprisings pre-existed these events abroad.

The divisions are less stark when only participationist individuals and organisations are considered, at least as far as their attitudes towards the role of Islam in the new governments of the region are concerned. According to Brandon and Pantucci, they generally appear more open-minded than the ‘extremist’ activists of Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun. However, the authors note some significant divisions between the participationists, triggered by the uprisings, in terms of their political interests and investments directed outside Britain to North Africa and the Middle East. A number of key Arab figures in British organisations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood have returned to their original countries to become actively involved in the new political arrangements of the region, or have become involved whilst maintaining a base in Britain. Because of this, Brandon and Pantucci state, ‘the leadership of some UK-based Islamist movements—most notably those connected to the Tunisian and Egyptian Brotherhoods—have been weakened or hollowed out’.¹⁹²

These figures include Rashid al-Ghannushi, a former Head of Policy, Media and Public Relations at MCB and frequent speaker at FOSIS events, and Kamal al-Helbawy. Al-Ghannushi, who founded and leads Tunisia’s al-Nahda party, returned to his home country in 2011 to participate in Tunisia’s transition to a democratically elected government. The ‘veteran Muslim Brotherhood member’ al-Helbawy, likewise, became involved in the post-Mubarak political developments of his native Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to participate openly in the country’s democratisation process following decades of being officially banned, even though he then renounced his support for the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. Other British-based Arab Brothers whose original countries did not

¹⁹¹ Brandon and Pantucci (2012), p.40.

¹⁹² Ibid., p.42.

undergo democratic uprisings, note Brandon and Raffaello, have also seized upon the opportunity to advance political causes particular to their countries of origin. Azzam Tamimi, for example, has been ‘visibly invigorated’ by the uprisings, seeing them as a chance to advance the Palestinian cause.

Although Brandon and Pantucci do not claim that there is no global Muslim Brotherhood movement in Britain, they paint a fragmented picture of ‘participationist Islamism’ within the country, exacerbated by events abroad, which might support such a claim. The fragmentation of the putative movement appears most prominently in the diverse political causes outside Britain to which the political capital of key Brotherhood figures has become directed. The involvement of these activists in the national politics of North Africa and the Middle East does seem to undermine the unity of purpose or orientation that the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain, with which they are associated, is assumed to possess. It may not offer conclusive evidence that no such movement exists, for there are Muslim Brotherhood-associated activists, other than the few figures referred to by Brandon and Pantucci, that remain engaged in Britain-focused activism. But it certainly raises the question of the extent to which an Islamist movement comprised of the global Muslim Brotherhood may be said to exist in Britain whilst some of its key activists are channeling their energies to multiple and separate national causes.

3.3. Doubting political lineages and aspirations

In addition to the analysts that portray a transformation in the values and goals of allegedly Islamist organisations, such as McRoy and McLoughlin—and to Brandon and Pantucci, who observe a fragmentation in the ‘Islamist movement’ made more apparent by the Arab uprisings—others seem to question whether these organisations were ever Islamist and doubt their links to the original Muslim Brotherhood or Jama’at-i-Islami organisations. Jytte Klausen, for example, in her study of Muslim elites in Europe, implies that there is no global Muslim Brotherhood movement:

A common misperception is that today’s national Muslim associations are direct descendants in new clothing of an earlier generation of exile organizations from Islamic countries. Muslim organizations that link faith with political advocacy are

often described as the offspring of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, but the label lumps together groups and individuals who have little in common.¹⁹³

A final perspective that appears to undermine the notion of the global Muslim Brotherhood as an ideologically-driven Islamist movement is offered by Brigitte Maréchal. Unlike Klausen, she does not claim the Muslim associations in Europe have no relation to the original Muslim Brotherhood organisation. Yet neither does she see the Brotherhood as an Islamist movement working to introduce the principles of Islamic law into Europe’s social fabric ultimately leading to an Islamic state. ‘As for their relationship to European society,’ she asserts, ‘the brothers do not oppose the nation state, nor do they advocate establishing an Islamic state.’¹⁹⁴ Unlike Silvestri, Maréchal does not assert that the Muslim Brotherhood has become ‘Europeanised’. She remarks, rather, that ‘the movement struggles to insert Islam into European society’, but doesn’t see this struggle as political.¹⁹⁵ This is not to say that she does not see it as politically engaged—it advocates, says Maréchal, active Muslim participation in the state and society—but that the fundamental struggle in which it is engaged is cultural and ethical rather than political. ‘Above all,’ she states, ‘the Brotherhood appears to be a *moral* movement’.¹⁹⁶ What the Brotherhood proposes, she asserts, ‘is an *ethos*. This is understood as an Islamic ethical practice involving a concrete way of acting, rather than an ideology understood as a seamless body of doctrines and dogmas’.¹⁹⁷

4. Assessing the debate for identifying a movement

Chapter one outlined a concept of social movement for assessing whether the organisations and individuals in Britain that are often portrayed as Islamists collectively constitute a movement. To recap, the three elements of this concept are, firstly, an organisational structure of networked individuals and groups; secondly, cultural affinities, including shared values, perspectives, attitudes and practices,

¹⁹³ Klausen (2005), p.12.

¹⁹⁴ Maréchal (2012), p.107.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p.106.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p.107, emphasis added.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p.91, emphasis added.

which form the basis for the network's organisation; and, thirdly, involvement in a double-sided conflict in relation to established authorities that concerns, on one hand, the identity of the group for which the movement is champion, and, on the other, control of the dominant vision and appreciation of the social order. The academic and think tank literature that explicitly or implicitly portrays a cluster of organisations and individuals in Britain as comprising a participationist Islamist movement—the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain—does not reflect an awareness of these interrelated conceptual elements. Nevertheless, the literature presents some valuable insights and information that may be useful for tracing out a movement in Britain in line with them.

Of the three elements, the organisational aspect of the movement—at least as it appears across Europe—is perhaps most comprehensively illustrated by the literature. Organisational connections between the groups and individuals alleged or assumed to comprise the movement are fairly clearly presented, although the existence of a leadership structure, and the extent to which this is formally organised, is not adequately established. Contrary to Jytte Klausen's claim that the organisations 'often described as the offspring of the "Muslim Brotherhood"... have little in common', the literature rather clearly confirms the existence of a politically active, collaborative network of organisations and individuals across Europe, as well as some striking continuities in the themes, ideas and aspirations expressed by them at certain times and places.

The question, however, is how to make sense of this network and these continuities with regard to identifying a movement in Britain. The observations of the personal, organisational, financial and other links shared between the various groups thought to comprise the movement, particularly in the work of Lorenzo Vidino and Steven Merley, are indeed important and useful for tracking the various collaborations of these groups within the contours of the network. But the literature doesn't really answer the question as to whether and how this network constitutes a movement in Britain.

The work that explicitly describes or implicitly invokes a participationist Islamist movement in Britain is generally united in characterising it as composed from two separate 'streams' related to al-Banna and Mawdudi's original organisations. But it

is divided over the extent to which the broader movement in the West within which it is situated is formally structured. This difference is most stark between the work of Merley and Vidino, as previously illustrated. Yet, apart from Merley's criticism of Vidino's perspective cited earlier, it is not discussed in the literature.

This might appear to present a lack of consistency in *what* is being described—a covert organisation in Merley's formulation or an ideological movement in Vidino's. However, this difference might charitably be interpreted as a matter of degree or emphasis, since Merley acknowledges the importance of ideology, and Vidino, whilst eschewing the notion of a central command structure, recognises the importance of organisational links between the groups comprising the movement and even acknowledges what he refers to as a Muslim Brotherhood 'superstructure' in the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe.¹⁹⁸

However, the difference of view regarding the formality of the Brotherhood is evident in other treatments of Islamic revivalism in Britain that less explicitly invoke the existence of a global Muslim Brotherhood movement as the sum of the two aforementioned 'streams'. In some of these analyses—in the work of Michael Whine, for example—the Muslim Brotherhood is seen as 'represented' in Britain by the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). Whilst not going so far as to explicitly endorse Merley's claim of a covert leadership structure in the West, this supports the notion of the Brotherhood as an internationally structured organisation, contrary to Vidino's claim that the New Western Brotherhood is essentially an informal ideological movement. Maher and Frampton's analysis, on the other hand, portrays the Muslim Brotherhood 'stream' in Britain, including MAB, as having the kind of operational independence from the Cairo-based organisation that Vidino perceives.

This lack of clarity on the formal or informal structure of the global Muslim Brotherhood network is accompanied by a lack of analytical rigour regarding how the movement is constituted *as* a movement. The analyses that explicitly characterise or tacitly assume an overarching Islamist movement in Britain and abroad comprised of individuals and organisations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i-Islami take for granted the issue of how such

¹⁹⁸ Vidino (2010), p.50.

organisations and individuals can collectively comprise a movement, something greater than the sum of its parts. Vidino and Merley both list criteria for identifying *organisations* with the global Muslim Brotherhood—they are possibly the only analysts of the Brotherhood to do so—but ignore the matter of how the movement *itself* may be identified.

Vidino's criteria, for example, which includes a group's historical ties with Muslim Brotherhood members and reverence for al-Qaradawi, relate to the identification of certain organisations *with* the movement, not to the identification *of* the movement. Merley takes the same basic approach. Whilst he asks the pertinent question, 'How is the Global Muslim Brotherhood identified?', his answer relates to the question that Vidino's analysis is geared towards, namely, of how a given *group* is identified as part of the movement.¹⁹⁹ 'Useful criteria,' writes Merley, echoing Vidino, 'include the origins and founding of the organization and its leaders, contact and links to other organizations, ideology, and conferences sponsored and/or attended'.²⁰⁰ For both, a global movement is implicitly conceived as the sum of a number of organisations, the inclusion of which is based upon the observation that each shares common historical, ideological and organisational links with an original, forerunner organisation, al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood—or with two if we include Mawdudi's Jama'at-i-Islami.

For Merley, a covert leadership structure is the lynchpin of the movement. But as noted earlier, the evidence he cites to support this contention relates only to the Brotherhood in the United States, is aspirational rather than demonstrative, and quite dated. For Vidino and almost all other analysts affirming a global Islamist movement with a presence in Britain and the West—regardless of their different perspectives upon the formal or informal structure of the movement—the key trait consistently referred to for identifying specific organisations and individuals as part of the Brotherhood movement is ideology, along with a political participatory methodology.

¹⁹⁹ *Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch*, 'FAQ'. <http://www.globalmbwatch.com/faq/>.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

Vidino is explicit that ideological affinities—and a ‘common vision’ as ‘outlined by al Qaradawi’—are what holds the various groups together in the global Muslim Brotherhood as an ‘ideological movement’.²⁰¹ Although he emphasises the ‘heterogeneity’ of the movement he considers each constituent organisation to share the same fundamental ideology and ‘a foundation of commonly accepted principles and goals [that] unites them all’.²⁰² This ideology, Vidino asserts, concerns a desire to apply Islam as a divine ethical code to every aspect of personal and social life, ultimately culminating in an Islamic state. The most important of their shared goals, he observes, at least in the short- to medium-term, are to preserve the Islamic identity of Muslims in the West, and to become the official or *de facto* interlocutors for Muslims in the organisations’ respective countries.²⁰³

This claim is important and incisive, though at face value it is not entirely accurate. As this thesis will show, Muslim identity is not something Brotherhood groups merely seek to preserve. It is something that they seek to define. And it is not true that all Brotherhood groups in Britain seek an interlocutory role. The Muslim Association of Britain, for example, does not. But it does strive to present the ‘correct’ understanding of Islam and represent Muslims’ needs within Muslim communities. The claim that all Brotherhood groups aim to preserve Muslim identity and act as interlocutors may not be exactly accurate, but it touches on some key aspects of the Brotherhood as a movement as conceived in this thesis. It highlights, albeit without explicit reflection, a *symbolic* struggle for the legitimate definition of a constituency and the legitimate authority of a vanguard—key stakes in social movement conflicts. However, the extent to which this struggle for legitimacy is observed in Britain in Vidino’s work, and that of others, is limited.

The analyses and arguments that might be used to support the notion of a participationist Islamist movement in Britain do not offer an unequivocal picture regarding the existence of this movement, but they do provide some useful information. Most importantly, they highlight the connections and activities of the individuals and organisations alleged to comprise it. It is evident from the literature

²⁰¹ Vidino (2010), pp.68, 40.

²⁰² Ibid., p.53.

²⁰³ Ibid., pp.80, 85.

that there has been a history of institution building and collaborative networking in Muslims' collective interests, although this is illuminated most clearly across Europe, leaving plenty of scope for mapping out networks in contemporary Britain, a task taken up in the next chapter. It is also evident from the literature that there have been a number of resounding concerns and themes expressed relating to Muslim identity and needs, but, again, this has been written about most extensively as a European phenomenon.

The work that exists on the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain is actually quite limited or dated. Both Vidino and Merley's work on the movement in Britain comprises a limited slice of a wide-angled look at the movement in the West, rather than an in-depth treatment. Whine and Rich, whilst explicitly addressing the Brotherhood in Britain have each only written a few articles on the subject and these, like McRoy's book, *From Rushdie to 7/7: The Radicalisation of Islam in Britain*, are now almost ten years old. Innes Bowen's more recent book, *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam*, is indeed a useful reference, but only contains two relevant chapters—one on Jama'at-related organisations and another on Arab Muslim Brotherhood-related ones. Pre-supposing their historical and ethnic origins as the most important manner of classifying these groups, it does not examine the issue of a singular network or movement. Like much work on Islamism in Britain, it presents a journalistic history of organisations, pre-categorised within sectarian or ethnic lines.

The arguments that might be amassed to counter the notion of such a movement are equally inconclusive, since they not really concerned with a *movement* as such, but they likewise provide some useful insights. Sara Silvestri is one of a few academics prepared to make sweeping generalisations about the political aspirations of the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement in Europe. But her contention that it has departed from its Islamist origins in terms of its ideology and objectives is dubious. It is founded upon an analysis of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE), rather than an analysis of a network of individuals and groups. Even then, her analysis is focused on FIOE's written statements, not on its activities. To be more precise, it is focused on the *content* of its statements, not on their production or practical role in the relevant fields of social struggle. Silvestri uses the terms

‘movement’, ‘network’ and ‘organisation’ interchangeably, indicating a lack of analytical clarity.

Most studies of Islam-inspired activism that might undermine the notion of the global Muslim Brotherhood as a movement with a presence in Britain are more focused upon specific organisations, such as the Islamic Foundation or the Islamic Society of Britain. As illustrated, these either paint a picture of Islamism as transforming towards Western liberal values or as fragmenting in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011: One line of reasoning observes a re-evaluation of Islam’s place in politics, involving a rejection of the need for an Islamic state, and another notes a breakdown of the movement in Britain as a number of key organisations’ leaders have returned to their original home countries to become involved in the new politics of the region.

However, there has not been a discussion concerning the relative strength of the organisations allegedly reforming within the network of Islamist organisations, and the possible effects of this reformation upon the movement as a whole. And, likewise, there has been no discussion of the possible impact upon the overall movement of a fragmentation of organisations along nationalist lines. The possible tension between a transnational *umma*-centred politics and multiple national politics has not been addressed at either the organisational or movement level.

It may also be said that these arguments are focused upon select individuals within these organisations. Yet, there is no reflection on the relative roles and power of the individuals who are allegedly developing a reformist or British Islam in relation to their colleagues who may remain committed to al-Banna and Mawdudi’s vision of an Islamic society and state. It is unclear, for example, what influence the several ‘thirty-somethings’ in the Islamic Foundation’s research unit have upon the organisation’s strategic direction or its choice of activities and alliances. The recent departure from the Foundation of Dilwar Hussain—a ‘thirty-something’ when he established its research unit—suggests that their influence is not great. Hussain left after many years, in part, because he felt his ability to effect change from within was limited.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴ Interview with Dilwar Hussain, January 15, 2015.

McLoughlin's claim that the Foundation is moving away from 'counter-cultural *da'wa*' may be correct, but it relies heavily upon one document written by Nadeem Malik, who is not even a member of staff at the organisation and whose influence within it is undemonstrated. Such evidence cannot be held to be reliable. That the Foundation's new approach of civic engagement may be a form of *da'wa* serving Islamist interests, albeit a very subtle one, is a possibility that McLoughlin fails to entertain.

Likewise, there is no reflection upon the relative influence within particular organisations, or in the overall movement, of the handful of individuals, such as Rashid al-Ghannushi, who have left Britain to participate in the national politics of the Middle East. Such individuals are actually few within the broader network of Muslim activist organisations and in recent years have not even played a key role in them. Moreover, even if it is true that there has been a transformation of values or aspirations in certain organisations, or that some key activists have diverted their energies to nationalist struggles in the Arab world, this doesn't refute the notion of a participationist Islamist movement as a whole.

Despite falling short of providing a conclusive picture over whether or not an Islamist Brotherhood movement exists in Britain, the arguments that might be mustered to support or undermine the existence of such a movement serve as the critical context from which this thesis emerged. They also serve as its point of departure. They are important because they identify many of the key individuals and groups of interest to this thesis and make the question of an Islamist movement in Britain possible: Without identifying politically active Muslim individuals and organisations—whether progressive, subversive or otherwise—it is unclear how the existence of a movement could be explored. They make the question of a movement interesting too: If the organisations often linked to the Ikhwan and Jama'at-i-Islami comprise a movement at all, it is significant whether it is potentially subversive of or supportive to liberal, democratic norms, i.e. Islamist, 'post-Islamist' or otherwise.

PART II

Chapter 3

Organisation and Leadership: Informal Networks and Formal Bodies

Chapter 1 presented a concept of social movement as combining three interrelated characteristics, namely, organisational networking, shared cultural solidarity, and a conflict of vision and values with institutional authority. The current chapter examines whether or not the key individuals and groups identified from the academic and think tank literature, as well as the news media, as comprising a participationist Islamist movement in Britain possess the first characteristic. That is, it examines the way in which, and the extent to which, these individuals and groups are networked organisationally.

This chapter builds on the literature presented in Chapter 2, which provided a useful illustration of some of these organisational relationships. But it incorporates additional insights gleaned from original interviews conducted by the thesis author with some of the leading Muslim activists within the network, as well as some more recent primary source data, to present a more complete picture of the organisational dimensions of this network. A unique visualisation of the network—comprised of relationships between individuals, between organisations, and between individuals and organisations—using the software application *Gephi* is provided in section three of the chapter. This chapter—novel in its explicit and detailed attention to the question of organisational links between two ‘streams’ of Islamist activism in Britain—concludes that there is a dynamic and enduring network comprised at several interrelated levels.

Although the cultural basis and conflictual aspects of this network are respectively explored in greater depth in Chapters 4 and 5, the relevant organisational parameters of the network that are traced out in the current chapter are marked internally by culture and externally by conflict. This is to say that the kind of organisational

connections and collaborative activities that matter for the purposes of this chapter are not merely political, such as those embodied by coalitions and partnerships working on specific campaigns. They are also cultural, in bringing together individuals with similar ways of perceiving and appreciating the social and political reality beyond any particular issue upon which coalition partners may be in agreement. For this reason, non-Muslim groups are excluded from consideration. The Socialist Workers Party, for example, is not considered part of the network, despite their connection with the Muslim Association of Britain in the Stop the War coalition.

The kind of connections and collaborations that are pertinent for the purposes of this chapter are also conflictual in their orientation to transform social and political realities. This is because such an orientation inevitably brings these individuals and their associated groups into a contentious relationship with authority, whether that is in the form of ways of thinking, regularised practices or the institutions that support them. Muslim groups that are clearly supportive of the social and political status quo, even if some of their staff have previously been involved in groups related to Jama'at-i-Islami or the Ikhwan, are not considered as part of the network. New Horizons in British Islam, a new organisation dedicated to the reform of Muslim thought and practice, for example, is not included, despite the former involvement of its founding chair, Dilwar Hussain, in a number of Jama'at-i-Islami associated organisations, including the Islamic Foundation. This is because Hussain, included in the network diagram because of his former roles, has made an explicit break with Islamism and New Horizons has no apparent contentious orientation to social and political life in Britain.

It is worthy to note these two parameters, since there are numerous organisational and collaborative relationships that might be observed starting with the individuals and groups of concern, not all of which would qualify as constituting a movement.

This chapter observes the working relationships between the relevant individuals and organisations in terms of collaborative activities and intermeshing leadership structures, formal and informal. As this chapter will show, in addition to instances of inter-organisational collaboration are the complex webs of interpersonal relationships between an elite cadre of individuals. Even when these interpersonal relationships

appear indistinguishable from inter-organisational relationships—as is most apparent when a given individual or group exercises clear control over a specific organisation—it is most useful to view them as forming an organised network that cuts *across* the formalised structures of named organisations. These interpersonal relationships form what may be called a *meta-organisational network*: an informal and decentralised network of individuals nested within and inseparable from the organisations that form a broader network viewable in more formal terms.

The elements of this network are not synonymous with organisations, but neither are they simply individuals: They are individuals that have authoritative roles within organisations or influence upon them, but they do not simply communicate and collaborate as representatives of specific organisations. In numerous instances these individuals have roles in multiple organisations, so even when they are officially representing one organisation in a given meeting or communicative exchange, the others for which they also play a key role have a direct, albeit invisible and only latent, involvement. Their connections, even public collaborations, are inseparable from—and fundamentally based upon—informal associations and shared histories. It is these associations and histories that enable the visible, formal structure of an overall network in the shape of organisations, but they are also what guarantee its fluidity. It is these associations and histories that enable the creation of new organisations and campaigns.

The interpersonal relationships of these individuals may be observed not just at the level of co-involvement in activities and events, but also at the level of planning and coordination beyond visible, public collaboration. This might suggest the existence of a vanguard, an elite or core group, driving the overall network, although if there is, its influence within this network is questionable. The core group within the broader network does not comprise a central command structure, but it is clear that the network possesses the basic characteristic of organisational collaboration characteristic of a social movement. This is evident in the co-implementation of activities and, more importantly, in overlapping leadership structures, both formal and informal, despite the absence of a singular command centre.

1. Networking and collaboration

Networking through collaboration may be observed between individuals and organisations in Britain associated with Jama'at-i-Islami, between those associated with the original Muslim Brotherhood, and—most importantly for the recognition of a singular Islamic revivalist network—between individuals and organisations *across* the Jama'at-Ikhwan divide. The relevant literature discussed in the previous chapter acknowledges the emergence of a trans-ethnic network in Europe, including Britain. But the literature leaves plenty of room to illuminate trans-ethnic working relationships in Britain. Lorenzo Vidino's work is arguably the most insightful on the subject of revivalist Islamist groups in the West. This includes British Jama'at-related organisations within what he sees as a broad ideological Brotherhood movement spread across Europe and the United States. But it does not extensively explore this movement in Britain beyond one chapter in his book on the subject.

There are, in fact, few explicit references in the literature to trans-ethnic networking in Britain where specific examples are provided. One exception is in an article, as noted earlier, by David Rich that refers to the work of Abdullah Faliq, who is involved in both Ikhwan-associated organisations, such as the Cordoba Foundation, and Jama'at-associated organisations, including the East London Mosque and the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE). Faliq's portfolio, Rich asserts, demonstrates how the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i-Islami 'often complement each other or merge into one in Britain'.¹ This chapter provides additional examples of such trans-ethnic networking with reference to campaign work, speaking events and publications. Although this does not undermine the importance and strength of ethnic- and linguistic-related networking amongst revivalist individuals and groups, it does, at the very least, question the notion of two distinct movements and suggests a singular network whose present concerns and future orientations are at least as important as its multiple historical lineages.

¹ Rich (2010), p.132, emphasis added.

1.1. Campaigns and other events

Collaborative working relationships between individuals and groups associated with the Ikhwan and Jama'at may be seen in a number of campaigns and other events concerned with the perception and treatment of Muslims as a community—expressed in Quranic terms as the Muslim *umma*—or the perception of Islam itself. These campaigns involving the various revivalist individuals and groups have been spearheaded to raise awareness of social or political issues affecting Muslims or to raise funds to support Muslims suffering from hardship or persecution. Key themes include the predicament of the *umma* and Islamophobia in Britain, Palestine, and the plight of the Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar. These working relationships may also be seen in other events, such as speaking engagements and skills development workshops, and in the sharing of resources, such as venues for events.

Islamophobia is an issue that has for some years brought Muslim groups together in awareness-raising initiatives, sometimes with the purpose of lobbying government for changes in law to protect Muslims from religious discrimination and hatred.² As Chapter 5 will show, Islamophobia also features strongly in their symbolic struggle with the British government over the authority to establish a way of seeing and evaluating social and political reality: Islamophobia blurs the line between anti-Muslim bigotry and the legitimate criticism of what the government refers to as Islamist ‘non-violent extremism’. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)—two key organisations respectively associated with the Jama'at and Ikhwan streams of the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain—were both official supporters of an event held in London in December 2014 organised by the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) entitled, ‘Institutional Islamophobia: A conference to examine state racism and social engineering of the Muslim community’. Just a month earlier MCB and MAB representatives attended a meeting together in Parliament dedicated to tackling Islamophobia.³

² ‘Secretary General’s Report’, report from MCB Eighth Annual General Meeting, May 14, 2005, pp.10-11. Available at http://web.archive.org/web/20111105153148/http://www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/Secretary_General_2005.pdf.

³ ‘Tackling Islamophobia – UAF Roundtable event at Parliament’, MCB website, November 24, 2014. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/tackling-islamophobia-uaf-roundtable-event-parliament/>.

MCB and MAB have both been active in campaigning against Islamophobia for many years. Both organisations were official supporters of a national rally organised in November 2006 by the Ikhwan-associated British Muslim Initiative and the human rights group Liberty to combat the ‘demonisation’ of Muslims and ‘defend freedom of thought, conscience and religion’. Other supporters included IFE, the Cordoba Foundation, IHRC, the Islam Channel, and Dawatul Islam UK and Eire.⁴ The rally marked the beginning of the 13th annually-held Islam Awareness Week, a programme initiated by the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB). In February of the same year, a ‘who’s who’ of British revivalist groups spanning the divide between Jama’at-i-Islami and the Ikhwan organised a public rally to demonstrate against Islamophobia in the wake of the publication in Denmark of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad. The organisers included MAB, IFE, UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), Dawatul Islam, the Federation of Islamic Student Societies (FOSIS), and ISB. Coordinating partners included the East London Mosque’s London Muslim Centre, Young Muslims UK (an offshoot of UKIM), Young Muslims Organisation UK (an offshoot of IFE), and Muslim Welfare House. The event was supported by MCB and sponsored by the Islam Channel.⁵

Islamophobia is an important theme for MCB and MAB, as well as other organisations in the revivalist network in Britain, though the two haven’t often worked jointly to address to it. This is partly due to the different organisational environments that they inhabit, and their different everyday roles and working partners. MCB, as Britain’s ‘national representative Muslim umbrella body’, has understandably taken a more proactive advocacy role in relation to the British government. MAB, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with providing services to its members and spreading what it deems as the correct understanding of Islam.⁶ MCB and MAB most certainly share close links, but this is less in the form of

⁴ ‘Mayor of London to speak at cross party rally to defend religious freedom’, Mayor of London’s website, 17 November 2006. <https://www.london.gov.uk/media/mayor-press-releases/2006/11/mayor-of-london-to-speak-at-cross-party-rally-to-defend>.

⁵ ‘Rally against incitement & Islamophobia’, IFE website, February 7, 2006. <http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=eventitem&itemId=69>; ‘Muslim Students Prepare for Rally in London’, FOSIS website, February 10, 2006. <http://new.fosis.org.uk/fosis-media/press-releases/194-muslim-students-prepare-for-rally-in-london>.

⁶ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

collaborative activities or campaigns and more in the form of personal connections and shared leadership roles within other structures.

MAB's president, Omer El-Hamdoon, for example, is an elected National Council Member of MCB,⁷ alongside former secretary generals Iqbal Sacranie, Muhammad Abdul Bari and Farooq Murad, as well as the Islamic Foundation's director general, Manazir Ahsan.⁸ MCB and MAB are also two of the four founding groups of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), established in 2006 to set standards and establish a system of self-regulation for mosques. As the founding representative of MAB, El-Hamdoon is the vice-chair as well as a trustee of MINAB,⁹ working alongside Shaykh Ibrahim Mogra, MCB's assistant secretary general and current MCB secretary general, Shuja Shafi. These associations have occasionally resulted in collaborations on events.

In December 2011, for example, MAB organised an event in Birmingham with MCB's official support, entitled, 'Creating Hope', aimed at a British Muslim audience.¹⁰ The event featured a number of key speakers from across the Jama'at-Ikhwan divide. These included Rashid al-Ghannushi, co-founder of Tunisia's al-Nahda party; Anas Altikriti, director of the Cordoba Foundation; Zahid Parvez, then director of the UKIM; and Farooq Murad, then secretary general of MCB. Others included Faisal Hanjara of MCB; Mohamed Ali Harrath, director of the Islam Channel; Batool Al-Toma of ISB; and Nabil Ahmed, then president of FOSIS. According to El-Hamdoon, the event aimed to galvanise British Muslims' greater participation in society at all levels, including politics, education and the media.¹¹

Several other examples of Jama'at-Ikhwan collaboration addressing the issue of Islamophobia and the perception of Muslims may be provided. In January 2012,

⁷ 'Muslim Council of Britain Elects New Leadership and Discusses British Values', MCB website, June 15, 2014. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslim-council-of-britain-elects-new-leadership-and-discusses-british-values/>.

⁸ 'Governance', MCB website, April 16, 2014. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/leadership/>.

⁹ 'The Executive Board', MINAB website, web capture from June 5, 2014. <http://web.archive.org/web/20140605083636/http://minab.org.uk/about-us/executive-board>.

¹⁰ 'MAB Conference: Creating Hope', event listing on Eventbrite website, undated. <http://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/mab-conference-creating-hope-tickets-2364646722?aff=event>.

¹¹ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

Harrath's Islam Channel initiated an 'alternative Leveson inquiry' to investigate 'widespread and systematic discriminatory practices in reporting on Muslims and Islam in the British media'.¹² Based on a public opinion poll that found that people believe the media are responsible for 'whipping up a climate of fear of Islam in the UK', the inquiry set out to examine the possible causal effect between media coverage and social attitudes towards Muslims. In addition to Harrath, a number of key individuals associated with Jama'at and Ikhwan legacy groups signed an open letter published in *The Guardian*, identifying themselves as 'supporters of the alternative Leveson inquiry'.¹³ These included Murad, on behalf of MCB; El-Hamdoon, for MAB; Massoud Shadjareh, the director of IHRC; Altikriti, representing the Cordoba Foundation; Faliq, representing IFE; Ahmed, for FOSIS; and Daud Abdullah, on behalf of the Middle East Monitor (MEMO).

Several months earlier, in October 2011, the Cordoba Foundation and MEMO headed by Abdullah, a former deputy secretary general of MCB, jointly hosted the launch of a SpinWatch-authored report on the spread of Islamophobia in Britain entitled, *The Cold War on British Muslims: The Instigators and Funders*.¹⁴ The event, held in the House of Commons, presented the main findings of the report, which amounted to an attack on the two London-based think tanks that have been most critical of Islamism in Britain, Policy Exchange and the Centre for Social Cohesion.

In addition to protests against Islamophobia, revivalist groups have sometimes collaborated on workshops to develop Muslims' engagement with the media. Whilst MCB deputy secretary general in 2009, Abdullah and the Cordoba Foundation's Altikriti jointly hosted a workshop entitled, 'Muslims and the Media: Positive Engagement from the Whole Community'. The event included a panel discussion 'on how individuals, organisations and Mosques can better engage with the media, to

¹² 'Background', Alternative Leveson Inquiry website, captured on March 24, 2012. http://web.archive.org/web/20120324163906/http://www.alternativeleveson.org.uk/?page_id=13.

¹³ 'We need an inquiry into anti-Islam press', *The Guardian*, January 23, 2012. <http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press>.

¹⁴ Samira Quraishy, 'Event Review: The Cold War on British Muslims - The Instigators and Funders', MEMO website, October 12, 2011. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/media-review/event-review/2935-event-review-the-cold-war-on-british-muslims-the-instigators-and-funders>.

promote positive stories'.¹⁵ This built upon an earlier workshop, held in December 2007, jointly run by the Cordoba Foundation and MCB that aimed to improve the media and communication skills of 'young Muslims involved in faith and BME groups, including charities, Mosques, local campaigns, voluntary and social-welfare organisations'.¹⁶ The event was part of the Muslim Media Empowerment Project, initiated by the Cordoba Foundation and the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. MCB was one of the partners and publicised it on its website.¹⁷

These examples demonstrate active collaborative relationships between individuals and groups linked with the Jama'at and Ikhwan-associated streams of Muslim activism in Britain centred on the shared concern over the public perception of Muslims and Islam. It may be argued that, taken collectively, these events comprise an ongoing campaign to assert control over how Muslims and Islam are perceived. A related and equally important concern for them is how Muslims view themselves. Although this may be more apparent when looking at the work of individual organisations, as subsequent chapters will show, representatives of Jama'at and Ikhwan-associated groups have sometimes collaborated in events targeting Muslims that address issues of Muslim identity.

In August 2013, for example, the then-secretary general of MCB, Farooq Murad, and the Cordoba Foundation's Anas Altikriti were both key speakers at an event at the Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre entitled, 'Rethinking the Muslim Community'. The event sought to address 'the challenges of inspiring and instituting a communal spirit' within Muslims in Britain.¹⁸ Contention over the public perception of Muslims and Islam, and over Muslim collective identity, are an important bonding factor for the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain, and will be explored in greater depth in

¹⁵ 'Muslims and the Media: Positive Engagement from the Whole Community', event listing on Cordoba Foundation website, June 4, 2009.
<http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/events.php?id=1&art=22>.

¹⁶ 'FREE TRAINING: Introduction to Media', event poster on Cordoba Foundation website, December 12, 2007.
http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/images/MuslimMediaTrainingProjectFlyer_03.pdf.

¹⁷ 'FREE Media & Public Relations Training for Young Muslims', MCB website, January 3, 2008.
http://web.archive.org/web/20080113205413/http://www.mcb.org.uk/features/features.php?ann_id=1671.

¹⁸ 'Rethinking the Muslim Community', event listing on FRF website, August 5, 2013.
<http://www.thefrf.org/component/zoo/item/rethinking-the-muslim-community-2>.

the following chapters. Here it suffices to note specific instances of organisational collaboration that touch on those themes.

In addition to protesting against certain perceptions of Muslims and Islam, and galvanising a particular self-perception of Muslim identity, Jama'at- and Ikhwan-associated groups have occasionally collaborated to directly influence the public perception of Muslims and Islam. In September 2014, for example, MCB officially supported another Cordoba Foundation-organised event entitled, 'Peace-Building in the 21st Century: Celebrating Achievements and Hopes, Confronting Real Issues'.¹⁹ To commemorate the UN International Day of Peace, in addition to an event with discussions between different religious and community leaders, the Cordoba Foundation helped to co-ordinate an 'open door' day for the general public at mosques around the country. This opportunity to present Muslims and Islam to the broader society was coordinated through a network of Islamic centres and organisations including MCB, the Jama'at-associated East London Mosque, and MINAB, represented on the official promotional material by its current chairman, Maulana Sarfraz Madni, a former president of UKIM. This endeavour to build a bridge to Islam for the general public was collectively organised across ethnic lines.

Trans-ethnic collaboration that fuzzes the Jama'at-Ikhwan division is also evident in recent campaigns focusing on the plight of Muslims outside Britain. An issue that for many years has been an effective rallying point for British Muslims is that of Palestine. In May 2013, the London Muslim Centre at the Jama'at-associated East London Mosque hosted a fundraising event for the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign, entitled 'An Evening of Palestinian Solidarity'.²⁰ The event was supported by Jama'at- and Ikhwan-associated groups, including IFE, MAB, the Cordoba Foundation and FOSIS. Several years earlier, in February 2009, a number of such groups sent representatives to the Turkish Ambassador in London in gratitude of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's remarks lambasting Israeli actions in Gaza. These representatives included Abdullah, then MCB deputy secretary general; Said Ferjani, then head of policy and public relations for MAB; Dilwar Hussain Khan, then IFE

¹⁹ 'Peace Conference: Peace-Building in the 21st Century', event listing on MCB website, September 4, 2014. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/peace-conference-peace-building-in-the-21st-century/>.

²⁰ 'An Evening for Palestine Solidarity', event promotional poster, IFE website, March 2013. http://islamicforumeurope.com/images_uploaded/2013/03/img3542.jpg.

secretary general; Faisal Hanjra, then FOSIS president; Harrath, Islam Channel's CEO; and Mohammad Sawalha, British Muslim Initiative president. Other groups represented included Dawatul Islam, the Palestinian Return Centre, and the Palestinian Forum in Britain.²¹ In Steven Merley's words, all of these individuals and/or organisations 'are known to have ties to the U.K. Brotherhood'.²²

Another recent fundraising event for Muslims in need abroad focused on the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar. Involving speakers from IFE, the Cordoba Foundation and the East London Mosque, a 'Charity Dinner in Aid of Muslims of Burma' was held in September 2012 in collaboration with the charity Muslim Aid, an organisation that, as this chapter will show, serves as a nexus for numerous individuals involved in other revivalist groups.²³

A final example of Jama'at and Ikhwan-associated groups collaborating may be provided on the theme of their characterisation as 'participationists'. According to Abdullah Faliq, IFE, MAB and UKIM worked together on a campaign to encourage civic engagement and voting. This was in conflict with the rhetoric of Hizb-ut Tahir, which had labelled participation in the democratic system as *haram*, Islamically forbidden. 'We brought in a lot of literature supporting participation published by IFE,' remarks Faliq. 'I produced that. Scholars included al-Qaradawi, al-Ghannushi, Khurshid Ahmad, as well as Salafis and Tablighis. ISB produced similar literature. This provided Muslims with the argument as to why they ought to be politically engaged.'²⁴ This campaign to encourage voting was not designed to promote participation *per se*, however. It was put behind George Galloway's Respect Party in the 2005 general election and, it may be argued, was a significant factor in the

²¹ 'British Muslims to deliver letter of thanks to Turkish Government', IFE website, February 6, 2009. <http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=428>.

²² 'Global Muslim Brotherhood Thanks Turkish Prime Minister Over Gaza Remarks', Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch. February 8, 2009. <http://www.globalmbwatch.com/2009/02/08/global-muslim-brotherhood-thanks-turkish-prime-minister-over-gaza-remarks/>.

²³ 'Charity Dinner in Aid of Muslims of Burma', event promotional poster, IFE website, September 6, 2012. <http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=imageview&type=event&itemId=201>.

²⁴ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012. See also 'Voting in Islam: Guidance to Muslims in Britain from the Scholars of Islam', leaflet on IFE website, April 2010. http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/images_uploaded/2010/04/img3205.pdf.

election of Galloway as MP for Bethnal Green and Bow in East London.²⁵ Galloway's appeal for these groups was his active role in the Stop the War Coalition, in which MAB was a key partner, as well as his ongoing support for the Palestinians, which includes funding Hamas, in its conflict with Israel.²⁶

MCB publicly lauded the efforts of IFE and MAB in promoting Muslim political participation. And in the run-up to the 2005 general election, it launched its own strategy aimed at urging British Muslims 'to participate more actively in mainstream politics'.²⁷ It published a brochure, 'Electing to Deliver', and a 'Voter Card' that highlighted 'the ten key questions that Muslims had to ask of all prospective parliamentary candidates'. It promoted this campaign on the Islam Channel and through other media outlets. More recently, Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND)—linked to MCB through the involvement of Inyat Bunglawala in both MCB and MEND's precursor organisation iEngage—organised a campaign to encourage Muslims to vote in the 2015 general election.²⁸

1.2. Publications

Collaborative networking between participationist or revivalist groups is also evident, albeit to a limited extent, in the publication of books and reports. The Islamic Foundation is one of Britain's most established and prolific publishers of Islamic books. As many observers have noted, in the first few decades after its founding in 1973, the Islamic Foundation published numerous works of both Jama'at-i-Islami and Muslim Brotherhood ideologues, including al-Banna and Mawdudi. Some of Mawdudi's books were edited by the Islamic Foundation's chairman, Khurshid Ahmad and its then-director general, Khurram Murad. In recent years, the Foundation has broadened the scope of its publications, including works on matters of greater contemporary significance, but despite its increasingly diverse

²⁵ Peace (2013), p.313.

²⁶ Shiraz Maher, 'UK: George Galloway Funds-- Surprise! – Hamas', Gatestone Institute, April 29, 2010. <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1175/uk-george-galloway-funds---surprise---hamas>.

²⁷ 'Secretary General's Report', report from MCB Eighth Annual General Meeting, pp. 8-9.

²⁸ 'Muslim Manifesto 2015', Muslim Engagement and Development, March 2015. http://www.getoutandvote.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/MEND-Muslim-Manifesto-GE2015_LowRes.pdf.

catalogue it still publishes a significant number of books by Mawdudi, in addition to Mawdudi-inspired authors and activists including Ahmad, Murad and Vice-Chairman Abdur Rashid Siddiqui.

In 2003, the Foundation edited and published a two-part series called, *Islam: The Way of Revival*, which collated the works of al-Banna, Mawdudi, Said Qutb, Ahmad, Murad, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Said Ramadan and others widely considered as revivalist or participationist Islamist writers. In a clear endorsement of the presentation of Islam as ‘an integrated, comprehensive way of life’, the editors, Riza Muhammad and Dilwar Hussain, write that although Islam is essentially concerned with a relationship with Allah, it is through organised activism in line with an Islamic socio-political vision that this relationship is given its ‘deepest meaning’.²⁹ The production of the series involved collaboration with FOSIS, established in 1962 by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami,³⁰ which provided many of the selected texts that originally appeared in its magazine, *The Muslim*.³¹

More will be said in subsequent chapters about the shared ideas and beliefs of the above-mentioned figures and other key individuals within the Jama’at-Ikhwan network in Britain. Here it suffices to note some of the working collaborations involved in publishing. In addition to working with individual authors for the publication of their works, such as former UKIM president Zahid Parvez, the Islamic Foundation has institutional partnerships with other publishers whose works it distributes. These include the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), established by UKIM in 1966 to ‘Islamise knowledge’ in Britain, and the Muslim Brotherhood-associated International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), which, whilst based in the United States, has an office in London. The Foundation is the only distributor for IIIT’s publications other than IIIT itself.

These relationships, however, appear rather limited. MET is a small and rather inactive publishing house, although, as discussed later, it has played a significant

²⁹ Mohammed and Hussain (2003), p.xiv. Since the publication of this book, Hussain’s understanding of Islam, its meaning as a ‘way of life’ and its role in relation to the state has undergone quite a transformation. For more on this, see Chapter 4.

³⁰ Bowen (2014), p.103

³¹ Mohammed and Hussain (2003), p. xxi.

advocacy role in Britain for the education of Muslims in line with Islamic principles. It has published less than ten books, mostly written by its director, Ghulam Sarwar. In contrast, IIIT's London office, headed by Anas al-Shaikh-Ali, has been very actively engaged in publishing, as well as organising conferences across Europe, working closely with the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) UK, of which al-Shaikh-Ali is also chairman. But despite what might appear to be a potentially fruitful overlap of thematic concerns between IIIT and the Islamic Foundation—for example, the impact of globalisation upon Muslims in Europe—the two organisations have not collaborated over joint-publications or co-organised events. The reason for this, suggests Dilwar Hussain, the former head of research at the Foundation and former president of ISB, is that although there was a 'reasonable relationship' between IIIT and the Foundation, 'there were also personality conflicts' and 'differences of view' between the leadership of the two organisations.³²

Nonetheless, there have been some noteworthy organisational connections between the Islamic Foundation and IIIT/AMSS. Such connections are the topic of the next section of this chapter, but links between these particular organisations can be mentioned briefly here. Khurshid Ahmad, the Islamic Foundation's chairman, is a member of AMSS-UK's advisory board.³³ Mohammad Siddique Seddon, a former research fellow at the Islamic Foundation, which publishes his books, is an executive committee member of AMSS-UK.³⁴ A member of the Islamic Foundation's Board of Advisers, Zafar Ishaq Ansari, is a fellow at the American branch of AMSS.³⁵ Another former researcher at the Islamic Foundation, Mohammed Abdul Aziz, was also an executive committee member of AMSS-UK.³⁶ Noteworthy too, but perhaps less importantly, Islamic Foundation staff have appeared as speakers at IIIT/AMSS events. Former Islamic Foundation research fellow, Sughra Ahmed, now president of

³² Interview with Dilwar Hussain, January 15, 2015.

³³ 'About us', AMSS-UK website, webpage captured on September 11, 2011. <http://web.archive.org/web/20110911192237/http://www.amssuk.com/aboutus.html>.

³⁴ Ahmad and Seddon (eds.) (2012).

³⁵ 'MEF Advisory Board', Muslim Education Foundation website, undated. <http://www.mef-ca.org/mef-ad-board.html>.

³⁶ Conference booklet for 'Muslim Education In Europe Conference', p.3, available on AMSS-UK website, October 2002. <http://www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf/AMSSUK%20MEiE%20Conf%20Sep2002%20-%20booklet.pdf>.

ISB, was one of numerous speakers at a 2009 conference entitled, 'Muslim Youth: Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations', co-organised by AMSS UK.³⁷ Hussain, then also representing the Foundation as a research fellow, was a speaker at a joint IIIT/AMSS UK conference held at the University of Westminster in 2004, which sought to address the issue of the practice of Islamic law within a Muslim minority context.³⁸

Aside from the Islamic Foundation and IIIT, the most active publisher within the network of Jama'at- and Ikhwan-associated organisations is the Cordoba Foundation. The organisation produces a quarterly magazine called 'Arches'; toolkits, including guides to conducting effective lobbying and media; policy papers; and reports. These materials feature the work of Muslim and non-Muslim contributors on a range of topics most of whom, whilst broadly sympathetic to the organisation's ethos, are not associated with the global Muslim Brotherhood. One significant collaboration, however, that cuts across Jama'at-Ikhwan lines is the report, *Meet the Challenge, Make the Change: A Call to Action for Muslim Civil Society in Britain*, authored by the former chairman of the East London Mosque and former MCB general secretary, Muhammad Abdul Bari. In this report, Bari decries what he sees as the 'collective under-achievement' and a lack of effective leadership of Britain's Muslim community, and calls for Muslims to become more engaged 'in neighbourhood and community works, social activities, economic exchanges, culture and politics'.³⁹

2. Leadership structures

The collaborations observed above provide a glimpse of active networking between individuals and groups associated with the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain. The overriding theme of these partnerships, reflected most clearly in events such as the MAB-organised conference, 'Creating Hope', and Bari's report, *Meet the Challenge, Make the Change*, is Muslim identity and unity. But such collaborations

³⁷ Conference programme for 'Muslim Youth: Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations' event, p.11, available on AMSS-UK website, February 2009.
<http://www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf/AMSSUK%20Chester%202009%20Conference%20Briefing.pdf>.

³⁸ AMSS-UK Newsletter No. 7, 2006, p.5.
<http://web.archive.org/web/20111027062825/http://www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf/AMSSUK%20-%20NewsLetter7.pdf>.

³⁹ Abdul Bari, Muhammad (2013), p.38.

do not adequately capture the extent to which these individuals and groups are networked, since they are typically engaged in work within different fields and with stakes that are different, at least in the short term. The potential for practical partnerships between organisations is limited somewhat by their respective official missions and areas of interest, as well as their practical expertise and organisational ability. But between the individuals working for these organisations is a fluid network of relationships.

The Islamic Foundation, for example, has not collaborated publicly with the Cordoba Foundation. The two organisations operate in two different fields, the former in publishing and academia, with a focus on higher education and economics, the latter mainly in advocacy and public policy with an eye to international affairs. However, they are connected in terms of personal networks. The Islamic Foundation's director general, Manazir Ahsan, is a former colleague of the Cordoba Foundation's Abdullah Faliq. Along with Iqbal Sacranie, Ahsan and Faliq were key players in the establishment of MCB and its pre-cursor, the National Interim Committee on Muslim Unity. Ahsan and Faliq remain linked through MCB. Ahsan is an elected council member and Faliq is a member of the Europe and International Affairs Committee. Through MCB, Faliq is also linked to the Islamic Foundation by his relationship with Foundation trustee and former MCB secretary general, Farooq Murad. Another example is with Muslim Aid. Whilst it has collaborated on some charity-related events in Britain, its public collaborations with other Jama'at- and Ikhwan-associated Muslim organisations are scarce. Yet, Muslim Aid, as detailed below, informally connects numerous organisations through its board of trustees. Despite a lack of official partnerships between certain organisations, there are a multitude of personal connections that link them.

To more fully appreciate the network of relationships between Jama'at- and Ikhwan-associated individuals and groups it is important to look beyond public collaborations and regard the personal connections between the key figures, as well as the leadership structures of these groups, both formal and informal. The personal connections between the key players in the network, it is argued, are inseparable from organisational roles, but these roles are fluid and often overlapping.

In an interview with the thesis author, Abdullah Faliq provides an invaluable insight into the ways in which Muslim activists and groups of Ikhwani and Jama'ati heritage are networked in Britain.⁴⁰ He identifies three ways: Firstly, there is the formal body of MCB. Secondly, there is a coordination committee made up from the leaders of key organisations, called The Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations. And, thirdly, there are loose, informal social connections comprised of working friendships. These three ways or modes of networking are each explored and elaborated below. In addition to these, it is important to look more holistically at the overall network, for there are numerous other connections beyond Faliq's involvement in the network in the three ways he describes. In some cases, for example, the trustees of a given organisation are directly involved in the work of other organisations that are Jama'at- or Ikhwan-associated. In other cases, the founding organisations of a certain organisation are Jama'at- and Ikhwan-associated.

2.1. The Muslim Council of Britain

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was founded in November 1997, according to its first secretary general, Iqbal Sacranie, to present 'a united Muslim voice'.⁴¹ The event that galvanised its founding was the Rushdie Affair in 1988. The publication of Salman Rushdie's novel, *The Satanic Verses*, was deemed offensive to many Muslims in Britain for its scandalous portrayal of the prophet Muhammad. The United Kingdom Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) was hastily set up to express Muslim discontent and protest the government to ban the book and to extend the existing blasphemy laws to include Islam. UKACIA was dissolved shortly after the Rushdie affair, but a small number of activists involved in UKACIA, including Manazir Ahsan and Islamic Foundation trustee Hashir Faruqi, saw a longer term need for national Muslim representation. In consultation with the then home secretary, Michael Howard, who recommended that Muslim leaders form a 'representative body' that he could 'support and recognise',⁴² they established the

⁴⁰ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

⁴¹ Iqbal Sacranie, quoted in Vidino (2010), p.122. [check]

⁴² Kenan Malik, 'take me to your leader', April 23, 2009.
http://www.kenanmalik.com/essays/hp_fatwa_extract.html.

National Interim Committee on Muslim Unity (NICMU). The blueprint for MCB was sketched at a NICMU meeting in 1994.

Anthony McRoy suggests that the formation of UKACIA ‘was an attempt not only to unite British Muslims on a specific issue of concern, but also to unite them behind the pro-Jama’at element’.⁴³ He acknowledges Gilles Kepel’s argument that by being the first to launch the campaign, ‘the Mawdudites had a real chance of taking over the leadership of a movement which promised to mobilise large numbers and this considerably extend their influence over British Islam’.⁴⁴ According to McRoy, MCB is ‘the result of longstanding plans by pro-Jama’at forces to take over the leadership of British Muslims’. McRoy acknowledges the Rushdie Affair as the watershed moment for the emergence of an *umma*-centric, Muslim political identity in Britain, consolidated by the first Iraq war (1990-1991) and the Bosnian war (1992-1995).⁴⁵ These fed the perception, commonly preached in radical mosques throughout Britain in the 1990s, of an attack on Islam. Yet, he notes, calls for the formation of a federation of Muslim organisations in Britain were made as far back as 1980 by the late Jama’at-i-Islami activist and Islamic Foundation director, Khurram Murad, and others.⁴⁶

MCB is, in its own words, ‘a national representative Muslim umbrella body’. Shaykh Ibrahim Mogra, MCB’s assistant secretary general, describes MCB as ‘the most representative Muslim umbrella organisation in Britain’. But he concedes that it ‘has failed to attract some groupings’.⁴⁷ A number of polls suggest a bigger failing. As Kenan Malik observes, ‘An NOP/Channel 4 poll of Muslims in 2006 found that less than 4 per cent thought that the MCB represented British Muslims, and just 12 per cent felt it represented their political views. This is in line with many other surveys. An NOP poll for the conservative think tank Policy Exchange found only 6 per cent of Muslims thought the MCB represented their views.’⁴⁸

⁴³ McRoy (2006), p.12.

⁴⁴ Kepel, (1997), p.133.

⁴⁵ McRoy (2006), pp.7-79.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.12.

⁴⁷ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

⁴⁸ Kenan Malik, ‘take me to your leader’.

Nevertheless, from its inception until around 2005, MCB served as the British government's primary interlocutor for Britain's diverse Muslim communities. Its well-documented fall from government favour is usually linked to two events. The first was its boycotting of the Holocaust Memorial Day, first in 2005. The second, more decisive event was the signing of the Istanbul Declaration by its deputy secretary general, Daud Abdullah, in 2009. Exhorting the Muslim *umma* to wage *jihad* against Israel 'until the liberation of all of Palestine', this document defined as a 'declaration of war' any country's support for Israel or deployment of forces in the 'Muslim waters' facing Gaza preventing the smuggling of arms and supplies.⁴⁹ Since the British government was considering deploying naval forces to the Gaza coastline, it viewed this as an unwarranted provocation and suspended ties with MCB. Although this decision was reversed in January 2010, the new coalition government under David Cameron has not granted MCB any special partnership status.⁵⁰

The loss of MCB's monopoly of engagement, lamented by Mogra as a denial of Muslim political representation,⁵¹ was consolidated by 'the growing array of different claims from groups such as the British Muslim Forum, the Al-Khoei Foundation, Progressive British Muslims, British Muslims for Secular Democracy and others', including the Sufi Muslim Council and Quilliam.⁵² But despite the growing multiplicity of Muslim voices in British civil society, according to Mohammed Abdul Aziz, a former adviser to Sacranie during his time as secretary general, MCB has become more Jama'at-dominated since Sacranie's departure in 2005. 'A large part of the influential part of the organisational structure,' he notes, 'consists of people who come from a Jama'ati-Ikhwan background of some sort.'⁵³

⁴⁹ For the text of the Istanbul Declaration, see 'A statement by the religious scholars and proselytisers (*du'a*) of the Islamic Nation (*ummah*) to all rulers and peoples concerning events in Gaza', available at: <http://hurryupharry.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/istpdf.pdf>.

⁵⁰ See Alan Travis, 'Hazel Blears' standoff with Muslim Council overshadows new anti-terror launch', March 25, 2009, *The Guardian*. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/25/muslim-council-britain-hazel-blears>; and Nicholas Watt, Government restores links with biggest Muslim group', *The Guardian*, January 15, 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jan/15/government-relations-muslim-council-britain-mcb>.

⁵¹ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

⁵² Stephen H. Jones, Therese O'Toole, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, Tariq Modood and Nasar Meer, A 'system of self-appointed leaders'?, *Public Spirit*, August 20, 2013. <http://www.publicspirit.org.uk/a-system-of-self-appointed-leaders/>.

⁵³ Interview with Mohammed Abdul Aziz, September 3, 2012.

Regardless of how representative or influential upon government it may or may not be, MCB remains an important body within the broader network of Jama'at-Ikhwan-associated individuals and groups.

Daud Abdullah describes MCB as a concerted effort to connect and unite British-based Muslims organisations. The mosques and other institutions that make up MCB's affiliates each pursue their own agendas, he explains, but work through MCB on national issues. 'The parameters,' he says, 'are clearly defined.'⁵⁴ Yet, it would be a mistake to think of MCB as the sole body within the global Muslim Brotherhood network in Britain advocating for Muslims' interests at the national level. Some of its affiliates, connected by association with a Jama'at-Ikhwan heritage, also have an interlocutory role and advocate for changes in government policy.

The Muslim Educational Trust, for example, set up by the Mawdudi-inspired UKIM in 1966, has a long track record of working with government. In 1993, it was instrumental in obtaining government approval for an Islamic studies syllabus in secondary schools, for which it has provided teachers and teaching materials. It states it has also persuaded local educational authorities to recognise and accept the 'special needs' of Muslim pupils in schools. For some years it was one of the main interlocutors between Muslim communities and the government with regard to educational matters. Today, this role has been taken over by the Association of Muslim Schools UK (AMS-UK), established in 1992. One of its core roles, it asserts, is to represent the views and interests of 150 or so Muslim schools in Britain to the Department for Education (DfE), statutory bodies and the private sector. DfE officially recognises its interlocutory function and contracts AMS-UK to conduct inspections of state-funded Muslim schools regarding their religious designation.⁵⁵

Whether or not MCB is understood as the main institutional interlocutor for Muslims on national matters, its greatest importance perhaps lies beyond its interlocutory function. MCB is a central hub within the network of Jama'at- and Ikhwan-associated individuals and groups. Whilst a hierarchical organisation with a formal leadership structure and clear mandate to advocate on behalf of its listed affiliates,

⁵⁴ Interview with Daud Abdullah, February 10, 2012.

⁵⁵ AMS-UK brochure, December 2013. <http://ams-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/AMS-Brochure.pdf>.

MCB also functions as a meshwork of interaction through which numerous individuals, and hence organisations, are informally connected. Immanent to but also far exceeding the formal structure of MCB is a network of related individuals that can only be observed with regard to their multiple associations and shared histories both within and outside MCB. Most observers note MCB's declining influence as a government partner. But MCB's far greater significance, it may be argued, even at the height of its popularity with the government, is its facilitation of numerous connections that traverse various fields of social activism, including public policy, education, law, and finance. Some of these connections are explored in the last section of this chapter.

2.2. The Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations

In addition to MCB, states Faliq, there is a less hierarchical but semi-formal committee through which some of the key organisations associated with Jama'at-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood meet. 'Within the mainstream Islamic groups,' he discloses, 'there is a coordination committee, where the leaders of these groups meet every now and then to discuss strategies, their achievements and what to focus on. It is called "The Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations".'⁵⁶

Faliq identifies the organisations that comprise this committee as the Islamic Foundation, IFE, MAB, UKIM and Dawatul Islam UK and Ireland. It is significant that in the academic and think tank literature with a focus on Muslim activism, all of these groups are associated with Jama'at-i-Islami or the Ikhwan. The individual committee members, Faliq explains, are from the *shuras*—the management—of the organisations represented on the committee, which meet occasionally, sometimes on camps and residential. Attendees include the leadership of the member organisations, plus other colleagues. Usually, around four or five people attend from each organisation. Along with Dilwar Hussain Khan—not to be mistaken for Dilwar Hussain formerly of the Islamic Foundation and ISB—Faliq represents IFE at these meetings. MAB, he notes, is represented by Omer El-Hamdoon. UKIM is represented by Maulana Muhammad Sarfraz Madni. Committee members have to be a representative of an organisation, informs Faliq, but, 'beyond the leaders of the

⁵⁶ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

organisations, you have some other key leaders, including Khurshid Ahmad and Muhammad Abdul Bari'. The Cordoba Foundation and IIIT are not involved in this committee, explains Faliq, because they are not community-oriented groups. The committee is mainly comprised of community-focused membership organisations.

The Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations is a discreet and hitherto unreported mechanism for the networking of Jama'at and Ikhwan-associated individuals and groups in Britain. In an interview with Innes Bowen, the former spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood in the West, Kemal al-Helbawy, says he led a group in the 1980s and 1990s almost identically named, called the 'Coordination Committee between Islamic Movements', and worked closely with the Islamic Foundation's Khurshid Ahmad 'to bring together leading representatives of the Islamic Movement from around the world'.⁵⁷ It is unclear if this is the same committee. But, if so, it is likely to have undergone some changes, since the committee Faliq describes is comprised mostly of British citizens and focused on Britain. In any case, this coordination committee, as it functions today, is absent from all of the literature on Islamism in Britain.

Despite being involved in MCB and the coordination committee, Faliq is candidly critical of both, referring to them as overly bureaucratic. He describes MCB as 'too statesmanlike' and the committee's leadership as mostly aged and inflexible.⁵⁸ A different line of criticism directed at the committee is voiced by Dilwar Hussain, the former president of ISB. According to Hussain, ISB was a member of the coordination committee, but under his leadership formally withdrew in 2011, participating with a gradually increasing sense of detachment from the other committee members' ideas and values from around 2003 to 2004. Questions that were raised by Hussain and his colleagues in ISB at this time, he says, included, 'What sort of social transformation do we want? Are we advocating social transformation in the name of Islam? What is our relationship with terms like "*shari'a*" and "Islamic state"?'⁵⁹ Their answers to these questions, he notes, made them realise that they were at a 'radically different place' than other committee

⁵⁷ Bowen (2012), p.115.

⁵⁸ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

⁵⁹ Interview with Dilwar Hussain, January 15, 2015.

members such as MAB, UKIM and IFE. Hussain's description of the coordination committee underplays its function as a forum for effective strategic planning and coordination. 'If these meetings were effective, ' he says, 'you'd see many more programs and activities with these organisations doing things together—and you don't. You hardly see any activities where you've got UKIM, MAB, IFE and ISB working on the same platform.'

Regardless of how effective the coordination committee was in the past and is today, some of the connections facilitated by it, as with those facilitated by MCB, are worth noting simply for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of an organised network in Britain. Indeed, these connections comprise such a network of dedicated activists inspired by Islamic principles working, in their eyes, for the betterment of Britain's Muslim communities and the society at large. The coordination committee member organisations are linked to numerous other Islamic organisations, including Jama'at- or Ikhwan-associated ones, chiefly by virtue of the committee member representatives' authoritative roles in organisations both within and outside the committee.

The coordination committee, for example, is linked to the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), whose membership, like the committee, is comprised of organisations. El-Hamdoon represents MAB in both structures. Whilst Safraz Madni represents UKIM on the committee, he represents MCB in MINAB. Formerly occupying MCB's allocated vice-chair position on MINAB's executive board, he is currently MINAB chair. In addition to being linked to MCB in terms of Safraz Madni's role within MCB, the committee is linked to MCB through Faliq's membership of its Europe and International Affairs Committee and El-Hamdoon's membership of its National Council. Dilwar Hussain Khan, whilst the central president of IFE,⁶⁰ is also linked to the East London Mosque (ELM), which houses IFE offices and for which he is the executive director.⁶¹ His link with Muhammad Abdul Bari on the coordination committee is strengthened by their respective roles in ELM, where Abdul Bari was for many years its chairman and is currently a trustee,

⁶⁰ 'Islamic Forum of Europe -- Shooraa and presidential elections', IFE media release, September 22, 2013. <http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=536>.

⁶¹ 'Management', East London Mosque website, updated on August 5, 2015. <http://www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/content/management>.

and in IFE, of which Abdul Bari is a former president. A final example of how the coordination committee is linked to Islamic organisations external to it is with Dawatul Islam UK and Ireland's connection to Britain's national Islamic Sharia Council network: The president of Dawatul Islam, Maulana Abu Sayeed, is also the chairman of the Islamic Sharia Council and involved in the creation of a national federation of *shari'a* councils, the UK Board of Sharia Councils.

This glimpse of connections between the coordination committee and other Islamic organisations provided above is limited to some of the main organisations associated with the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain. But most of the individuals on the committee are also involved in smaller, more local organisations, including mosques and schools. The revivalist network of the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain extends to local communities via these organisations and grassroots initiatives, although these connections are rarely discussed or explored in the academic and think tank literature or news media that is concerned with Islamism in Britain. It is through these local groups that the leadership network of most concern to observers in academic and think tank circles extends to what Alberto Melucci refers to as 'submerged networks'.

For example, in addition to his role in IFE, Dilwar Hussain Khan, is vice-chair of the Faiths Forum for London. According to his biography, he has been director of Islamic community centre, finance manager of a housing association, and manager of a special educational needs organisation in East London, the Asian Parents Association for Special Educational Needs in Tower Hamlets. Madni is actively involved in the Blackheath Mosque in Birmingham. He represented the mosque as a signatory on an open letter, signed in July 2014 by over 100 imams, urging Muslims not to go to Syria and Iraq to fight in the conflict there.⁶² A teacher by profession, Madni was also the interim headteacher and head of the Parents Teachers and Friends Association Steering Committee at Al-Hirjah School in Birmingham, after it was placed in special measures in 2013.⁶³ Muhammad Abdul Bari's involvement in

⁶² 'Over 100 UK imams unite to sign open letter urging British Muslims not to travel to Syria and Iraq', Imams Online website, July 4, 2014. <http://imamsonline.com/blog/over-100-uk-imams-unite-to-sign-open-letter-urging-british-muslims-not-to-travel-to-syria-and-iraq/>.

⁶³ 'In the Wilderness Together ...', Faithful Neighbourhoods Centre website, January 17, 2014, http://www.faithfulneighbourhoods.org.uk/wordpress/?ai1ec_event=in-the-wilderness-together; Al-

community work is extensive. He is the founder director of Amana Parenting, which publishes books and provides workshops, as well as consulting services, on parenting. He is a founding member of The East London Communities Organisation, part of the Citizens UK. Abdul Bari is also a patron of Anchor House, a homeless charity, the Ramphal Institute, and the educational charity, the Nida Trust.

2.3. Informal personal connections

In addition to MCB and the Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations, Faliq identifies an informal network of friendships as the ‘third front’ in which he and his associates collaborate.⁶⁴ Within his personal network, he says, is Anas Altikriti, Dilwar Hussain Khan, Daud Abdullah, Muhammad Abdul Bari, and Mohammad Kozbar. He describes this group as more informal and ‘advanced’, since it is less burdened with formalities and more actively involved with the organisation of various campaigns. This network of friends meets more regularly and communication is frequent. This group partially overlaps with the coordination committee and has strong connections with MCB.

All of the individuals in Faliq’s personal network named above are or have been involved in organisations with Jama’at-i-Islami or Muslim Brotherhood associations, and all are actively involved in Islamic activism or advocacy work today. Altikriti, whose father was the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing in Iraq, was a founding member of MAB prior to establishing the Cordoba Foundation. He set up MAB alongside Kemal al-Helbawy, Azzam Tamimi, a former activist in the Brotherhood’s political party in Jordan, and Mohammed Sawalha, a former Hamas operative. After a stint as MAB president, Altikriti left MAB, along with Tamimi and Sawalha in 2006 to form the British Muslim Initiative (BMI), which government records state was dissolved in September 2014.⁶⁵

Hirjah School Parents Teachers and Friends Association launch invitation letter, June 3, 2013. http://www.alhijrahschool.co.uk/Docs/PTFA_Launch12613.pdf.

⁶⁴ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

⁶⁵ Companies House website. <http://wck2.companieshouse.gov.uk>.

Kozbar is the vice-president of MAB,⁶⁶ a national council member of MCB,⁶⁷ and was a listed director and spokesperson for BMI.⁶⁸ Steven Merley identifies him as ‘a well known leader in the U.K Muslim Brotherhood’ who ‘has been an officer in numerous U.K. Brotherhood organizations including BMI and the MAB, the Finsbury Park Mosque, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), and the Muslim Welfare House’.⁶⁹ Kozbar is also a project director for IslamExpo, an Islamic cultural festival and political conference established by Sawalha in 2004. Khan, as mentioned above, is a key figure in both IFE and the East London Mosque, as well as the London Muslim Centre, where Abdul Bari has held senior leadership positions. Daud Abdullah, in addition to his former role in MCB worked as a senior researcher for the Palestinian Return Centre and currently directs the Middle Eastern Monitor, a pro-Palestinian media research organisation.

This informal network is inseparable from the multiple formal roles that each of these individuals has in their respective organisations. This is not just a circle of friends. The friendships between these individuals are shaped in part by shared, religiously-conceived values and perspectives, and shared histories of association, but, equally importantly, they are also shaped by a shared commitment to social activism enabled by their positions of authority. Collectively, they comprise a web of latent working partnerships that may be actualised in response to specific emerging issues. This network extends to other contacts, including similarly-minded Muslim colleagues and friends—some of whom are not in equivalent leadership positions, but active as volunteers and interns—and non-Muslim partners who share concerns on particular issues.

The informal network that Faliq describes as the third way in which he and others collaborate is not really a distinct alternative to the organisation-to-organisation

⁶⁶ ‘Tackling Islamophobia – UAF Roundtable event at Parliament’, MCB website, November 24, 2014. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/tackling-islamophobia-uaf-roundtable-event-parliament/>.

⁶⁷ ‘Governance’, MCB website, undated. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/leadership/>.

⁶⁸ British Muslim Initiative listing on Company Check website. <http://companycheck.co.uk/company/05703363/BRITISH-MUSLIM-INITIATIVE-LIMITED/directors-secretaries>.

⁶⁹ ‘U.K. Muslim Brotherhood Leaders Threatens Israel With Destruction’, Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch, March 15, 2012. <http://www.globalmbwatch.com/2012/03/15/u-k-muslim-brotherhood-leaders-threatens-israel-with-destruction/>.

approach of the coordination committee, or to their everyday official work within these organisations. It is not an informal as opposed to a formal way of working. It is, rather, an informal mode of organisation that is in a sense dependent on these formal structures—particularly for the recognition and contacts that they provide—whilst being unconstrained by them. The formal roles of Faliq and his close associates within his informal network facilitate collaboration on projects, campaigns, and other events, but the organisations for which they officially work are not always formally recognised in these activities as coordinators or hosts. Their formal roles have endowed them with contacts, reputation amongst these contacts and, thus, their ability to organise new initiatives and establish new coalitions or organisations through informal channels.

Faliq's role in the formation of the Rohingya Minority Crisis Group (RMCG) in August 2012 exemplifies this blurring of formal and informal networking. Faliq was the key instigator of RMCG, but did not play this central role on behalf of the Cordoba Foundation or IFE where he holds senior positions. 'I've got most of the people together, most of them are my contacts,' he says. 'This is what I'll do. I'll just bring them to the table and let them run with it. I did the same thing with Syria and Palestine.'⁷⁰ In convening this group and coordinating a series of related events, Faliq drew upon his close, informal connections: The charity dinner mentioned earlier was co-hosted by IFE, where he and Khan have official leadership roles, and a related conference was held at the London Muslim Centre at the East London Mosque, where Khan is the executive director; Altikriti was one of the key speakers. Yet, although the Cordoba Foundation is listed as a founding partner of RMCG, Faliq didn't convene RMCG on behalf of the Cordoba Foundation. 'I don't do it with a certain organisational hat on,' explains Faliq, 'but the people involved know where I'm from.'⁷¹

Faliq's personal network ought not to be seen in isolation from the connections each one of his close associates has outside it, particularly those to other Jama'at- or Ikhwan-associated individuals. Each individual within Faliq's close network has his own network with expected overlaps but also new nodes. As with any politically-

⁷⁰ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

⁷¹ Ibid.

active social network, global Muslim Brotherhood figures in Britain and abroad are not all directly connected by personal acquaintance or organisational collaboration. But their overlapping connections provide a fuller picture of their organisational network as a whole. The following section seeks to provide such a picture—although not an exhaustive one—with regard to connections between individuals, between individuals and organisations, and between organisations.

2.4. Overlapping organisational structures

The connections between revivalist individuals and groups are both extensive and complex. In addition to collaborative links (some of which have been described in this chapter), the coordination committee (which has been detailed here for the first time in an academic study), and informal personal links (of which Faliq's are but one example), there are numerous other connections between individuals and organisations that help collectively comprise an organised network. This section of the chapter maps out some of these other connections. There is no ideal starting place to do this, so it will focus on several hubs or clusters.

A significant hub that connects a number of key individuals within the revivalist network is the charity established by Yusuf Islam in 1985, Muslim Aid. The individuals involved in its strategic management include leaders associated mostly with Jama'at-linked groups, whilst its controversial connection with the Union of Good (UG), an umbrella group of charities led by al-Qaradawi that is dedicated to serving Hamas, places it within the ambit of the Brotherhood. These individuals, by virtue of sharing an active collective role in Muslim Aid whilst being involved in other organisations, informally link MCB, the Islamic Foundation, UKIM, the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), MAB, the Cordoba Foundation, IFE, the East London Mosque, the Islamic Sharia Council, Muslim Welfare House, and two other organisations headed by al-Qaradawi, the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) and the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS).

Manazir Ahsan, the director general of the Islamic Foundation, is the chairman of Muslim Aid's board of trustees.⁷² He is also a trustee of the Islamic Foundation

⁷² 'Governance', Muslim Aid website, June 25, 2014. <https://www.muslimaid.org/about-us/governance/>.

alongside Khurshid Ahmad and Muhammad Abdul Bari.⁷³ Muslim Aid's vice chairman is Suhaib Hasan, the secretary of the Islamic Sharia Council. Hasan is also an active member of ECFR and IUMS. Abdul Bari, a former MCB secretary general and former president of IFE, is Muslim Aid's secretary. Another Muslim Aid trustee is Farooq Murad, a director of the Islamic Foundation who completed his term as MCB secretary general in June 2014.⁷⁴ A fellow trustee of the charity, Zahid Parvez, is the director of the Islamic Foundation's Markfield Institute of Higher Education,⁷⁵ of which Murad is a trustee.⁷⁶ Parvez is also a trustee of both the Islamic Foundation⁷⁷—along with Ahsan, Ahmad and Abdul Bari—and UKIM.⁷⁸ Riyadh al-Rawi, yet another trustee of Muslim Aid, is also the director and a trustee of Muslim Welfare House, a founding organisation of the Islamic Sharia Council.⁷⁹ Other Muslim Aid trustees include Iqbal Sacranie, MCB's founding secretary general; Ghulam Sarwar, a former Muslim Aid treasurer and the longtime director of the MET; and Syed Tanzim Wasti, a former Muslim Aid secretary and a founding member of UKIM.

Each of these individuals, in addition to being involved in multiple organisations, has his own trajectory through various other connected organisations. Ahsan's role in NICMU and the founding of MCB has been noted. Sacranie and Murad were also founding MCB members alongside Ahsan. The involvement of Abdul Bari and Wasti in other organisations has been described briefly above. Additionally, Parvez is a former president of Young Muslims UK (YMUK), the Islamic Society of Britain

⁷³ Listing for the Islamic Foundation, Charity Commission website. <http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=263371&SubsidiaryNumber=0>.

⁷⁴ 'Special Conference for The Deaf Muslims In British And Arab Sign Language', London Central Mosque website, September 2014. <http://www.iccuk.org/page.php?section=media&page=deaf2014>.

⁷⁵ 'Staff', MIHE website, undated. <http://www.mihe.org.uk/staff>.

⁷⁶ Listing for the Markfield Institute of Higher Education, Charity Commission website. <http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1125851&SubsidiaryNumber=0&TID=1328118>.

⁷⁷ 'Board of Trustees', Islamic Foundation website. <http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/User/BoardofTrustees.aspx>.

⁷⁸ Listing for UKIM, Charity Commission website. <http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1127246&SubsidiaryNumber=0&TID=3325778>.

⁷⁹ 'About Us', Islamic Sharia Council website. <http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/>.

(ISB), and UKIM; Murad, who was the chair of Muslim Aid, is also a former president of both YMUK and ISB; and al-Rawi is a former president of FOSIS. Besides these senior figures, other Muslim Aid staff have historical connections with other Brotherhood- or Jama'at-associated organisations. The former Muslim Aid country director for Sri Lanka, Amjad Saleem,⁸⁰ for instance, was the head of communications for the Cordoba Foundation as well as a member of MCB's central working committee.⁸¹

Muslim Aid is a key node within the overall network of revivalist organisations in Britain, although perhaps it is more accurate to describe it as a network nested within the overall network. But the most significant node or nested network is undoubtedly MCB. As noted earlier, MCB acts as a web of communication and interaction through which numerous individuals and organisations are informally connected. It has been noted by numerous observers that many of its affiliate organisations have their origins in Jama'at-i-Islami or the Ikhwan. These include the Islamic Foundation, UKIM, MET, the East London Mosque, IFE, Young Muslim Organisation-UK (YMO-UK), Dawatul Islam, YMUK, the Islamic Sharia Council, Muslim Aid, MAB, FOSIS, and Muslim Welfare House. They also include some other smaller organisations, such as the Association of Muslim Schools UK and the Association of Muslim Lawyers. But for the purposes for ascertaining the existence of an organised network and understanding how it is comprised, more interesting than these organisational affiliations are the numerous overlapping roles that the key leadership of MCB share in these organisations as well as others.

Many of the senior figures actively involved in MCB today are also involved in other organisations associated with Jama'at-i-Islami or the Ikhwan. Some of these have been mentioned above in relation to Muslim Aid. For example, in addition to being the chairman of Muslim Aid and director general of the Islamic Foundation, Ahsan is a member of MCB's National Council. He was also the chair of MINAB's Membership Committee. Abdul Bari is still involved in MCB as the chair of its

⁸⁰ Amjad Saleem, 'Going beyond the Rhetoric: The Muslim Aid/UMCOR Partnership in Sri Lanka', Inter-Religious Studies website, December 2010. <http://irdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Going-beyond-the-Rhetoric-The-Muslim-Aid-UMCOR-Partnership-in-Sri-Lanka-by-Amjad-Saleem-.pdf>.

⁸¹ 'Central Working Committee 2004', MCB website, webpage captured on February 14, 2005. <http://web.archive.org/web/20050214094055/http://www.mcb.org.uk/cwc.html>.

National Council. Alongside Ahsan and Abdul Bari, both Murad and Sacranie are members of MCB's National Council. Parvez is a former member of MCB's Central Working Committee.

Other current MCB figures similarly have multiple roles within other revivalist organisations. Azad Ali, for instance, is a member of MCB's Central Working Committee and the chair of its Membership Committee. He is also a member of the East London Mosque, the community affairs co-ordinator for IFE, a presenter on the Islam Channel, the head of community development and engagement for Muslim Engagement and Development—the current incarnation of iEngage—and the founding chairman of the Muslim Safety Forum. The CEO of iEngage was Inayat Bunglawala, the long-time media secretary for MCB who now heads Muslims4UK. Faliq, as mentioned, is a member of MCB's Europe and International Affairs Committee. He is also the head of research for the Cordoba Foundation, the director of media and public relations for IFE, a trustee of IFE and the East London Mosque, the director of training at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism, which was founded by Kemal al-Helbawy, and a former president of YMO-UK. Both El-Hamdoon and Kozbar are, as mentioned, members of MCB's National Council and have senior roles within MAB. Kozbar is also a listed director for BMI alongside Mohammad Sawalha, a former member of MCB's Central Working Committee and director for Muslim Welfare House, of which both El-Hamdoon and al-Rawi are trustees.

Other active MCB figures include Iqbal Asaria, Maulana Muhammad Abu Sayeed, and Ibrahim Mogra. Asaria is the special adviser to the secretary general on business and economic affairs. He is also a member of the Islamic Foundation's advisory board and a lecturer at MIHE. According to some reports, Asaria was the webmaster for the websites of Muslim Aid, IHRC and Tamimi's IIPT. Alongside Sacranie he is a guest speaker for the Ramphal Institute, where Abdul Bari is a patron. Abu Sayeed is a member of MCB's National Council as well as the president of Dawatul Islam and the chair of the Islamic Sharia Council, where he works closely with Suhaib Hasan. Both Abu Sayeed and Hasan are members of ECFR and IUMS, strengthening the connection between al-Qaradawi and the Islamic revivalist network in Britain. Mogra is MCB's assistant secretary general and a member of its National Council.

He is also a trustee and the vice-chair of MINAB, as well as a trustee of the Al-Aqsa School Trust, alongside Ibrahim Hewitt, a former MCB assistant secretary general.

Former MCB senior figures such as Hewitt also help comprise the network of individuals and organisations in Britain associated with Jama'at-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood. Hewitt is the chairman of Interpal, the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund, which the US government classified as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization in 2003 due to allegations of funding Hamas in the Gaza Strip.⁸² He is also a senior editor at MEMO, where he works alongside former MCB assistant secretary general Daud Abdullah. He is a founder and former executive committee member of the Association of Muslim Schools UK (AMS-UK), the former assistant director of MET, where he worked alongside Ghulam Sarwar, and a former public affairs committee member at MINAB. Additionally, Hewitt is a trustee of the International Board of Educational Research and Resources (IBERR), founded by Yusuf Islam in 1996, in its own words, 'to "Islamise" the provision of educational services'.⁸³

IBERR, although based in South Africa, is linked to several British organisations that connect a number of individuals and groups in Britain's Muslim Brotherhood network. IBERR and the Nida Trust have worked together on events and educational training. IBERR's former CEO, Mohammed Akram Khan-Cheema was a keynote speaker at the Nida Trust's Education Fair in March 2012. Together with the Islamic Shakhshiyah Foundation, IBERR and the Nida Trust have collaborated in the design and provision of teacher training for Muslim teachers in Britain.⁸⁴ The venue they have regularly used, the Regent's Park Mosque, is a founding organisation of the Islamic Sharia Council. Amongst the listed advisers of the Islamic Shakhshiyah

⁸² 'U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas and Six Senior Hamas Leaders as Terrorist Entities', U.S. Department of Treasury website, August 22, 2003. <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js672.aspx>.

⁸³ 'Aims & Objectives', IBERR website, webpage captured on April 8, 2013. <http://web.archive.org/web/20130408051924/http://www.iberr.net/aims-objectives>.

⁸⁴ 'Teacher Education and Consultancy', Islamic Shakhshiyah Foundation website, webpage captured on February 17, 2014. <http://web.archive.org/web/20140217063046/http://www.isfnet.org.uk/index.php/teacher-education-and-cpd.html>.

Foundation is Edris Khamissa of IBERR and Ibrahim Hewitt.⁸⁵ The Nida Trust also has working relationships with MAB and the Islamic Foundation. The Nida Trust was invited to run MAB's annual leaders training camp in May 2012. It has also worked with the Islamic Foundation's Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE) for the provision of courses delivered by MIHE senior lecturer Abdullah Sahin on 'Qur'anic pedagogy' and Islamic education, the latter of which was sponsored by Muslim Aid.⁸⁶

In addition to Hewitt, other former MCB figures with overlapping roles in the revivalist network include Tahir Alam and Mohammed Abdul Aziz. Alam was assistant secretary general in 2006-2008, as well as the chair of MCB's Education Committee during the same period, and was also involved in AMS-UK as an executive committee member. Additionally, until his resignation in July 2014, Alam was the director and chair of the Parkview Educational Trust, responsible for the management of three schools at the centre of the Trojan Horse affair. Mohammed Abdul Aziz was also involved in MCB as its representative on the Department of Trade's Equality and Diversity Forum in 2006 and as the former adviser to MCB secretary general Sacranie. He was, as mentioned, a former researcher at the Islamic Foundation and an executive committee member of AMSS-UK, as well as an honorary trustee of the East London Mosque and a former executive committee member at YMO-UK.

The networked individuals identified in the preceding section all share a connection to MCB or Muslim Aid. Yet, there are other connections that also form part of this network that are worth noting. The Islamic Sharia Council, for example, is linked to the Association of Muslim Lawyers (AML) through Ahmad Thomson. AML was co-founded in 1993 by Thomson, who is the deputy chair. He is also a member of the Islamic Sharia Council committee.⁸⁷ The Islamic Sharia Council also has a connection with MCB, in addition to its affiliation to MCB. Although MCB has no

⁸⁵ 'Advisors', Islamic Shakhshiyah Foundation website, webpage captured on February 19, 2014. <http://web.archive.org/web/20140219084045/http://www.isfnet.org.uk/index.php/advisors.html>.

⁸⁶ 'Qur'anic Pedagogy' course outline, Nida Trust website, <http://nidatrust.org.uk/content/booking>; Conference programme for 'Islamic Education in the Western Context: Challenges & Opportunities', Nida Trust website, http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/docs/conference_programme3.pdf.

⁸⁷ Interview with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 15, 2012.

formal role with *shari'a*, since it abstains from being associated with any particular school of Islamic law, informally it does: Ibrahim Mogra explains that although MCB does not issue *fatwas* (religious rulings) it does 'signpost people to *shari'a* councils and to *shari'a* bodies and the like'.⁸⁸ The Islamic Sharia Council is also informally connected to the Muslim Research and Development Foundation (MRDF), since Haitham al-Haddad, a senior judge and trustee of the council, is a trustee and former chairman of MRDF. Furthermore, Suhaib Hasan, the Islamic Sharia Council secretary, links the council with the Islam Channel, for which he is the presenter of the show, 'Journey Through the Qur'an'.⁸⁹

3. Visualising a network of networks

The numerous overlapping positions in organisations associated with Jama'at-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood described above, in addition to the collaborative relationships between them described earlier, form a complex network, referred to in this thesis as the 'revivalist network'.

This network may be termed *meta-organisational*, since it cuts *across* the formal structures of named organisations. Certainly, it encompasses collaborative partnerships and official affiliations between registered companies and charities. More importantly, however, the network also includes *informal* relationships between numerous organisations that are inseparable from the personal relationships between the leaders of these organisations. Informal organisational links are furthermore implied in the multiple and overlapping leadership roles that numerous individuals within certain organisations have in various other organisations. Thus, the network described in this chapter is not, strictly speaking, a network *of* organisations, since it is the individuals within organisations that drive them and make connections. In some organisations, it is only certain individuals within them that are part of the network. Yet, it may be described as *organised*: All individuals within the network are related to at least one organisation. They are all engaged in what al-Qaradawi terms as 'organised work'.

⁸⁸ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

⁸⁹ Programme details for 'Journey Through the Quran', Islam Channel website. <http://www.islamchannel.tv/ProgramDetail.aspx?id=15&date=3/1/2010>.


It should be noted that the individuals comprising this network come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. In addition to those with family origins in the Indian subcontinent and the Arab Middle East, the network also includes white converts, such as Ibrahim Hewitt, Yusuf Islam, and Ahmad Thomson, and black converts, including Daud Abdullah, who have taken up prominent roles in particular organisations. The involvement of converts is unsurprising given the broadly trans-ethnic composition and orientation of the network. Although there are some groups that serve a particular ethnic or linguistic Muslim community (such as UKIM) and others whose activism is focused on the politics of a particular Muslim region or state (such as the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund), these are all connected within a web of groups that are dedicated to Islamic affairs transcending parochial lines.

The revivalist network may be visualised in two dimensions using the open-source network analysis and visualisation software programme, *Gephi*. Figure 1 below is a network diagram produced in *Gephi*, including all the individuals and organisations identified in this chapter as forming the network, plus some others.

The data used to generate this diagram is comprised, firstly, of a list of ‘nodes’, which are either individuals or organisations, and, secondly, of ‘edges’, i.e. the relationships between these nodes. Such relationships may be between individuals, between organisations, or between individuals and organisations. They include close personal connections, collaborations, affiliations, and leadership roles within organisations, such as director or trustee. The list of relationships was collated with reference to open source material, including the publications of the organisations in the list, plus interviews with key leaders of some of these organisations. Some of the relationships are historical and some current. The full list of nodes and edges, with notes, including descriptions of collaborations and job titles, and sources, is presented in Appendix 2.

Figure 1 below shows the complex web of connections between Jama’at- and Ikhwan-associated groups and individuals in Britain.

Figure 1: Diagram of Islamic revivalist network in Britain. Colour key for nodes: yellow = individuals, blue = organisations. See Appendix 2 for the full names of the individuals and organisations as well as descriptions of the relationships between them.



In the literature on Islam and Islamism in Britain, these two ‘strands’ are typically written about as two distinct constellations of personalities and groups, albeit with some connections. Innes Bowen’s 2014 book, *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent*, exemplifies this approach by dedicating separate chapters to Jama’at-i-Islami-related groups and those connected to the Ikhwan. But, whilst there are close relationships between individuals and groups with Arab connections that cluster on the issue of Palestine, and whilst there are tight relationships between those with connections to the Indian subcontinent, these two strands within the network are thoroughly interlinked. Even clusters of individuals and organisations at the outer edge of the network, such as the Palestine Return Centre, are just several connections away from the central region of the network where MCB is situated. The key hubs in this trans-ethnic network, as described in this chapter, include MCB and Muslim Aid, as well as the Islamic Foundation and MAB. They each play an important role in connecting the various other smaller groups and associated individuals, as well as fostering trans-ethnic Muslim solidarity.

This network diagram has some limitations. It is not exhaustive, for there are sure to be other ‘nodes’ and ‘edges’ that are missing. There are most certainly numerous other individuals involved in the work of the organisations featured in the network, though these have been omitted to allow focus upon the key figures identified in the literature and others with recognisable multiple roles within various groups. As mentioned earlier, activist groups that are connected to the network via coalitions and collaborations but which do not share a Muslim identity have also been omitted, even though they may play an important role in the work of revivalist groups. And, likewise, organisations that are identifiably Muslim but which have clearly moved away from an ‘Islamist’ orientation—for example, in rejecting a role for Islam as the fundamental principle for state governance—have not been included, even when their leaders have previously been involved in Jama’at- or Ikhwan-associated groups.

Furthermore, the ‘nodes’ as depicted in this diagram are clearly of two kinds, organisations and individuals, which suggest a level of independence not borne out in reality. The building blocks of this network are not, in fact, synonymous with either organisations or individuals *in vacuo*: They are either individuals that have authoritative roles within organisations or influence upon them, or organisations that

are driven by specific individuals. Nevertheless, the diagram serves a practical purpose. Bearing in mind Bourdieu's warning not to mistake 'the model of reality for the reality of the model', the diagram establishes that there is an organised network between the individuals and organisations named within it.⁹⁰

To conclude this chapter, the interpersonal and inter-organisational relationships comprising this revivalist network may be observed in terms of co-involvement in activities and events, and in terms of various leadership structures. Such structures, as this chapter has shown, includes MCB, as Britain's most important umbrella organisation for representing Muslims' interests; the Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations, a hitherto unreported, semi-formal group comprised of key leaders of Jama'at- and Ikhwan-associated organisations; and informal friendship networks, exemplified by Abdullah Faliq's circle of associates. It also includes informal overlapping organisational structures, particularly evident in the multiple leadership positions of key individuals in MCB, Muslim Aid and other organisations.

The individuals that feature prominently in the network are involved in organised work, but do not constitute a clear vanguard in the sense of a unified front with control over the strategic direction of the network. There are multiple leadership clusters but, whilst these overlap somewhat, they do not amount to (or enable) a central command structure. Nevertheless, it is clear that the groups and individuals of concern collectively comprise an organised network characteristic of a social movement. It remains to be seen to what extent this network is bonded in terms of cultural solidarity, including shared ways of seeing and evaluating the world, the subject of the next chapter, and in terms of a shared conflictual relation with social norms and political authority, the subject of Chapter 5.

⁹⁰ Bourdieu (1990), p.39.

Chapter 4

The Basis of the Bonds of Brotherhood: Cultural Solidarity, Habitus and Ideology

This chapter seeks to answer the question as to whether the organisations and individuals comprising the revivalist network identified in Chapter 3 share the bonds of cultural solidarity. In much of the academic, think tank and news media literature, the individuals and groups of concern are characterised as sharing a ‘political ideology ... that calls for the establishment of a distinctly Islamic system of government’.¹ This chapter, however, does not regard the key factor likely bonding the network as ideology, in the sense of an explicitly formulated doctrine. Rather than seek to establish the ‘ideology’ of the network and ascertain whether this includes the goal of an Islamic state, this chapter seeks to establish whether or not a bonding factor in the network is an identifiably similar set of classifications, concepts and dispositions. This particularly relates to the individuals’ sense of themselves as members of a group and their concern with the social world they inhabit, including but by no means restricted to matters of politics and governance.

Accordingly, this chapter shows how the individuals comprising the network identified in Chapter 3 share cultural solidarity in terms of how they classify themselves as a community and the environment or territory within which they live. It regards their conception of communal identity and solidarity through certain Islamic concepts, such as the Muslim *umma*, and Islamic principles implicit to their work, including that of ‘Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Wrong’. It shows the extent to which they share a common understanding of themselves as a community, of their place in the world, and of their work and its purpose. This chapter contends that although there is some variation in the way in which

¹ Pew Forum (2010), p.20.

individuals understand their collective identity and certain key Islamic concepts and principles through which they understand their work, there are nevertheless grounds to assert that the network identified in the previous chapter embodies cultural solidarity characteristic of a social movement.

1. Communal and territorial classifications

Individuals and groups in the revivalist network share a way of seeing themselves as part of a religious community, the *umma*, and as part of humanity, within which the *umma* is nested. Although these forms of identification are not mutually exclusive, the Muslim *umma* takes precedence because of its perceived possession of divine knowledge and its duty to share Islam. Also common within the network is a perception of the territory in which they reside, understood in terms of reformed Islamic concepts.

1.1. Community: the Muslim *umma* and humanity

The *umma* is an Islamic concept that derives from the Qur'an. As Frederick Denny observes, 'in the Qur'an the *ummah* concept itself develops from a general one, applying to non-Arab groups, too, toward a more exclusive one which is limited to the Muslim community'.² By regarding the appearance of the term *umma* as it appears in the Qur'an according to the order in which the verses were allegedly revealed, Denny notes that the meaning of the term changes from religious communities, including Christians and Jews, to Muslims as the ideal religious community. He writes that in the latter part of the Qur'an, the term seems to apply exclusively to Muslims 'as the *Ummah* par excellence, a concept and reality which possess an ontological status'.³

This concept of the *umma* as the community or nation of Muslim believers is a basic feature of the perceptual schemata, and thus the cultural solidarity, shared by members of the revivalist network in Britain. A sense of religious fraternity is certainly not exclusive to these individuals, or Muslims more generally, but a

² Denny (1975), p.36.

³ Ibid., p.55.

specific sense of the *umma*, along with other ways of seeing and evaluating their position in the world, connects them to a distinct social and politically oriented habitus. The notion of belonging to the *umma* as a singular community involves a bonding in terms of shared beliefs and a collective Islamic identity. This may be compatible with other forms of identification, such as ‘Britishness’, but may not be subordinate to them. Yet, importantly, it also involves an obligation to share Islam, principally its ethical code, beyond this community within the broader society.

Such a concept is clearly expressed, explicitly or implicitly, by prominent leaders within Jama’at- and Ikhwan-associated organisations in Britain. For example, Muhammad Abdul Bari, the former MCB secretary general, writes in a report for the Cordoba Foundation that the term *umma* ‘is commonly used to mean the collective community of Islamic peoples. It can be used to mean the concept of a commonwealth of the Believers’.⁴ Elsewhere he writes, ‘Muslims are one *ummah*’, a ‘community of people bonded by their desire to surrender to the will of God’.⁵ Ibrahim Hewitt, senior editor at the Middle Eastern Monitor and the former assistant director of the Muslim Educational Trust, defines *umma* as ‘Community; in particular, the global Muslim community’.⁶ Zahid Parvez, the director of the Islamic Foundation’s Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE) and a former president of UKIM, similarly defines *umma* as ‘the Muslim world community’ which is ‘connected into one brotherhood and sisterhood by the Islamic faith and vision’.⁷

Acknowledgement of the *umma* as the Muslim community or nation, and of the importance of the solidarity of the *umma*, has been expressed at numerous events in Britain or involving Muslim activists based in Britain. Such an acknowledgement was expressed by numerous figures in the revivalist network in Britain at the ‘Muslims in Europe Conference’, held in Istanbul in July 2006. These included Khurshid Ahmad, chairman of the Islamic Foundation; Manazir Ahsan, the Foundation’s director general; Iqbal Sacranie, then the secretary general of MCB;

⁴ Abdul Bari (2013), p.8, fn.1.

⁵ Abdul Bari (2005), p.84.

⁶ Hewitt (2004), p.59.

⁷ Parvez (2007), pp.266, 54.

Mohammed Abdul Aziz, Sacranie's then adviser; Iqbal Asaria, MCB's finance director; Said Ferjani, then the head of public relations for the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB); Wakkas Khan, then the president of the Federation of Islamic Student Societies (FOSIS); Mohamed Mukadam, the former chairman of the Association of Muslim Schools UK; Anas Shaikh-Ali, the director of the London branch of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT-UK); and Ahmed Al-Rawi, then the president of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. Assuming a fundamental social reality designated by the term *umma*, but concerned with its manifest cohesiveness, the conference delegates declared,

We recognise that [the] solidarity of the Ummah is a key priority for all Muslims—both in Europe and throughout the world ... We call for solidarity between us and the upholding of Islam's universal vision of peace, fraternity, tolerance and social harmony.⁸

A similar invocation of the *umma* as a unitary Muslim community was made in June 2011 at MCB's fourteenth Annual General Meeting by Maulana Shahid Raza, then the chairman of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB). He stated, 'despite our diversity, we are one Muslim ummah (nation) and there are fundamental beliefs and practices that make us one'.⁹ He added that 'MCB is one of the strongest expressions of that unity in this country'. The same sense of the term *umma* was expressed in the Cordoba Foundation-supported event held in 2012 entitled, 'Staging the Ummah', which addressed the issue of a 'culturally relevant Islam'.¹⁰ Other, earlier events focused on the concept of the *umma* as a singular Muslim community, and upon rousing Muslim solidarity based upon this concept, include those held by FOSIS. In 2003, for example, Zahid Parvez and Azzam

⁸ 'The Topkapi Declaration', Amman Message website, July 2, 2006. http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid=34.

⁹ 'Muslims in Britain Come Together and Confirm their Commitment to Unity, and Working for a Just and Fair Society for all', MCB website, June 15, 2011. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslims-in-britain-come-together-and-confirm-their-commitment-to-unity-and-working-for-a-just-and-fair-society-for-all/>.

¹⁰ 'Staging the Ummah: An Evening with Wajahat Ali', event listing, Cordoba Foundation website, September 24, 2012. <http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/events.php?id=1&art=81>.

Tamimi both gave presentations on the topic of the Muslim *umma* at the organisation's annual summer conference.¹¹

For revivalists, a sense of brotherhood amongst Muslims is central to being a Muslim. Daud Abdullah, the former assistant secretary general of MCB, expresses this as follows: 'The Qur'an says, "All of the believers are brothers," and there are so many traditions [*hadiths*] on this subject of brotherhood that you cannot be a sincere Muslim and not take these teachings seriously.'¹² Citing from the *hadith* collection of al-Bukhari, the director of the Muslim Educational Trust, Ghulam Sarwar, writes, 'Believers are like parts of a building to one another—each part supporting the others'.¹³ He cites another *hadith*, adding, 'None of you can be a believer unless he loves for his brother what he loves for himself'.¹⁴

However, the Muslim *umma* is perceived by members of the revivalist network not simply as a source of identity or solidarity, but more specifically as a vanguard for ushering in Allah's divine will within the entirety of human society. The director of the Islamic Foundation's Markfield Institute of Higher Education, Zahid Parvez, describes the *umma*'s responsibility as 'uphold[ing] morality, truth and justice' and 'lead[ing] Mankind [sic] from the depths of ignorance to the true knowledge: Islam'.¹⁵ IIIT-UK declares it is 'dedicated to the revival and reform of Islamic thought and its methodology in order to enable the Ummah to deal effectively with present challenges' and bestow divine 'guidance' upon human civilisation.¹⁶ This duty of guiding humanity is similarly expressed by the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), which is connected to the Islamic Sharia Council and the UK Board of Sharia Councils by the overlapping roles of Suhaib Hasan and Maulana Muhammad Abu Sayeed in these organisations. 'IUMS does not follow a

¹¹ Maréchal (2008), p.322.

¹² Interview with Daud Abdullah, February 10, 2012.

¹³ Sarwar (2006), p.198.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.199.

¹⁵ Zahid Parvez, 'The Crux of the Matter', *Trends*, Vol. 2, No. 3., 1988, p.14.

¹⁶ 'About Us', IIIT-UK website. <http://www.iiituk.com/about.htm>.

certain country, group, or sect,' it asserts, 'it is only proud of belonging to Islam and its transnational community - Ummah'.¹⁷ It adds:

We have been taught by the Quran as well as by the Sunnah that this Muslim Ummah will never agree to commit an error, whereas the Quran says: 'And of those whom We have created, *there is a community who guides (others) with the truth, and establishes justice therewith*'.¹⁸

Numerous individuals in the revivalist network, particularly in the field of inter-faith work, articulate a notion of the *umma* as embracing all humanity, including Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The director of the Islamic Foundation, Irshad Bacqui, for example, expresses this view. 'The whole world is *umma*,' he states, 'because its the *umma* of humanity'.¹⁹ This is, however, by no means an alternative notion to that of the Muslim *umma*. The *umma* as humanity and the *umma* as the nation of Muslim believers may, in fact, be viewed as inter-related social classifications within a distinct perceptual schemata shared by individuals within the network. What connects them is a perception of Islam's universal mission to embrace the whole of human society.

Anas al-Shaikh Ali, the director of IIIT-UK, Ibrahim Mogra, assistant secretary general for MCB, and Anas Altikriti, director of the Cordoba Foundation, all support this view. 'The *umma*,' says al-Shaikh Ali, 'is both Muslim society and humanity, since Muslims are part of humanity. Whatever we do, its not only for the betterment of Muslims, its also for the betterment of humanity in general'.²⁰ Mogra similarly explains: 'The *umma* is the global *umma*,' he states. 'It is not just about Muslims. If we say Muhammad was a universal messenger and then exclude non-Muslims, where's the universality?'.²¹ Altikriti echoes this, asserting that because of the universality of Islam, the *umma* includes both Muslims as a community and,

¹⁷ 'Introducing IUMS', IUMS website. <http://iumsonline.org/portal/en-US/introduction/37/>.

¹⁸ Ibid., emphasis added.

¹⁹ Interview with Irshad Bacqui, February 22, 2012.

²⁰ Interview with Anas al-Shaikh Ali, January 17, 2013.

²¹ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

more widely, non-Muslims.²² ‘The message of Islam,’ he states, ‘does not resonate to the borders of the Muslim community. It resonates far beyond ... and that is why people are turning to Islam.’²³ For these prominent individuals, the term *umma* denotes different but related communities, with the Muslim *umma* nested within the more general *umma* of humanity. In Mogra’s words:

When we talk of the *umma* we should be thinking globally. But sometimes you have to bring it closer to home. When you have Muslims in Burma being persecuted, then I would say, yes these part of our *umma*, these are brothers and sisters in Islam, that is our *umma*, and when one part of the body aches, every part of the body is restless.²⁴

The metaphor Mogra uses is derived from canonical *hadiths*.²⁵ It is one that is commonly referred to by other revivalist Muslims. Abdul Bari, for example, writes, ‘According to the traditions [*hadiths*] from Prophet Muhammad, “You see the believers ... as if they were a single body; when one of its members is ailing, the rest of the body joins it in sleeplessness and fever”.’²⁶ Manazir Ahsan, the director general of the Islamic Foundation and elected council member of MCB, similarly observes, ‘In a Prophetic Hadith (Traditional saying) Muslims have been compared to the body—if one part of it aches, the whole body feels its effect and rushes to its relief.’²⁷ It seems that despite expressions of humanity as one *umma*, the notion of the Muslim *umma* takes precedence when Muslims are enduring hardship, and that this is inextricable from a scripturally-informed religious perspective.

This conceptual precedence—to see Muslims as part of the Muslim *umma* prior to seeing them as part of the broader *umma* of humanity—sometimes expresses an unconscious bias towards Muslims over non-Muslims. Such a bias was expressed by

²² ‘RESPONSE TO THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES-BR ANAS AL TIKRITI’, YouTube, December 25, 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_KkWLtn07VE.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

²⁵ This metaphor appears in the two most popular collections of *hadiths*, in Sahih Bukhari (number 5665) and Sahih Muslim (number 2586). See Abu Amina Elias, ‘Hadith on Brotherhood: The believers are like one body in their love, mercy, and compassion for each other’, Daily Hadith website, March 3, 2012. <http://dailyhadith.abuaminaelias.com/2012/03/03/hadith-on-brotherhood-the-believers-are-like-one-body-in-their-love-mercy-and-compassion-for-each-other/>.

²⁶ Abdul Bari (2005), p.85.

²⁷ Ashan (1977), p.22.

the former MCB general secretary Iqbal Sacranie in his explanation of MCB's boycott of Holocaust Memorial Day in 2005 and its campaign to have it replaced with a more 'inclusive' event. Sacranie claimed that a new, 'EU genocide memorial day' would be able to commemorate 'other ongoing genocide and human right abuses around the world'. The examples he gave in his letter to the Home Office were all concerned with Muslims (and questionable as genocides): 'the occupied Palestinian territories, Chechnya, Kashmir'.²⁸ Only when the story broke in the news media did he add Rwanda and Vietnam as examples.²⁹

This bias is inseparable from a distinctive religious habitus in which the Muslim *umma* is perceived—and indeed referred to in the Qur'an, verse 3:110—as the 'best community'. Its special value lies in its piety. In Abdul Bari's words, within humanity, the Muslim *umma* is 'blessed' because of its wilful submission to 'the will of God'.³⁰ His view that only the possession of 'God-consciousness' distinguishes some people as superior to others implicitly portrays the Muslim *umma* as a superior community over others.³¹ The Muslim *umma* is also deemed special because of its responsibility towards humanity of sharing the message and way of life of Islam. This sense of responsibility is what connects the concept of the *umma* as humanity with that of the Muslim *umma*. The latter, gifted for its possession of divine revelation and right guidance, is seen to be the vanguard community at the cutting edge of a social transformation for the benefit of all towards Islam: The *umma* as humanity forms the broader, global community within which Islam's universal mission is yet to be realised. Sacranie expresses this view in suggesting that although the concept of the *umma* marks a communal Muslim identity, this does not entail an isolated community, since 'Islam is a universal religion' and 'engagement and exchange' is necessary for Islam to benefit humanity as a whole.³²

²⁸ 'MCB and the Holocaust Memorial Day', MCB website, January 23, 2005. <http://web.archive.org/web/20050211155329/http://www.mcb.org.uk/archivenews.php>.

²⁹ 'Programme transcript' (for 'A Question of Leadership' documentary), BBC website, 16 September 16, 2005. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/4171950.stm>.

³⁰ Abdul Bari (2005), p.84.

³¹ Ibid., p.81.

³² Sacranie (2006), p.29.

Sacranie's claim that Muslim identity does not engender a mentality of separatism was voiced in a political environment where a perceived 'hardening of attitudes' towards Muslims after the July 2005 London bombings put MCB on defensive footing. But it may also be seen in relation to an Islamic point of view in which non-Muslims are yet to be 'awakened' to the reality of their 'forgotten' Muslim identity. According to an orthodox Islamic belief based upon Muhammad's *sunna*, each child is born a Muslim, but many are raised in ignorance of this status. Ahsan expresses this view clearly. Islam, he declares, 'teaches that every man is born naturally a Muslim'.³³ This view is explicitly supported by other leading figures in the network, including Abdul Bari.³⁴ In acknowledgement of this original status, Muslim converts are sometimes referred to as 'reverts'. This perspective, popularised in the works of the late Khurram Murad, is reflected in some of the initiatives for new converts established by revivalist organisations, such as UKIM's Revert Support Programme.³⁵ In Glasgow, UKIM also has a Revert Coordinator.³⁶

Other leading figures in the revivalist network similarly express a broad concept of community in which Muslims and non-Muslims, distinguished only by their embrace of their 'true' Muslim identity, are connected as one family. Farooq Murad, the director of the Islamic Foundation and former MCB secretary general, asserts, 'In the Qur'an it is said that all of mankind is one *umma*—one people. Some recognise that they are members of this family. Some may not.'³⁷ Muslims are viewed as those who readily acknowledge themselves as part of God's family and non-Muslims are viewed as those who are yet to do so. Non-Muslims, Murad believes, need to be drawn 'back into the family' of God. The method of doing this—and a duty incumbent upon Muslims—is, Murad says, *da'wa*. Non-Muslims are thus seen as part of God's family that, by virtue of failing to recognise this, have gone astray. And *da'wa* is seen as the dutiful means by which Muslims are to bring

³³ Ashan (1977), p.22.

³⁴ Abdul Bari (2005), pp.78-79.

³⁵ 'Dawah Report 2012', UKIM website, August 7, 2012.
<http://web.archive.org/web/20130810090143/http://www.ukim.org/ukimdata/256/UKIM-DAWAH-REPORT-2012>.

³⁶ 'UKIM Outreach Services', Alfurqan Mosque website, August 2, 2014.
<http://www.alfurqanmosque.com/index.php/departments/outreach>.

³⁷ Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013.

them *back* into the fold of Islam, a return to their original, ‘natural’ status. Such a return ultimately dissolves the barrier between the Muslim *umma* and the *umma* of humanity which it lies within. Framing this view of the relationship between Muslims and the rest of humanity, and the importance of *da’wa*, is the perception of Islam, expressed in Ahsan’s words, as ‘the universal religion meant for mankind of all races, colours and times’.³⁸

Abdul Bari likewise sees Islam as a ‘universal religion’ and *da’wa* as ‘the most important duty of Muslims’.³⁹ He asserts that although serving ‘the Muslim community’ is the core of MCB’s work, this ‘community focus’ does not absolve it of its ‘greater societal responsibilities’.⁴⁰ Abdul Bari invokes the idea of *qawm* as equivalent to the British nation which includes all British citizens, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Addressing a Muslim audience, he says non-Muslim British citizens ‘may not be part of the “Muslim Ummah”, but they are our “Qawm”’.⁴¹ Drawing attention to the social challenges that affect all people regardless of religious identity, Abdul Bari takes a practical view of ‘working for the common good’.⁴² Yet, the notion of *qawm* also delineates the broader community within which the Muslim *umma* in Britain is part and with which it is obliged to share the message of Muhammad for the benefit of all. Thus, there are both practical and religious motivations underlying Abdul Bari’s concern for the ‘common good’.

The Muslim *umma*, in one sense, is not perceived as a community apart from the more inclusive community of the British *qawm* or even humanity. There are several factors that have prompted MCB’s leaders and other prominent Muslim figures to articulate this publicly. Their expressions of Muslims’ willingness to be an integral part of Britain are inseparable from public concerns and fears relating to Muslim radicalisation and terrorism. They are also inseparable from a perceived need to

³⁸ Ahsan (1977), p.42.

³⁹ Abdul Bari (2005), pp. 124, 127.

⁴⁰ Muhammad Abdul Bari, ‘Secretary General’s Address To the Annual General Meeting of the General Assembly’, p.6, MCB website, June 16, 2007.
<http://web.archive.org/web/20111105152829/http://www.mcb.org.uk/uploads/SGAGM2008.pdf>.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² ‘Working for the common good’ is the motto of MCB. See ‘MCB Constitution’, p.6, available at <http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MCBCON2002.pdf>.

distinguish themselves and their organisations from ‘quietist’ groups, such as Tablighi Jama’at, which advocate a withdrawal from politics and the mainstream non-Muslim culture, and ‘rejectionist’ groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, which consider political participation *haram*, Islamically forbidden. Public announcements regarding the inclusive character of the *umma* and the pro-integration attitude of British Muslims, such as Sacranie and Abdul Bari’s, no doubt occur in a field of contention in which the public perception of Muslims and Islam is a key stake.

But it is important to note that this is not purely defensive, since what is at stake are distinctive perceptions and positively conceived notions of the Muslim *umma* in relation to non-Muslims and Muslim-minority culture: The Muslim *umma* is perceived as a distinct brotherhood united by its possession of an ethics and a mode of knowledge rooted in the divine and, importantly, its obligation to share these universally. As Adbul Bari writes, ‘Muslims belong to a global family and they are commanded to remain united in the pursuit of Islam, as “all believers are brethren”.’⁴³ And as Zahid Parvez articulates it, ‘The purpose and mission of the Muslim world-community (Ummah) ... is no other than to align individuals and society to the natural way shown by Allah through the glorious Quran.’⁴⁴ This sense of the *umma*’s ‘purpose and mission’ was similarly articulated by the late Khurram Murad, the former vice president of Jama’at-i-Islami and secretary general of the Islamic Foundation. A hugely influential figure for his son, Farooq Murad, and others including Parvez, he wrote:

[T]he Muslim Ummah has not been constituted to become just another nation among nations, to compete with others to advance its interests. No, it has been ‘raised for all mankind’. It is the ‘best community’ [a reference to the Qur’an, verse 3:110] only if it serves their [i.e. mankind’s] interests, their foremost interest being that they should *find guidance to the right path* [i.e. to Islam].⁴⁵

⁴³ Abdul Bari (2005), p.85.

⁴⁴ Zahid Parvez, ‘Why Fasting?’, UKIM Facebook page, July 29, 2012.
<https://www.facebook.com/UKIMBfd/posts/392971687419445>.

⁴⁵ Murad (1986), p.16.

1.2. Territory: *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*

Individuals of the revivalist network express a similar sense of the terrain in which they live and practice their faith. Traditionally, Islamic legal thought classified territory into *dar al-Islam* (the abode of peace or submission to Allah) and *dar al-harb* (the abode of war).⁴⁶ Contemporary revivalist thinkers, including Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Khurram Murad, began to question the applicability of this classification when it became clear, from the late 1970s, that Muslims in Europe were not temporary residents but permanent citizens. Europe could not be considered *dar al-harb*, since it was now the home of some millions of Muslims who were more or less free to practice Islam, though it could not be considered *dar al-Islam*, since *shari'a* was not fully applied. Thus, a new legal category was devised for it, *dar al-da'wa* (the abode of the call to Islam). Al-Qaradawi also speaks of Europe as *dar al-ahd* (the abode of contact), whilst Tariq Ramadan describes it as *dar al-shahada* (the abode of testimony).⁴⁷ These alternative conceptual categories are explicitly or implicitly endorsed by some members of the revivalist network, indicating a shared perspective of their relationship with their social and political environment.

Abdullah Faliq, for example, notes that from the early 1980s, organisations such as the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) and MAB, continued the trend established by other organisations, including the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM) and FOSIS, to serve Muslims' interests and protect Muslim identity, but also began to view Britain as home. Their activities began to be directed to Muslims as British citizens. He contends that events such as the Rushdie Affair not only helped galvanise a trans-ethnic sense of Muslim solidarity amongst British Muslims, but also made clear that the classical Islamic definitions of territory were irrelevant to Muslims' contemporary situation in Britain. 'This is a place where Islam can be practiced,' asserts Faliq, 'so it is not *dar al-harb*. Britain is home to me, so I consider it "land of peace"'.⁴⁸ Other leading figures in the network seem to agree. Citing the influence

⁴⁶ This distinction was first legally codified by Abu Hanifa (d. 767), founder of one of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, as recorded by Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani in his *Kitab al-Siyar al-Kabir*. See Nyazee (2002), p.172, and Khadduri (1955), pp.52-53.

⁴⁷ Ramadan (1999).

⁴⁸ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

of his late father upon his thinking, Farooq Murad rejects the relevance of the idea of *dar al-Islam* versus *dar al-harb*. ‘Islam is not a geographical idea,’ he states, ‘it is a universal message.’⁴⁹ Muslims, he believes, should integrate and participate in Britain through democratic means. ‘There is no idea of isolation, withdrawal or rejection.’ This is not merely his father’s teachings, he insists, since ‘it comes from the Islamic concept of *da’wa*. This is invitation, interaction. We have a message and we should share it’.

The rejection of traditional, dichotomous Islamic notions of space was similarly articulated in a report, *Contextualising Islam*, published by the University of Cambridge. Authored by a group including some individuals identified as playing key roles in the revivalist network, such as Mohammed Abdul Aziz, Anas al-Shaikh Ali, Ibrahim Mogra and Mohamed Mukadam, the report states that it is ‘important to move away from the terminology of the “dar al-Islam” and “dar al-harb” dichotomy,’ which, it says, is not found in the Qur’an, but ‘developed by classical jurists in an era before globalisation’.⁵⁰ The report claims that the concept of *dar al-Islam* was equivalent to *dar al-amn*—‘land of security’—as opposed to a ‘land of insecurity’. It also states that security means the ‘freedom to perform public acts of worship, including the five prayers, giving alms (*zakah*), performing pilgrimage to Makkah, performing the fast of Ramadan, slaughter of animals for halal food, building mosques, giving the call to prayer (*adhan*), wearing appropriate dress and avoiding the cardinal sins’.⁵¹ In Britain, the report notes, there is freedom to do all of these things, the implication being that Britain may be considered in this sense as *dar al-Islam* or, at the very least, *not* as *dar al-harb*. Mogra concurs with this view. ‘Britain for me is the best place in Europe for Muslims,’ says. ‘We have everything we would wish for in this country. I can dress as I like, we have *halal* shops, you can call out the call to prayer from the minarets, we have every freedom within the parameters of the law.’⁵²

⁴⁹ Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013.

⁵⁰ Suleiman (2009), p.36.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.35.

⁵² Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

The perception of Britain beyond the dichotomous terms of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* is not unique to revivalists who seek a transformation of society towards the universalisation of Islam. Whilst revivalists who perceive Islam's rightful place as comprehensively embedded throughout the entire social fabric reject an attitude of hostility towards Britain and non-Muslim fellow citizens, there are others who likewise view Britain in non-confrontational terms but see Islam as needing to find a home within a mostly secular society and a liberal democratic political system. Both groups of individuals view Islam and the Muslim-minority environment of Britain in compatible rather than antagonistic terms. But what distinguishes these two groups is how Islam is viewed as best at home in Britain. Whereas revivalists see no limit to the applicability of Islam within Britain's social and political structures—and in fact sees such change in the long term as the will of God—Muslim secularists see a need for a clear separation of religion and the state, and a need to re-interpret the fundamentals of the religion within the contemporary context of today's liberal democratic, human rights framework.

Classifications of Britain or Europe more broadly as *dar al-da'wa*, *dar al-ahd* or *dar al-shahada*, certainly separate their proponents from the 'rejectionist' groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, who eschew any third possible classification of territory beyond *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*. But what separates them internally is whether or not Islam is viewed as a universal religion and whether or not the *umma* is seen as having a 'purpose and mission' to guide humanity through *da'wa* to a comprehensive social transformation in the name of Islam. What distinguishes Islamic revivalists is not just a non-confrontational sense of the territory in which they live, but—as the next section aims to show—a certain sense of the nature, purpose and meaning of their work, as well as a certain orientation to the future.

2. Missionary concepts and perceptions

In addition to a shared sense of themselves as part of a religious community, the *umma*, and a sense of the terrain upon which they live, individuals and groups in the revivalist network share a sense of their work and its purpose. This section of the chapter identifies three ways in which this manifests. Firstly, in terms of an effort to educate Muslims on their faith; secondly, as a call to non-Muslims to Islam,

understood through the Islamic concept of *da'wa*; and thirdly, in terms of a proactive moral duty to 'enjoin good and forbid wrong'. These are all inter-related, and together amount to a collective tendency to define and classify Islam, but for the purposes of elucidation are introduced separately.

2.1. Speaking for Muslims and Islam

Many of the individuals and groups of the revivalist network are involved in classificatory work that acts to influence Muslims' own understanding of their faith. They are connected by a similar approach, adopted consciously or unconsciously, to shape the perceptions and realities of Muslims in line with a particular way of seeing and appreciating the world—a particular Islamic habitus. There is some variation between individuals' practical or reflexive understanding of Islam, including certain key religious concepts, but this does not undermine the basic observation that there is a shared concern to represent what is deemed to be the true understanding of Islam. There is a collective effort, albeit largely uncoordinated and distributed, to classify the 'correct' and, thus, the 'incorrect' practice of the religion.

At the nexus of the revivalist network, MCB's official aims include working 'for a more enlightened appreciation of Islam and Muslim in the wider society' and promoting 'cooperation, consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK'.⁵³ However, as the former advisor to Iqbal Sacranie, Mohammed Abdul Aziz, admits, the constitution of its leadership and organisational affiliates is dominated by Jama'at or Ikhwan-associated individuals and groups.⁵⁴ Ostensibly, MCB seeks to build consensus and represent the broad range of Islamic viewpoints on policy matters, though in practice the views it expresses belie a certain outlook that is difficult to separate from the specific background of its leadership. The distinctiveness of this outlook is not just marked by certain views or concepts—for example, the *umma* as a community with a universal mission to share Islam—but by the perception of its own mission to speak on behalf of Islam. In speaking for Muslims, MCB adopts a significant role in presenting a specific understanding of Islam to the government and the wider public, as well as to Muslims themselves.

⁵³ 'MCB Constitution', p.6.

⁵⁴ Interview with Mohammed Abdul Aziz, September 3, 2012.

Former secretary general Farooq Murad states, ‘On many issues we have tried to build consensus. It is not easy, I accept, but we feel that there are issues that we need to make provision for. This includes the *education of our faith*’.⁵⁵ Whilst presenting itself as an interlocutory agent for the diversity of Muslim views—a conduit for different Islamic perspectives—MCB no doubt sees as part of its mission the education of Muslims and non-Muslims on what Islam is. Murad states, ‘We try to build consensus within the [Muslim] community, try to *articulate what Islam is* for the majority of the community.’ Murad’s assertion that MCB seeks to express the understanding of Islam held by the majority of Muslims is highly contentious. It is possibly based upon a belief that most British Muslims adhere to what he and his associates deem to be orthodox Islam, rather than any systematic study of what British Muslims perceive their faith to consist of. It certainly appears more aspirational or prescriptive than descriptive.

This is supported by some of the events MCB has organised. For example, in September 2004, MCB held a seminar at the East London Mosque’s London Muslim Centre, which marked the launch of the publication of MCB’s ‘Guide to the British Media’. The media guide and the seminar aimed ‘to develop the skills needed by British Muslims to ensure *a better and more accurate representation of their faith and values* in the print and broadcast media.’⁵⁶ MCB is not the only organisation that sees itself as speaking on behalf of Islam. Manazir Ahsan, the director general of the Islamic Foundation, acknowledges that the organisation, particularly its publication arm, is dedicated to portraying Islam in authentic terms. ‘Since its inception,’ he notes, ‘the Islamic Foundation has been engaged in bringing out works which may enable readers to gain a better, sharper understanding of things Islamic.’⁵⁷

The current executive director, Irshad Bacqui supports this view. When the Foundation was established, he says, ‘it was about how to present Islam to

⁵⁵ Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013.

⁵⁶ Iqbal Sacranie, ‘Secretary General’s Report’, p.11, MCB website, May, 14, 2005. http://web.archive.org/web/20111105153148/http://www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/Secretary_General_2005.pdf.

⁵⁷ Ahsan (2002).

society’.⁵⁸ In the 1970s, there was hardly any literature from the perspective of Muslims living in a Muslim-minority country. The Foundation tried to fill this gap, he says, by providing guidance on ‘the roles and responsibilities’ of Muslims in this different context. Initially focusing on children’s literature, Bacqui states, it was important to help create a new mindset, of ‘how to live according to Islamic values’ in a new environment. The authoritative presentation of Islam continues to be important to the Foundation’s work today. ‘We want to present Islam to the Muslim community and the wider society,’ says Bacqui, ‘to create awareness, so that people become aware.’ He adds that this is important in order to combat ‘misunderstandings that occur from ignorance about each other. The Muslim community is as guilty of that as any other community. We try to explain, interpret and raise awareness about each other so we can live better together’.⁵⁹

Other individuals and groups in the network similarly see themselves as working to increase the understanding of Islam. Omer El-Hamdoon, the president of MAB, for example, explains MAB’s work as targeting three distinct groups, namely, Muslim members, Muslim non-members and non-Muslims. Amongst members, El-Hamdoon describes MAB’s work as promoting a ‘better understanding of Islam, better knowledge’, as well as developing greater awareness of local and global issues affecting Muslims. Amongst Muslim non-members, he states, ‘We try to promote *the correct* understanding of Islam’. Explaining what he means by this, he says: ‘The people who have deviated in Islam are the people who have deviated from *the texts*. If you really want to understand Islam you have to go back to the texts of Islam, the Qur’an and the *sunna*, the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad.’ El-Hamdoon summarises MAB’s aspirations as follows:

We hope that the Muslim Association of Britain tries to *correct* Muslims’ understanding of Islam, so they are not narrow minded ... At the same time we try to reach out to non-Muslims and say to them, ‘This is Islam, these are the ideals of Islam, this is what Islam talks about’.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Interview with Irshad Bacqui, February 22, 2012.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

UKIM and IFE—described by IFE’s press secretary, Abdullah Faliq, as the two ‘strongest’ Muslim organisations in Britain—also view themselves as working to enhance Muslims’ understanding of Islam, as well as educating non-Muslims about Islam through *da’wa*, or outreach work. More will be said shortly on *da’wa*, since it is a key element of their *modus operandi* to attain an Islamic society. Here it suffices to observe that both organisations regard their work as beginning with disseminating the right understanding of Islam amongst Muslims. This is at least partly because only Muslims with the right understanding of Islam may engage in *da’wa*.

Like the Islamic Foundation, IFE sees itself as speaking for Islam through the facilitation of ‘an enlightened appreciation of Islam that is relevant to the context and realities of our time’.⁶¹ Such an appreciation is fostered by a range of activities, including formal and informal courses, retreats, workshops and seminars, including training programmes in leadership development for imams. UKIM likewise has a grassroots connection with over 40 branches and around 30 mosques. It similarly targets local communities with a range of social programmes, including youth clubs and cultural events. According to its website, around 5,000 children annually receive an Islamic education through its *madari* system.⁶² UKIM states that it is important for its members to acquire a ‘basic knowledge and understanding of the Islamic faith and values’. This includes ‘knowing what is obligatory (*fard* and *wajib*) and prohibited (*haram*)’.⁶³ UKIM has a very clear concept of Islam that it deems authentic and for which it sees itself as struggling to comprehensively *revive* throughout British society.

Both UKIM and IFE, as with the Islamic Foundation, MCB and others, are involved in an effort to define and classify Islam. This can take the form of educating Muslims on their faith in the context of competing Islamic interpretations, particularly secular liberal ones, or challenging mainstream public perceptions of Islam, particularly those critical (or perceived to be critical) of Islamic beliefs and

⁶¹ ‘About Us’, IFE website. <http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=intro>.

⁶² ‘Education Proejcts’, UKIM website. <http://www.ukim.org/education/>. *Madari* refers to evening and weekend schools.

⁶³ ‘The Methodology of UKIM’, UKIM website. <http://www.ukim.org/ukim/methodology/>.

practices. Some groups speaking on behalf of Muslims and Islam in recent years have taken a rather strident tone against what they see as government-led ‘Islamophobia’. Implicit to this is a certain understanding of Islam that requires protection. Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND), for example, states, ‘The desperate need to challenge the status quo, to present Islam and Muslims in a more balanced light and to defend civil liberties has never been more acute.’⁶⁴

These groups appear united in having a vision of their work as providing the ‘right’ understanding of the religion, even though they may differ upon some of the details. What this understanding consists in may be elaborated through several concepts, including *da’wa*, and doctrines, such as Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Wrong, that characterise their work.

2.2. *Da’wa*: the call to Islam

Related to the efforts to present an authentic vision of Islam to Muslims are the efforts to present Islam to non-Muslims. These efforts are entwined within a tendency to control the legitimate classification of Muslim identity and the Islamic faith. Indeed, for Islamic revivalists, what it is to be a Muslim is in part comprised of a commitment to conduct *da’wa*, to present Islam to non-believers.

The special significance of *da’wa* is related to the importance placed upon a genuine embrace of Islam—a willing rather than a coerced submission to God—for the universalisation of the religion. The propagation of Islam, it is believed, cannot be done effectively through the isolation of Muslims from the surrounding Muslim-minority culture, nor through violent means. The importance of *da’wa* underlies revivalists’ active participation in democratic politics and their condemnation of violent jihadists, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. This is exemplified by MCB’s campaign to encourage Muslims to vote⁶⁵ and its condemnation of the

⁶⁴ MEND, ‘Activity Report 2014’, p.4, MEND website, December 2014. http://mend.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/MEND_Activity_Report_2014_Low_Res.pdf.

⁶⁵ ‘Electing to Deliver – British Muslims Launch Election Strategy and Programme’, MCB website, April 18, 2005. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/electing-to-deliver-british-muslims-launch-election-strategy-and-programme/>.

Islamic State as *unIslamic*.⁶⁶ Thus, revivalists may be distinguished from militants who seek an Islamic world order through military-driven territorial expansion, and from ‘quietists’ who wish to isolate themselves in communities of putative spiritual purity.

The characterisation of groups such as the Islamic Foundation and MCB as ‘participationist’ accurately highlights the importance they place upon Muslims’ active involvement in Western social and political structures. However, it obscures a more fundamental conviction underlying their willingness to participate in politics, which concerns the importance of sharing Islam, or from their perspective *reviving* it, through willing submission. For this reason, the term ‘*dawa*-ist’ might be more accurate, though ‘revivalist’ is maintained throughout this thesis due to its relative ease of use.

Prominent individuals and groups in the revivalist network of the global Muslim Brotherhood consistently characterise *da’wa* as a religious duty. IFE’s website states, ‘Islam obligates Muslims to share and discuss their faith with those around them, as directed by the Qur’an: “Invite people to the way of your Lord, with wisdom and beautiful speech”. [Qur’an,16:125].’⁶⁷ It adds, ‘This principle, known as *Da’wa*, requires Muslims to undertake dialogue and discourse about our faith in a manner that resonates with the people around us.’ Through the principle of ‘Islamic Dawah,’ states IFE’s website, the ‘responsibility of promoting Islam is a duty placed on us all’.⁶⁸ IFE meets this perceived duty by organising ‘Islam awareness’ projects, producing audio-visual resources and hosting exhibitions, mosque open days and interfaith events.

Other groups that are similarly involved in *da’wa* activities likewise see *da’wa* as an Islamic duty. FOSIS, for example, runs an annual Islam Awareness Week in collaboration with the Islamic Education and Research Academy (iERA). In its guide for the event organisers, FOSIS states that the ‘first and foremost reason’ for

⁶⁶ ‘Not in our Name: British Muslims Condemn the Barbarity of ISIS’, MCB website, August 20, 2014. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/not-in-our-name-british-muslims-condemn-the-barbarity-of-isis/>.

⁶⁷ ‘About Us’, IFE website.

⁶⁸ ‘Introduction To Women’s section’, IFE website.
<http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=womens>.

conducting such an event is ‘that it is obligatory upon to Muslims to call others to Islam. It is narrated that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said “convey Islam to the people even if it were by a single ayah”. By organising an Islam Awareness Week,’ it states, ‘you will have something to show Allah on the Day of Judgement. This is without doubt the most important reason to participate in dawah’.⁶⁹ iERA itself is a very active organisation dedicated to *da’wa* work. It conducts training courses and develops resources for *da’wa* under its Mission Dawah initiative, and has a programme aimed at supporting new Muslims with the fundamentals of their new faith. Another organisation, the Islam Channel is conceived by its founder, Mohamed Ali Harrath, as a powerful modern vehicle for *da’wa*. The channel was established as a part of Harrath’s Dawah Project, the website of which states:

‘Dawah’ (inviting others to Islam) is an obligation upon all Muslims. Thus, it is our duty to educate people about Islam, subsequently to have a better understanding of the Muslim way of life.⁷⁰

The conception of *da’wa* as a duty is shared by key figures in the revivalist network, including Muhammad Abdul Bari, Suhaib Hasan, Omer El-Hamdoon and Anas Altikriti. Abdul Bari writes that ‘the most important duty of Muslims is to create awareness, bearing witness to God’s message among people’.⁷¹ Consistent with this, Hasan asserts that,

Da’wa, which means the propagation of Islam, the word of Allah, is a duty upon every Muslim. According to his means and abilities, he should do *da’wa*. Because as long as I think that Islam is good for everyone, and as long as I think that it is a way of your salvation on the day of judgment, then I should not hold it, I should not confine it to myself, I should propagate it.⁷²

⁶⁹ FOSIS, ‘Islam Awareness Week – a brief guide’, undated, available at: https://www.google.co.th/url?url=http://fosis.org.uk/resources/resource-pool/iscc/ireland/80-guidesislamawarenessweek-final/file&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&sa=U&ved=0CBwQFjAAahUKEwjPxMkn5bHAhWLkY4KHWUHB0U&sig2=kUsZcccPz9dvNM11keRYOw&usg=AFQjCNE69wnvIXjY-xocBaVusLKC_0QA.

⁷⁰ ‘About Us’, Dawah Project website. <http://www.thedawahproject.com/about-us/>.

⁷¹ Abdul Bari (2005), p.127.

⁷² Interview with Suhaib Hasan, February 9, 2012.

El-Hamdoon also sees *da'wa* as a duty for Muslims, but emphasises that it is something that ought to be conducted from the heart. 'The message has not been clear,' he says, 'because when people talk about *da'wa*, inviting others to Islam, they always talk about it as a duty. At MAB, however, we want to take it to a different level, where it's not just your duty, but it is something that you really do genuinely, sincerely.'⁷³ He cites the Muslim scholar al-Ghazali (1058-1111), who criticised some Muslims' worship of God as 'the worship of traders or businessmen', conducted because they calculate paradise will be rewarded to them in return. 'The higher level of worship,' says El-Hamdoon, 'is conducted by people who worship God because He deserves to be worshipped. Even if there was no Paradise, if there was no Hellfire, they would still worship God because He is worthy of worship.'

This notion of the duty of *da'wa* is one in which it is conducted not merely from a rational acknowledgement of its importance or a calculation of its rewards, but from a natural inclination, an unconsciously embodied and 'heartfelt' understanding of its importance. It resonates with the view of *da'wa* expressed by Khurram Murad, who wrote, 'Da'wah, prior to everything, is a state of mind, a world view, an attitude to life, indeed a kind of life.'⁷⁴ In this sense, *da'wa* is more than just the conscious act of presenting and promoting Islam to non-Muslims, for example through organised activities. It is also a way of conducting oneself in every action. It is unsurprising, then, that this is how Khurram Murad's son, Farooq Murad, views *da'wa*. Whilst conceding that MCB's official remit does not include *da'wa*, he asserts:

But *da'wa* is a very broad concept and can be done in many ways. If I live my values of Islam of decency, respect, kindness and generosity, I may be doing the best kind of *da'wa* possible. I think you are doing *da'wa* without consciously, actively doing *da'wa*. If you live Islam, you cannot but be doing *da'wa*.⁷⁵

Altikriti echoes these sentiments, emphasising the comprehensive nature of *da'wa* as permeating all of the various domains of human action. Social work, public relations, teaching and all other kinds of work, he states, may be classified into their

⁷³ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

⁷⁴ Murad (1986), p.10.

⁷⁵ Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013.

respective categories only from a practical point of view, but all of them fall into the one category of *da'wa*:

All that we do, every single activity that we engage with, every single rhetoric that we issue, every statement that we publish, every person that we meet, every party that we hold an alliance with—everything—everything around us rotates around the central and focal meaning of *da'wa*.⁷⁶

From this point of view, *da'wa* involves a state of mind *and* a state of being, in which Islam permeates every conscious thought and unconscious action. According to this perspective, activities strategically dedicated to promote Islam, those consciously explicative of the virtues of Islam as a way of life, are considered to be but one form of *da'wa* alongside actions that unconsciously promote Islam by exemplary behaviour. Manazir Ahsan supports this interpretation, asserting, 'Witnessing by word, *Shahadah bil qaul*, and reinforcing it by action, *Shahadah bil amal*, are two sides of the same coin—both are complementary and necessary to the other.'⁷⁷

Da'wa is not a matter of rational advocacy seeking an intellectual conversion, but a holistic presentation of the faith, both consciously, through reflection and explication, and unconsciously, through embodied action. Yet, even strategic activities that seek to make explicit the appeal of Islam as a way of life, are required—as *da'wa*—to be conducted in a certain way that unconsciously embody the values of Islam. This is because *da'wa* is not considered merely as a means of changing people's thinking, but a way of changing their unconsciously held attitudes and dispositions, as well as their behaviour.

From a revivalist perspective, *da'wa* is fundamentally remedial in serving to combat 'incorrect' ways of thinking concerning Islam as a way of life. One of the functions of *da'wa*, maintains Farooq Murad, 'is to remove misconceptions' about Islam.⁷⁸ Zahid Parvez concurs. He states that *da'wa* 'helps in removing misconceptions,

⁷⁶ 'RESPONSE TO THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES-BR ANAS AL TIKRITI'.

⁷⁷ Ahsan (1989), p.14.

⁷⁸ Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013.

builds respect and tolerance for Islam and Muslims'.⁷⁹ The website for Harrath's Dawah Project expresses a similar point of view, extolling the power of the media to 'dispel the misconception some have about Islam'. Under the auspices of the Dawah Project, Harrath plans to open an International Dawah Centre to fulfill what he describes as Muslims' 'obligatory duty of Dawah [to] counter the ever increasing misconceptions about Islam and to promote understanding amongst each other'.⁸⁰

However, *da'wa* is not just deemed as a corrective to wrong *notions* about Islam. It is also considered, more fundamentally, as a remedy to what Parvez refers to as 'false consciousness' and 'the influences of false gods and wrong ways' that affect a person's outlook on life.⁸¹ Thus, it is considered to address not just specific, incorrect propositions, but wrong ways of seeing things. It is deemed to transform, in Pierre Bourdieu's words, the unconsciously held dispositions and orientations of the habitus. Parvez contends that,

the purpose of sharing the message of Islam and offering a critique of wrong notions is to awaken people to the realities of life, to challenge their preconceived ideas and beliefs, to agitate their thoughts and attitudes and to support them in seeing the world and social issues from an Islamic perspective. Thus, the aim of *dawa* is to counteract the harmful social conditioning which a people may be under-going, to invite them into the fold of God's Way and to help them discover their true purpose in life and the multiple dimensions of their existence.⁸²

Given Parvez's former leadership role in UKIM for so many years, it is unsurprising that UKIM adopts an identical position on *da'wa*. In fact, much of the description of UKIM's work on its website, including its aims, approach and programmes, appears to be derived from Parvez's book, *Building a New Society: An Islamic Approach to Social Change*, published by the Islamic Foundation in 2000. Consistent with this book—which is without doubt the most comprehensive manifesto for Islamic revivalism in Britain—UKIM describes *da'wa* as one of the key components of its methodology for attaining an Islamic society in Britain. It is conceived not just as an

⁷⁹ Parvez (2007), p.154.

⁸⁰ 'About Us', Dawah Project website.

⁸¹ Parvez (2007), p.154.

⁸² Ibid.

important means of changing the way people see and understand their social and political realities, but also as a crucial way of changing such realities by transforming social and political institutions. Its website asserts, ‘Without being actively engaged in calling people to the Islamic message and way of life, Islamic ideas and values will not be heard or appreciated by society, and positive changes based on Islam cannot be accomplished.’

A shared sense of the importance of *da’wa*—directed to both non-Muslims and Muslims—may be considered as a distinguishing feature of the revivalist network in Britain. The concept of *da’wa* as a duty for all Muslims is expressed consistently throughout the network, despite the varying ways individuals or groups may see themselves meeting this duty in practice. This is related to a shared sense of the purpose of *da’wa*—to present and propagate ‘authentic’ Islam through peaceful and non-coercive means—and a shared sense of Islam as a way of life that leaves no aspect of human existence untouched. Far from being merely concerned with ideas or ideology, *da’wa*, as revivalists see it, is a process of transforming people’s ways of perceiving, thinking about and evaluating social reality. It has perceptual, cognitive and moral dimensions. It affects not just what or how one sees, but how one judges what one sees. It affects not just what or how one thinks, but how one is disposed to certain ideas. It also concerns imparting the ‘correct’ morality to individuals and the society as a whole.

2.3. ‘Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Wrong’

In addition to viewing themselves as dutifully educating Muslims on Islam as a way of life and inviting non-Muslims to ‘return’ to the fold of Islam, individuals and groups within the revivalist network share a common view of their work in terms of the Qur’anically-prescribed duty known as *al-amr bi-l-ma ‘ruf wa-l-nahi ‘an al-munkar*, Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Wrong (EGFW).⁸³ This duty is often explicitly referred to as guiding their actions, yet it also seems to help form a set of dispositions and orientations that are shared within the network. These include a proactive stance towards social change. It also helps constitute a constellation of

⁸³ There are various translations into English from the Arabic phrase. These include ‘enjoining the good and forbidding the evil,’ and ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’.

inter-connected concepts—including *da'wa*, *umma*, *shari'a* and *jihad*—through which the world is seen and made sense of, and through which their actions are guided.

Acknowledgement of the duty of EGFW was expressed in the joint statement made by numerous figures in the revivalist network in Britain at the aforementioned 'Muslims in Europe Conference' held in Istanbul in July 2006. Attendees—including Khurshid Ahmad, Manazir Ahsan, Iqbal Sacranie, Mohammed Abdul Aziz, Iqbal Asaria, Said Ferjani, Wakkas Khan, Mohamed Mukadam, Anas Shaikh-Ali, and Ahmed Al-Rawi—declared: 'Islam calls upon all Muslims to promote the common good and welfare (*maslaha*) of society as a whole and prevent what is wrong (*munkar*).'⁸⁴ This duty is also acknowledged by individuals and particular groups in the network, including MCB, IFE, UKIM and MAB.

In the pre-amble of its constitution, MCB states that its members aspire 'to be a community "enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah" (The Qur'an, 3:110)'.⁸⁵ This verse is also one of three cited at the start of the document, reading, 'You are the best community raised up for mankind—you enjoin what is right, forbid what is wrong, and believe in Allah'.⁸⁶ All member organisations have to subscribe to this aspiration, in addition to MCB's aims, in order to be eligible for membership. Considering that there are 6,236 verses in the Qur'an, its selection and prominent placement in MCB's constitution is significant. It highlights not only a sense of vanguardism on MCB's part, but also a strong sense of moral activism at the core of its *raison d'être*. This moral activism is inseparable from a sense of mission, however conceived as best implemented, to universalise Islam for the benefit of society at large.

Farooq Murad, the former MCB secretary general, whilst acknowledging that MCB's official remit does not include *da'wa*, recognises EGFW as a form of *da'wa*.⁸⁷ This recognition suggests that MCB's aspiration to be a proactive moral

⁸⁴ 'The Topkapi Declaration'.

⁸⁵ 'MCB Constitution', p.6.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.4.

⁸⁷ Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013.

authority—one that assumes its position to judge ‘right’ and ‘wrong’—is inseparable from a mission to present Islam to the broader society with a view to spreading the faith. Writing as president of the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), Murad lauds this mission as ‘the establishment of *deen* [Islamic way of life]’ and laments its neglect amongst British Muslims. He also invokes EGFW, citing a *hadith* in which the prophet Muhammad exhorts social and political activism towards the fulfilment of this mission. Murad asks: ‘Did not the Messenger of Allah (saw) say, “*If anyone of you sees an evil let him change it by his hands ...*” (Muslim)?’⁸⁸ Zahid Parvez, the current director of the Markfield Institute of Higher Education, also invokes the term ‘changing by hand’, which, he concedes ‘is implied by scholars as possessing political power—the arm of the law, the ability to effect change; the power to enjoin good (*maruf*) and forbid wrong (*munkar*)’.⁸⁹

Murad and Parvez’s reference to the use of ‘hands’ to effect social change, in fact, has a rich history in Islamic literature. It is commonly understood as a kind of *jihad*, the effort or struggle towards the consummation of God’s will on Earth. According to Michael Cook, a scholar of Islamic history, EGFW is ‘an integral part of the mainstream scholastic tradition of Islamic societies’ and was frequently linked by the Muslim scholars with *jihad*. Some considered it a part of *jihad*, others considered *jihad* a part of it.⁹⁰ ‘*Jihad* of the hand’ was just one kind of *jihad* linked to the doctrine, albeit the dominant one. Although this typically meant military force—both defensive and offensive—in modern times it seems to highlight the various ways it may be implemented physically. Another form of *jihad*—that ‘of the tongue’—highlights the importance of language and symbolic struggles for the legitimisation and naturalisation of Islam throughout society. This type of *jihad* is extolled by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who states:

Jihad for the sake of God includes supporting His cause by writing, and speaking as much as by fighting. *Jihad* may be educational, journalistic, social, economic, or political *jihad* as much as military *jihad*. We must remember that in all kinds of *jihad*, the essential condition is that the action helps make God's word supreme on earth.

⁸⁸ Farooq Murad, ‘Our Vision of the Future’, *Trends*, Vol. 6, No. 1., undated, p.10.

⁸⁹ Cook (2003), p.165.

⁹⁰ Ibid. See also Cook (2000), pp.38-39.

Thus, it is no coincidence that EGFW is referred to by Parvez as a form of *jihad* and a key component of the methodology required to usher in an Islamic revival in Britain. He writes,

In Islamic terminology, *jihad* refers to well thought-out, strategic and organised actions, guided by Islamic values and principles, taken by an Islamic movement to enjoin good (*maruf*), forbid wrong practices (*munkar*) and remove obstacles in the way of advancing positive social change.⁹¹

Ibrahim Hewitt similarly links EGFW with *jihad* in describing the latter as '[s]triving to establish Good and remove Evil from society, to gain Allah's pleasure'.⁹² For Hewitt, Parvez and others in the revivalist network, *jihad* is primarily a non-violent effort or struggle to advance Islam within society through challenging ways of thinking and acting. Hewitt states that 'any personal or communal struggle to establish an Islamic lifestyle is Jihad'.⁹³ In Parvez's words, *jihad* aims at '[i]ntellectually challenging ideologies, beliefs and ways of life that conflict with God's Way'. It also aims at '[i]nfluencing positive social, economic and political change in society according to Islamic ideals'.⁹⁴

EGFW is widely considered as a fundamental Islamic duty within the revivalist network by groups other than MCB and by prominent individuals, including Muhammad Abdul Bari, Omer El-Hamdoon, Abdur Rashid Siddiqui, and Ghulam Sarwar. Of EGFW, El-Hamdoon, president of MAB, asserts: 'The doctrine itself is a Qur'anic doctrine. It is something that God tells us, we cannot reject it in any way.'⁹⁵ Siddiqui, the vice chair of the Islamic Foundation and former secretary general of UKIM, states,

Commanding good and forbidding evil is one of the most important injunctions imposed upon an individual Muslim as well as upon the *ummah* as a whole. Its

⁹¹ Parvez (2007), p.158.

⁹² Hewitt (2004), p.58.

⁹³ Ibid., p.27.

⁹⁴ Parvez (2007), p.158.

⁹⁵ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

importance can be gauged by the fact that it is mentioned at least nine times in the Qur'an.⁹⁶

As with the concept of *da'wa*, with which it is intimately connected, Siddiqui asserts, 'The duty of commanding good and forbidding evil is such an important part of Islamic teachings that it permeates all the affairs of a Muslim's life'.⁹⁷ Furthermore, EGFW is seen as essentially concerned with addressing not merely one's own moral righteousness but *social* morality. 'Muslims are duty bound,' claims Siddiqui, 'to get actively involved in working for the social betterment of the society in which they live.' Abdul Bari similarly understands EGFW as an obligation for social activism at the heart of Islam. He writes:

[S]ocial activism ... comes from Islam's teachings that, as vice-regents of Allah on earth, human beings are accountable to Him on the Day of Judgement. Islam motivates its adherents to flourish spiritually and be active socially—to create a better world, with balance and harmony. *'Enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong' (Al-Qur'an 3:110) has been the cornerstone of a Muslim social life.*⁹⁸

From UKIM's perspective, EGFW is one of the 'most significant components' of its methodology for achieving its stated aim of reviving Islam within British society.⁹⁹ The Qur'anic verse 3:110 cited by Adbul Bari, and more fully in MCB's constitution, was selected and placed prominently on a banner at UKIM's 50th anniversary event in September 2012.¹⁰⁰ EGFW also features prominently in the work of UKIM Youth. The first of its four official aims is 'To seek the pleasure of Allah by enjoining the good and forbidding the evil'.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Siddiqui (2013), p.177.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.181.

⁹⁸ Muhammad Abdul Bari, 'Islam-Inspired Social Activism: A Vision for the Common Good', Amana Parenting website, July 26, 2011. <http://www.amanaparenting.com/?p=128>.

⁹⁹ 'The Methodology of UKIM', UKIM website. <http://www.ukim.org/ukim/methodology/>.

¹⁰⁰ Photo of banner at UKIM's annual convention celebrating the 50th anniversary of the organisation, September 16, 2012, <https://theislamicfarrightinbritain.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/ukim-annual-convention-2012.jpg>; 'UKIM Newsletter', October 2012, p.7, available at http://ukim.org/ukimdata/newsletters/UKIM-NewsLetter_2012-10.pdf.

¹⁰¹ UKIM Youth website homepage, www.ukimyouth.com.

Other organisations in the revivalist network see their work in relation to EGFW. The Association of Muslim Lawyers, for example, refers to the doctrine in its description of the role Islam has allegedly played in the regulation of social morality through legal reform. ‘Based on divine revelation,’ it claims, ‘Islam has always acted as a filter—which retains what is good in a society while removing what is harmful ... Part of this process of change and transformation is the review of existing laws and the introduction of new ones, particularly as regards those regulating religious discrimination’.¹⁰² Ghulam Sarwar, the longtime director of the Muslim Educational Trust, states that the second of eleven objectives of Islamic education is to ‘Ensure the promotion of *Mar’af* (good) and the prevention of *Munkar* (evil) in a society’.¹⁰³ He conceives of EGFW as a religious duty that is required to achieve the goals of Islamic education, which include the spread of Islam throughout society. ‘This duty,’ states Sarwar, ‘is universal and must be acted upon for the benefit of human kind [*sic*]’.¹⁰⁴

Sarwar’s understanding of humanity as the ultimate beneficiary of Islam expresses a commonly held point of view within revivalist circles. UKIM, for example, describes Islam as ‘a mission and a social and political movement for establishing peace, justice and harmony in society and the entire world’. In addition to *da’wa*, it views EGFW as a duty required for the fulfilment of this mission:

They must also *enjoin good and forbid all forms of wrongs and injustices prevalent in society*. Even a cursory reading of the Glorious Quran will indicate clearly that the Muslim community is charged with this noble and challenging purpose and mission.¹⁰⁵

UKIM then cites the Qur’an, verse 3:104, ‘And let there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and those will be the successful.’ This verse is cited by Abdul Bari in a report produced for the Cordoba Foundation to encourage Muslims in Britain to be

¹⁰² ‘About Us’, AML website, webpage captured on June 4, 2014. <http://web.archive.org/web/20140604195835/http://aml.org.uk/aboutaml/>.

¹⁰³ Sarwar (2001), p.44.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p.32.

¹⁰⁵ ‘UK Islamic Mission - Our Struggle’, UKIM website, <http://ukim.org/ukim-struggle>.

part of the group taking up this obligation.¹⁰⁶ According to El-Hamdoon, this verse provides the basis for the *collective* nature of the duty to ‘enjoin good and prevent wrong’: As long as there are some from within the Muslim *umma* who are undertaking this duty, it is not an obligation for each individual.¹⁰⁷ This interpretation is shared by Siddiqui, who writes that although EGFW ‘is the responsibility of the entire *ummah*, Allah, in His Mercy, has given this allowance whereby there must be at least a group of people who are exclusively devoted to this task’.¹⁰⁸ This, he notes, has a basis in Islamic jurisprudence.

However, some groups and individuals within the revivalist network appear to present EGFW as a duty applicable to each and every Muslim individual. IFE’s website, for example, states:

In an Islamic society the individual cannot be indifferent. He is enjoined to play an active part in the establishment of sound social morals by way of *inviting to the good and combating evil in any form with all lawful means at his disposal*. In so doing, not only does he shun evil and do good but also helps others to do the same. The individual who feels indifferent to his society is a selfish sinner; his morals are in trouble, his conscience is in disorder, and his faith is undernourished.¹⁰⁹

Haitham al-Haddad, a judge at the Islamic Sharia Council, similarly asserts: ‘It is clearly evident to any Muslim who possesses a basic understanding of Islam that the greatest and most important aim of Islamic law is the deterrence of evil ... and the attainment of good ... [I]t is an obligation upon every Muslim to achieve this aim, whether in part or in its totality’.¹¹⁰ Thus, there is some difference of emphasis upon where the duty for EGFW lies, but common within the network is an understanding of the general applicability of the duty as well as its importance.

¹⁰⁶ Abdul Bari (2013), p.22.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

¹⁰⁸ Siddiqui (2013), p.176.

¹⁰⁹ ‘A Constructive, Unified Society’, IFE website, December 10, 2003. <http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=95>.

¹¹⁰ Haitham Al-Haddad, ‘Advice To British Muslims Regarding The Coming Elections’, Islam21c website, October 16, 2006. <http://www.islam21c.com/politics/216-advice-to-british-muslims-regarding-the-coming-elections/>.

Most references to EGFW do not specify *what* is ‘good’ or ‘wrong’. Zahid Parvez, however, asserts that ‘Enjoining good includes the promotion of Islamic values in society’.¹¹¹ These include, he says, ‘truth, honesty, chastity, family values, respect and care for the elderly, care and proper upbringing for the young, a moral and balanced education, just social policies, the equitable distribution of wealth, care for orphans and support for the poor’.¹¹² Parvez’s list of Islamic values appear equally shareable by non-Muslims, though he adds that ‘efforts for change should be motivated by a strong faith in Allah, to win his good pleasure’.¹¹³

Suhaib Hasan, chair of the Islamic Sharia Council, further emphasises the role of the framework of religious belief within which such values are given their meaning. Citing the Qur’an, verse 9:71, Hasan explains that ‘good’ (*al-Ma ‘ruf*) denotes ‘Islamic Monotheism and all that Islam orders one to do’ and that ‘wrong’ (*al-Munkar*) denotes ‘polytheism and disbelief of all kinds, and all that Islam has forbidden’.¹¹⁴ Hasan thus emphasises not so much *what* is valued, but the *value system itself*, the structure of belief that gives specific values, such as care for the poor, their practical sense and ultimate worth. His view resonates with that of Siddiqui, who states ‘the criteria for *ma ‘ruf* and *munkar* is provided by the *Shari’ah*’.¹¹⁵ This is consistent with a *shari’a* manual lauded as reliable by El-Hamdoon, which defines ‘good and bad’ strictly in terms of ‘Sacred Law’.¹¹⁶

Within the revivalist network is a shared perception of the applicability of EGFW beyond the individual to society at large: It is generally a collective duty whose ultimate beneficiary is humanity. It is clear that, at least for some, this extends to the state too. As Zahid Parvez asserts, ‘acting on such good in one’s private life is not enough according to Islam. Public life and the state must conform to equitable and

¹¹¹ Parvez (2007), p.251, emphasis added.

¹¹² Ibid., p.251.

¹¹³ Ibid., p.257.

¹¹⁴ Suhaib Hasan, ‘The Current Problems of the Muslim Ummah and their Solution in Light of the Purified Seerah’, April 8, 2014. <http://sheikhsuhaibhasan.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/the-current-problems-of-muslim-ummah.html>.

¹¹⁵ Siddiqui (2013), p.178.

¹¹⁶ al-Misri (1994), a1.4, a1.5, pp.2-3.

moral principles'.¹¹⁷ He adds, 'the followers of Islam are charged with a mission to realise the vision of Islam in social life and the state'.¹¹⁸ But not only is the state desired to conform to Islamic morality, it is also—if it becomes an *Islamic* state—expected to enforce it. Siddiqui writes: 'Due to the importance accorded to *al-amr bi al-ma 'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar* it is also one of the duties that an Islamic State is required to enforce ... Hence, the Islamic State is duty-bound to see that its citizens are adhering to the code of life and behaviour required by Islam.'¹¹⁹ Likewise, Sarwar writes that the implementation of EGFW is one of the functions of the Islamic state.¹²⁰ The question then arises, dealt with in the final section of this chapter, regarding how the Islamic state features in the imaginations and aspirations within the revivalist network.

Before addressing the critical issue of the Islamic state, however, it is worth noting that EGFW is not exclusive to revivalists. For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir—which differs from revivalists in rejecting participation in democratic politics—also sees it as a duty. Outlining its 'methodology for change', it states:

Enjoining *Ma'rouf* and denying *Munkar* is a duty upon Muslims in every situation, whether there is a *Khilafah* state [caliphate] or not, and whether the rules of Islam are implemented in the government or not. Both enjoining *Ma'rouf* and forbidding *Munkar* existed at the time of the Prophet and at the time of the *Khulafah* [caliph] after him, and the other *Khulafah* who followed, and it will continue to exist until the end of time.¹²¹

For Hizb ut-Tahrir, however, whilst EGFW may help to revive Islamic morality within society, this is insufficient to usher in an Islamic way of life. What is required, from Hizb ut-Tahrir's perspective, is a political revolution. 'Resuming the Islamic way of life,' it asserts, 'would not be achieved *except* by establishing the *Khilafah*'.¹²² As will be shown, some revivalists share with Hizb ut-Tahrir a view

¹¹⁷ Parvez (2007), p.251.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.256.

¹¹⁹ Siddiqui (2013), p.181.

¹²⁰ Sarwar (2006) p.170.

¹²¹ Hizb ut-Tahrir (1999).

¹²² Ibid., p.15, emphasis added.

that Islam needs to be institutionalised in the state, though they generally differ from Hizb ut-Tahrir in their view of the state: Whereas Hizb ut-Tahrir see the Islamic state as a necessary tool to universalise an Islamic way of life, revivalists tend to see it as a natural and inevitable result of the widespread adoption of an Islamic way of life, and therefore not as something that needs to be aimed for in itself. These different conceptions of the Islamic state problematise, if not undermine, the categorisation of the Ikhwan and Jama'at as 'participationists' and Hizb ut-Tahrir as 'rejectionists' under the broad banner of 'Islamism', united in the goal of an Islamic state but merely separated by strategy.

3. Social and political orientations

The revivalist network, as this chapter has shown so far, is bonded by a shared sense of community and territory, as well as a perceived set of collective responsibilities, which include speaking for Muslims and Islam, calling both Muslims and non-Muslims to the 'right path' of Islam, and taking a proactive moral stance towards social change expressed in the doctrine of Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Wrong. These aspects of the cultural solidarity shared by members of the network are related to a cluster of social and political orientations hinged upon the central concept of an Islamic revival. This section of the chapter shows how this concept features strongly in their way of thinking. It shows how revivalists in Britain broadly share an understanding of their work in terms of fulfilling God's divine will, from matters of personal conduct to those at the level of society at large. Revivalists share a perception of themselves as oriented towards a comprehensive transformation of society that, whilst not aiming for an Islamic state, will ultimately culminate in one as a reward for piety. A shared value placed upon non-compulsion is accompanied by a shared understanding of gradualism as the ideal approach, along with a shared perception of the future as belonging to Islam in line with religious prophecy.

3.1. The Islamic revival and the Islamic movement

In September 2011, the Islamic Foundation organised a two-day meeting entitled, 'Islamic Revival in the UK: Past, Present and Future'. The purpose of the event, described in a Foundation newsletter, was to discuss the history and prospects of

‘Islamic revival in the UK, as well as the wider scene of Islamic activism’ with a view to gauging lessons for the Foundation.¹²³ Present at the meeting were numerous revivalist figures, including Khurshid Ahmad, Manazir Ahsan, Muhammad Abdul Bari and Mohammed Abdul Aziz. The keynote speech, ‘Islamic Revival in the UK: Past, Present and Future’, was delivered by Ahmad, who sees in the Islamic revival a ‘reawakening of the Islamic faith and destiny’ for nothing less than an alternative world order.¹²⁴ Asked to explain meaning of the phrase ‘Islamic revival’ in an interview for this thesis, Islamic Foundation executive director Irshad Baqui fumbles uncomfortably with words before stating that it relates to the application of ‘Islamic values’ in contemporary Britain.¹²⁵

The Islamic revival may indeed be interpreted by key figures in the network as an application of Islamic values throughout society, but contrary to Baqui’s denial that it has any ‘political agenda’, other individuals and groups in the network make clear that it does relate to politics, as this chapter will show. For them, it relates to politics since Islam is considered as the alternative basis for a complete way of life, including personal conduct but also matters of governance, including politics, education, law and economics.

For example, according to journalist Andrew Gilligan, in the transcript of an IFE training course, Muhammad Rabbani—a trustee of IFE’s youth wing, the Young Muslim Organisation UK—informs IFE’s new members,

Our goal is not simply to invite people and give *da’wah*. Our goal is to create the True Believer, to then mobilise those believers into an organised force for change who will carry out *da’wah*, *hisbah* and *jihad*. This will lead to social change and *iqamatud-deen*.¹²⁶

¹²³ ‘Islamic Revival in the UK—Past, Present and Future’, *Islamic Foundation Newsletter*, October 2011, p. 9.

¹²⁴ Ahmad (1995).

¹²⁵ Interview with Irshad Baqui, February 22, 2012.

¹²⁶ Andrew Gilligan, ‘Inextricably linked to controversial mosque: the secret world of IFE’, *The Telegraph*, February 28, 2010.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstoppers/politics/labour/7333487/Inextricably-linked-to-controversial-mosque-the-secret-world-of-IFE.html>.

In Islamic scholarly works, *hisbah* denotes the injunction to enjoin the good and forbid the wrong. In this context, *jihad* denotes the legal obligation upon Muslims to strive—through violent or non-violent means—towards the universal fulfilment of Allah’s divine will. And *Iqamatud-deen*, according to Jama’at-i-Islami itself, translates as the ‘Islamization of life’.¹²⁷ Gilligan also obtained internal IFE documents which explicitly state its strategic objective as ‘the establishment of a global society, the *Khilafah* [caliphate] ... comprised of individuals who live by the principles of ... the *Shari’ah*’.¹²⁸ They state that it is dedicated to changing the ‘very infrastructure of [Western] society, its institutions, its culture, its political order and its creed ... from ignorance to Islam’. Abdullah Faliq, IFE’s press secretary, denies that such aspirations represent IFE’s ‘corporate view’, though concedes that there may be some within IFE who hold this perspective.¹²⁹

Irrespective of how mainstream the desire for an Islamic revival is within IFE, there are other groups and leading individuals within the network who express the desire for it, for what they see as a comprehensive transformation of society based upon Islamic values. The London-based Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), for instance, declares as one of its key aims the promotion of ‘a new social and international order’.¹³⁰ The alternative nature of this order relates to an alternative understanding of human rights based upon Islam. IHRC states its foremost aim is to champion human rights—and duties—conceived as ‘divinely granted’ and ‘revealed for human beings’ by Allah. This suggests an affinity with the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (or the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights), rather than the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Cairo Declaration states that *all* rights and freedoms are ‘are subject to the Islamic Sharia’.¹³¹

Ghulam Sarwar, the director of the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), whose lifetime work has consisted in the promotion of Islamic education in Britain, states,

¹²⁷ See “Philosophy,” *Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan* website: <http://jamaat.org/beta/site/page/8> (accessed November 2010). Emphasis added.

¹²⁸ Gilligan, ‘Inextricably linked to controversial mosque: the secret world of IFE’.

¹²⁹ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

¹³⁰ ‘Aims & Objectives’, IHRC website. <http://www.ihrc.org.uk/about-ihrc/aims-a-objectives>.

¹³¹ ‘Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam’, OIC website, August 5, 1990. <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/article/human.htm>.

‘Islamic education and a global Islamic revival are inextricably connected.’¹³² He writes, ‘The introduction of an Islamic education system should be an integral part of the efforts worldwide to establish Islam as an all-encompassing way of life.’¹³³ Islamic education, for MET, is a tool in the service of a higher objective: the ‘Islamisation of society,’ beginning with Muslim communities in Britain and culminating on a global scale.¹³⁴

Abdur Rashid Siddiqui states that Islam ‘aims for the transformation of human society and fashions it according to its unique ideology’.¹³⁵ The Islamic revival, writes Siddiqui, will not be able to commence without the most valued sacrifice, the submission of individuals’ egos ‘to the dictates of the Shariah’.¹³⁶ Such a social transformation was conceived by Siddiqui’s contemporary, the late Khurram Murad, as the calling of ‘the Islamic movement’, which he described as ‘an organised struggle to change the existing society into an Islamic society based on the Qur’an and the Sunna, and make Islam, which is a code for the entire life, supreme and dominant’.¹³⁷

The notion of the Islamic movement is shared by other revivalists. Ahmad, for example, states, ‘Islam is a movement for social change’.¹³⁸ This movement, he believes, is responsible for establishing ‘a new world order’ based on Islam.¹³⁹

Islam also launches a social movement, an international movement requiring all those who accept these [Islamic] ideals and values to establish the new world order. Islam is eager to establish this new model in any part of the world ... Once this model is

¹³² Sarwar (2001), p.52.

¹³³ Ibid., p.30.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Abdul Rashid Siddiqui, ‘Tazkiyah’, On Islam website, June 11, 2008.
<http://www.onislam.net/english/shariah/refine-your-heart/advice/439987.html>.

¹³⁶ Abdul Rashid Siddiqui, ‘Time for Sacrifice’, Moon Research Centre website, 2008.
<http://www.mrc.org.uk/sacrifice.html>.

¹³⁷ Murad (1981), p.3.

¹³⁸ Ahmad (1995), p.46.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p.47.

established somewhere in the world, the experiment can be shared with everyone else, just as sunshine is shared by all.¹⁴⁰

Zahid Parvez echoes this in describing Islam as ‘a global movement’.¹⁴¹ He writes extensively on the notion of the Islamic movement as a necessary, practical means to usher in such an order, dedicating an entire book chapter to its ideal characteristics.¹⁴² Demonstrating that this perspective is shared across ethnic lines, in a speech in July 2005 to a Muslim audience in Britain, Anas Altikriti asserts: ‘Islam, and the *da’wa* of Islam, is by definition a reform movement, *harakat al-islah*’.¹⁴³ He laments that the Islamic movement, however, has come short of ‘leading the way towards shaping events’ in line with Islamic principles and in response to the contemporary situation.

Altikriti perceives the need for a comprehensive social transformation based upon Islamic values similarly to the other figures above. Altikriti, who established the Cordoba Foundation to address what he sees as a false dichotomy between Islam and the West, believes that because of a crisis of multiple dimensions—including politics, economics, science and morality—a comprehensive social transformation is required and that Muslims must play an active role in it. The message of Islam, he states, is about ‘transforming people’s realities’.¹⁴⁴ To a young Muslim audience, he implores:

It is vital that we fulfil our role as individuals that we work together with our brothers, with our sisters, within our community, within our societal structure, for the benefit not only of ourselves—we Muslims we are not selfish, we don’t do this just for ourselves. This is in order to create that transformation *on a worldwide level*.¹⁴⁵

This transformation, states Altikriti, is not just about politics, education, finance, or spirituality, but *every* aspect of human existence. ‘Every single part of life,’ he

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p50.

¹⁴¹ Parvez (2007), p197.

¹⁴² Ibid., Chapter 9.

¹⁴³ ‘RESPONSE TO THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES-BR ANAS AL TIKRITI’.

¹⁴⁴ ‘Young and the Brave: Roles and Responsibilities By Brother Anas Altikriti’, YouTube, June 25, 2011. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOnCEiFuL4M>.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

insists, ‘needs to be touched, needs to be affected, needs to be changed, needs to be reformed’.¹⁴⁶ In an interview with the thesis author, Altikriti plays down the Islamic character of the key values he deems needed in modern society, preferring to describe them as ‘universal’.¹⁴⁷ This is because he sees them as not exclusive to Islam, but as shared by non-Muslims. In a talk given in 2005, however, he describes non-Muslims’ sharing of such values favourably as a pathway to them becoming Muslims.¹⁴⁸ In another talk given in September 2011 to the Federation of Islamic Student Societies (FOSIS) in the wake of the Arab uprisings, he is clear in seeing Islam as the driving force behind the comprehensive social transformation he calls for:

We need to touch on every single sphere and with that we can bring our message. When we say that Islam is a way of life, a comprehensive way of life, we would have acted it. We practice it, we don’t need to preach about it anymore. When we talk about the excellence, the perfection, the accuracy, the precision of Islam, we would have acted it, we don’t need to talk about it anymore, we don’t need to theorise anymore.¹⁴⁹

The belief that Islam is a comprehensive way of life and also a liberatory force for a civilisational crisis affecting mankind is shared by others including Manazir Ahsan, who writes that Islam ‘provides a complete and comprehensive code’ for human conduct ‘in all social, economic, political, moral and spiritual aspects of life’.¹⁵⁰ He elaborates:

Islam, being the universal religion meant for mankind of all races, colours and times, is as relevant today as it was fourteen hundred years ago. It has been a great liberating force in the past and has the potential for leading man out of the contemporary crisis of human civilization ... In the context of contemporary spiritual and cultural crises,

¹⁴⁶ ‘Anas Altikriti - A New Dawn’, YouTube, September 8, 2011.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YYBCy60x3qw>.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Anas Altikriti, February 27, 2012.

¹⁴⁸ ‘RESPONSE TO THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES-BR ANAS AL TIKRITI’.

¹⁴⁹ ‘Anas Altikriti - A New Dawn’.

¹⁵⁰ Ashan (1977), p.21.

Islam provides an alternative basis for the development of the human personality and the organization of human society.¹⁵¹

Likewise, for Khurshid Ahmad, the world is experiencing a civilisational crisis. He states that ‘the dominant secular-humanistic civilisation of the West, despite its material affluence and military prowess, is in the throes of a serious crisis’. The solution, he proffers, is the ‘Islamic alternative’, a ‘new paradigm for life’, beginning with reform of the individual, passing through reform of society and culminating in reform of the world order.¹⁵² Parvez similarly bemoans today’s ‘complex social, economic and political problems and global crisis’.¹⁵³ An important component of this crisis is the perceived breakdown of morality and religiosity in the West. Ahmad argues that the predicament of Muslims in Western societies is not just about ‘socio-political and economic ills’.¹⁵⁴ ‘[T]he Islamic resurgence,’ he insists, is not reducible to ‘the angry reaction of under-privileged Muslims against Western affluence’.¹⁵⁵ It fundamentally concerns faith and morality. Such a view is expressed by IFE, which states that it ‘is in Europe because it is this continent, despite all the furore about its achievements, which has a moral and spiritual vacuum’.¹⁵⁶

Despite the perception of moral and spiritual bankruptcy within Britain and the West, and despite the understanding of the Islamic revival as addressing much more than political frustration, politics is nevertheless seen as a part of the problem and, thus, the solution. Ahmad gives voice to this sentiment, asserting, ‘It is part of our religious mission to harness political and economic power for the fulfilment of moral objectives ... Islam wants to bring political power under the control of its moral ideals’.¹⁵⁷ In an article penned whilst president of Young Muslims UK,

¹⁵¹ Ahsan (1977), p.42.

¹⁵² Ahmad (1995), pp.46-47.

¹⁵³ Parvez (2007), p.85.

¹⁵⁴ Ahmad (1995), p.52.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Gilligan, ‘Inextricably linked to controversial mosque: the secret world of IFE’.

¹⁵⁷ Ahmad (1995), pp.47, 49.

Farooq Murad writes that political power for Islam follows the people's complete embrace of Islam as a way of life.¹⁵⁸ Echoing this, Zahid Parvez declares:

[I]n order to administer justice and establish a peaceful society, *political power is essential in the eyes of Islam*. In fact, Islam obligates its followers to engage with power and enjoins social and political participation. It sees power as a moral and civilising force if it is utilised in accordance with God's law [*shari'a*]. A just social order cannot be established through sermons and preaching only.¹⁵⁹

Political power, states Parvez, is something to be 'brought under God, and utilised for realising His Will in society and state; for reforming and transforming society and the state for the common good'.¹⁶⁰ Understanding the role of politics, including the Islamic state, in the revivalist habitus is important to get a sense not just of their aspirations but also their way of thinking within which their aspirations are formed. This matter is the subject of the following and final section of the chapter.

3.2. *Shari'a* and the Islamic state

The typical view in the academic, think tank and news media literature on what characterises Islamists is expressed by Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, who writes, 'all want to create an Islamic state, but they are at odds with each other about how best to achieve this, and where they should start'.¹⁶¹ Bassam Tibi shares this view. He claims that there are two kinds of Islamism—'institutional Islamism and jihadism'—which both 'share the very same ideological goal of establishing an Islamic shari'a state'.¹⁶² Only tactics, he claims, separates them.

However, it is more accurate to say that all Islamists want an Islamic society organised according to Islamic principles and values and that they are at odds with each other about whether the state is primarily a tool to achieve this or the natural outcome of it. They are also at odds with each other about whether *shari'a*—Islamic

¹⁵⁸ Murad, 'Our Vision of the Future'.

¹⁵⁹ Parvez (2007), p.39.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, 'The Islamic Forum of Europe and Political Participation', *Standpoint Magazine*, April 1, 2010. <http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/2901>.

¹⁶² Tibi (2009), p.152.

ethics and law—is to be adopted and enforced by the state prior to, or after, the attainment of a Muslim majority that demands as much.

A distinguishing characteristic of Islamic revivalists is their understanding of Islam as a way of life that cannot be imposed through state structures but which, once adopted by a majority population, requires state institutionalisation for its protection and maintenance. The individuals and groups in the revivalist network mapped out in Chapter 3 broadly share this understanding. They also broadly share an understanding of *shari'a*, and of its importance, as an ethical code applicable to every aspect of Muslims' lives and as a legal code to be adopted, eventually, by the Islamic state.

Shari'a: from the personal to the political

Islamic revivalists understand the *shari'a* as a code of conduct applicable at the levels of the individual, society and the state: It encompasses both a fixed set of laws, such as the prohibition of financial interest and alcohol consumption, and a number of ethical principles that may be codified into law in various ways depending on the time and place. To Islamic revivalists, the *shari'a* takes precedence over the Islamic state: The state merely facilitates and consummates its application.

This is consistent with the orthodox Islamic position as explained by the late Majid Khadduri, who writes, '[Islamic] Law ... precedes the State: it provides the basis of the State'.¹⁶³ In describing the classical position, Khadduri explains that 'the fundamental loyalty of the Muslim is given not to the imam [caliph] but to the *shari'a*'.¹⁶⁴ This view extends back at least as far as the classical period. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the 'greatest of Islamic political thinkers,' described 'the true meaning of the caliphate [Islamic state]' as bringing 'the whole people to conform themselves to [the] ordinances [of Revealed Laws, i.e. the *shari'a*] in all matters of this world and the next'.¹⁶⁵ For contemporary revivalists, allegiance to the *shari'a*

¹⁶³ Khadduri (1955), p.16.

¹⁶⁴ Khadduri and Liebesny (2009), p.14, italics added.

¹⁶⁵ Ibn Khaldun, cited in *ibid.*, p.13. The source is Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah* (often translated as *The Introduction*), widely considered the most important Islamic history of the pre-modern world. A more recent edition of Ibn Khaldun's classic work is Ibn Khaldun (1989), edited by N. J. Dawood and

takes precedence over the establishment of an Islamic state, but such a state is generally seen as desirable and as a natural outcome of achieving a Muslim majority population.

Shari'a is commonly understood as beginning with personal conduct, applying to Muslims' each and every action. Ibrahim Mogra, in an interview with the thesis author, affirms, 'Everything that a Muslim does is governed by *shari'a*. My sitting with you this morning also is governed by *shari'a*'.¹⁶⁶ Likewise, Farooq Murad professes, 'I live this term on a daily basis',¹⁶⁷ and Abdullah Faliq states, 'It does govern my every activity and my every thought'.¹⁶⁸ Omer El-Hamdoon highlights the personal dimension of *shari'a* in observing that, 'The first things to appear in the books on *shari'a* concern purification. That's a personal thing'.¹⁶⁹ Consistent with this understanding, the application of *shari'a* to Muslims' personal lives is the priority for the Islamic Sharia Council. Highlighting this priority, but intimating the possibility of broader application in the future, its chair, Maulana Abu Sayyed describes the personal aspect of *shari'a*, including marriage and divorce, as the 'bare minimum requirement' for Muslims.¹⁷⁰

The Islamic Sharia Council's secretary, Suhaib Hasan, likewise highlights Muslim personal law as the priority area within *shari'a* for application in Britain. But, like others in the revivalist network, he sees *shari'a* as far more comprehensive than can be currently implemented. '*Shari'a* covers all the aspects of a Muslim's life', he explains. But not only does it cover all matters of personal conduct, such as worship, eating and dress, it also covers all aspects of criminal and international law: 'Everything is covered by *shari'a*', he says.¹⁷¹ This is because, in Abu Sayyed's words, *shari'a* is 'God's revealed *system of life*'.¹⁷² Ibrahim Mogra agrees, noting,

translated by Franz Rosenthal. The quote provided by Khadduri and Liebesny can be found in this publication, albeit in a slightly different translation, on p.155.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Maulana Abu Sayyed, February 16, 2012.

¹⁷¹ Interview with Suhaib Hasan, February 9, 2012.

¹⁷² Interview with Maulana Abu Sayyed, February 16, 2012.

‘Muslims see Islam as a way of life. That would mean that everything is lumped into that way of life, including politics’.¹⁷³ In Murad’s words, *shari’a* is the ‘code of your conduct, your affairs: personal, social, political, your whole social conduct as a collective entity’.¹⁷⁴ Ahmad Thomson, the deputy chair of the Association of Muslim Lawyers, similarly sees *shari’a* as applicable beyond personal conduct. He bemoans efforts to reform Islam into a secular religion that leaves the ‘political and economic spheres of human activity ... unaffected and impervious to the way of Islam’.¹⁷⁵

El-Hamdoon recommends as an authentic guide to *shari’a* a book entitled *Umdat al-Salik (The Reliance of the Traveller)*.¹⁷⁶ This tome, officially endorsed by the International Institute of Islamic Thought, clearly articulates rulings applicable within the realm of state politics.¹⁷⁷ These include corporeal (*hudud*) punishments, such as the cutting of hands and feet for theft, as well as dictates for the conduct of warfare and state administration. Numerous prominent figures in the network, including El-Hamdoon, Hasan, Parvez, Mogra, Faliq and Anas Altikriti acknowledge and do not seem to reject such punishments, preferring to underplay their significance by noting that they constitute just a fraction of *shari’a* rulings.¹⁷⁸ ‘We believe in God, and we believe in *shari’a* and we do not give up *shari’a*,’ states El-Hamdoon. ‘We don’t believe *shari’a* is discriminatory, that *shari’a* is prejudiced.’¹⁷⁹ Mogra and Parvez both emphasise that prior to such punishments being applied, Islam has to be firmly embraced within society and *shari’a* established as lived morality.¹⁸⁰ This aspect of *shari’a* is not applicable in Britain, explains Faliq: ‘When it comes to ruling, it doesn’t apply to us here. We don’t have

¹⁷³ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013.

¹⁷⁵ Ahmad Thomson, ‘Shari’a – A Way of Life’, presentation given at Regents Park Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre, July 20, 2008. Available at: http://www.wynnechambers.co.uk/pdf/Sharia_English_law.pdf.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

¹⁷⁷ al-Misri (1994).

¹⁷⁸ Interviews with Omer El-Hamdoon, Suhaib Hasan, Ibrahim Mogra, Abdullah Faliq and Anas Altikriti, 2012-2013 (see Appendix 1 for dates); Parvez (2007), p.104.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012; Parvez (2007), p.105.

an Islamic system of government, so *hudud* punishments shouldn't even arise as a question. You follow the law of the country, as long as it doesn't make you compromise your Islamic faith.'¹⁸¹

The Islamic state: a reward not an objective

In academic, think tank and news media literature, Islamists are consistently characterised as bonded by their desire for an Islamic state. Peter Mandaville, for example, defines Islamism in fairly typical terms as 'forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions, and legal system derive directly from the shari'ah'.¹⁸² But the individuals and organisations in Britain who are typically classified as 'non-violent Islamists'—whom this thesis prefers to refer to as Islamic revivalists—express a consistent understanding of the Islamic state as a matter of *secondary* importance in relation to the attainment of society in which Islamic values and principles prevail. The Islamic state, as several prominent figures explain, is not an objective but, rather, a promise in reward for piety and righteousness. Farooq Murad expresses this as follows:

We forget that not once does the Qur'an make *Khilafah* [the Islamic state] the aim and the goal of Muslim struggle. Rather it promises the glory of political power, help and victory [only] when we invite and prepare people to live for complete Islam.¹⁸³

Suhaib Hasan provides additional clarity to this view of a promise. Firmly believing that Islam will one day become established as the dominant religion in the world, he writes:

Succession on the Earth is Allah's promise [to the Muslim *umma*] ... *but it is not the highest aim or objective* ... The implementation of [a] divinely ordained Caliphate [Islamic state] is only a part of Islam's aggregated system *not the objective itself* ...

¹⁸¹ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

¹⁸² Mandaville (2007), p.57.

¹⁸³ Murad, 'Our Vision of the Future'.

Our view is that the objective should be kept as the objective and the promise as the promise.¹⁸⁴

In an interview with the thesis author, he elaborates:

The *main* objective of a Muslim is to please Allah and to worship Allah ... Now comes the *secondary* issue. When you are a group of people living at a certain place, you have to organise your matters. On what basis you are going to organise yourselves? [The Islamic state] comes as a natural outcome of a Muslim gathering at any place, as it came to Medina where the Prophet moved and then he was accepted as a ruler and he started implementing the *shari'a* of Allah. So, this comes as a gradual process, *but it is not the objective*. We have to differentiate between the objectives and the requirements of any community wherever they are living.¹⁸⁵

Mogra concurs with Hasan that the Islamic state is not an objective. 'I don't believe it is a requirement for Muslims to have an Islamic state,' he says. Whilst not rejecting the notion of an Islamic state, he emphasises, 'For me, it is more important that God's law is *lived* by individuals in whichever political set up they are living in'.¹⁸⁶

El-Hamdoon shares this understanding of the primacy of the embrace of Islam throughout society over the creation of an Islamic state: 'MAB does not look to establish a state here in Britain. As Muslims here in Britain we want to worship God and we want to introduce people to God'.¹⁸⁷ He emphasises, 'We want to make clear that we are not here in Britain to establish an Islamic state *because the realisation* [of Islam as a way of life] *has to come from within*'. Thus, according to El-Hamdoon, MAB is not focused on establishing an Islamic state but, rather, on what may eventually lead to it, namely, the widespread adoption of Islamic beliefs and practice of Islamic values within society. Nevertheless, although claiming MAB doesn't officially have any political objectives, he admits,

¹⁸⁴ Suhaib Hasan, 'The Current Problems of the Muslim Ummah and their Solution in Light of the Purified Seerah'.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with Suhaib Hasan, February 9, 2012.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

As a Muslim, irrelevant of where I am living, *one of my objectives is to establish an Islamic state*. Islam is comprehensive and since the problems are comprehensive, the solution has to be comprehensive.¹⁸⁸

Elaborating his position, he explains that establishing an Islamic state is not unique to Islam, since all people want some form of government to maintain order. ‘But when you ask me as a Muslim, “What kind of state do you want?”, I’m going to say to you, “An Islamic state”, a state which is ruled by God’s rules because God created us and knows what’s good for us’. Putting this back into the context of *da’wa*, he cautions, ‘If you just focus on the Islamic state and you don’t focus on changing the individual, the state will not survive because the state is made out of individuals’.

In the rhetoric of some revivalists, the aspiration of a society organised according to Islamic principles is inseparable from that of an Islamic state. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for example, links the goal of an Islamic society with that of the Islamic state proclaiming, ‘The most important form of *jihad* today is serious, purposive organized work to re-build the Islamic society and state and to implement the Islamic way of life in the political, cultural, and economic areas’.¹⁸⁹ Zahid Parvez similarly connects the two in repeating the call for the fulfilment of ‘the vision of Islam in social life and the state’.¹⁹⁰ He asserts, ‘all human beings have a God-given right to justice and an Islamic state is commanded by the Quran to ensure that this is rooted in all social and economic policies and fully implemented’.¹⁹¹

However, consistent with the perspective taken by Hasan, El-Hamdoon and others, Parvez prioritises the attainment of a society based upon Islamic principles over that of an Islamic state. Such a state, he cautions, cannot arise except as an embodiment of religious, moral values:

An effective Islamic change requires the cultivation of faith, God-consciousness, morals, correct attitudes and patience, and *its systems of society evolve from these*

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ al-Qaradawi (1999), p.70.

¹⁹⁰ Parvez (2007), p.256.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p.38.

seeds, and not the other way round. As a general principle, a legal, political or an economic system must be compatible with the social life which it is seeking to regulate and direct, otherwise it will inevitably be rejected by it.¹⁹²

Others in the revivalist network who idealise Islam as a way of life do not express a desire for an Islamic state or even doubt its relevance. For example, when questioned regarding al-Qaradawi's bold claim that Islam will 'conquer' Europe through non-violent means, Mogra responds:

Islam is not about conquering people. Islam is about people finding peace in a lifestyle, which is all about submission to God's will. For me, it is more God conquering the hearts of his people than Islam as a religion conquering geographical pieces of land. It is not about the land. I don't even believe we need an Islamic government, so to speak. It is about people *living Islam*.¹⁹³

Altikriti believes that calls of an Islamic state should 'not scare us ... or bring about a negative reaction',¹⁹⁴ but, like Mogra, he underplays its importance in an interview with the thesis author. 'I don't think the Islamic state even figures on the radar or priorities for Muslims,' he opines. 'But if it's established, it's established through the dominance of *values*'.¹⁹⁵ Citing Rashid al-Ghannushi, Altikriti asserts, '*Shari'a* is justice'. He adds, 'And if I have a state where justice prevails, that to me is an Islamic state'. Faliq echoes this sentiment, stating, 'As long as Islamic values are in place—that the governor has to uphold justice, freedom *et cetera*—any system of government is fine'.¹⁹⁶

Several individuals who have been very active within the network more firmly dismiss the necessity of an Islamic state altogether. Mohammed Abdul Aziz, for example, concedes that he 'probably held on to the idea of an Islamic state' until as recently as 2007.¹⁹⁷ The notion of the Islamic state as propounded by Mawdudi and

¹⁹² Parvez (2007), p.173, emphasis added.

¹⁹³ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

¹⁹⁴ James Bloodworth, 'Why is the left so blinkered to Islamic extremism?', *The Independent*, June 28, 2013. <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/why-is-the-left-so-blinkered-to-islamic-extremism-8679265.html>.

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Anas Altikriti, February 27, 2012.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

¹⁹⁷ Interview with Mohammed Abdul Aziz, September 3, 2012.

Qutb, he says, was coloured by their experiences of colonialism. An Islamic state, he adds, is not a Qur'anic requirement. Yet, Abdul Aziz still regards himself as a 'Jama'ati' because of the social circles he moves within and because of the social welfare orientation of the Jama'at-associated organisations he works with. Abdul Aziz dismisses the goal of an Islamic state for Britain, but believes that the ideal purpose of such a state—to propagate Islamic values and deliver social welfare—remains important and can be fulfilled within society governed by a secular state.

Dilwar Hussain, a former president of the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), also advocates a secular state as the best model for negotiating 'the reality that there are [people of] other faiths and those with none'.¹⁹⁸ Describing himself as a 'post-Islamist', he emphatically rejects the goal of an Islamic state altogether. Under his leadership, ISB left the group of revivalist groups clustered in the Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations, as described in Chapter 3, because of a transformation of values within ISB away from the revivalist aspirations held by the committee.¹⁹⁹ After many years of involvement, Hussain has departed from organisations within the revivalist network, including ISB and the Islamic Foundation, and his perspective upon Islam's place in contemporary Britain are not typical within the network. His personal journey is significant, however, along with that of Abdul Aziz, in showing that there is a degree of fluidity within the network in how the Islamic state is understood, particularly in relation to aspirations for Islam as a way of life in Britain.

Non-compulsion and the matter of majority rule

Given that *shari'a* is understood by individuals within the revivalist network as comprehensive and therefore inclusive of matters of governance, the question arises regarding the possibility that *shari'a* might remain restricted to personal matters and not be applied by the state: How can such a scenario fulfil God's will? How can revivalists be content with this scenario? To this, they present a consistent response that Islam cannot be imposed.

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Dilwar Hussain, August 29, 2012.

¹⁹⁹ Interview with Dilwar Hussain, January 15, 2015.

Ahmad Thomson of the Association of the Muslim Lawyers states that ‘a system of law other than the Shari‘ah which incorporates some aspects of the Shari‘ah into it but not others’ is ‘unpalatable’.²⁰⁰ Yet, he affirms, ‘The Shari‘ah can only be established where it is the will of a community’s or society’s members to be governed in accordance with the Shari‘ah’. Abdul Aziz articulates a similar sentiment, as follows:

Shari’a is God’s will from a Muslim perspective but God has also given every individual the right not to obey him. Islam is submission, but you choose to obey God, but God has given everyone the right to obey or not to obey him. For those who choose not to obey him, you cannot force them—‘there is no compulsion in religion’.²⁰¹

Farooq Murad echoes this, asserting,

There is no compulsion in religion. This is a basic fact of the Qur’an. Islam is a voluntary idea of life. If God wanted to make all of us Muslims he could have done it. He decided not to. He wants to test us, check or see who wants to please him, who wants to come to his ways. This is absolutely a fundamental principle. So we begin from that.²⁰²

Abu Sayeed concurs. Even though he perceives ‘man-made law’ as inferior to ‘God’s law’, he emphasises that ‘Islam does not want to impose an Islamic system on people who are not in favour of Islam’.²⁰³ He contends, ‘In Muslim-minority countries, Muslims will not and should not try to implement Islam in centrality [*sic*], apart from [in] private life where worship and family aspects are concerned, because Islam believes in personal choice’. He adds, ‘A military coup for Islam would not do for an Islamic state’. Faliq, likewise, asserts:

Any system of government has to be liked by the people, at least the majority. It has to come via elections. If a radical Muslim group imposes *shari’a* via a coup in Egypt or elsewhere, like Hizb ut-Tahrir, al-Muhajiroun or al-Qaeda, I’ll go against them.

²⁰⁰ Thomson (2000), p.4.

²⁰¹ Interview with Mohammed Abdul Aziz, September 3, 2012.

²⁰² Interview with Farooq Murad, October 7, 2013.

²⁰³ Interview with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012.

That's not Islam for me. Those who put the system of government first, they don't understand that that has to come by the will of the people, they have to willingly embrace it.²⁰⁴

Although the issue of non-compulsion is clear-cut within the network, the issue of the conditions under which the state would become governed by and adopt *shari'a* principles is somewhat vague. A shared belief in non-compulsion doesn't answer the question as to how a society may become comprehensively Islamic, including its system of government. Faliq says 'at least the majority' of people have to endorse a system of government. Similarly, Hasan contends that an Islamic system of government may emerge with a simple majority in favour. Abu Sayeed agrees, stating 'it is the majority's wishes that are to be fulfilled'. Regarding the Islamic state, he claims, 'Once people have chosen Islam as their life system, then automatically it should come.' El-Hamdoon, however, doesn't think it is so straightforward. Although he doesn't believe everyone has to have embraced Islam for the emergence of an Islamic state, he doesn't think the emergence of such a state can simply follow majority support from the electorate or parliamentarians.²⁰⁵

Gradualism and prophecy

In addition to the assertion of non-compulsion, another response to the question of *shari'a* not being comprehensively applied in Britain, some individuals and groups emphasise that Muslims are under no obligation to apply *shari'a* beyond matters of personal conduct, since this lies beyond their capabilities. Related to this, some believe that a gradual approach will ensure that Islam will eventually be embraced as an alternative way of life. Hasan, for example, states that the Qur'an implores Muslims to implement *shari'a* only according to their ability.²⁰⁶ Abu Sayeed agrees, affirming that whilst Muslims are the minority in a society, they cannot promulgate *shari'a* in its entirety.²⁰⁷ This chimes with the statement of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), of which both Hasan and Abu Sayeed are members:

²⁰⁴ Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

²⁰⁵ Interview with Omer El-Hamdoon, February 14, 2012.

²⁰⁶ Interview with Suhaib Hasan, June 11, 2013.

²⁰⁷ Interview with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012.

According to Shari'ah, Muslims are not obliged to establish the civil, financial and political status of Shari'ah in non-Muslim countries, *as these lie beyond their capabilities*. Allah, Most High, does not require people to do things that are beyond their capacity.²⁰⁸

Even though Muslims may not be in a position to establish *shari'a* beyond the level of personal conduct, there is a shared view that they must approach a more comprehensive application of *shari'a* incrementally. Al-Qaradawi exhorts such an approach as follows:

If we want to establish a real Muslim society, we should not imagine that such an end can be achieved by a mere decision issued to that effect by a king or a president or a council of leaders or a parliament. Gradualism is the means through which such an end can be fulfilled. Gradualism here refers to preparing people ideologically, psychologically, morally, and socially to accept and adopt the application of the Shari'ah in all aspects of life ...²⁰⁹

IFE appears to endorse the same view. Its website includes an article that states, 'The Ummah is in a real need to ... [r]e-introduce to the youth the *Fiqh At-Tadarrug* (Fiqh of Gradualism) in which people are trained bit by bit on how to lead a true balanced Islamic life.'²¹⁰ Parvez articulates a gradual approach, citing the incremental changes in law at the time of Muhammad:

... [A]ll the noble Prophets of Allah worked according to the set priorities of Islam and introduced change gradually so that it could become firm in people's hearts and minds ... Once people begin to respond to Islamic values and ideas, the door to change is opened.²¹¹

Abu Sayeed shares Parvez's long-term perspective of the Islamic mission, also referring to Muhammad's example:

²⁰⁸ *Fatwas of the European Council for Fatwa and Research* (2002), p.164.

²⁰⁹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 'Gradualism in Applying the Shari'ah', On Islam website, November 24, 2011. http://www.onislam.net/english/ask-the-scholar/shariah-based-systems/judiciary-and-police-systems/169643-gradualism-in-applying-the-shariah.html?Police_Systems=

²¹⁰ Ahmed Saad, 'Al-Wasatiyyah: The Lost Middle Path', IFE website, December 30, 2006. <http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=324>.

²¹¹ Parvez (2007), pp.163-164.

God did not make any kind of obligation on the Muslims to apply *shari'a*—full *shari'a*—in the early period. It took twenty-three years. The first wave of the Prophet Muhammad's life at Mecca was just the stage of *the purification of ideas*.²¹²

Muslims in Britain, Abu Sayeed says, don't feel restricted in Britain because they know that it took a long time for Muhammad to establish Islam. His reference to the precise number of years it took for Muhammad to consolidate Islam is also cited by Manazir Ahsan, who similarly warns, 'Everything cannot be achieved at once. Was not the Quran revealed piecemeal over a period of twenty-three years so that people and society could adopt Islam step-by-step and become firmly rooted in it through a gradual process?'²¹³ Indeed, Ahsan, Abu Sayeed and others in the revivalist network take a long-term view regarding Islam's place in Britain. This appears connected to a firm conviction in Islam's future triumph, based upon Islamic prophecy. Al-Qaradawi expresses this vision most assertively as follows:

Constantinople was conquered in 1453 by a 23-year old Ottoman named Muhammad ibn Murad, whom we call Muhammad the Conqueror. Now what remains is to conquer Rome. That is what we wish for, and that is what we believe in. After having been expelled twice, Islam will be victorious and reconquer Europe ... I am certain that this time, victory will be won not by the sword but by preaching and [Islamic] ideology ... The conquest of Rome and the spread of Islam East and West will be the fruit of the seed we plant and entail the return of the Caliphate, which treads the straight path [of Islam] and is based on the path of the prophets ... [The Caliphate] is worthy of leading the nation to victory.²¹⁴

Abu Sayeed agrees with al-Qaradawi's optimistic view of Islam's future 'conquest', referring to the allegedly high rates of Muslim conversion in Britain.²¹⁵ Altikriti, in an interview with John Ware, also expresses firm conviction in al-Qaradawi's vision. 'I believe in it because that is the prophecy of the Prophet,' he admits. 'It's

²¹² Interview with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012.

²¹³ Ahsan (1989), p.15.

²¹⁴ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, cited in Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi, 'The Muslim Brotherhood: A Moderate Islamic Alternative to al-Qaeda or a Partner in Global Jihad?', Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, November 1, 2007. <http://jcpa.org/article/the-muslim-brotherhood-a-moderate-islamic-alternative-to-al-qaeda-or-a-partner-in-global-jihad/>.

²¹⁵ Interview with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012.

not an invention of Sheikh Qaradawi.²¹⁶ Suhaib Hasan likewise voices a firm conviction in the future triumph of Islam not just in Europe but worldwide. Regarding the return of the caliphate, Hasan contends, 'It will come because it is prophecised by the Prophet'.²¹⁷

4. Habitus and ideology

This chapter has shown how individuals and groups in the revivalist network mapped out in the preceding chapter possess cultural solidarity in terms of shared ways of classifying themselves as part of a religious community and the territory in which they live; shared ways of understanding their work and its purpose; and shared ways of perceiving the moral and political dimensions of their faith. They are connected by their understanding of the role and responsibilities they see themselves possessing as Islam's vanguard within British society. Their sense of distinction as a group is expressed in their perception of non-Muslims as part of the broader community of humanity to which they have a duty to deliver Islam. Their group solidarity is also expressed in their perception of other Muslims as either mistaken in isolating themselves from Britain's non-Muslim mainstream or integrating themselves seamlessly within it. It is also expressed in their perceived distinction from yet other Muslims who place the goal of an Islamic state prior to the attainment of a society infused with Islamic beliefs and values.

The cultural solidarity of the revivalist network is inseparable from certain concepts enabled by a vocabulary of terms rooted in Islamic tradition and expressed in particular theological doctrines. Most observers of the individuals and organisations comprising this network refer to this expression of religious notions, particularly where they have political implications, as *ideological*. Most observers describe the social activism of these people and groups, labelled 'Islamists', as motivated by an ideology that fuses religion and politics. They describe the goals of these individuals and organisations as determined to perpetuate such an ideology. Action is assumed to be both motivated by and dedicated to the reproduction of a certain consciously

²¹⁶ John Ware, 'Time to Wise Up to the Muslim Brotherhood', *Standpoint Magazine*, July/August 2013. <http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5082/full>.

²¹⁷ Interview with Suhaib Hasan, June 11, 2013.

accepted framework of ideas, including diagnoses of social and political problems, as well as their solutions.

Yet, what bonds the network is not ideology in the sense in which this term is typically used in academic and think tank literature. The network is not held together or driven by an explicitly articulated set of beliefs, values and ideas dedicated to pre-determined political ends. It is held together or driven, rather, by precisely what makes the explicit articulation of beliefs, values and ideas possible, namely, a collective habitus. The concepts that they share, their understanding of who they are, what they are working towards, and what rewards are in store for them, are dependent upon a shared perceptual schemata that is never fully transparent to conscious reflection and a related, unquestioned manner of evaluating social and political realities. Their shared way of classifying themselves and others—indeed, their way of proactively propagating such classifications, which constitutes a key mark of their cultural solidarity—is not the result of a conscious ideological commitment or of rational calculation. It is, rather, an expression of a shared habitus, a culturally inherited ‘socialised subjectivity’.²¹⁸

What connects the revivalist network—a similar way of perceiving and evaluating the social world—also forms the stakes of their struggle. What is at stake for revivalists is not just a social transformation, even less a political revolution, but a transformation in how the world is perceived and evaluated. This is contended, as the next chapter will show, not just in the external, ‘objective’ institutions comprising the social and political order, but also in the internal, ‘subjective’ categories of perception and cognition.

²¹⁸ Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), p126.

Chapter 5

Contentious Politics and Symbolic Struggles: 'Non-Violent Extremism' and 'British Values'

Chapter 3 established the existence of a network in Britain of individuals and organisations associated with Jama'at-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood. Chapter 4 established the existence of a sense of cultural solidarity between many of the network's key protagonists, particularly in the form of shared ways of seeing themselves, their sociopolitical milieu and their mission as a vanguard community to disseminate what they deem to be 'true' Islam within and beyond Britain's Muslim population. The current chapter seeks to show that, in addition to being organisationally networked and culturally bonded, the key figures and groups comprising the network are engaged in a political and cultural struggle, that is, a conflict concerning perspectives, values, and a way of life, as well as the authority to determine them. This chapter shows how the revivalist network is involved in a conflict concerning the power to determine an alternative social reality, and an alternative way of seeing social reality, both for Muslims and the broader population. In doing so, it shows how the network meets the third criterion for a movement as specified in Chapter 1.

Certain aspects of this conflict, highlighted by recent events in Britain, have placed Islamic revivalists at the forefront of political debate. In particular, the media spotlight shone upon the numerous British Muslims that have joined the Islamic State (IS) has led some analysts to claim that revivalist groups play a key role in the 'radicalisation' of British Muslims. Samuel Westrop, for example, writes that "'non-violent" Islamist networks', comprised of groups linked to Jama'at-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood, impose an 'extremist culture' and ideology upon British

Muslims.¹ Because of these groups' influence in inculcating radical beliefs amongst Muslim Britons, he asserts, some have travelled abroad to fight for IS, whilst others who remain at home have developed a distrust of Britain, disdain for British liberal democratic values, and a victim mentality that serves to divide communities. Westrop asserts that these groups have, for a number of years, sought to impose a 'culture of extremist Islamic thought' on British Muslims by exerting their influence within local government, schools, universities, charities, prisons and even interfaith groups. 'By permitting Islamist groups to represent British Muslims, and then equipping them with funds and political recognition,' he writes, 'Britain has actually advanced intolerance—and for far too long'.

The radicalising effect of revivalist groups upon British Muslims and the role of these groups in Muslim Britons joining jihadist groups abroad or in Islamist terrorism at home, as claimed by Westrop, the think tank Quilliam and others, is indeed a key issue for the British government to handle. Such concerns have prompted the government to create, for the first time, a strategy to counter both violent and non-violent 'extremism', as well as a new Extremism Analysis Unit located in the Home Office.² On July 1, 2015, a statutory duty came into force requiring all public bodies, including schools, prisons and local councils 'to take steps to identify and tackle radicalisation'.³ The causes of terrorism and the alleged causal relationship between non-violent and violent extremism are issues that lie beyond the scope of this thesis. But the debates concerning radicalisation are woven into a more fundamental question that is central to this thesis, namely, that of a *conflict of values*.

Such a conflict may be seen to concern not just certain values, however, but the schemes of perception in which values make sense: It is not just a matter of *what* is right or wrong, but *how* what is right and wrong obtains its moral value. This involves different perceptions regarding the sources of authority for determining morality. Westrop's phrase of a 'culture of thought' appears to capture this key

¹ Samuel Westrop, 'How to Radicalize an Entire London Borough', The Gatestone Institute, May 5, 2015. <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5677/tower-hamlets>.

² HM Government (2015a).

³ 'PM statement on Tunisia and European Council', British Government website, June 29, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-tunisia-and-european-council>.

stake in the conflict, but it should be emphasised that what is contested is not just a particular set of thoughts or ideas, but the culture in which they form and resonate with meaning and value. In other words, this conflict of values is less a conflict of ideas or thoughts than one concerning a *way* of thinking. Yet, more than this, it concerns a way of seeing or, better still, a way of living in which such a way of thinking is nurtured and rewarded.

This chapter focuses upon three areas in which revivalists have been most active in contesting a ‘culture of thought’, in engendering a conflict of visions and values. These include *politics*, in the sense of national and local systems of representation and governance, and *education*, in the sense of the institutional provision of teaching and learning, particularly as they relate to Muslim children. There are some clear links between these two fields where advocacy is concerned, for example in the representation of Muslims’ educational needs to government, but for the purposes of clarity, politics and education are treated as two separate fields. The third focus area is *arbitration*, in particular the network of *shari’a* courts. This is presented in the second section of the chapter after education, since both relate to a conflict of values occurring primarily within Muslim communities.⁴

Although politics as it relates to policymaking is treated as a distinct field of contention in this chapter, it should be noted that contention in *all* three fields is political, in the sense that authority is contested across them. This concerns the power to represent Muslims and Islam within official discourse, policy and law, as well as within Muslim communities, in Muslim schools and *shari’a* courts. In Bourdieu’s terms, it concerns the possession of symbolic capital. This contested authority also concerns the power to shape the social order in which Muslims live and Islam is practiced, through institutionalising a certain understanding of Islam and Islamic values amongst Muslims and the wider population. Thus, the political dimension of this struggle relates to contention concerning the authority to structure the social world, as well as the perception and evaluation of it. This cuts across the

⁴ It should be noted that these are not the only fields of contention where a clash of values are apparent. Universities, prisons and mosques present three other kinds of institution in which such a clash has been reported and recognised by the government. Because of limited space, however, this thesis has had to omit consideration of these arenas of cultural conflict.

fields of politics ‘proper’, where government is concerned, and education, in relation to institutions of teaching and learning.

1. Politics and governance:

A conflict of values with the state

The field of politics referred to in this section of the chapter relates to national and local systems of government. There are several ways in which Islamic revivalists’ activism within this field demonstrates their engagement in a conflict with political and cultural dimensions. The first involves the efforts of specific organisations to serve as interlocutors for Muslims’ needs and interests. There is a distributed but concerted effort to speak on behalf of Muslims at the interface with central and local government authorities. The second way involves the involvement or infiltration of certain individuals and organisations within local government authorities, exemplified by the Islamic Forum of Europe in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. The efforts of these interlocutionary groups are contentious not only for Muslims outside the revivalist network for determining Muslim identity, a common understanding of Islam and the needs of Muslims. They are also contentious for Britain more generally in influencing or seeking to influence government policy in support of a vision of society that, in the final analysis, clashes with that of a culturally secular liberal democracy.

1.1. Representation and advocacy: MCB and other interlocutors

Some of the organisations and individuals comprising the revivalist network currently play, or have played, an active role in advocating for Muslims’ needs and interests at the interface with government authorities. There are two senses in which this work may be understood as constituting a conflict of values contesting cultural norms and political authority, and therefore as more than mere advocacy. The first is in vying to represent the entirety and diversity of Muslims in Britain by promoting and instituting a particular understanding of Islam that is contentious amongst some Muslims in contemporary Britain. The second is in challenging mainstream liberal democratic values in the public arena of policymaking. Thus, some revivalist groups and individuals, whilst appearing to advocate Muslims’ needs and interests, promote

a particular vision of Islam within British society to the detriment of alternative visions held by other Muslims. They also promote a particular understanding of ‘common’ social values that clashes with their understanding in mainstream society and their articulation by the state.

Put succinctly, the conflict of values in which revivalists are engaged has two sides, one facing *Muslims*, whom they claim to represent, and one facing *society as a whole*, represented by government authorities. But it also has two aspects that cut across these two faces, one that involves *perception, belief and thought*, and one that involves *institutions* (see Table 2 below). These might be thought of, respectively, as the ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ of Britain’s political culture. This conflict might be termed a ‘clash of narratives’, but it is more than a conflict over the meaning of words. The effort to control language—particularly as it relates to Islam, ‘British values’, and ‘extremism’—is the *symbolic* aspect of a conflict over how certain values are understood. But this is connected to the conflict’s *practical* aspect, which concerns how such values are most appropriately embedded within the social fabric and upheld by the state.

ASPECT OF AUTHORITY → DIRECTION OF STRUGGLE ↓	<i>Symbolic</i> (i.e. subjective or cognitive)	<i>Practical</i> (i.e. objective or institutional)
<i>The Muslim Umma</i> In-group (but secondarily part of the out-group)	A struggle to embody an Islamic worldview and values in Muslim minds and to engender Muslim solidarity. Through education, training, sermonising and agitation. References to Islamic sources. A form of internal <i>da’wa</i> .	A struggle to embody an Islamic worldview and values in Muslim institutions . In schools, mosques, <i>sharia</i> courts, Muslim advocacy groups within state bodies or civil society, etc., as well as national or local policies or laws that relate specifically to Muslims.
<i>Mainstream society (or humanity)</i> Out-group (but an in-group ‘in- denial’, i.e. potential ‘reverts’)	A struggle to embody an Islamic worldview and values in the minds of the public in mainstream society , and a struggle to engender solidarity between Muslims and non-Muslims. References to secular, liberal democratic sources insofar as compatible with Islam. A form of external <i>da’wa</i> .	A struggle to embody an Islamic worldview and values in mainstream social institutions . In schools, universities, local governments, advocacy groups within state bodies or civil society, etc., as well as national or local policies or laws that relate to both Muslims and non-Muslims.

Table 2: Symbolic and practical dimensions of authority contested by the revivalist movement within the Muslim umma and across mainstream society.

The Muslim Council of Britain

A clash of values and government disengagement

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was the primary interlocutor between British Muslims and the British government from its creation in 1997 until 2009. For over a decade MCB acted as the government's key consultative partner, providing 'the Muslim perspective' on national policy matters. Its fall from government favour, which began whilst Labour was in office, was from the government's point of view the result of a conflict of core values.

The incident that provoked the then communities secretary, Hazel Blears, to formally suspend the government's relationship with MCB was the signing of the Istanbul Declaration by MCB's deputy secretary general, Daud Abdullah. The Istanbul Declaration exhorted the Muslim *umma* to wage *jihad* against Israel 'until the liberation of all of Palestine'—in other words, to strive for Israel's annihilation. As understood by Blears, it also 'advocat[ed] attacks on Jewish communities all around the world'.⁵ Furthermore, it defined any country's support for Israel or its deployment of forces in the 'Muslim waters' facing Gaza preventing the smuggling of arms and supplies as a 'declaration of war'.⁶ Since the British government was considering deploying naval forces to the Gaza coastline, it viewed this as condoning attacks on British troops. Abdullah's refusal to withdraw his signature on the declaration and MCB's refusal to force Abdullah's resignation marked the end of MCB's special relationship with the government.

However, there were numerous signs of a clash of values between MCB and the British government prior to Abdullah's signing of the Istanbul Declaration. In 2001, for example, the MCB's then secretary general, Yousuf Bhailok, instigated MCB's boycotting of Holocaust Memorial Day. MCB claimed that the occasion ought to be replaced by one that commemorates genocides other than the Nazi genocide of

⁵ Hazel Blears, 'Our shunning of the MCB is not grandstanding', *The Guardian*, March 25, 2009. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/mar/25/islam-terrorism>.

⁶ For the text of the 'Istanbul Declaration', see 'A statement by the religious scholars and proselytisers (du'a) of the Islamic Nation (ummah) to all rulers and peoples concerning events in Gaza' published online at <http://hurryupharry.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/istpdf.pdf>.

Jews, most notably what it dubiously referred to as ‘the Palestinian genocide’.⁷ MCB lifted the boycott in 2008, but resumed it the following year in protest against Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. In 2010, it changed its position again, sending a junior representative, Shuja Shafi (the current MCB secretary general). MCB’s protest of the memorial event appears now to have been shelved. However, the initial boycott and the perceived attempt to extract political capital from it for the Palestinian cause raised concerns for some in government and the media that the MCB leadership was expressing an unacceptable antisemitic stance.⁸

Another indication of a clash of values between MCB and the government came in August 2006, after the police arrested a group of British Muslims who planned to detonate liquid explosives on seven trans-Atlantic flights from Heathrow airport to American and Canadian cities.⁹ Despite the group leader’s video-recorded explanation of the plot’s rationale to ‘fulfill a covenant and promise with Allah the almighty, and to make his *din* [religion and way of life] reign supreme’,¹⁰ MCB solely blamed British and American foreign policy as the primary motivation behind it. As Martyn Frampton and Shiraz Maher observe:

The MCB was felt to be legitimizing terrorism, drawing moral equivalences, while failing to directly confront the radicalization of some young British men. This raised fresh and troubling concerns about its suitability as a partnership organization. Subsequently, therefore, the government sought to rebalance its relationship with groups like the MCB by empowering alternative organizations at the grassroots. The new mantra in Whitehall was that it would only work with groups and individuals that accepted a set of ‘*non-negotiable values*’.¹¹

⁷ See MCB, ‘Holocaust Memorial Ceremony MCB Regrets Exclusion of Palestinian Tragedy’, MCB website, January 25, 2002, <http://www.mcb.org.uk/holocaust-memorial-ceremony-mcb-regrets-exclusion-of-palestinian-tragedy/>; and MCB, ‘Holocaust Day: MCB regrets exclusion of Palestinian genocide’, MCB website, January 27, 2003, <http://www.mcb.org.uk/holocaust-day-mcb-regrets-exclusion-of-palestinian-genocide/>.

⁸ Vikram Dodd, ‘Muslim Council ends Holocaust memorial day boycott’, *The Guardian*, December 3, 2007. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/dec/03/secondworldwar.religion>.

⁹ Duncan Gardham, ‘Airline terror trial: The bomb plot to kill 10,000 people’, *The Telegraph*, September 7, 2009. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6153243/Airline-terror-trial-The-bomb-plot-to-kill-10000-people.html>.

¹⁰ BBC News, ‘“Suicide videos”: What they said’, 4 April 4, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7330367.stm.

¹¹ Frampton and Maher (2013), p.38.

In fact, a month prior to this, Ruth Kelly, then communities secretary, had already announced that the government would work with a broader range of Muslim groups, including the newly formed Sufi Muslim Council, which she praised for condemning ‘terrorism in all its forms’.¹²

Beginning under Labour and continued by the coalition and Conservative administrations, the British government has brought the question of values to the forefront of political debate. Moreover, it has explicitly articulated the sharing of non-negotiable ‘British’ values as a pre-requisite for official engagement with (and the funding of) community organisations. Since 2011, with the publication of the Conservative-led coalition’s revised counterterrorism strategy, *Prevent*, an explicitly values-led approach to community engagement and counterterrorism has been adopted.¹³ This is evident in the government’s definition of ‘extremism’ as the ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’.¹⁴ Its definition also includes calling ‘for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas’. MCB’s sidelining by Cameron’s successive administrations indicates that the government sees the group as failing to uphold these core British values.

Contesting the notion of ‘British values’

MCB’s involvement in a conflict of values with the state is not just a matter of government perspective. Most evident in the policy areas of counterterrorism and community engagement, it is belied by its attitude to the Home Office’s introduction of fundamental values as a key criterion for moderation and partnership. Rather than expressing agreement and support for the government on this matter, MCB, under Farooq Murad’s leadership, dismissed the government’s definition of ‘extremism’, and thus of ‘British values’, as ‘arbitrary’ and devised by ‘neoconservative think-

¹² Dominic Casciani, ‘Minister backs new Muslim group’, BBC News, July 19, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5193402.stm.

¹³ Toby Helm, ‘Back British values or lose grants, Kelly tells Muslim groups’, *The Telegraph*, October 12, 2006. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1531226/Back-British-values-or-lose-grants-Kelly-tells-Muslim-groups.html>.

¹⁴ Home Office (2011), p.107.

tanks’¹⁵ and ‘divisive pundits’.¹⁶ This view is often echoed by other groups in the revivalist network, including Muslim Education and Development (MEND), a group that campaigns for Muslims’ active political participation. MCB’s attitude to the government’s criticism of Muslim groups or individuals espousing non-violent but extremist beliefs is often similarly dismissive and conspiratorial. This was evident in 2014 in its response to the Trojan Horse affair in Birmingham, which will be examined in detail later in this chapter. MCB’s response was to lambast critics of the Muslim individuals and groups involved as conducting a ‘witch hunt’.¹⁷ As journalist John Ware observes, MCB has ‘a reflex tendency to dismiss criticism of such [‘extremist’] beliefs as “Islamophobic” and motivated by a right-wing “neo-con” agenda’.¹⁸

This denial of Muslim non-violent extremism, as defined by the government in terms of a rejection of British values, may be interpreted as concealing certain realities, such as the preaching of enmity for non-Muslims in MCB-affiliated mosques and the unequal treatment of women at MCB-affiliated *shari’a* councils. But it may also be interpreted as a denial of the way in which such realities are classified and understood. Denials of non-violent but ‘extremist’ acts committed by Muslims are effectively a rejection of the government’s monopoly on the discourse of values. They express a symbolic conflict in which the stakes include the way in which Muslims and Islam are perceived, as well as how ‘Britishness’ may be understood. As former MCB leader Daud Abdullah opines, ‘It was a one-way, one-track process: These are the rules, our values, you take it or leave it’.¹⁹ MCB and the government are not merely engaged in a conflict of values, but also a conflict of

¹⁵ MCB, ‘Stigmatising Muslim civil society won’t avert terrorism – Prevent strategy still flawed’, MCB website, June 7, 2011. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/stigmatising-muslim-civil-society-wont-avert-terrorism-prevent-strategy-still-flawed/>.

¹⁶ MCB, ‘Secretary General Calls for Fresh Thinking on Extremism at MCB AGM 2013’, MCB website, July 29, 2013. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/secretary-general-calls-for-fresh-thinking-on-extremism-at-mcb-agm-2013/>.

¹⁷ MCB, ‘Education and Muslims: End this Witch-Hunt of British Muslims’, MCB website, April 17, 2014. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/education-and-muslims-end-this-witch-hunt-of-british-muslims/>.

¹⁸ John Ware, ‘Inside The World Of “Non-Violent” Islamism’, *Standpoint Magazine*, March 2015. <http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5936/full>.

¹⁹ Interview with Daud Abdullah, February 10, 2012.

vision relating to the fundamental way in which the social world is seen and in which such values obtain their worth.

MCB leaders have sometimes publicly endorsed ‘British values’, but done so by absorbing them into their own narrative as *Islamic* values. In January 2015, for example, MCB secretary general Shuja Shafi gave a talk at a conference organised by the 100 Group entitled, ‘British Values are Islamic Values’.²⁰ Citing David Cameron’s description of British values as including belief in freedom, the tolerance of others, personal and social responsibility, and respect for the rule of law, Shafi stated that such values are ‘indeed Islamic values and we should champion them’. British values are thus re-classified as Islamic values. That the latter takes precedence in terms of providing the perceptual and moral framework in which the former make sense is suggested in Shafi’s statement that—whilst MCB has ‘no objection to British values’—what inspires Muslims ‘to seek the common good’ are ‘*the values of our faith*’.²¹ Others in the revivalist network, such as Muhammad Abdul Bari, similarly conceive of British values as Islamic in the language of ‘universal values’.²² Anas Altikriti, who also champions universal values, goes as far to say that the term ‘British values’ has ‘no meaning whatsoever’.²³

Contesting the notion of ‘extremism’

The concept of British values was introduced into political parlance in the context of security concerns and in this context is inseparable from a certain concept of extremism. In the same way that the notion of British values is a point of contention for the government and MCB, so is that of extremism. MCB associates extremism with violence and it therefore renounces and disassociates itself from it. But, it

²⁰ MCB, ‘Speech by Dr Shuja Shafi on British and Islamic Values’, MCB website, January 29, 2015. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/shuja-shafi-speech-british-values-290115/>.

²¹ MCB, ‘Muslim Council of Britain Elects New Leadership and Discusses British Values’, MCB website, June 15, 2014. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslim-council-of-britain-elects-new-leadership-and-discusses-british-values/>.

²² Muhammad Abdul Bari, ‘Who Does Not Agree With British Values That Are Universal?’, *The Huffington Post*, June 18, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/muhammad-abdul-bari/british-values_b_5506138.html. See also AMS-UK, ‘Iqra Slough Governor discusses Islamic and British Values’, AMS-UK website, April 10, 2014. <http://ams-uk.org/iqra-slough-governor-discusses-islamic-and-british-values/>.

²³ ‘Young and the Brave: Roles and Responsibilities By Brother Anas Altikriti’, YouTube, June 25, 2011. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HONCEiFuL4M>.

asserts, ‘Anyone who eschews violence and wants to engage by democratic means should be encouraged to do so, no matter how difficult their opinions may be for some’.²⁴ MCB is ‘against the singling out of particular mosques, imams, charities, or student societies’, regardless of their possibly radicalising effects. Non-violent extremism is rejected as a principle, rather than an empirical matter. This is because, in Murad’s words, much of the prevalent vocabulary, concepts and theories in relation to terrorism and radicalisation ‘remain deeply muddled and misguided’.²⁵

MCB’s concept of extremism stems from a different intellectual lineage than the government’s. Using the terminology of the Muslim Brotherhood’s spiritual guide, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, MCB views itself as taking a ‘middle path’ between ‘extremism’ and what it calls ‘rejection’. In March 2009, for example, MCB convened a meeting of over 200 Muslim activists and community leaders to discuss proposed changes to the government’s counter-terrorism strategy.²⁶ In addition to contesting the government’s definition of extremism—which it declared was ‘dictated by xenophobic commentators’—it stated that, ‘Islam is the religion of the middle way that rejects any form of extremism’. In May 2015, MCB organised a seminar to explore ‘the implications of increasing counter terror legislation and rising extremism, and how peaceful Muslims caught in the middle can navigate the terrain drawing on the middle path traditions of Islam’.²⁷ Former MCB secretary general Muhammad Abdul Bari gave the keynote talk on the subject of ‘Islam’s Middle Path: Between Rejection & Extremism’.

Abdul Bari articulates MCB’s notion of extremism succinctly as ‘rigidity, fanaticism, and radicalism’.²⁸ Muslims may be extremists by ‘misunderstanding’ their faith either by committing violent acts or isolating themselves from the mainstream society. Neither may be condoned from this point of view because of

²⁴ MCB, ‘Secretary General Calls for Fresh Thinking on Extremism at MCB AGM 2013’.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ MCB, ‘Muslims Unite for Civil Liberties: Consultation Meeting’, MCB website, March 23, 2009. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslims-unite-for-civil-liberties-consultation-meeting/>.

²⁷ MCB, ‘Seminar – Navigating Extremes: Muslims in the Middle’, MCB website, May 11, 2015, <http://www.mcb.org.uk/navigating-extremes-muslims-in-the-middle/>.

²⁸ ‘Dr Muhammad Abdul Bari - Between Ignorance and Extremism’, Radical Middle Way website, January 24, 2011. <http://www.radicalmiddleway.org/uploads/assets/e83de8e1d63f0f3f2c1c8a2699a0b86c611dd3e8.pdf>.

the belief that Islam ought to be spread beyond the Muslim population without coercion. Abdul Bari describes ‘rejection’, on the other hand, as a ‘libertarian attitude, laxity, or so-called liberalism’. In fact, both of these positions are viewed as extremes. Between what amounts to violence or self-segregation and secularism—all of which are deemed extremist—he asserts, ‘we have to take the middle path, the path that Allah *subhanahu wa ta’ala* has given us’. This understanding of extremism, shared by the Islamic Forum of Europe,²⁹ is inextricable from a certain Islamic perspective: What MCB deems as extreme is measured not in relation to what the government describes as British values, but in relation to the proper practice of Islam, which serves as the middle ground.

Contesting the symbolic authority to speak for Islam

For revivalist Muslims, contention over the concept of extremism is inextricable from contention over the understanding of Islam. Whilst the government has often expressed the view that Islam is a ‘religion of peace’ and that Islam-inspired terrorism or extremism is a ‘misunderstanding’ of the faith—a view shared by MCB—the umbrella body sees itself in a struggle with the state to control the representation of Islam.³⁰ MCB says that it agrees with the government that those who call for the murder of innocent civilians present ‘a distorted interpretation of Islam’, but it firmly rejects the government’s authority to classify Islam. Expressing concern ‘as to who will be the judge of what a “distorted interpretation of Islam” really is’, it professes that ‘the idea of the state or police arbitrating theological “distortion” is especially worrying’.³¹ Any effort by the government to classify what Islam is or isn’t, states MCB, amounts to the promotion of ‘state-sponsored sectarianism’. In response to Peter Clarke’s report on the Trojan Horse affair, MCB

²⁹ Ahmed Saad, ‘Al-Wasatiyyah: The Lost Middle Path’, IFE website, December 30, 2006. <http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=324>.

³⁰ See, for example, ‘PM speech at the UN General Assembly 2014’, British Government website, September 25, 2014. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-the-un-general-assembly-2014>.

³¹ MCB, ‘Fear and Loathing is not the Best Response to Terrorism: Muslim Council of Britain Responds to Extremism Task Force Proposals’, MCB website, December 5, 2013. <http://www.finsburyparkmosque.org/news/mcb-press-release-fear-and-loathing-is-not-the-best-response-to-terrorism-muslim-council-of-britain-responds-to-extremismtask-force-proposals/>.

contested the observation that ‘a hardline and politicised strand of Sunni Islam’³² was being pushed in some Birmingham schools, asserting, ‘It is not for the state to define the theological boundaries of the Islamic faith and to create an “approved version of Islam”’.³³

MCB’s conflict of vision and values with government authority is inseparable from a symbolic conflict with other Muslims over the representation of their faith. This relates not just to the right to advocate changes in policy on behalf of British Muslims, but to the possession of the symbolic authority to influence the public perception and understanding of Islam. Murad states that ‘the MCB cannot represent anyone but its many affiliates’.³⁴ But MCB clearly seeks to represent more than the 500 or so organisations under its umbrella by presenting itself as the most authentic voice for British Muslims and by striving to establish an understanding of Islam—one consistent with a long-term vision of a society in which it is willingly embraced by all—that is contentious from a variety of other Muslim perspectives.

MCB’s engagement in a symbolic conflict with other Muslims is apparent in its consistent rejection of the association of violent acts with Islam by Muslims who see such acts as *jihad* for the sake of pleasing Allah. It is also apparent in Murad’s rejection of the practice of *takfir*, the declaration of Muslims as non-Muslim made most commonly by violent jihadists and non-violent rejectionist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.³⁵ Decrying the ‘arrogance’ of those who ‘claim that they can pronounce on the relationship that any of the rest of us have with Allah’, he is blind to the irony of his own declarations that such Muslims have themselves misunderstood Islam and hijacked it for merely political ends.

³² ‘Oral statement by Nicky Morgan on the “Trojan Horse” letter’, British Government website, July 22, 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/oral-statement-by-nicky-morgan-on-the-trojan-horse-letter>, and Clarke (2014), p.48.

³³ MCB, ‘The Muslim Council of Britain Responds to Peter Clarke’s “Trojan Horse” Letter Report’, MCB website, July 23, 2014. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/the-muslim-council-of-britain-responds-to-peter-clarkes-trojan-horse-letter-report/>.

³⁴ MCB, ‘Secretary General Calls for Fresh Thinking on Extremism at MCB AGM 2013’.

³⁵ Ibid. For an interesting take on ‘non-violent’ takfirism, see James Brandon, ‘By denouncing ISIS as “not Muslims”, moderate Muslims risk making things worse’, September 9, 2014. Left Foot Forward blog. <http://leftfootforward.org/2014/09/by-denouncing-isis-as-not-muslims-moderate-muslims-risk-making-things-worse/>.

Furthermore, under Sacranie's leadership, MCB was adamant in classifying Ahmadi Muslims as non-Muslims, a position it has not publicly disavowed.³⁶ In April 2016, responding to pressure to clarify its position, MCB stated that since 'the Ahmadi community' does not subscribe to the 'cornerstone' tenet of Islam that Muhammad is its final messenger, it could not represent the Ahmadis as Muslims.³⁷ Stopping short of explicitly declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslim, it added that Muslims should not be obliged to classify Ahmadis as 'Muslim'.

MCB has also clashed with secular, reformist Muslim groups, such as Quilliam and the Sufi Muslim Council, for whom Islam ought to be a matter of personal worship, rather than a religious moral code arbitrated by the state in the public space, for example in schools.³⁸ Such clashes have occasionally spilled out into the media.

In 2008, for example, MCB initially supported a marriage contract produced by the Muslim Institute for use by Muslims wishing to have an Islamic marriage (*nikah*). As Ed Husain, co-founder of Quilliam, explains, 'The new Muslim marriage contract sought to update and develop *fiqh*, or Muslim personal jurisprudence, by shifting the power balance in a marriage to empower women to trigger divorce, feel safe from rape or abuse, prevent husbands from taking second wives, and set up accommodation separated from a husband's parents.'³⁹ Traditionally, Muslim women require a *wali*, or male guardian, to oversee and consent to the marriage, plus male witnesses. The new contract waived the requirement for a *wali* and stipulated that witnesses can be women and even non-Muslims. MCB quickly withdrew its support for the contract, clarifying that it had misplaced its trust in those leading the initiative, whose attempts to 're-invent' *shari'a* towards a

³⁶ MCB, 'Qadiyani Centre not Mosque', MCB website, October 2, 2003. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/qadiyani-centre-not-mosque/>.

³⁷ MCB, 'Position Statement: The Muslim Council of Britain and Ahmadis', MCB website, April 6, 2016. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/position-statement-the-muslim-council-of-britain-and-ahmadis/>.

³⁸ For example, see Oliver King, 'Criticism for new Muslim organisation', *The Guardian*, July 19, 2006. <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/jul/19/immigrationpolicy.religion>; and George Readings, 'British Islamism's Black Knight Strikes Again', June 16, 2009, Harry's place blog, <http://hurryupharry.org/2009/06/16/british-islamisms-black-knight-strikes-again/>.

³⁹ Ed Husain, 'Frustrated love and forced marriage', *The Guardian*, August 20, 2008. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/aug/20/islam.religion>.

‘modern’ or ‘reformist’ view it described as ‘misguided’ and ‘incorrect’.⁴⁰ MCB’s assistant secretary general, Ibrahim Mogra, defended the decision, asserting that *shari’a* is the domain of Muslim theologians and jurists, and that they are clear that Muslim brides-to-be are required in Islamic law to be represented by their male guardians.⁴¹

Contesting the symbolic authority to represent Muslims

MCB’s claim to represent a diversity of Islamic perspectives is dubious, as is its assumption that it provides the most authentic voice for Britain’s Muslims. Ignoring the other Muslim groups that the government has engaged with in recent years, Mogra portrays MCB as the necessary voice for British Muslims that is provided neither by Muslim politicians, who represent their constituents rather than Muslims’ needs, nor the mosques. In sidelining MCB, says Mogra, the government is denying Muslim communities of political representation.⁴² His view is echoed by others, including Saleem Kidwai, the secretary general of the Muslim Council of Wales. ‘[Y]ou must talk to the Muslim Council of Britain,’ states Kidawi, ‘because it is the largest organization. You can talk to think-tanks but they are not the grassroots groups—the MCB has got the mandate from 500 organizations who represent Muslims from all walks of life’.⁴³

However, MCB’s representativeness is questionable in terms of how many mosques fall within its network and how many British Muslims view it as representing their interests. Research by Mehmood Naqshbandi—which heavily informs Innes Bowen’s book, *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent*—calculates that mosques managed by MCB affiliates total just 12% of all mosques in Britain.⁴⁴ MCB represents half or more of all Jama’at- and Ikhwan-related mosques in the country,

⁴⁰ MCB, ‘STATEMENT: Muslim Marriage Certificate’, MCB website, August 15, 2008. http://web.archive.org/web/20080824221846/http://www.mcb.org.uk/article_detail.php?article=announcement-734.

⁴¹ Allen Esterson, ‘The MCB and the Muslim Marriage Contract’, August 24, 2008. Butterflies & Wheels blog. <http://www.butterfliesandwheels.org/2008/the-mcb-and-the-muslim-marriage-contract/>.

⁴² Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

⁴³ ‘Anti-Terror Measures Foster Extremism: MCB’, On Islam website, September 2, 2014. <http://www.onislam.net/english/news/europe/476971-anti-terror-measures-foster-extremism-mcb.html>.

⁴⁴ Naqshbandi (2014).

but less than half of the mosques belonging to any other ‘faction’. Deobandi mosques comprise the largest number of MCB-affiliated mosques, but comprise a small proportion of the total in Britain. Perhaps more significant in indicating the representativeness of MCB as a national interlocutory body, according to a 2007 survey, only 6% British Muslims consider MCB as representing their views.⁴⁵

Humayun Ansari, in his comprehensive history of Muslims in Britain, *The Infidel Within*, states that MCB has ‘made no claim to be the “sole” representative of “true” Islam or the “whole” of the British Muslim community’.⁴⁶ This is not quite accurate. Whilst it may not have publicly declared as such, MCB quite clearly views itself as speaking for Muslims as an entire group, rather than for just its affiliates. In the description of its aims and vision it consistently refers to ‘the’ Muslim community as the singular constituency it seeks to advocate for, unify and empower.⁴⁷ The same assumption that it represents all British Muslims is apparent in the language it employs in official lobbying. ‘The Muslim community’, it has advocated in Parliament, ‘would like to see the early introduction of a law that makes it a criminal offence to vilify any religious belief’.⁴⁸

Furthermore, in deriding some Muslim groups as unrepresentative of British Muslims and presenting itself as the most authoritative alternative—without which Muslims would lack a political voice—MCB quite clearly seeks to speak for all British Muslims, rather than a select few. And in denouncing some Muslim groups as misrepresenting Islam and in judging what is a correct or incorrect interpretation of *shari’a*, MCB claims the authority to speak for Islam. The authority it vies for is both political, in seeking legal and policy changes, and symbolic, in seeking recognition for its point of view from both government officials and Muslim communities. As noted above, this authority has been challenged by the government as it casts MCB within a narrative of national values and non-violent extremism. It has also been challenged by observers who note its slim base of support within the overall Muslim population.

⁴⁵ Mirza, Senthilkumaran and Ja’far (2007).

⁴⁶ Ansari (2004), p.365.

⁴⁷ MCB, ‘About MCB’, MCB website, April 16, 2014. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/>.

⁴⁸ MCB (2003), 2.2.

Other revivalist interlocutors

MCB is not alone in having an interlocutory role with the government regarding Muslims' interests in Britain. Whilst not receiving media attention comparable with MCB, there are other, smaller organisations that specialise in certain sectors, including education, law and policing, which have a history of engagement with the authorities. Some of these are highlighted below. Each of these organisations brings to the interface with government a mode of advocacy that, whilst legal and non-violent, is framed by a vision of society and a set of values that ultimately clash with Britain's liberal democratic culture.

The Muslim Educational Trust

The Muslim Educational Trust (MET), an affiliate of MCB, began lobbying and advising central and local governments from the early 1970s for specific arrangements in schools for Muslim children and for revisions of the national school curriculum according to Islamic principles. In Britain, each Local Education Authority (LEA) is required by law to have a Standing Advisory Council on Religious Education (SACRE). MET representatives have served on SACREs all over Britain. In 1993, it obtained government approval for an Islamic studies syllabus in secondary schools, for which it has provided teachers and teaching materials. Urfan Khaliq notes that MET participates and assists in Islamic studies lessons 'in the majority' of schools in the Midlands.⁴⁹ MET states that it has persuaded LEAs to recognise and accept the 'special needs' of Muslim pupils in state schools, including halal food, 'appropriate' dress for Muslim girls, dress for sports for Muslim boys and girls, exemption from mixed-sex swimming lessons, exemption from some aspects of sex education, facility for prayers, and the inclusion of its approved Islamic books in school libraries.⁵⁰ Ansari concurs with this, attributing changes in schools, including the provision of Islamic religious education, to MET.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Khaliq (2004), p.257.

⁵⁰ MET, 'Achievements', MET website. Webpage captured May 3, 2008.
<http://web.archive.org/web/20080503042942/http://www.muslim-ed-trust.org.uk/achievements.php>.

⁵¹ Ansari (2004), p.386.

Yet, in some respects, MET's work is highly contentious in presenting a set of values and a vision of society that clearly conflict with that of the liberal democratic mainstream. In an introductory text on Islam—which, according to Ed Husain, is used widely in British Muslim schools—MET founder and director Ghulam Sarwar presents Islam as a 'complete system of life' in which politics of a highly contentious nature and religion are inextricable.⁵² This book, *Islam: Beliefs and Teachings*, commends the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i-Islami for working towards the 'establishment of Allah's law in Allah's land', confessing a hope that 'a real Islamic state will emerge from these efforts' for the benefit of the world.⁵³ As Husain recalls,

In my school, a Jamat-e-Islami activist named Abdul Rabb represented the MET and awarded us trophies and medals for our performance in MET exams. Ostensibly it all seemed harmless, but the personnel all belonged to Jamat-e-Islami front organizations in Britain. Their key message was that Islam was not merely a religion but also an ideology that sought political power and was beginning to make headway.⁵⁴

For Sarwar, 'The introduction of an Islamic education system should be an integral part of the efforts worldwide to establish Islam as an all-encompassing way of life'.⁵⁵ In his book used in British schools, he describes such an ideal way of life as including the legal sanction of polygamy and arranged marriages and the prohibition of the 'free mixing of grown-up boys and girls'. Children in British schools learning about Islam from this resource are taught that men and women have different duties defined by Allah, and that to aspire for 'total equality between a man and a woman' goes 'against nature'.⁵⁶ This teaching strikes a chord with Mawdudi's view of the different roles of men and women assigned to them by nature, which he detailed in his book *Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam*.⁵⁷

⁵² Husain (2007), pp.20-21. Sarwar (2006), p.169.

⁵³ Sarwar (2006), p.171.

⁵⁴ Husain (2007), p.22.

⁵⁵ Sarwar (2001), p.30, emphasis added.

⁵⁶ Sarwar (2006), p.160.

⁵⁷ Mawdudi (1979), cited in Mayer (2007), p.144.

The Association of Muslim Schools UK

In recent years, advocacy for Muslim education has become the domain of the Association of Muslim Schools UK (AMS-UK), also an MCB affiliate. Unlike MET, AMS-UK is a national membership organisation. As such, it has been able to build on MET's advocacy work by developing relationships with and representing the 150-odd independent Muslim schools throughout Britain. Its influence is suggested by its formal recognition by the Department for Education (DfE) as the national representative body for Muslim faith schools in the country. In 2005, it was given financial support by DfE's precursor, the Department of Education and Skills, to the sum of £100,000, to assist 60 or so of its affiliated schools integrate into the state maintained sector.⁵⁸ AMS-UK has played an active lobbying role for increased funding for its affiliate schools. Furthermore, along with the Christian Schools Trust (CST), it was successful lobbying the government for a separate inspections body for faith schools. In 2008, AMS-UK and CST jointly established the Bridge Schools Inspectorate, which until recently conducted inspections of their affiliate schools on behalf of the government. Some of AMS-UK's leaders have enjoyed roles advising the government on other educational issues. In 2010, for example, AMS-UK's former chairman, Mohamed Mukadam, and its current chair, Ashfaque Choudhury, helped co-author a report for the Department for Communities and Local Government, entitled, *The training and development of Muslim Faith Leaders: Current practice and future possibilities*.⁵⁹

AMS-UK's website claims that 'British values', 'such as democracy, the rule of law, mutual respect, tolerance, freedom of speech and freedom of association', are examples of universal values.⁶⁰ But it suggests that such values derive from the 'traditional authentic Islamic values as taught in the Qur'an and through the example of the Prophet Muhammad'. And, although the organisation does not openly challenge the state, there are indications that its leadership sees itself as promoting a vision of society and a set of values that clash with those that the state upholds. Josephine Squires observes that AMS-UK claims the government 'wishes

⁵⁸ Conway (2009), p.5.

⁵⁹ Department for Communities and Local Government (2010).

⁶⁰ AMS-UK, 'FAQ', AMS-UK website. <http://ams-uk.org/faq/>.

to maintain a Judeo-Christian monopoly in controlling the minds of youth in the state education system'.⁶¹ AMS-UK seems to view itself as fighting an ideological battle against the state and the liberal democratic culture of Britain not just for the minds of young Muslims, but also for their souls. Mukadam, states that Muslim children need to be 'saved' from a secular educational environment.⁶² The 'first and foremost' duty of Muslim parents, he asserts, is the transference of Islamic faith and values to their children, without which they would enter 'the fire of hell'. For Mukadam, the prioritisation of Islam as a religion over the individual human rights of Muslims is further expressed in his belief that Muslim apostates in an Islamic state must be killed, since this is the penalty ordained by Allah and prescribed by the *shari'a*.⁶³

Mukadam is also the principal of an AMS-UK-affiliated Muslim school, whose website has stated—in terms inimical to 'British' values and social cohesion—"If we oppose the lifestyle of the West, then it does not seem sensible that the teachers and the system which represents that lifestyle should educate our children".⁶⁴ In 1999, under Mukadam's leadership, the school was criticised by Ofsted for 'its failure to prepare pupils to take their place in the wider society'.⁶⁵ In another AMS-UK school, undercover filming 'discovered that Muslim children are being taught religious apartheid and social segregation'.⁶⁶ Although AMS-UK cannot be held responsible for what goes on in a particular school, it has been accused of whitewashing such 'extremism' in its role within the Bridge Schools Inspectorate (BSI).⁶⁷ These concerns appeared well founded when in June 2015 the government

⁶¹ Squires (2003), p.88.

⁶² Jamal and Panjwani (2011), p.81.

⁶³ Faisal, 'The penalty for apostasy', Spittoon blog. March 30, 2010. <http://web.archive.org/web/20100407163056/http://www.spittoon.org/archives/5719>.

⁶⁴ Andrew Gilligan, 'Ofsted praises Islamic schools which oppose Western lifestyle', *The Telegraph*, November 6, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/8114452/Ofsted-praises-Islamic-schools-which-oppose-Western-lifestyle.html>.

⁶⁵ Conway (2009), p.22.

⁶⁶ Tazeen Ahmad, 'Shame of Britain's Muslim schools: Secret filming shows pupils being beaten and "taught Hindus drink cow p***"', *The Daily Mail*, February 13, 2011. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1356361/Shame-Britains-Muslim-schools-Secret-filming-shows-pupils-beaten.html#ixzz3bV4ri2fB>.

⁶⁷ Gilligan, 'Ofsted praises Islamic schools which oppose Western lifestyle'.

announced its plans to close BSI in October 2015 for failing to identify ‘warning signs of extremism and radicalisation in school settings’.⁶⁸ In 2014, *The Sunday Times* reported that AMS-UK was being investigated by the Department for Education ‘amid claims that some of their inspectors support fundamentalist Islamic beliefs’.⁶⁹

AMS-UK’s inspectors include its vice-chair, Tahir Alam. A former assistant secretary general of MCB, Alam is linked to the Trojan Horse scandal, which will be covered in the next section of the chapter. Another inspector—a co-founder and executive committee member of AMS-UK—is Ibrahim Hewitt. A former assistant director at MET and a former MCB official, Hewitt is the head of Al-Aqsa school in Leicester. He advocates that, in an ideal Islamic state, adulterers should be stoned to death and that homosexuals and fornicators should be lashed.⁷⁰ Muslim schools, for Hewitt, are not just for educational purposes, but for safeguarding the future of the Muslim *umma*: Islam as a way of life takes priority over its Muslim adherents; the ‘community’ or nation takes priority over individuals.⁷¹ Hewitt is also a trustee of IBERR, the International Board of Educational Research and Resources, which was established to implement the aims of the First World Conference on Islamic Education held in Makkah in 1977.⁷² The conference statement affirmed the ‘complete submission to Allah on the level of the individual, the community and humanity at large’ as the ‘ultimate aim of Muslim Education’.⁷³

⁶⁸ Andrew Gilligan, ‘Schools watchdog with links to extremists shut down’, *The Telegraph*, June 14, 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/11673313/Schools-watchdog-with-links-to-extremists-shut-down.html>.

⁶⁹ Richard Kerbaj and Sian Griffiths, ‘Two Muslim school inspectorates face axe’, *The Sunday Times*, May 11, 2014. http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Education/article1409438.ece.

⁷⁰ Tom Worden and Abul Taher, ‘Private school chief linked to Islam Trojan Horse plot says: Stone all adulterers to death’, *The Daily Mail*, April 19, 2014. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2608662/Private-school-chief-linked-Islam-Trojan-Horse-plot-says-Stone-adulterers-death.html>.

⁷¹ Hewitt (1996), p. 78.

⁷² This information was available on IBERR’s main website until at least November 2010 (at ‘About IBERR’, http://iberr.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=2), but has subsequently been removed. However, it is still available on its Russian website at <http://iberr.chat.ru/iberr1.htm>.

⁷³ Statement from The First World Conference on Muslim Education, 1977, Mecca, quoted in Sarwar (2001), p. 29.

The founder of AMS-UK, Mohammed Akram Khan-Cheema, is also linked to IBEER. Until recently he was its chief executive. At the AMS-UK 2013 conference, consistent with a revivalist perspective in which Islam is viewed as an alternative way of life, he gave a workshop entitled 'Islamification of the whole school curriculum'.⁷⁴ Also speaking at this conference was Farah Ahmed, a founding trustee of the Islamic Shakhsiyah Foundation (ISF) and former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir. She has attacked the National Curriculum for 'pushing the idea of religious tolerance' and its 'systematic indoctrination' of Muslim children, whilst criticising 'attempts to integrate Muslim children' into British society as an effort 'to produce new generations that reject Islam'.⁷⁵

The Association of Muslim Lawyers

The Association of Muslim Lawyers (AML) was established in 1993 to 'promote the legal rights of Muslims and the availability of advice in accordance with the Shari'ah of Islam'.⁷⁶ According to its own literature, it has worked with the Commission for Racial Equality, City Hall, the Home Office, the House of Commons and the House of Lords, as well as other Muslim organisations including MCB, of which it is an affiliate. Although neither as active as AMS-UK, nor as connected to government agencies as MSF has been, AML has played a key role in advocating changes in law in the interests of Britain's Muslims. Most notably, it campaigned for an extension of England's (now abolished) blasphemy law to cover Islam and a redefinition of the crime of incitement to hatred to protect Muslims. AML states that the government has a duty 'to secure the basic rights of freedom of religion, freedom to practice one's religion and freedom to educate one's children in

⁷⁴ John Ware, 'The Plot to Islamise Birmingham's Schools', *Standpoint Magazine*, September 2014. <http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5696/full>.

⁷⁵ 'When tolerance is taken too far', *The Telegraph*, December 12, 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/6798250/When-tolerance-is-taken-too-far.html>; Andrew Gilligan, 'Muslim extremists, and a worrying lesson for us all', *The Telegraph*, March 16, 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationopinion/10700041/Muslim-extremists-and-a-worrying-lesson-for-us-all.html>.

⁷⁶ AML, 'Aims and Objectives', AML website, webpage captured on June 4, 2014 (the current website omits this information). <http://web.archive.org/web/20140604195835/http://aml.org.uk/aboutaml/>.

accordance with one's religion'.⁷⁷ For AML, this duty entails the full incorporation of Muslim personal law into English law, so that the 'decisions of properly constituted Shari'a courts will have to be recognised by the English civil courts as being legally binding and enforceable'.⁷⁸

Much of AML's campaign work has been led by its co-founder and deputy chair, Ahmad Thomson, who is a committee member of the London-based Islamic Sharia Council. In 2002, on behalf of AML, he made written and oral representations to the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences. These proposals clearly conflict with liberal democratic values, including the freedom of speech and equality before the law. Anti-blasphemy legislation, he urged, ought to be updated to criminalise behaviour that is 'likely to shock and outrage the feelings of the general body of believers'.⁷⁹ He added, 'it is not just the people who follow the religion, but it is *the religion itself* which has to be protected'.⁸⁰ This prioritisation of group rights over individual rights clearly conflicts with a fundamental tenet of liberal democratic law and culture.

These lobbying efforts were part of a campaign involving MCB, ICHR, MSF and others, to criminalise the criticism of Islam, the Qur'an and Muhammad, with a prison sentence of up to seven years. Although new offences 'involving stirring up hatred against persons on racial or religious grounds' were created in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, in the interests of free expression, clauses criminalising the insulting and abuse of religion were removed from the final draft of the act.⁸¹ Under the act, religious hatred has to be shown to be intentionally stirred up.

In his representations to the select committee, Thomson lobbied to have some aspects of *shari'a* incorporated into English law. These included the statutory right of Muslims to have prayer breaks at work and for Islamic marriages to be legally

⁷⁷ AML, 'In Practice', AML website, webpage captured on September 1, 2014 (the current website omits this information). <http://web.archive.org/web/20140901195742/http://aml.org.uk/aboutaml/in-practice/>.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Association of Muslim Lawyers (2003b), n.18.1.1.

⁸⁰ Ibid., n.23, emphasis added.

⁸¹ See Cox and Marks (2006), p.132-133; and Raub (2009), p.59.

recognised, as well as that of Muslim men to marry up to four wives.⁸² He also argued that the ‘freedom of religion’ trumps gender and sexuality equality:

[W]here there is such a conflict of rights—for example, between the right to freely practice one’s religion on the one hand, and on the other hand, the right not to be treated less favourably because of one’s gender or sexual orientation—there is a statutory requirement to pay particular regard to the former rather than the latter.⁸³

In other words, institutionalised discrimination against women and homosexuals can be legally sanctioned if it is part of religious practice. Furthermore, religious schools, he asserted, have the right to discriminate in not employing those who do not share their faith. The assumption is that religion ought to be taught not critically but doctrinally, that the teaching of religion itself ought to be religious rather than disinterested and educational.

Thomson cites the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) as the basis of the British government’s duty to protect the ‘freedom of religion’ and incorporate the personal aspects of Islamic law into state law. He refers to Article 9 of the HRA to justify separate legal jurisdictions for different religious groups, including Muslims. Yet, paradoxically, Thomson views ‘secular human rights law’ as an imposition ‘in the name of equality’.⁸⁴ He considers ‘man-made’ law—which includes all Western legal systems and statutes—as inferior to Islamic law. He believes that the *shari’a*—which, he confesses, allows ‘humane slavery’⁸⁵—is the final ‘legal modality’ of civilisation and one that his lobbying efforts are presumably directed to.⁸⁶ Thomson views the legal changes that he has lobbied for in Britain on behalf of AML as practical ‘for the time being’ until ‘the democratic wish of the majority of its people’ is for British law to be fully compliant with the *shari’a*.⁸⁷

⁸² Association of Muslim Lawyers (2003a), n.88.

⁸³ Ibid., n.43.

⁸⁴ Thomson (2010), p.13.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p.5, emphasis added.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.18

⁸⁷ Association of Muslim Lawyers (2003a), n.95.

The Muslim Safety Forum

The Muslim Safety Forum (MSF) was, until recently, ‘the key advisory body for the Police Service’, providing advice ‘on matters of safety and security from *the* Muslim perspective’.⁸⁸ It was established, in its own words, to challenge the ‘unfair focus on the Muslim community when it came to policing activities and enforcement of anti-terror policing legislation’.⁸⁹ As an indication of its influence, it met on a regular basis with senior representatives of the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the Home Office, the Crown Prosecution Service and other official bodies. The agreement between the Metropolitan Police Service and MSF stated that the police will ‘use the MSF as a consultation body to help formulate policy or practice’.⁹⁰ Comprised of numerous other revivalist organisations, including MCB, the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS), the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) and the East London Mosque, MSF was accused of being ‘anti-establishment’ and unrepresentative of Britain’s diverse Muslim communities. Subsequently, in 2012, it was replaced by the London Muslim Communities Forum (LMCF).

On The Islam Channel’s ‘Politics and Media Show’ in July of that year, MSF chair, Azad Ali, claimed not to know why MSF had been side-lined by the newly formed LMCF.⁹¹ Yet, his political views had for some years been troubling to government officials and other observers, who had noted his ‘strong track record of extremism’.⁹² He had praised the al-Qaeda-linked cleric Anwar al-Awlaki; denied that the Mumbai *jihad* terror attacks were terrorism; and quoted, apparently approvingly, a statement advocating the killing of British troops in Iraq made by

⁸⁸ IFE, ‘Attempted car bombings in London’, Muslim Safety Forum press release, IFE website, June 30, 2007. <http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=350>, emphasis added.

⁸⁹ Andrew Gilligan, ‘Police Muslim forum headed by Islamic extremist’, *The Telegraph*, July 24, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/7908273/Police-Muslim-forum-headed-by-Islamic-extremist.html>.

⁹⁰ Andrew Gilligan, ‘Sir Ian Blair’s deal with Islamic radical’, *The Telegraph*, Mar 1, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/7339604/Sir-Ian-Blairs-deal-with-Islamic-radical.html>.

⁹¹ ‘Politics and Media Show’, Islam Channel, broadcast on July 2, 2012, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=122&v=HFLi8ZTVmsM>.

⁹² Gilligan, ‘Sir Ian Blair’s deal with Islamic radical’.

Huthaifa Azzam, son of the architect of the global *jihad*, Abdullah Azzam, upon he has also lavished praise.⁹³ For these comments, he was suspended from his job as a civil servant in January 2009, but returned to work in June of that year after being cleared in an internal investigation. Ali, a senior member of IFE, addressed a Muslim readership on the organisation's website, stating, 'we are all working our socks off, in different ways, for the resurgence of the Khilafa [caliphate]'.⁹⁴ Writing on the political blog, *Harry's place*, David Toubé states that Ali's 'politics are as great a threat to our democratic, liberal and pluralist system as any white fascist or far left extremist'.⁹⁵

Although MSF has been marginalised by the government, Ali remains its chairman and is very active in numerous other groups. According to the website for Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND), in which he plays a leading role, he also sits on the National Accountability Board for Schedule 7 Stops with the police and Home Office. He is a member of the Independent Police Complaints Commission's Community Advisory Group and the Home Office's Trust and Confidence Community Panel.⁹⁶ As detailed in Chapter 3, he is also a member of MCB's Central Working Committee and the chair of its Membership Committee.

The National Association of Muslim Police

The National Association of Muslim Police (NAMP) was launched by MCB in 2007 to support Muslim officers and staff within the police service. Like other organisations in the revivalist network, it has a *dawa* role. It seeks to 'promote understanding and awareness of Islam' within the police by advising on cultural and religious issues. Yet, similarly to MSF, NAMP's aspirations include 'bridging the gap between the police and the Muslim community', as well as tackling

⁹³ See Andrew Gilligan, 'Mayor gives £30,000 of taxpayers' money to Muslim group led by "extremist"', *The Evening Standard*, March 12, 2009, <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/mayor-gives-30000-of-taxpayers-money-to-muslim-group-led-by-extremist-6938333.html>; and habibi (pseud.), 'Azad Ali: The Jihad Lover and the Civil Service', *Harry's place* blog, November 20, 2008, <http://hurryupharry.org/2008/11/20/azad-ali-the-jihad-lover-and-the-civil-service/>.

⁹⁴ Shiraz Maher, 'A reduction of reality at the Guardian?', *Standpoint Magazine*, August 5, 2010, <http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/3267>. Ali's original post is archived at: <http://web.archive.org/web/20081005054141/http://blog.islamicforumeurope.com/?p=89>.

⁹⁵ David T., 'Defend Azad Ali', *Harry's place* blog, January 18, 2009, <http://hurryupharry.org/2009/01/18/defend-azad-ali/>.

⁹⁶ MEND, 'MEND Team', MEND website, <http://mend.org.uk/advocacy/about-us/engage-team/>.

‘Islamophobia’.⁹⁷ Prior to MSF’s marginalisation, the two organisations collaborated on some issues. According to Azad Ali, the two organisations worked together to improve the recruitment and retention of Muslim police officers. NAMP has also collaborated with LMCF, which appears to some extent to have taken MSF’s concern with Islamophobia forward.

Comprised of local police associations and serving police officers, NAMP, unlike the other organisations highlighted in this section of the chapter, is situated within the institutional structure of the state. Perhaps because of this, it has a less contentious relationship with the government. However, its choice of organisational partners and attitudes towards government policy, particularly regarding counterterrorism, suggest it is at least sympathetic to a view that contests both the authority of the state to determine the national values upon which British society is based and the mainstream understanding of Islam in Britain.

One of NAMP’s key organisational partners is MEND. In November 2014, the two organisations held a joint conference, ‘Challenging Islamophobia: Building Communities’, at which NAMP’s president, Asif Sadiq, was a keynote speaker.⁹⁸ LMCF promoted the event. Sadiq was also a speaker at MEND’s re-branding launch earlier in the year.⁹⁹ In its previous incarnation as iEngage, notes Andrew Gilligan, MEND ‘consistently defended fundamentalist organisations such as the East London Mosque and the Islamic Forum of Europe’.¹⁰⁰ It also undermined and discredited spokespeople for secular interpretations of Islam, ‘defended the right of radical Muslim preachers to come to Britain ... and opposed the ban on extremist group Hizb-ut-Tahrir from university campuses’.¹⁰¹ MEND’s founder and managing director, Sufyan Ismail, is a promoter of Haitham al-Haddad, a preacher and a judge

⁹⁷ NAMP website homepage. <https://www.nampuk.org/home.html>.

⁹⁸ MEND (2014a), p.12.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.16.

¹⁰⁰ Andrew Gilligan, ‘Islamists establish a bridgehead in Parliament’, *The Telegraph*, November 25, 2010. <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100065538/islamists-establish-a-bridgehead-in-parliament/>.

¹⁰¹ Martin Bright, ‘Anti-Islamophobia parliamentary group drop “Islamist” secretariat’, *The Jewish Chronicle*, December 8, 2010. <http://www.thejc.com/politics/42307/anti-islamophobia-parliamentary-group-drops-muslim-secretariat>.

at the Islamic Sharia Council.¹⁰² Al-Haddad states that women are inferior to men and that wives ought to obey their husbands; that homosexuality is a ‘crime against humanity’; that adulterers found guilty ought to be stoned to death; and that once an Islamic state is in place, it is obliged to wage ‘proactive’ *jihad* to establish Islam as a global force.¹⁰³

NAMP has also a close relationship with the London-based Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), recommending British Muslims to report crimes to it.¹⁰⁴ However, for its alleged links to the Iranian regime it has been described as a ‘promoter of Khomeini jihadism in the UK’.¹⁰⁵ IHRC openly supports Hezbollah and holds an annual Al-Quds Day, where protesters call for the annihilation of Israel. Some of its advisers, including Hamid Algar, are advocates of *jihad* for Islam’s eventual global hegemony.¹⁰⁶ IHRC is also a loyal supporter of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who advocates suicide bombings in Israel and calls for the Muslim conquest of Europe through non-violent *jihad*. At the time of the cleric’s visit to Britain in 2004, the metropolitan police commissioner passed a dossier on al-Qaradawi’s sermons to the Crown Prosecution Service with a view to prosecution. Raza Kazim, an IHRC spokesman and trustee of its charitable trust, considered this as an ‘insult’ and in protest walked out of a meeting with the police, with which it used to meet regularly regarding ‘the treatment of Muslims at the hands of the police and others’.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² Harry Black, ‘MEND – The Rebranding of iENGAGE’, Harry’s place blog, July 11th 2014, <http://hurryupharry.org/2014/07/11/mend-the-rebranding-of-iengage/>. See also Andrew Gilligan, ‘Muslim group with links to extremists boasts of influencing election’, *The Telegraph*, April 4, 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/11515630/Muslim-group-with-links-to-extremists-boasts-of-influencing-election.html>.

¹⁰³ Al-Haddad’s statements have been sourced from video recordings of al-Haddad’s lectures available at <http://tifrib.com/haitham-al-haddad/>.

¹⁰⁴ Douglas Murray, ‘The Government should ignore the National Association of Muslim Police’, *The Telegraph*, January 21, 2010. <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/douglasmurray/100023218/the-government-should-ignore-the-national-association-of-muslim-police/>.

¹⁰⁵ Melanie Phillips, ‘Hezbollah cells await Iran’s orders’, *The Spectator*, August 2, 2006. <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/24356/hezbollah-cells-await-irans-orders/>.

¹⁰⁶ Joseph D’Hippolito, ‘A Front For Jihad’, *Frontpage Magazine*, September 22, 2004. <http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=11339>.

¹⁰⁷ ‘Islamic Human Rights Commission 2007: A Decade of Fighting Injustice’, Innovative Minds website. <http://www.inminds.com/ihrc10years.php>.

Both MEND and IHRC encourage a perception in Britain that Muslims are under siege. NAMP's relationship with these groups suggests that it is not just policy that it seeks to change, but also a public mind-set. Clearly indicating its involvement in a symbolic struggle to speak for Islam, NAMP denies the documented religious inspiration for terrorism in Britain committed by Muslims in the name of their faith.¹⁰⁸ Instead, echoing the narrative of MEND and IHRC, it blames the government's foreign policy and Islamophobia for these attacks and plots. In accord with these groups, it also condemns the government's preference to engage with Muslim organisations other than MCB, such as Quilliam.

1.2. Local government: the Islamic Forum of Europe

True to their characterisation as 'participationists', some of the groups in the revivalist network—including MEND, MCB, the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE), and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)—have campaigned for Muslims' active participation in electoral politics. The Electoral Commission made MEND an 'official partner' for registering Muslim voters for the 2015 general election, despite its endorsement of Muslim clerics, such as Abu Eesa Niamatullah and Haitham al-Haddad, who, whilst condoning democratic elections, preach against secularism and liberal democratic values.¹⁰⁹ At least 10 Labour and Conservative MPs joined the launch of the MEND's 'Muslim manifesto' in the House of Commons in March 2015.¹¹⁰ That wasn't the first time that the organisation has been embraced by the government. Its precursor, Engage, led by MCB's Inyat Bunglawala, was invited to be the secretariat of a new All-Party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia, whose inaugural meeting was held in the House of Commons in November 2010.

Some groups have been more directly involved in politics by supporting the election of local government councillors, mayors and members of parliament. IFE, for example, was instrumental in the success of George Galloway's Respect Party in the

¹⁰⁸ NAMP (2010).

¹⁰⁹ Andrew Gilligan, 'The baroness, Islamic extremists and a question of free speech', *The Telegraph*, March 22, 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11488175/The-baroness-Islamic-extremists-and-a-question-of-free-speech.html>.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

2005 general election,¹¹¹ where Galloway—a supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah—won the seat for the London Borough of Bethnal Green and Bow.¹¹² At a dinner shortly after his victory at the East London Mosque, the home of IFE, he was recorded as saying, ‘I am indebted more than I can say—more than it would be wise *for them* for me to say—to the Islamic Forum of Europe. I believe they played the decisive role.’¹¹³ Some of MAB’s leading activists were also involved in the Respect Party. Anas Altikriti, for instance, gave up his MAB presidency to stand for Respect in Yorkshire and Humberside in the 2004 European Parliamentary elections. IFE was also involved in a group called ‘Muslims 4 Ken’, which unsuccessfully campaigned for Ken Livingstone’s re-election as the mayor of London in 2008. The group was run by Azad Ali, IFE’s community affairs co-ordinator, and Altikriti, an ‘IFE ally’.¹¹⁴

But the most significant involvement of revivalist Islam in British politics was with IFE’s infiltration of the Labour Party within the London Borough of Tower Hamlets and its involvement in Lutfur Rahman’s successful campaign to become the mayor of the borough.¹¹⁵ Whilst it is difficult to measure the precise extent of the impact of IFE and Rahman’s involvement in Tower Hamlets’ local government, it has certainly empowered and encouraged groups whose values conflict with Britain’s liberal democratic culture.

Rahman was elected as a Labour party councillor in 2008 and soon after won the leadership of the borough council. In October 2010, he became the borough’s mayor

¹¹¹ Andrew Gilligan, ‘The infiltration of Labour’, *The Telegraph*, February 28, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstoppers/politics/labour/7333470/The-infiltration-of-Labour.html>.

¹¹² On Galloway’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, see ‘George Galloway’, Mark Humphrys’ blog. <http://markhumphrys.com/galloway.html>.

¹¹³ Andrew Gilligan, “‘Britain’s Islamic republic’: full transcript of Channel 4 *Dispatches* programme on Lutfur Rahman, the IFE and Tower Hamlets’, *The Telegraph*, October 22, 2010. <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100060409/britains-islamic-republic-full-transcript-of-channel-4-dispatches-programme-on-lutfur-rahman-the-ife-and-tower-hamlets-the-full-transcript/>.

¹¹⁴ Andrew Gilligan, ‘Islamists got voters out for Livingstone’, *The Telegraph*, March 6, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/7386900/Islamists-got-voters-out-for-Livingstone.html>.

¹¹⁵ At the forefront of journalism covering these matters has been *The Telegraph*’s Andrew Gilligan. His work is referred to in this chapter more than that of other journalists at *The Telegraph* and other news publications, since it provides the cutting edge of reporting on Islamism in Tower Hamlets and across Britain more widely. His reporting on the Trojan Horse affair in Birmingham, covered in the second section of the chapter, is referred to for the same reason. No other journalist has covered these issues so extensively.

after running as an independent candidate. Labour had dropped him as its party candidate over ‘serious allegations’ over both ‘the eligibility of participating voters’ and his ‘conduct’.¹¹⁶ Rahman governed the borough for five years until he was removed from office in April 2015 when a High Court hearing found him guilty of electoral fraud. Throughout this time, evidence emerged of his links with IFE, whose literature describes its commitment to change the ‘very infrastructure of [Western] society, its institutions, its culture, its political order and its creed ... from ignorance to Islam’.¹¹⁷

In his court judgement, Richard Mawrey QC asserted that the court had ‘not heard a shred of credible evidence linking Mr Rahman with any extreme or fundamentalist Islamist movement’.¹¹⁸ But if the court understood ‘extreme’ or ‘fundamentalist’ as connected with violence, then it is no surprise that it did not consider IFE in such terms. IFE is a revivalist, *dawa*-oriented organisation that operates within the law. The notion of and concern about *non-violent* extremism, which the Cameron-led government has begun to incorporate into government policy, is not necessarily shared throughout the political and legal establishments. Because of its legality, it was probably not a concern for the High Court.

However, despite Mawrey’s dismissal of the claim that Rahman was linked to an ‘extremist’ movement, there are indications that Rahman was linked to IFE. Rahman was said by seven serving and former councillors to have gained his post as council leader with the help of IFE. The petition that led to the establishment of a directly-elected mayor for Tower Hamlets was organised by the IFE activist Abjol Miah, who subsequently took a leading role in Rahman’s 2010 campaign for mayorship. The manager of Rahman’s campaign to become mayor, Bodrul Islam, admits Rahman enjoyed a ‘strategic relationship’ with IFE.¹¹⁹ Most of his

¹¹⁶ BBC News, ‘Lutfur Rahman wins Tower Hamlets mayoral election’, October 22, 2010. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-11604108>.

¹¹⁷ Andrew Gilligan, ‘Inextricably linked to controversial mosque: the secret world of IFE’, *The Telegraph*, February 28, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstoppers/politics/labour/7333487/Inextricably-linked-to-controversial-mosque-the-secret-world-of-IFE.html>.

¹¹⁸ For the full text of the court judgement, see ‘COURT JUDGEMENT’, Red Flag Anti-Corruption website. <http://redflagac.org/news/569>.

¹¹⁹ Andrew Gilligan, ‘Lutfur Rahman: the “chief coordinator” of his election campaign says he has “strategic relationship” with extremist IFE’, *The Telegraph*, November 23rd, 2010.

campaigners, he states, were ‘either Respect or IFE activists’. Prior to Rahman’s success in becoming mayor, another IFE activist, Abu Talha, confessed to an undercover reporter for Channel 4’s *Dispatches* programme that IFE was planning to get ‘one of our brothers’ into that position.¹²⁰ He named Azad Ali, community affairs coordinator for IFE and a member of MCB’s central working committee, as one possible candidate.

Independently of the relationship between IFE and Rahman, there were indications that the organisation had infiltrated the council. In the *Dispatches* programme broadcast in March 2010, Abjol Miah, then a Tower Hamlets councillor as well as an IFE leader, was caught boasting on secret camera, ‘We’ve consolidated ourselves now. We’ve got a lot of influence and power in the council, councillors, politicians’.¹²¹ His IFE colleague, Abu Talha, claimed, ‘Our brothers have gone into positions of influence, council positions’. These may include up to 30 councillors, the number of Muslim councillors in Tower Hamlets according to IFE’s head of media and public relations, Abdullah Faliq.¹²² IFE activists Miah and Talha, recorded by undercover reporters, described Tower Hamlets council—with its 15,000 staff and £1.1 billion budget—as their most impressive political achievement.¹²³ Such entryism was confirmed by Jim Fitzpatrick, then the Environment Minister and MP for Tower Hamlets. Interviewed by Andrew Gilligan for *Dispatches*, Fitzpatrick claimed that IFE had become, in effect, a secret party within Labour and other political parties: ‘They are acting almost as an entryist organisation,’ he said, ‘placing people within the political parties, recruiting members to those political parties, trying to get individuals selected and elected so

<http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100065100/lutfur-rahman-one-of-his-former-supporters-says-he-has-strategic-relationship-with-extremist-ife/>

¹²⁰ Gilligan, ‘Islamists got voters out for Livingstone’.

¹²¹ Andrew Gilligan, ‘Radicals with hands on the levers of power: the takeover of Tower Hamlets’, *The Telegraph*, February 28, 2010.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/labour/7333537/Radicals-with-hands-on-the-levers-of-power-the-takeover-of-Tower-Hamlets.html>.

¹²² Interview with Abdullah Faliq, September 5, 2012.

¹²³ Gilligan, ‘Radicals with hands on the levers of power: the takeover of Tower Hamlets’.

they can exercise political influence and power, whether it's at local government level or national level.'¹²⁴

Rahman wasn't the only IFE-linked individual to secure an elite political position in the borough council. In 2008, Lutfur Ali was appointed its assistant chief executive, the second highest civil servant position in the council with responsibility for grant funding. Ali's appointment was controversial, since he was hired by Rahman despite apparently lacking the proper credentials for the job. In this role, Ali oversaw a marked re-direction of funds from a variety of Muslim community organisations, including secularists such as Udichi Shilpi Ghoshthi, to those with ties to IFE.¹²⁵ These included Blyda and Elite Youth, which were closely linked to IFE in sharing numerous trustees and staff. Under Ali's leadership, the council decided to hand over its entire youth service for the west of the borough to a consortium in which Blyda and Elite Youth were to play a key role. Gilligan's reporting on these matters helped prompt Ali's resignation in March 2010.

Rahman too channelled millions of pounds into sympathetic groups, including 'IFE front organizations'. Gilligan reports that 'there was a clear diversion of funding away from secular bodies serving the whole community to faith-based or religious groups serving only sections of the community'.¹²⁶ Whilst Muslims make up only 34.5% of the borough's population, Muslim organisations received £858,500 (70%) of the £1,235,000 grants for community and economic engagement, and £334,500 (64%) of the £526,000 grants for children, schools and families. A similar pattern was evident in the allocation of grants for a community faith buildings support scheme, study support schemes, mother tongue classes, youth and career advice services, and lifelong learning. Throughout his mayorship, Rahman never appointed one non-Muslim to a cabinet post, despite Muslims being a minority in the borough. According to Gilligan, Rahman was 'hostile or indifferent' to the non-Muslim

¹²⁴ Andrew Gilligan, 'Islamic radicals "infiltrate" the Labour party', *The Telegraph*, February 27, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/labour/7333420/Islamic-radicals-infiltrate-the-Labour-Party.html>.

¹²⁵ See Gilligan, 'Radicals with hands on the levers of power: the takeover of Tower Hamlets'; and Gilligan, "'Britain's Islamic republic": full transcript of Channel 4 Dispatches programme on Lutfur Rahman, the IFE and Tower Hamlets'.

¹²⁶ Andrew Gilligan, 'Lutfur Rahman's Muslim favouritism: the evidence', *The Telegraph*, April 3, 2014. <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100266083/lutfur-rahmans-muslim-favouritism-the-evidence/>.

heritage of the borough, one example being the attempted sell-off of the local history library, which was prevented by a backlash of protest.¹²⁷

The beneficiaries of Rahman's Muslim favouritism—what Home Secretary Theresa May has referred to as 'divisive community politics'—included a number of 'IFE fronts' including the Osmani Trust.¹²⁸ Created from the merging of Blyda and Elite Youth, the Osmani Trust runs weekend schools, organises workshops in primary schools and works to 'help young people into education'.¹²⁹ Through this work, however, it is likely that government money has helped pay for the dissemination of a worldview and moral values in young Muslims that clashes with Britain's liberal democratic culture. One of the managers at the trust, Muhammad Rabbani, trained recruits for IFE, informing them:

Our goal is not simply to invite people and give *da'wah* [the call to Islam]. Our goal is to create the True Believer, to then mobilise those believers into an organised force for change who will carry out *da'wah*, *hisbah* [enforcement of Islamic morality] and *jihad* [struggle for Islam].¹³⁰

He added that this will lead to 'social change and *iqamatud-deen*', which is translated by Jama'at-i-Islami as the 'Islamization of life'.¹³¹ Rabbani now leads CAGE, an organisation that campaigns for Muslim prisoners, including convicted terrorists, and espouses the view that Islam is under attack in Britain.

Another IFE-related beneficiary of Rahman's largesse was the London Muslim Centre, which is closely linked to the East London Mosque (ELM) and serves as IFE's base. The centre and mosque has a documented history of promoting speakers who espouse a vision of the world and ethical values antithetical to liberal

¹²⁷ Andrew Gilligan, 'Lutfur Rahman: 30 things you need to know about the extremist-linked mayor of Tower Hamlets', *The Telegraph*, May 21, 2014. <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100272429/lutfur-rahman-what-you-should-know/>.

¹²⁸ *The Spectator*, 'Theresa May's speech on terrorism and extremism – full text and audio', September 30, 2014. <http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2014/09/theresa-mays-speech-on-terrorism-and-extremism-full-text-and-audio/>.

¹²⁹ Westrop, 'How to Radicalize an Entire London Borough'.

¹³⁰ Gilligan, 'Inextricably linked to controversial mosque: the secret world of IFE'.

¹³¹ On the Islamisation of life, see 'Philosophy', Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan website. Webpage captured on April 20, 2010: <http://web.archive.org/web/20100410031144/http://jamaat.org/beta/site/page/8>.

democracy and universal human rights.¹³² These include Anwar al-Awlaki, al-Qaeda's late chief ideologue, alleged to have mentored the Fort Hood jihadist, Nidal Hasan, and the Detroit Bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.¹³³ Al-Awlaki espoused the view that the goal of Islamic *jihad* is not just victory in Palestine, Iraq, or Afghanistan, but the collapse of the 'system of *kufir* [unbelief] with global reach'.¹³⁴ Other speakers include Bilal Philips, an unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, who advocates death for homosexuals and 'defends child marriages, wife beating, polygamy and killing apostates';¹³⁵ Abdullah Hasan, an IFE activist who praises Osama bin Laden and describes Jews as 'devil-worshippers';¹³⁶ Murtaza Khan, a primary school teacher and a keen advocate of the *shari'a*, including the punishment of stoning to death for adulterers;¹³⁷ and Abdul Rahman al-Sudais, a Saudi cleric who believes Muslims are locked in 'a war of faith, identity and existence' with Jews, who he describes as the 'worst of mankind'.¹³⁸

The supremacy of Muslim over non-Muslim culture, misogyny, homophobia and antisemitism have been recurrent themes in many of the sermons of these and other speakers at ELM, which is intimately connected to IFE through overlapping trustees and staff. In March 2015 the Home Secretary Theresa May noted these as serious

¹³² Hasan Afzal, 'Extremism in Abdul Bari's Mosque', *The Huffington Post*, September 20, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hasan-afzal/extremism-in-abdul-baris-b_971232.html.

¹³³ Bill Roggio, 'US-born cleric Awlaki "proud" to have taught al Qaeda operatives', *The Long War Journal*, April 27, 2010. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/usborn_cleric_awlaki.php.

¹³⁴ Shaykh Anwar al-Awlaki, *44 Ways to Support Jihad*, p.1. Available online at: http://ebooks.worldofislam.info/ebooks/Jihad/Anwar_Al_Awlaki_-_44_Ways_To_Support_Jihad.pdf.

¹³⁵ See Nadia Moharib, QMI Agency, 'Controversial Muslim preacher to speak in Calgary', *Canoe News*, June 9, 2012, <http://cnews.canoe.com/CNEWS/Canada/2012/06/09/19858731.html>; and Stewart Bell, 'Islamic former guitarist now preaches against music', *The National Post*, February 15, 2011, webpage captured on March 1, 2011, <http://web.archive.org/web/20110301184748/http://www.nationalpost.com/news/Islamic+former+guitarist+preaches+against+music/4290981/story.html>.

¹³⁶ Stand for Peace, 'Bin Laden supporter, anti-gay preacher speaks at East London Mosque', Stand for Peace website, October 14, 2014. <http://standforpeace.org.uk/bin-laden-supporter-anti-gay-preacher-speaks-at-east-london-mosque/>.

¹³⁷ See Khan's lecture, 'Free Love', recorded in June 2007 and released on a DVD, *A Menace II Society*, available on YouTube at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sF1zErRdn4U>.

¹³⁸ 'Shaykh Abdur Rahmaan As-Sudays', Al Haramain Sermons website, April 19, 2002. Webpage captured on April 12, 2008. <http://web.archive.org/web/20080412023817/http://www.alharamainsermons.org/eng/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=71>

concerns across Tower Hamlets, the only borough referred to by name in her speech that made explicit the government's new thinking on extremism.¹³⁹ Dean Godson of the think tank Policy Exchange describes IFE as 'a key ideological influence in Tower Hamlets'.¹⁴⁰ Without further research, however, it is difficult to ascertain the impact of IFE's political influence in the council upon local Muslim attitudes. But it is less problematic to observe both IFE's entryism into council politics and a conflict of vision and values that its activists and associates have often expressed.

This conflict is apparent in some of the borough's schools, including the London East Academy, which is managed by ELM. The school was warned by Education Secretary Nicky Morgan in November 2014, along with five other Muslim private schools in Tower Hamlets, to make urgent changes or face closure.¹⁴¹ She claimed the schools were 'failing to prepare children for life in modern Britain'. This came in the wake of Ofsted chief Sir Michael Wilshaw's report, following unannounced inspections, that pupils were 'vulnerable to extremist influences and radicalisation'.¹⁴² This was borne out in March 2015, when it was reported that Zubair Nur, a graduate of the London East Academy, had joined the Islamic State.¹⁴³

2. Education and arbitration:

A clash of values within Muslim communities

Within Muslim communities, education and arbitration are two key fields of contention where a conflict with Britain's liberal democratic values, championed by

¹³⁹ 'A Stronger Britain, Built On Our Values', British Government website, March 23, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-built-on-our-values>.

¹⁴⁰ Dean Godson, 'David Cameron and Theresa May are to be congratulated for their strategy on tackling Islamist extremism', Conservatives website, June 7, 2011. <http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2011/06/dean-godson-david-cameron-and-theresa-may-are-to-be-congratulated-for-their-strategy-on-tackling-isl.html>.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Michael Wilshaw, 'Advice note from Her Majesty's Chief Inspector, Sir Michael Wilshaw, to the Secretary of State for Education, Rt Hon. Nicky Morgan MP, on school inspections in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets'. Available online at: <http://tiny.cc/wilshawadvicenote21112014>.

¹⁴³ David Churchill and Anna Davis, 'Zubair Nur: Teen feared to have joined Isis attended private Muslim school where students were "vulnerable to radicalisation"', *The London Evening Standard*, March 27, 2015. <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/zubair-nur-teen-feared-to-have-joined-isis-attended-private-muslim-school-where-students-were-vulnerable-to-radicalisation-10138534.html>.

the state, can be observed. In the classrooms of Muslim schools and in the court rooms of *shari'a* councils, a worldview and associated set of values are being taught or implemented that conflict with liberal democracy and human rights legislation.

The British government recognises these two domains, in addition to universities and prisons, as problematic in the fight against 'extremism'. In a speech in March 2015, Home Secretary Theresa May identified the 'Trojan Horse plot' in Birmingham schools as an example of how 'extremists use entryist tactics to infiltrate legitimate organisations to promote their own agendas'.¹⁴⁴ She also singled out *shari'a* councils' use of *shari'a* law to discriminate against women as an example of the rejection of 'British values'. To address these two issues, she announced that the newly formed Extremism Analysis Unit in the Home Office will develop a counter-entryist strategy for 'government, the public sector and civil society as a whole', and commission a independent investigation into 'the application of Shari'a law in England and Wales'.¹⁴⁵ The government's *Counter-Extremism Strategy*, published in October 2015, reiterates this dual commitment.¹⁴⁶

This section of the chapter details this conflict of values in these two key fields of contention where Muslims' lives are being directly affected. It shows how a key stake in this conflict is the authority to legitimise competing visions of an ideal society and the values associated with it, both in the minds and institutions of British Muslims.

2.1. Muslim schools: influencing Muslim minds

According to Michael Whine, of all the campaigning issues of concern for Islamist groups in Britain, the education of Muslim children is the most important.¹⁴⁷ For such groups, schooling is seen as the most effective way of inculcating religious belief and safeguarding Muslim identity against the pernicious influences of Britain's decadent, secular society. There have been numerous reports in recent

¹⁴⁴ 'Theresa May speech A Stronger Britain, Built on our Values: A New Partnership to Defeat Extremism', Conservatives website, March 23, 2015.
<http://press.conservatives.com/post/115395299770/theresa-may-speech-a-stronger-britain-built-on->

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ HM Government (2015a), p.19.

¹⁴⁷ Whine (2005), p.54.

years demonstrating this. They show that in some British Muslim schools a worldview and set of values antagonistic to liberal democracy is being propagated. For example, John Ware reported in November 2010 that some 40 British Muslim schools are teaching the Wahhabi-Islamist curriculum of Saudi Arabia to around 5,000 children.¹⁴⁸ He showed how young Muslim children are being taught to regard Britain as an enemy of Islam and to hate non-Muslims, especially Jews about whom these children are taught conspiracy as fact, and homosexuals for whom the death penalty is taught in accordance with the *shari'a*. For Andrew Gilligan and other observers, the spread of illiberal and anti-integrationist ideology in Muslim schools is 'the single most worrying aspect of Islamist and radical activity in Britain'.¹⁴⁹

This part of the chapter does not consider the influence of Wahhabi Islam in Britain's schools, but limits its focus to individuals and groups within the revivalist network and their role in a clash of values in the field of education. It first regards the Trojan Horse affair in Birmingham, what Sam Westrop refers to as 'a concerted attempt by Islamist groups to infiltrate and Islamize British schools'.¹⁵⁰ It then details how this may be viewed as part of a long-term strategy within a wider network of Islamic activists to 'Islamise knowledge' for a global Islamic revival.

The Trojan Horse Affair

In November 2013, a document was sent anonymously to Birmingham City Council describing a strategy it alleged was being implemented for the take-over of a number of schools and their governance according to 'strict Islamic principles'. The strategy involved identifying target schools in predominately Muslim areas, selecting groups of 'Salafi' parents to join governing bodies, identifying key staff to 'disrupt' schools from within, and removing non-Muslim teachers from positions of

¹⁴⁸ 'British Schools, Islamic Rules', *Panorama*, BBC. Originally broadcast on November 22, 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00w8kwz>. See also BBC News, 'Saudi school lessons in UK concern government', November 22, 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11799713>.

¹⁴⁹ Andrew Gilligan, 'Extremist Muslim schools: Islamism's most worrying manifestation of all', *The Telegraph*, November 22, 2010. <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100064814/extremist-muslim-schools-islamisms-most-worrying-manifestation-of-all/>.

¹⁵⁰ Samuel Westrop, "'Inevitable' that Extremists Gained Entry into UK Schools', The Clarion Project, March 8, 2015. <http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/inevitable-extremists-gained-entry-uk-schools>.

influence. The information contained in the document, which had no addressee and no signature, demonstrated a detailed knowledge of events in certain schools. The document came to be known as the Trojan Horse letter. After receiving the letter from the Home Office, the Department for Education instigated an investigation into the schools of concern to understand the implications for the school system in Birmingham and more widely. Former deputy assistant police commissioner, Peter Clarke, was appointed to the task, whilst Birmingham City Council began its own investigation headed by Ian Kershaw. By June 2014, five of the schools were placed in special measures.

Clarke's report concluded there had been 'co-ordinated, deliberate and sustained action' by a number of individuals to introduce an 'intolerant and aggressive Islamic ethos' into a number of Birmingham schools.¹⁵¹ This had been achieved, he wrote, by such individuals gaining influence on the governing bodies, installing sympathetic head teachers and senior staff, appointing like-minded people to key positions and removing heads who were not compliant with their religiously-inspired agenda. There is clear evidence, he asserted, that 'there are a number of people, associated with each other and in positions of influence in schools and governing bodies, who espouse, endorse or fail to challenge extremist views'.¹⁵²

Clarke identified a 'disconcerting pattern reaching across a number of schools', which included 'the reinforcement of Muslim identity to the exclusion and disparagement of others', 'the introduction of conservative Islamic practices into school life', and changes in the curriculum by governing bodies taken over by 'like-minded' people.¹⁵³ The agenda that Clarke found being pursued, however, went beyond mere religious conservatism, and was clearly in conflict with the liberal democratic vision and associated values of universal human rights:

In the context of schooling, it manifests itself as the imposition of an aggressively separatist and intolerant agenda, incompatible with full participation in a plural, secular democracy. Rejecting not only the secular and other religions, but also other strands of Islamic belief, it goes *beyond* the kind of social conservatism practised in

¹⁵¹ Clarke (2014), p.14.

¹⁵² Ibid., p.95.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p.10.

some faith schools which may be consistent with universal human rights and respectful of other communities. It appears to be a deliberate attempt to convert secular state schools into exclusive faith schools in all but name.¹⁵⁴

In March 2015, the House of Commons Education Committee produced its own report into the Trojan Horse affair. The report asserted, ‘All our witnesses also accepted that they had found no evidence of extremism in schools’.¹⁵⁵ This is incorrect, however. Although Clarke—a key witness—reported no evidence of ‘terrorism, radicalisation or violent extremism’, he reported clear evidence of ‘a number of people, associated with each other and in positions of influence in schools and governing bodies, who espouse, endorse or fail to challenge extremist views’.¹⁵⁶ Supposedly supporting its claim, the committee report cited Education Secretary Nicky Morgan’s admission to the House of Commons in July 2014 that there had been ‘no evidence of direct radicalisation or violent extremism’. Yet, whilst conceding that there was no evidence of children becoming radicalised or of violence being promoted, she added that ‘there is a clear account in the [Clarke] report of people in positions of influence in these schools, who have a restricted and narrow interpretation of their faith, not promoting British values and failing to challenge the extremist views of others’.¹⁵⁷

The report also cites Ofsted chief, Michael Wilshaw, who stated: ‘We did not see extremism in schools. What we did see was the promotion of a culture that would, if that culture continued, have made the children in those schools vulnerable to extremism because of ... the disconnection from wider society and cultural isolation’.¹⁵⁸ Thus, claims the committee report, whilst the promotion of a culture that may lead to extremism was evident in some schools, extremism itself was not. This is a curious distinction for it places extremism at the far end of a sequence in which cultural disconnection, and prior to that the promotion of such disconnection, precedes it: The assumption is that practices that express a disconnection from

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p.48, emphasis added.

¹⁵⁵ Education Committee (2015), p.6.

¹⁵⁶ Clarke (2014), p.12.

¹⁵⁷ Education Committee (2015), p.6.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

British mainstream culture do *not* constitute extremism, and neither does the advocacy of such practices.

However, this is not consistent with the government's view that extremism is not confined to violent acts but includes the 'vocal or active opposition' to the values that underpin British society, as first articulated in the revised *Prevent* counter-radicalisation strategy in 2011.¹⁵⁹ Such values, it says, include 'the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs'.¹⁶⁰ And yet Wilshaw himself has criticised Birmingham City Council for its 'failure to support schools in their efforts to keep pupils safe from the risk of extremism', noting that in some schools 'children are not being encouraged to develop tolerant attitudes to other faiths and other cultures'.¹⁶¹ As Morgan remarked, 'Teachers have said they fear children are learning to be intolerant of difference and diversity'.¹⁶² Wilshaw also noted that boys and girls are being treated unequally and that in one school, an extremist preacher was invited to address schoolchildren.

Other behaviours equally interpretable as extremist according to the government's thinking have been observed at Trojan Horse schools—none of which are designated as faith schools—as documented by Peter Clarke. These include the teaching, in sex and relationships education (SRE) lessons, that rape is permissible in marriage; the alteration of the curriculum along Islamic lines prohibiting music, drama and the figurative arts; the banning of Christmas, Easter and Diwali celebrations; and misogynistic attitudes towards women expressed in the lack of training opportunities and promotion, as well as disparaging comments by teachers and governors. Attitudes expressed by senior staff, stemming from 'a shared ideological basis to their faith', espoused anti-Western and homophobic views; divided the world between 'us' (Muslims) and 'them' (non-Muslims or Muslims who disagree); and perceived 'a worldwide conspiracy' against Islam.¹⁶³ Whether

¹⁵⁹ Home Office (2011), p.107.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Gary Marks, 'Trojan Horse: Sir Michael Wilshaw's statement in full', *The Birmingham Mail*, June 9, 2014. <http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/trojan-horse-sir-michael-wilshaws-7240705>.

¹⁶² 'Oral statement by Nicky Morgan on the "Trojan Horse" letter'.

¹⁶³ Clarke (2014), pp.11, 49.

these behaviours and attitudes constitute ‘extremism’ may be debated between supporters of the government’s position and others who dissent from it. In any case, they certainly indicate a conflict of vision and values with the British liberal democratic mainstream.

Such a conflict also involves the authority to legitimise competing visions of an ideal society and the values associated with it. The governance and management of schools is the ideal battleground for such authority. The education committee’s report, however, seems to obfuscate this. It states, ‘we have seen no evidence to support claims of an organised plot to take over English schools’.¹⁶⁴ Upon the publication of this report in March 2015, and leaning heavily upon its conclusions, the BBC incorrectly stated that a ‘series of official investigations’ found as ‘groundless’ claims that ‘extremists had tried to take over several schools in Birmingham to advance radical interpretations of Islam’.¹⁶⁵ These assertions have been taken by certain groups in the revivalist network in Britain to declare that there has been no collectively organised effort to Islamise schools in Birmingham. For example, Islam21c, a project of the Muslim Research and Development Foundation,¹⁶⁶ stated, ‘there was no evidence of any “radical” or “extremist” plot’.¹⁶⁷ MEND similarly stated that ‘the “plot” has been declared a sham idea’.¹⁶⁸

But both the committee’s report and the BBC have ignored what Morgan recognised in Clarke’s report as ‘compelling evidence of a determined effort by people with a shared ideology to gain control of the governing bodies of a small number of schools in Birmingham’ and introduce within them ‘the segregationist attitudes and practices of a hardline and politicised strand of Sunni Islam’.¹⁶⁹ This effort, Clarke reported, has been ‘co-ordinated, deliberate and sustained’ by a network of

¹⁶⁴ Education Committee (2015), p.7.

¹⁶⁵ Patrick Howse, ‘Overlapping “Trojan Horse” inquiries criticised by MPs’, BBC News, March 17, 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-31905704>.

¹⁶⁶ MRDF, ‘Islam21c’, MRDF website. <http://www.mrdf.co.uk/our-projects/islam21c/>.

¹⁶⁷ Yusuf Patel, ‘Gove’s Trojan Horse Hoax finally exposed by Education Select Committee’, Islam21c, March 18, 2015. <http://www.islam21c.com/politics/goves-trojan-horse-hoax-finally-exposed-by-education-select-committee/>.

¹⁶⁸ MEND, ‘Home Secretary announces new counter-extremism strategy’, MEND website, March 24, 2015. <http://mend.org.uk/home-secretary-announces-new-counter-extremism-strategy/>.

¹⁶⁹ ‘Oral statement by Nicky Morgan on the “Trojan Horse” letter’, and Clarke (2014), p.48.

individuals.¹⁷⁰ ‘The tactics used,’ he wrote, ‘are too similar, the individuals concerned too closely linked’ and their behaviour ‘too orchestrated for there not to be a degree of co-ordination and organisation behind what has happened’.¹⁷¹ Wilshaw also acknowledged the reports of numerous head teachers ‘that here has been an organised campaign to target certain schools in Birmingham in order to impose a narrow faith-based ideology and alter the school's character and ethos’.¹⁷² *The Telegraph* conducted its own inquiry into the controversy and concluded, similarly to Clarke, that ‘there is indeed an organised group of Muslim teachers, education consultants, school governors and activists dedicated to furthering what one of them describes as an “Islamising agenda” in Birmingham’s schools’.¹⁷³

According to Clarke, ‘At the centre of what has happened are a number of individuals who have been, or are, associated with either Park View School or the Park View Educational Trust’ (PVET), the latter of which he described as ‘the incubator for much of what has happened and the attitudes and behaviours that have driven it’. The most important of these individuals is Tahir Alam who, until his resignation in July 2014, was the director and chair of the trust. In this role, Alam was responsible for the management of three schools at the centre of the Trojan Horse affair, including Park View, which ‘appeared to act as a blueprint for [other schools], exhibiting all the behaviours which cause concern’.¹⁷⁴

Alam—which the Trojan Horse letter describes as having ‘fine-tuned the ‘Trojan Horse’ [operation] so that it is totally invisible to the naked eye and allows us to operate under the radar’—is also linked to MCB.¹⁷⁵ He was the organisation’s assistant secretary general between 2006 and 2008 and the chair of its education committee during the same period. He co-authored MCB’s 2007 paper, *Meeting the Needs of Muslim Pupils in State Schools*, which critics have described as a blueprint for the Islamisation of British schools. Alam was also an executive committee

¹⁷⁰ Clarke (2014), p.14.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p.96.

¹⁷² Marks, ‘Trojan Horse: Sir Michael Wilshaw's statement in full’.

¹⁷³ Gilligan, ‘Muslim extremists, and a worrying lesson for us all’.

¹⁷⁴ Clarke (2014), p.119.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p.21.

member of AMS-UK. Furthermore, as *The Sunday Times* revealed, Alam was ‘the leader of HISAM, an organisation which believed in imposing Islamic law and promoting gender segregation’.¹⁷⁶ In September 2015, Education Secretary Morgan banned Alam from having any involvement with schools. The barring decision was made on the grounds that he had been involved in activities aimed at ‘undermining fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’.¹⁷⁷

Alam’s successor as chair of the board of directors and governors at Park View School, Waheed Saleem, also has links to Islamic groups who seem to share views and values that conflict with Britain’s liberal democratic culture. Saleem was banned from holding public office for a year after leaking commercially sensitive information to the Abu Bakr Trust about a bid in a tender process for a council property. The Abu Bakr Trust, as *The Birmingham Mail* reported, ‘adheres to the strict Salafi version of Islam and also runs a mosque and schools in Walsall’.¹⁷⁸ It has embraced figures many consider radical, such as Muhammad Taqi Usmani.

Speaking at the trust as recently as November 2014, and echoing the sentiments of Hewitt and Mukadam, Usmani told the audience that, ‘looking at the flood of disbelief and the threat of atheism, it is clear there is so much still to be done in order to save our children from going astray’.¹⁷⁹ Usmani is also an unapologetic advocate of the global supremacy of Islam and, under the right conditions, of offensive *jihad* against non-Muslims towards this end. In an interview with *The Times* in 2007, Usmani asserted that ‘Muslims should live peacefully in countries such as Britain, where they have the freedom to practise Islam, *only until they gain*

¹⁷⁶ Richard Kerbaj and Sian Griffiths, ‘Trojan Horse kingpin led fundamentalists’, *The Sunday Times*, June 1, 2014. http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Education/article1417360.ece.

¹⁷⁷ ‘Direction: Tahir Alam barred from managing independent schools’, Government website, September 9, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/direction-tahir-alam-barred-from-managing-independent-schools>.

¹⁷⁸ *The Birmingham Mail*, ‘Trojan Horse-linked school appoints former disgraced councillor as new chairman of governors’, May 11, 2015. <http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/trojan-horse-linked-school-appoints-former-9226747>.

¹⁷⁹ ‘Gems from Mufti Taqi Uthmani’s Talk: Abu Bakr Trust’, 1st Ethical website, November 24, 2014. <http://www.1stethical.com/gems-mufti-taqi-uthmanis-talk-abu-bakr-trust/>.

enough power to engage in battle'.¹⁸⁰ It should be noted that Usmani is part of the revivalist network in Britain through his connections with the Islamic Foundation. In 2006, Usmani led the 'first Shariah Finance Course in the UK' hosted by the Islamic Foundation, which lauded him as an 'eminent scholar'.¹⁸¹

Alam and MCB have both maintained that the Trojan Horse letter is a hoax and deny the existence of a plot. However, as Clarke wrote in his report, whether the letter is a hoax 'misses the point. The important issue is not who wrote it or whether it is a genuine extract from a letter between co-conspirators, but whether the events and behaviours have actually happened'.¹⁸² He noted that 'the behaviour described in the "Trojan Horse" letter has been seen at a number of schools over a long period of time and particularly more recently', and that allegations about a plot to Islamise schools pre-existed the letter.¹⁸³

MCB has stated that failures in governance and procedures do not equate to a 'khalifate-takeover'.¹⁸⁴ The implicit distinction drawn here between bad governance and the promotion of an extremist religious agenda in schools is supported by the education committee report, which states that the Trojan Horse affair 'is less about extremism than about governance'.¹⁸⁵ But this is a contrived distinction that doesn't acknowledge the religious motivations behind the numerous cases of governance malpractice or the religious basis of the behaviour and attitudes documented that clearly clash with Britain's liberal democratic, human rights-based culture.

This clash of values is inextricable from clashing perceptions regarding the social order and humanity's place within the universe, as well as the nature of truth, knowledge and morality. Such clashing perceptions inevitably relate to how the Trojan Horse affair itself is understood. MCB's response to it—that it is a

¹⁸⁰ Andrew Norfolk, 'Our followers "must live in peace until strong enough to wage jihad"', *The Times*, September 8, 2007, emphasis added. <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/faith/article2098586.ece>.

¹⁸¹ Islamic Foundation, 'First Ethical stage First UK Shariah Finance Course at the Islamic Foundation', *Islamic Foundation Newsletter*, July 2006, p. 3.

¹⁸² Clarke (2014), p.8.

¹⁸³ Ibid., pp.6, 75.

¹⁸⁴ MCB, 'Speech by Dr Shuja Shafi on British and Islamic Values'.

¹⁸⁵ Education Committee (2015), p.29.

fabrication that amounts to an Islamophobic attack—indeed exhibits signs of cognitive dissonance, but also demonstrates that it is involved in a conflict over the authority to establish a way of seeing social and political reality. This is most apparent in its denial of the government’s authority to pronounce on matters relating to Islam. In an effort to control the language and conceptualisation of the matters at hand, MCB stated:

We are however concerned about the phrase ‘particular strand of Sunni Islam’: given how diverse our Muslim communities are, it is unwise for any of us to pass judgement on the acceptability of certain strands of Islam over others. It is not for the state to define the theological boundaries of the Islamic faith and to create an ‘approved version of Islam’. Such an aim is contrary to the spirit of our free society and beyond the scope of debate on education of children in school. We are troubled that Mr Clarke delves into intricacies of Muslim theological debate raising serious allegations against a number of national Muslim organisations including the MCB.¹⁸⁶

It should be noted that Clarke’s report was not representative of the state’s view and made no judgement of what constitutes authentic from inauthentic Islam, merely noting that *an* understanding of Islam implicitly or explicitly informed much of the thinking behind the actions and attitudes he observed. MCB, assuming for itself the symbolic authority to determine the religious nature of what Clarke had seen, passed off such behaviour as mere religious conservatism rather than an ‘ideology and agenda to “Islamise” secular schools’.¹⁸⁷ This may be a deliberate attempt to conceal the truth but, regardless, it reflects a conflict of vision with the state, in trying to impose an understanding that certain actions and attitudes belong within the acceptable limits of the social and political order, and are not thus ‘extremist’ or subversive. This clash of perceptual schemas—in which, for example, the nature of education or the role of men and women means something quite different—escapes the government’s definition of extremism. But such a clash is what *underlies* the ‘vocal or active’ undermining of values that extremism is defined by.

The government’s response to the Trojan Horse affair, despite the education committee’s report, demonstrates an explicitly-held understanding that it is involved

¹⁸⁶ MCB, ‘The Muslim Council of Britain Responds to Peter Clarke’s “Trojan Horse” Letter Report’.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. See also MCB (2015), p.15.

in a conflict of values. The most wide-reaching of all new measures taken by the Department of Education is the active promotion of ‘British values’ in maintained schools, academies and nurseries. Morgan has stated that ‘actions which undermine fundamental British values should be viewed as misconduct’ resulting in teachers being ‘barred from the profession’.¹⁸⁸ Implicit to the values the government struggles to articulate and defend, however, is a way of seeing the world, a cognitive framework comprised of a set of unquestioned assumptions, including those that relate to human nature, political organisation and scientific knowledge.

The Islamisation of knowledge

The Trojan Horse affair may be viewed as part of a global Islamic revivalist phenomenon that contests the Western, liberal democratic understanding of the role of education. Clarke argued that the Trojan Horse agenda ‘appears to stem from an international movement to increase the role of Islam in education’, supported by AMS-UK and the International Board of Educational Research and Resources (IBERR), both of which have been mentioned earlier in this chapter, as well as MCB. ‘The movement,’ he stated, ‘provides practical advice and religious legitimisation to those who, in the words of the IBERR, seek to “*Islamise the provision of educational services*”’.¹⁸⁹ Clarke did not elaborate on this point, but it is worth doing so, since the actions and attitudes he observed in Birmingham indeed have historical origins and national, as well as global, dimensions.

As noted, MCB produced a paper in 2007 entitled, *Meeting the Needs of Muslim Pupils in State Schools*.¹⁹⁰ Co-authored by Alam, this document advocates what may be described as the voluntary Islamisation of education in British schools. It proposes that Muslim pupils ought to be separated from their non-Muslim peers in numerous areas of the curriculum. It also advocates that schools adjust numerous classes according to Islamic principles—including music, dance, drama, art, sports, and sex education—or grant Muslim parents the right to withdraw their children from them. Religious education, the report urges, ought to include greater attention

¹⁸⁸ ‘Oral statement by Nicky Morgan on the “Trojan Horse” letter’.

¹⁸⁹ Clarke (2014), p.48, emphasis in original.

¹⁹⁰ MCB (2007).

to Islam for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Remarkably, the report states that the adoption of a policy where religion is treated as a private matter ‘makes it more difficult for schools to appreciate and respond positively to meeting some of the distinctive spiritual, moral, social and cultural needs of Muslim children’.¹⁹¹ It appears that the provision of special arrangements in schools are proposed not merely to meet the allegedly distinct needs of Muslim children—which MCB treats homogeneously—but to *inculcate* such needs.

MCB’s paper recommends for schools a book, *Islam: Beliefs and Teachings*, by the director of the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), Ghulam Sarwar. This book describes Islam as a code of conduct for ‘personal and private affairs, including social, political, economic, moral and spiritual activities’.¹⁹² As noted earlier, it praises Jama’at-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood for working to establish a global Islamic state, condones polygamy, and states that men and women have different roles in society due to their different natures. Sarwar believes Islamic education ought to be ‘an integral part of the efforts worldwide to establish Islam as an all-encompassing way of life’.¹⁹³

In 2004, MET published a paper, ‘A Programme for Muslim Education in a Non-Muslim Society’, by Sahib Mustaqim Bleher.¹⁹⁴ This states that critical thinking can occur ‘only on the basis of knowledge from the original sources’, namely the Qur’an and Muhammad’s *sunna*.¹⁹⁵ Bleher describes Islamic education as a tool to secure the permanence of the Muslim community in a non-Muslim environment. What is needed, he states, ‘is much more of an *Islamic socialisation process*, rather than simply Islamic teaching’.¹⁹⁶ This theme was echoed at a European conference convened by the AMS-UK in 2002 by Musharraf Hussain, who asserted, ‘The *raison d’être* of Muslim schools is vigorously stated by its founders as follows: to

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p.18, emphasis added.

¹⁹² Sarwar (2006), p.13.

¹⁹³ Sarwar (2001), p.30, emphasis added.

¹⁹⁴ Bleher (1996), pp.61, 64.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p.64.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., emphasis added.

prevent the assimilation of the new generation'.¹⁹⁷ The problem identified by Hussain was the secular National Curriculum that is compulsory for all schools including Muslim ones. His proposed course of action is to embed the National Curriculum within an 'Islamic milieu' by instilling an Islamic ethos in schools, and then by gradually working to Islamise its contents.¹⁹⁸ This approach is strikingly similar to what Clarke observed in Birmingham schools.

This concept of Islamic education, which elevates the Muslim social collective above the Muslim individual, conflicts with the liberal democratic principle of individual liberty by devaluing the independence of mind and inhibiting the spirit of rational inquiry. It is based upon orthodox Islamic precepts. J. Mark Halstead, who has written at length about Islamic education, observes that, 'Independence of thought and personal autonomy do not enter into the Muslim thinking about education, which is more concerned with the progressive initiation of pupils into the received truths of the faith'.¹⁹⁹ Islamic education, he affirms, is a vehicle for helping children become fulfilled adults, but such fulfilment hinges upon a particularly Islamic notion of human nature in which humanity is geared towards the 'realization on earth of divinely ordained moral imperatives'.²⁰⁰

The Islamisation of education can be understood as a cultural and political strategy, employed within the arc of the global Islamic revivalist movement, to dissolve the separation of the secular and religious spheres of human society, by subordinating rational inquiry and the pursuit of scientific knowledge in schools to the dogma of divine revelation. Halstead describes it as 'a key process in countering the influence of western secularism and purging Muslim institutions of insidious western influences'.²⁰¹ This is borne out by the attitudes expressed by key individuals in the revivalist network in Britain, including Ibrahim Hewitt, Ghulam Sarwar and Mohamed Mukadam. This strategy as it applies in Britain and the West more

¹⁹⁷ Musharraf Hussain, quoted from Association of Muslim Social Scientists UK, Muslim Education in Europe Conference, September 27-29, 2002, p.36, cited in MacEoin (2009a), p.50.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Halstead (2004), p.519.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p.523.

²⁰¹ Ibid., pp.521-522.

generally is decades old and can be traced back to the First World Conference on Muslim Education held in Mecca in 1977.

The conference statement affirmed as the ‘ultimate aim of Muslim Education’ the ‘complete submission to Allah on the level of the individual, the community and humanity at large’.²⁰² This aim appears verbatim in the mission statement of one of the first Muslim schools to receive state funding in Britain, the Islamia Primary School, founded in 1983 by Yusuf Islam. IBERR, also established by Islam, describes its origins in the late 1990s as ‘the natural outcome of the deliberations of a core group of Muslim educationalists committed to implementing the aims and objectives’ of the 1977 Mecca conference.²⁰³ Attended by over 300 scholars and statesmen, this conference convened to address a perceived crisis facing the *umma* relating to the encroachment of Western, secular values in education upon Muslims in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. One of the speakers, S. N. al-Attas, asserted that the ‘confusion and error’ in knowledge resulting from the detachment of education from Qur’anic principles and Muhammad’s *sunna*, was the ultimate cause of the difficulties experienced by contemporary Muslim communities.²⁰⁴ This had to be addressed, he declared, by a global programme dedicated to ‘*the Islamization of knowledge*’.

The Islamisation of knowledge was a key theme taken up in the writings of Ismail Raji al-Faruqi, who ‘saw no hope for the revival of the *umma* unless the dualism in Muslim education that separates Islamic and secular aspects be abolished once and for all’.²⁰⁵ In 1981, al-Faruqi founded the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in the U.S. in order to advance the Islamisation of knowledge project. Ian Johnson informs us that IIIT was initiated at a meeting in Lugano, Switzerland, also held in 1977, which brought together a much smaller number of Muslim leaders from around the world, including al-Faruqi, to lay the foundations for a Islamic revivalist network in Europe and the U.S.²⁰⁶ IIIT has an office in London. Although

²⁰² Statement from The First World Conference on Muslim Education, 1977, Mecca, quoted in Sarwar (2001), p.29.

²⁰³ ‘About IBERR’.

²⁰⁴ Halstead (2004), p.521.

²⁰⁵ Bat Ye’or (2005), p.254.

²⁰⁶ Johnson (2008), p.77; Johnson (2010), pp.195-196.

it is not involved in children's education in Britain, it sees its work as contributing to the revival of Islamic knowledge and the Muslim *umma*. By supporting research projects, organising academic conferences and publishing scholarly works, it seeks to contribute to the reform of Islamic thought and 'help Muslims regain their intellectual and cultural identity'.²⁰⁷

The Islamisation of knowledge project, despite its official conception at the Mecca conference and further formalisation in the work of IIIT, appears to have developed informally, without centralised coordination, in several directions. In Britain, whilst the key concern of IIIT-UK is the academic reflection upon the key concepts and methods for a revival of Islamic thought, the practical work of promoting Islamic knowledge is the focus of numerous other organisations, linked within the revivalist network, including MET, AMS-UK, IBERR and the Nida Trust. The outcome of their work within schools appears to have engendered a conflict with the very liberal democratic culture which has enabled them to operate.

This conflict has manifested in Tower Hamlets. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Michael Wilshaw, the head of Ofsted, recently noted that hundreds of children in six of the borough's private Islamic schools are at risk of 'extremist influences and radicalisation'.²⁰⁸ In an advice note to Education Secretary Nicky Morgan in November 2014, he wrote, 'All schools focused intensively on developing Islamic knowledge and understanding at the expense of other important areas of the curriculum'. Wilshaw noted that all the schools had failed 'to provide an appropriately broad and balanced curriculum'. Consistent with MCB's paper on the needs of Muslim pupils, music, art and drama were rarely taught. In all six schools, he warned, 'pupils' physical and educational welfare is at serious risk'. Despite this, Muhammad Abdul Bari—the founding chairman of IFE and the former chair of the borough's East London Mosque—describes Islamic knowledge as the 'antidote to

²⁰⁷ 'About Us', IIIT-UK website. <http://www.iiituk.com/about.htm>.

²⁰⁸ Michael Wilshaw, 'Advice note'.

extremism'.²⁰⁹ Such knowledge, if taught properly, he insists, 'increases belief in human goodness, patience and wisdom, and a belief in God's mercy'.

2.2. *Shari'a* councils

Shari'a courts have been operating unofficially in Britain since the 1980s, but the first recorded demand for the introduction of Islamic law into the domestic legal structure for British Muslims came from the Union of Muslim Organisations and the UK and Eire in 1975 in a petition to Parliament.²¹⁰ Officially, they have been operating since August 2007 as Muslim Arbitration Tribunals (MATs) under the 1996 Arbitration Act.²¹¹ What sparked the media's interest in these courts in 2008, and brought to light some of the pertinent issues raised by them, was their public endorsement by Rowan Williams, then Archbishop of Canterbury. Williams said that it was a fact that aspects of the *shari'a* were already being implemented in Britain and that the formal incorporation of the *shari'a* 'seems unavoidable'.²¹²

Shari'a courts in Britain are of two types. Firstly, are the MAT courts whose rulings are legally enforceable under the Arbitration Act on certain conditions. Their judgements must not contravene British law and all parties must agree voluntarily to have their disputes arbitrated by them. Since criminal issues cannot be dealt with by any tribunal under the Act, these courts deal mostly with family matters, such as Islamic marriages, as well as mosque and commercial disputes. Operating under the Act since August 2007, initial reports stated that there were five such courts, in London, Birmingham, Bradford, Nuneaton and Manchester.

The London court is run by the Islamic Sharia Council, headed by Suhaib Hasan and Maulana Abu Sayeed, who are both networked with Yusuf al-Qaradawi's European

²⁰⁹ Muhammad Abdul Bari, 'Religious Middle Way Is the Antidote to Extremism', *The Huffington Post*, June 3, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/muhammad-abdul-bari/religious-extremism_b_7483840.html.

²¹⁰ Neilsen (1992), p.109.

²¹¹ See, for example, Richard Edwards, 'Sharia courts operating in Britain', *The Telegraph*, September 14, 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2957428/Sharia-law-courts-operating-in-Britain.html>; and Abdul Taher, 'Revealed: UK's first official sharia courts', *The Times*, September 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4749183.ece>.

²¹² Riazat But, 'Uproar as archbishop says sharia law inevitable in UK', *The Guardian*, February 8, 2008. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/feb/08/uk.religion>.

Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR). The council has sought charitable status for a national federation of *shari'a* councils, the UK Board of Sharia Councils, which is designed to serve as 'a representative and supervisory body of individual Sharia Councils' that will look to it 'for advice and expertise in matters of Sharia law'.²¹³ Abu Sayyed describes a key function of the federation as providing 'a common formula and set of principles' which local *shari'a* councils must adhere to in dispensing verdicts.²¹⁴ This is considered as achievement since, although there isn't much variation across councils, 'some aren't as strict as we are'. Via this federation, *shari'a* councils across the country are now networked to ECFR, which provides guidance on the application of *shari'a* more widely across Europe.²¹⁵

Constituting the second type of *shari'a* court are the more numerous unofficial courts littered around the country that, according to British law, can at most provide mediation, not arbitration, where an agreement, rather than a legal judgement, can be made.²¹⁶ Denis MacEoin, in his report for the think tank Civitas, *Sharia Law or 'One Law for All'?*, claimed that there are at least 85 *shari'a* courts, including both types, in Britain.²¹⁷

Both kinds of courts are supported by MCB. According to Ibrahim Mogra, MCB does not have a formal role to issue religious edicts, but it does 'signpost people to *shari'a* councils and *shari'a* bodies and the like'.²¹⁸ However, there are four main issues with these courts that demonstrate a conflict with liberal democratic principles, including, most prominently, equality of all under the law. Underlying all of these is a conception of *shari'a* as a complete legal and ethical system, applicable

²¹³ 'UK Board of Shariah Councils', London Central Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre website, undated. http://www.iccuk.org/page.php?section=media&page=ukboard_sharia_councils. This was confirmed in interviews with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012, and Suhaib Hassan, February 9, 2012.

²¹⁴ Interview with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012.

²¹⁵ Interviews with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012, and Suhaib Hassan, February 9, 2012.

²¹⁶ See Neil Addison's foreword to MacEoin (2009b), pp.xiii-xv.

²¹⁷ MacEoin (2009b), p.69.

²¹⁸ Interview with Ibrahim Mogra, August 29, 2012.

to all aspects of human existence, which is superior to ‘man-made’ law and destined to replace it in the long-term.²¹⁹

Firstly, *shari’a* courts are providing discriminatory verdicts on disputes that would not be supported in the civil courts. Such disputes include those relating to inheritance. Under the *shari’a*, women are discriminated against since they are entitled to just half of what their male siblings are able to inherit. Suhaib Hasan says his court does not get involved in the division of property after separation.²²⁰ But in September 2008, it was reported that the Nuneaton court had ruled in exactly this way, dividing the estate of a Midlands man between three daughters and two sons.²²¹ In theory, the rulings of *shari’a* courts must be enforceable in English civil courts, but the civil courts are unlikely to support a ruling in an inheritance dispute on the discriminatory basis of the *shari’a*. The likely reason that *shari’a* courts can make these rulings in practice is because they are rarely sent to civil courts for enforcement.

Secondly, *shari’a* courts are issuing rulings on areas that lie outside their legal remit. These include criminal matters, such as domestic violence and assault.²²² In 2007, for example, a stabbing case involving Somalian youths was apparently decided upon by an unofficial *shari’a* court in Woolwich, southeast London.²²³ Cases of domestic violence have also apparently been settled without justice being served to women in England’s criminal courts.²²⁴ Divorce and child custody are also specifically excluded under the Arbitration Act, since under English law the best ‘interests of the child’ must be ensured in such cases and, accordingly, decisions in

²¹⁹ Interviews with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012, and Suhaib Hassan, February 9, 2012; Thomson (2000 and 2001).

²²⁰ Interview with Suhaib Hassan, February 9, 2012.

²²¹ Edwards, ‘Sharia courts operating in Britain’, and Taher, ‘Revealed: UK’s first official sharia courts’.

²²² Domestic violence was actually listed on MAT’s website one type of case that it deals with. See Muslim Arbitration Tribunal website: <http://web.archive.org/web/20111004220746/http://www.matribunal.com/cases.html>.

²²³ Murad Ahmed and Frances Gibb, ‘From Leyton to Dewsbury, Sharia courts are already settling disputes’, *The Times*, February 8, 2008. <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/faith/article2098953.ece>.

²²⁴ Edwards, ‘Sharia courts operating in Britain’, and Taher, ‘Revealed: UK’s first official sharia courts’.

these areas are the legal domain of the civil Family Courts.²²⁵ But both MAT courts and the many more unofficial *shari'a* courts are issuing legal judgements in these areas. Divorce possibly constitutes the vast majority of the cases handled by the network of MAT courts.²²⁶ Yet, whereas for a Muslim man a divorce is automatic, for a Muslim woman complicated legal procedures are required with no guarantee of divorce. The Islamic Sharia Council makes clear that Islamic divorce is the right of a man, but available to a woman only with her husband's permission.²²⁷

The third problematic aspect of *shari'a* courts in Britain is the likely coercion of Muslim women to use such courts. The director of the UK-based think-tank Civitas, David Green, claims that 'there is a good deal of intimidation of women in Muslim communities', which prevent us from safely assuming that women use *shari'a* courts on a genuinely voluntary basis.²²⁸ The prospects and reality of coercion are testified by the One Law for All Campaign, which reported that 'women are often pressured by their families into going to these courts and adhering to unfair decisions and may lack knowledge of English and their rights under British law'.²²⁹ The refusal to settle a dispute in a *shari'a* court, it warned, can lead to threats, intimidation and ostracisation. There have also been reports of Muslim clerics' willingness 'to conduct sharia marriages involving child brides as young as 12'.²³⁰ In 2012, *The Times* reported that, 'Almost one in seven of the estimated 8,000 forced marriages of Britons each year are believed to involve girls of 15 or under'.

The fourth troubling aspect of these courts is the risk of the creation of parallel legal systems and societies, divided along Muslim and non-Muslim lines. The possible retort that *shari'a* courts' rulings, in theory, have to be consistent with British law

²²⁵ See Neil Addison, in Denis MacEoin (2009b), p.xi.

²²⁶ Perhaps indicative of how divorce features in the majority of disputes referred to *shari'a* courts in Britain, the Leyton Islamic Sharia Council, which has operated an unofficial *shari'a* court since 1982, claims that 95% of the 7,000 cases it has dealt with since its inception relate to divorce. See Ahmed and Gibb, 'From Leyton to Dewsbury, Sharia courts are already settling disputes'.

²²⁷ 'WHAT IS KHUL'A?', Islamic Sharia Council website, undated. Webpage captured on April 1, 2009. <http://web.archive.org/web/20090401224229/http://www.islamic-sharia.org/divorce-khula/what-is-khula-2.html>.

²²⁸ David G. Green, in Denis MacEoin (2009b), p.4.

²²⁹ Namazie, Atasheen and Waters (2010), p.16.

²³⁰ Mazher Mahmood and Marie Woolf, 'Revealed: scandal of child brides', *The Times*, September 9, 2012. http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Society/article1122316.ece.

does not begin to address the problem that, in practice, rulings are issued that directly contravene basic human rights, and in most cases such rulings are not referred to secular courts for formal legal sanction. It is simply not in the interests of any *shari'a* court to seek approval within the English legal system to uphold a ruling when it is unlikely to be approved under English law. This is especially so when 'man-made' law is conceived as inferior to *shari'a*, as made explicit by Sheikh Maulana Abu Sayeed, president of the Islamic Sharia Council, and Ahmad Thomson, the founder of the Association of Muslim Lawyers, who states that the demise of 'man-made' law is inevitable.²³¹

The dichotomy in English legal system that is opened up by the presence of a network of *shari'a* courts and tribunals is strikingly illustrated by the starkly different conceptions of crime in English secular law and the *shari'a*. What is clearly a criminal matter under English law is, in certain important instances, not considered so from a *shari'a* perspective. Rape is a key case in point. Demonstrating a point of view that clearly conflicts with a liberal democratic, human rights perspective, Abu Sayeed states that rape is impossible in marriage: 'In Islamic sharia', he affirms, 'rape is adultery by force. So long as the woman is his wife, it cannot be termed as rape'.²³² Haitham al-Haddad, a judge at the Islamic Sharia Council, shares this view, referring to such an act as '*so-called* rape against your wife', bemoaning the prison sentence against a husband who rapes his wife as an infringement upon his liberty.²³³

This is not just their shared personal view. It is based on *shari'a* precepts.²³⁴ It has also appeared in edicts issued from online *fatwa* services.²³⁵ Although the number of

²³¹ Interview with Maulana Abu Sayeed, February 16, 2012; Thomson (2001), p.6.

²³² Tim Ross, 'Rape within marriage is 'impossible', claims Muslim cleric', *The Telegraph*, October 15, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstoppers/religion/8064571/Rape-within-marriage-is-impossible-claims-Muslim-cleric.html>.

²³³ Al-Haddad cited from audio and video recordings available at 'Haitham al-Haddad', The Islamic Far Right in Britain blog, undated. <http://tifrib.com/haitham-al-haddad/>.

²³⁴ According to orthodox interpretations of the *shari'a*, a married woman is obliged to accommodate her husband's sexual advances and needs. See, for example, the Shafi'ite manual of *shari'a*, '*Umdat al-Salik*'. This was authorised in 1991 by Sunni Islam's highest learning institution, al-Azhar University in Egypt and recommended as a guide to the *shari'a* by the president of the Muslim Association of Britain to the thesis author. It states that it is 'obligatory for a woman to let her husband have sex with her' if 'he asks her', if they are 'at home', and if 'she can physically endure it'. The husband has the 'full right to enjoy his wife's person ... in what does not physically harm her' (al-Misri (1994), pp.526, 527).

rape cases seen by *shari'a* courts may be small, this view of the legal status of rape is likely to ensure that justice for some Muslim women will never be obtained in English courts. The issue here is that these cases will be dealt with as non-criminal matters in *shari'a* courts. One of the fundamental conditions upon which *shari'a* courts have obtained their approval in England—that they will not handle criminal matters—rests upon a shared understanding of what constitutes a crime, yet this is lacking on a key area where women's human rights are concerned.

Notwithstanding the *shari'a*'s inhumane penal code—which can include the death penalty for apostasy, homosexuality and adultery, amputation for theft, and flogging for a range of other offences—its civil code is comprised of numerous tenets that contravene basic human rights. The One Law for All Campaign, pioneered by Maryam Namazie in response to the discriminatory nature of *shari'a* courts in Britain, provides sufficient examples:

Under Sharia law's civil code, a woman's testimony is worth half that of a man's; a woman's marriage contract is between her male guardian and her husband and a Muslim woman is not permitted to marry a non-Muslim. A man can have four wives and divorce his wife by simple repudiation, whereas a woman must give justifications for requesting a divorce, some of which are extremely difficult to prove. Child custody reverts to the father at a preset age, even if the father is abusive; women who remarry lose custody of their children even if the child has not reached the preset age; and sons are entitled to inherit twice the share of daughters.²³⁶

Furthermore, according to orthodox interpretations of the *shari'a*, a Muslim cannot renounce Islam without facing the prospect of a death penalty.²³⁷ The criticism or mocking of Muhammad, Allah, the Qur'an, or the *shari'a* itself, is likewise forbidden, incurring the same punishment. Thus, some basic human rights taken for

²³⁵ See, for example, the *fatwa* of Shaykh Ibn 'Uthaymeen (1925-2001), the prominent Saudi scholar of Islamic law, who wrote around 50 books on the subject. This is still posted on the Web and referred to as authoritative. Unless a woman is ill, he states, 'It is obligatory upon the woman to respond to her husband if he calls her to his bed'. See Shaykh Ibn 'Uthaymeen, 'Husband calls his wife to bed, but she is ill and unable to respond to his call', June 24, 2001. <http://www.fatwa-online.com/husband-calls-his-wife-to-bed-but-she-is-ill-unable-to-respond-to-his-call/>.

²³⁶ Namazie, Atasheen and Waters (2010), p.7.

²³⁷ The acknowledgement that all schools of classical Islamic jurisprudence sanction the death penalty for apostasy is made in two recent calls for the reform of *shari'a* in line with universal human rights, one published by the revivalist International Institute for Islamic Thought and the other published by Quilliam, See, respectively, Alalwani (2012) and Hasan (2013).

granted in Britain—including the freedoms of conscience, expression and movement, and equality of all under the rule of law—are outlawed by the *shari'a*. The incompatibility between the *shari'a* and human rights has, in fact, been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the upper house of the United Kingdom's national legislature, the House of Lords. In 2003, ECHR stated:

Sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable ... It is difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which *clearly diverges* from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts.²³⁸

In October 2008, in determining the asylum claim of a Lebanese woman who, in accordance with *shari'a* principles, risked handing over custody of her 12 year old son to an abusive husband if returned to Lebanon, the House of Lords described the Islamic legal code as 'wholly incompatible' with human rights legislation and granted her asylum.²³⁹ Recognising the problems with *shari'a* courts in Britain, Baroness Cox, an unaffiliated life-peer in the House of Lords, authored a report in March 2015 that condemns what she calls 'the emergence of a rapidly developing alternative quasi-legal system, which not only promotes systematic gender discrimination, but also undermines the fundamental principle of one law for all'.²⁴⁰ In June 2014, she introduced a Private Members' Bill to the House of Lords—the Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill—to address these matters.

²³⁸ European Court of Human Rights, *Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey* BAILII (ECHR 87). February 13, 2003, emphasis added. <http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2003/87.html>.

²³⁹ Afua Hirsch, 'Sharia law incompatible with human rights legislation, Lords say', *The Guardian*, October 23, 2008. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/23/religion-islam>.

²⁴⁰ Cox (2015).

3. Political and cultural conflict

This chapter has demonstrated that organisations and individuals in the revivalist network in Britain are engaged in a conflict of values with Britain's liberal democratic culture, particularly as represented by the state.

This conflict has both practical and symbolic dimensions. The stakes of this conflict include the institutionalisation of competing worldviews—Islamic and liberal democratic—and related values within the structure of civil society, as well as in government policy and state law. This practical dimension of the conflict is evident, as this chapter has shown, in the fields of political advocacy and local governance, as well as education and arbitration, particularly where Muslim communities are concerned. It concerns the institutional and legal structures that regulate peoples' lives. Inseparable from the practical dimension of this conflict, there is also a symbolic or cognitive dimension. The stakes thus also include the institutionalisation of competing worldviews and related values within the minds of people, whether they are policymakers, British Muslims or the general public. This dimension of the conflict is evident in competing efforts to classify—and to command the authority to classify—the 'correct' understanding of fundamental social values ('British' or 'universal' values), and Islam.

The practical and symbolic dimensions of this conflict overlap. The attempt to influence the minds of children and foster an Islamic identity in Muslim schools, for example, is inseparable from attempts to influence government policy in the area of educational provision for Muslims, as well as the structure of schools' governing boards. The arbitration of disputes in *shari'a* courts does not just have practical consequences for people's lives, it also establishes the symbolic authority of the courts to establish an understanding of Islam in Muslim communities. This overlapping may also be seen in revivalist groups' efforts to undermine the government's counter-extremism strategy both symbolically, where concepts such as 'extremism' are contested, and practically, where changes in government policy is sought through protest, advocacy or testimony.

A clash of values has been discernible in a practical sense since the Rushdie Affair in 1989, when MCB's pre-cursor organisation initiated a campaign to criminalise

what it perceives as the ‘vilification’ of Islam and its prophets, what its liberal opponents see as their right to criticise, satirise or even insult religion. Other groups, such as the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) and MEND, have supported MCB’s effort.²⁴¹ This campaign has been unsuccessful, but it conflicts in principle with a key tenet of liberal democracy, that of the freedom of speech, as well as its bedrock assumption of individual rather than group rights.

MCB fell from government favour after its boycotting of Holocaust Memorial Day and Daud Abdullah’s signing of the Istanbul Declaration in 2009. Whilst these acts were understood by the government as a betrayal of ‘non-negotiable’ values, the clash they underline may also be understood in terms of conflicting perceptions of social and political reality. Rather than arguing for the legitimate value of the declaration, MCB contested the government’s understanding of it. Vigorously denying Communities Secretary Hazel Blears’ view of it as endorsing attacks on Jews, MCB called such a view ‘outrageous’.²⁴² MCB added that it is ‘completely opposed to all forms of prejudice’. MCB does not perceive as prejudicial its support for *shari’a* councils and its rejection of the model marriage contract produced by the Muslim Institute, despite evidence to the contrary.

This indicates not a straight-forward clash of values in the sense that it is contested whether a certain act or kind of act may be classified as good or bad. It indicates clashing perceptual and evaluative frameworks where it is contested whether or not a given act has taken place at all, or whether a kind of act may be considered as such in the first place. A more striking example of this contention is how rape within marriage is understood by the leaders of *shari’a* councils: There is simply no such thing. In a clash of worldviews and their related moral frameworks, there is no shared understanding of the key terms to allow for an agreement to disagree. Terms are shared, like ‘extremism’ and ‘universal values’, but their meanings are different because they are situated in different perceptual schemes informed by different cultures of knowledge.

²⁴¹ Gilligan, ‘Muslim group with links to extremists boasts of influencing election’.

²⁴² MCB, ‘MCB Rejects Hazel Blears’ Baseless Accusations About Attacking Jewish Communities’, MCB website, March 26, 2009. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/mcb-rejects-hazel-blears-baseless-accusations-about-attacking-jewish-communities/>.

As this chapter has shown, the practical aspects of this clash of values is evident in the fields of political and legal advocacy in relation to central government, where MCB and other revivalist interlocutors have sought to influence domestic and foreign policy in line with an Islamic revivalist worldview. Some groups in the network have taken a more activist approach to challenge the government over foreign policy, either through street demonstrations or protest campaigns. The Muslim Association of Britain, for example, played a key role in the anti-war demonstrations in 2002 and 2003, but in recent years its activism has been eclipsed by other, newer groups such as MEND and CAGE. However, more often than not, government policy has been contended quietly through advocacy work by sector-specific groups working in various fields, most importantly, education. Whilst appealing to Britain's equality legislation to justify their causes—for example, for the right of Muslims to have more state-maintained schools—the worldview and values that fundamentally guide such efforts are clearly antagonistic to the liberal democratic basis of Britain's society and mode of government.

Beyond such advocacy work, the practical aspects of this clash of values is evident in local government, as observed in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets where individuals connected to the revivalist Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) played an important role in directly obtaining or influencing political power. The IFE-linked mayor, Lutfur Rahman, has been deposed, but other, less prominent revivalists possibly remain in office in the borough. Their influence is difficult to gauge without a thorough investigation. But it is also difficult to disassociate the cultural dispositions and long-term political aspirations of IFE—which are clearly antagonistic with liberal democratic values and its secular model of government—and the fact that hundreds of children in six of the borough's Islamic schools are recognised by the government of being at risk of 'extremist influences and radicalisation'.²⁴³

The symbolic dimension of the conflict has become more apparent in recent years, as the British government has become increasingly clear regarding the importance of targeting what it refers to as the 'ideology' of 'Islamist extremists'. From the revision of the *Prevent* counter-radicalisation strategy in June 2011, which first

²⁴³ Wilshaw, 'Advice note'.

defined ‘extremism’ as the ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values’,²⁴⁴ to the publication of Britain’s first *Counter-Extremism Strategy* in October 2015,²⁴⁵ the government has increasingly sought to confront what it deems as an ideological challenge to the values that underpin the British way of life.

Since 2011, the government has explicitly viewed the key battleground for combatting terrorism as ideological. The first of the three objectives of the revised *Prevent* strategy is to ‘respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it’.²⁴⁶ But, whilst countering ‘extremist’ ideology remains at the heart of the government’s counter-terrorism programme, it has also begun to view the ideological problem it faces beyond its function as a precursor to violence, as a matter affecting social cohesion and institutional entryism.

The government’s concern with the extent to which extremist ideology has spread throughout various public institutions was made clear in December 2013 in a report by the Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism. This report identified schools, universities and prisons as vulnerable to ‘the ideology of Islamist extremism’.²⁴⁷ Drawing on the recommendations of the report, Home Secretary Theresa May delivered a speech in March 2015 in which she noted ‘increasing evidence’ of a rejection of British values amongst some British people.²⁴⁸ Highlighting some of the problems with non-violent extremism beyond its link to terrorism, she warned of the dangers of segregated communities and discrimination on the basis of sex, sexuality and race. She cited ‘the Trojan Horse plot’ as an example of the infiltration of extremism within British public institutions and singled out Tower Hamlets as a borough with ‘extremist’ issues.

In July 2015, Cameron delivered an address setting out the four pillars of the government’s new counter-extremism strategy. Highlighting the first pillar—

²⁴⁴ Home Office (2011), p.107.

²⁴⁵ HM Government (2015a).

²⁴⁶ Home Office (2011), p.7.

²⁴⁷ Cabinet Office (2013), p.1.

²⁴⁸ ‘Theresa May speech A Stronger Britain, Built on our Values: A New Partnership to Defeat Extremism’.

countering ‘extremist ideology’—he stated, ‘What we are fighting, in Islamist extremism, is *an ideology*’.²⁴⁹ The new strategy is the first of its kind that aims to tackle both violent and non-violent ‘extremism’. Importantly, it lays out an approach to combat ‘non-violent extremism’ not just as a pathway to terrorism, but also as a contributing factor to a range of other issues, which were touched on in May’s March 2015 speech. These include ‘isolated communities’ (which can lead to ‘alternative values, structures and authorities’); ‘alternative systems of law’ (including *shari’a*) that discriminate against women; the non-participation in or rejection of democracy; and ‘harmful and illegal practices’ (such as Female Genital Mutilation, Honour Based Violence and Forced Marriage).

Also in 2015, indicating its firm commitment to combating the ideological basis of terrorism and these kinds of ‘non-violent extremism’, the government established the Extremism Analysis Unit (EAU) in the Home Office. Significantly, the EAU is the first body of its kind in the world that pools resources for the study and combatting of violent and non-violent manifestations of ‘extremism’. According to May, it will ‘inform the development of a counter-entryism strategy’ to protect key British institutions, and is likely to play a role in an independent investigation into *shari’a* courts in England and Wales.²⁵⁰

The reaction of Islamic revivalist groups to these developments has been hostile, casting the government as intent on dividing British society between Muslims and non-Muslims. MCB, for example, has suggested that, for the government, ‘Muslims and Islam are inherently apart from British society’.²⁵¹ Contesting the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’—as MCB has done—IHRC produced a statement in March 2015 against the ‘ongoing demonisation of Muslims in Britain’ and ‘their values’, which was signed by numerous revivalist groups and individuals.²⁵² It

²⁴⁹ ‘Extremism: PM speech’, British Government website, July 20, 2015.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech>, emphasis added.

²⁵⁰ ‘Theresa May speech A Stronger Britain, Built on our Values: A New Partnership to Defeat Extremism’.

²⁵¹ Patrick Wintour, ‘Muslim Council of Britain objects to Pickles letter to Islamic leaders’, *The Guardian*, January 19, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/19/uk-muslim-council-objections-eric-pickles-letter>.

²⁵² IHRC, ‘Muslim community rejects the State’s criminalisation of Islam and condemns moves to silence legitimate critique and dissent’, IHRC website, March 11, 2015.

described the government's inclusion of 'non-violent extremism' within its revised counter-terrorism strategy as the 'criminalisation of Islam'. IHRC proclaimed that the government's criticism of *shari'a* councils—which it says are 'an essential institution in the Muslim community'—was an assault on Islam: 'In our view the focus on Shariah councils is part of a wide, insidious and relentless attack on the whole Muslim way of life under the pretext of security and anti-terrorism'.²⁵³ Other groups, such as MEND, defended *shari'a* councils in similar terms.²⁵⁴ MEND has, in fact, become one of the most ardent critics of government policy within the revivalist network, eclipsing MAB, which now defers to MEND's work in articulating its own dissent.²⁵⁵ Another very vocal critic of the government is CAGE. Echoing MCB's point of view described earlier, it has stated:

The British government, advised primarily by those who are inclined toward neoconservatism, are re-defining what constitutes genuine Islam. This idea that a British government can interfere with, define and regulate the Islamic faith and ideology is insulting to Muslims.²⁵⁶

Asim Qureshi, CAGE's research director, declares of *Prevent*, 'It's always been a social engineering programme to legitimise the government sponsored version of Islam only'.²⁵⁷ He describes the government's counter-extremism approach as 'criminalising thought'. Standing side-by-side with CAGE is the Federation of Islamic Student Societies (FOSIS). At a CAGE event in March 2015, its vice president of student affairs, Ibrahim Ali, described the work of FOSIS and CAGE as part of a 'broad coalition' on university campuses dedicated to disseminating the

<http://ihrc.org.uk/news/comment/11381-muslim-community-rejects-the-states-criminalisation-of-islam-and-condemns-moves-to-silence-legitimate-critique-and-dissent->.

²⁵³ IHRC, 'A letter to Nick Clegg regarding the government's proposed new plans to "combat Islamic extremism"', IHRC website, March 11, 2015. <http://www.ihrc.org.uk/activities/campaigns/11382-a-letter-to-nick-clegg-regarding-the-governments-proposed-new-plans-to-combat-islamic-extremism>.

²⁵⁴ MEND, 'Home Secretary announces new counter-extremism strategy'.

²⁵⁵ For example, see Mariam Amir Hassan, 'Diverse and Strong Voices Emerging – 15,000 Stood Up to Racism and Fascism in the UK', MAB website, March 30, 2015. <http://www.mabonline.net/diverse-and-strong-voices-emerging-15000-stood-up-to-racism-and-fascism-in-the-uk/>. This refers to MEND's document that sought to stop the Counter Terrorism and Security Bill, MEND (2014b).

²⁵⁶ Mohammed and Siddiqui (2013), p.9.

²⁵⁷ Karen Jayes, 'The PREVENT Policy: a politically motivated programme', CAGE website, August 5, 2014. <http://cageuk.org/article/prevent-policy-politically-motivated-programme>.

message that, '*Prevent* in itself is a racist agenda; its an Islamophobic agenda'.²⁵⁸ The government has recognised universities as important sites in this clash of values, but is yet to effectively evaluate and confront it. Similar sentiments have been expressed by Ibrahim Hewitt, a prominent figure within the revivalist network, who states that the government's targeting of non-violent extremism amounts to a war on Islam:

Claims that the government is pursuing an 'anti-extremism' agenda are wearing thin; it is anti-Islam, period. It's fine for Muslims to have their faith as long as they keep it to themselves and out of the public domain. In other words, the neo-conservatives want Islam to be shorn of its 'complete way of life' guidelines. This is dangerous territory.²⁵⁹

Islamophobia is perceived as an attack on Islam as a way of life carried out not just through government policy, but throughout a variety of social institutions. Iqbal Sacranie encapsulates this view, asserting, 'Islamophobic prejudice is prevalent in the mainstream on display in political life, in the media and in the attitudes of the police and the courts.'²⁶⁰ In particular, journalists and think tanks that highlight the detrimental effects of Muslim organisations and individuals upon civil liberties and social harmony in Britain are commonly attacked as being 'Islamophobic'. Targets include journalists John Ware and Andrew Gilligan and the think tanks Policy Exchange and the Centre for Social Cohesion.²⁶¹

According to a former Islamic activist, the term 'Islamophobia' was invented by the International Institute for Islamic Thought to stifle the criticism of Islam, particularly its political, revivalist interpretations.²⁶² Abdur-Rahman Muhammad, a former member of IIIT, has stated, 'This loathsome term is nothing more than a

²⁵⁸ Stuart (2015), p.22.

²⁵⁹ Ibrahim Hewitt, 'Crusade against British Muslims in education', *Aljazeera*, May 12, 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/05/crusade-against-british-muslims-201451018411814899.html>.

²⁶⁰ Murtaza Ali Shah, 'Muslims call for change in UK blasphemy laws', *The International News* (Pakistan), November 14, 2012. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-142770-Muslims-call-for-change-in-UK-blasphemy-laws>.

²⁶¹ See Mills, Griffin and Miller (2011).

²⁶² Claire Berlinski, 'How the Term "Islamophobia" Got Shoved Down Your Throat', *Ricochet*, November 24, 2010. <http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Moderate-Muslim-Watch-How-the-Term-Islamophobia-Got-Shoved-Down-Your-Throat>.

thought-terminating cliché conceived in the bowels of Muslim think tanks for the purpose of beating down critics’.²⁶³ This claim is difficult to ascertain. However, whether intentional or not, the widespread use of the term effectively blurs the distinction between the legitimate criticism of Islamic doctrines and practices—including those that undermine liberal democratic values and human rights—and the bigoted discrimination against Muslims. Revivalist organisations have never articulated this distinction, let alone defended it. The government has so far not demanded them make this distinction, perhaps because it has consistently claimed that Islam is a ‘religion of peace’ and does not wish to be seen as critical of Islam for fear of inciting further social division along lines it cannot control.

Indeed, commanding the authority to speak on matters of social division—to determine the principles of such division—is a key arena of conflict in which Islamic revivalists and the government, as the most powerful representative of Britain’s liberal democracy, clash: Islamic revivalist groups claim the government is sowing the seeds of social division with its counter-extremism policies, branding non-violent, law-abiding Muslims as ‘extremists’ (or ‘the other’).

This trend was observable in MCB’s response to the government’s announcement that it was developing a counter-extremism strategy. It voiced its over-riding concern as the possibility that all Muslims will be labelled ‘extremist’ and the perpetuation of ‘a deep misunderstanding of Islam’.²⁶⁴ When the strategy was published, in October 2015, MCB’s secretary general, Shuja Shafi, stated that was based on a ‘flawed analysis’.²⁶⁵ He said it risked alienating Muslim communities and restricting the freedom of thought and expression. ‘For over 10 years,’ he added, ‘we have had to contend with a misguided “conveyor-belt theory” analysis that conflates terrorism with subjective notions of extremism and Islamic practices’. On the government’s plans to close mosques hosting ‘extremist’ speakers, Shafi questioned the government’s authority to classify any mosque as ‘extremist’.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ MCB, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech on Extremism: Muslim Council of Britain Makes Initial Response’, MCB website, July 20, 2015. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/prime-ministers-speech-on-extremism-muslim-council-of-britain-makes-initial-response/>.

²⁶⁵ MCB, “‘One Nation Counter-Extremism Strategy’ Risks Further Undermining Fight Against Terrorism’, MCB website, October 19, 2015. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/one-nation-counter-extremism-strategy-risks-fight-against-terrorism-191015/>.

The government, on the other hand, claims that MCB and other revivalist groups inculcate a victim mentality amongst British Muslims, exacerbating the problem of radicalisation. As it has begun to articulate a problem with non-violent extremism—not just as a potential stepping-stone to terrorism, but as a threat to civil liberties and social cohesion—revivalist groups have become increasingly vocal in their opposition. The struggle to distinguish an ‘in-group’—whether it be model British citizens or Muslims—from an ‘out-group’ is inextricable from a clash regarding the authority to establish social values. This couldn’t have been more clearly articulated than when Theresa May stated:

Extremists often talk about a ‘them’ and ‘us’—often described as a war between the West and Islam—and we do not challenge that successfully or often enough. Promoting the values *we* believe in will allow *us* to define the ‘them’ and ‘us’ on *our* terms ...²⁶⁶

Both the government and the revivalist groups use the language and concepts of the other to accrue symbolic authority. On one hand, the government, whilst characterising extremism as a rejection of British values, uses the notion of a ‘genuine’ Islam to identify its enemy: Islam is a ‘religion of peace’ that extremists have hijacked for their violent ends. But MCB and other revivalist groups, whilst making exactly the same claim, deny the government the authority to pronounce on this.²⁶⁷ On the other hand, revivalist groups, whilst characterising Islamophobia as a rejection of Islam and Muslims’ freedom to practice it, use the liberal notions of bigotry and racism to identify an enemy, an oppressor. This most importantly includes the government and its policies, which are characterised as breaching human rights and the liberal democratic principles of equality and justice.

Yet, this use of each other’s terminology is somewhat asymmetrical due to an imbalance in symbolic power in favour of the state. Whilst revivalist groups explicitly deny the government the symbolic authority to represent Islam—even when it disassociates Islam from violence—the government does not explicitly deny

²⁶⁶ ‘Home Secretary speech at summit on countering extremism’, British Government website, February 20, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/white-house-summit-on-countering-violent-extremism>, emphasis added.

²⁶⁷ For example, MCB, ‘MCB Condemns Day of Violence’, MCB website, June 26, 2015. <http://www.mcb.org.uk/mcb-condemns-day-of-violence/>.

MCB and other revivalist groups the authority to determine what constitutes bigotry. Instead, it simply asserts its own authority to do so most clearly in the language of British values and extremism, as well as in legal reform, most notably in the area of counter-terrorism.

MCB's explicit attack on the state's authority to classify Islam is in part a reflection of its weakness: If the government has the symbolic authority to classify Islam as *non-violent*—even though MCB agrees with this view—then it is a short step to it possessing the authority to classify Islam as *non-extremist*. The government so far has not taken this step to classify Islam as such, although revivalist groups assume the contrary. Doing so would exacerbate the symbolic aspect of this clash. It would cast what MCB and its allied groups consider as 'conservative' Muslim practices to be *unIslamic* and perhaps even illegal. It would render groups that support such practices, including MCB and numerous others, beyond the pale of engagement, if not the law. Moreover, it would also undermine MCB's authority to command respect and recognition within the Muslim population for its particular vision of society, its understanding of Islam and of the task of Muslims to usher in an Islamic revival.

§

To conclude this chapter, it suffices to note that, in addition to being connected by the bonds of organisational networking and cultural solidarity, the key figures and groups comprising the network are engaged in a conflict with the state as the key representative of liberal democratic values and an associated way of viewing the world. This conflict of vision and values is both cultural and political. It concerns communal identity and a way of life, which includes how children are educated and how government policy is conducted, as well as the authority to articulate it and protect it by law. This conflict of values concerns the institutionalisation of competing worldviews within the structure of society and, ultimately, the state.

Islamic revivalism presents to the British state not mere advocacy for change within its liberal democratic framework, but a programme for a peaceful transformation of it. In this sense, it may be described as *metapolitical*, a term introduced in Chapter 1. This conflict may be considered as a form of political subversion, but not in the

sense conceived in the Security Services Act of 1989, as the undermining or overthrowing of ‘parliamentary democracy’.²⁶⁸ The political subversion of Islamic revivalism is not concerned with usurping the organs of government, as such, but with contesting the authority to represent and institutionalise the framework of moral values and mode of knowledge upon which the political order rests. It may be thought as the subversion of the cultural edifice upon which the political system is based. This concerns fundamental values, but these depend upon the way in which the world is perceived. As Pierre Bourdieu observed of all collective struggles, ‘political subversion presupposes cognitive subversion, a conversion of the vision of the world’.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁸ Gill (1994), p.120.

²⁶⁹ Bourdieu (1991), pp.127-128.

Conclusion

The Global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: A Cultural and Political Movement

The individuals and groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i-Islami in Britain, as the preceding three chapters have shown, are organisationally networked, bonded with the ties of cultural solidarity, and engaged in a conflict of values with Britain's mainstream liberal democratic culture as well as the British political authorities. This thesis can therefore conclude that collectively they form a social movement.

This is not a social movement in the sense in which the term is most commonly understood in the popular imagination or in the academic study of social movements. It does not have a central leadership structure with clearly identifiable spokespeople, it is not primarily driven by a desire to address inequalities within the political system, and the conflict in which it is involved is not merely with the state. But it is a social movement nonetheless. It is decentralised, but very well networked and organised. It is concerned with what its protagonists perceive as injustices within Britain's political and legal apparatus, but this concern drives deeper to the taken-for-granted values underlying and sustaining this apparatus. It is engaged in a conflict with the state but, more importantly, it is opposed to the culture—political, legal, economic, scientific and social—that the state represents and protects. It is a social movement but, to emphasise its concern with both a way of life and the authority to present and maintain it, it is perhaps better described as a cultural and political movement.

The individuals that feature prominently in this movement do not constitute a clear vanguard, in the sense of a unified front directing its strategic direction. There is no hierarchical central command structure but, rather, a multiplicity of overlapping

leadership structures. In each distinct field of contention, there are clearly positioned leaders or clusters of leaders with specialist knowledge and experience. Without a central or dominant leadership structure, it may be asked whether the network of revivalists are engaged in disconnected and diverse struggles, and thus whether it is a movement at all. But what makes this a singular struggle, as opposed to a plurality of struggles, is not only the overlapping organisational connections between the key protagonists, but also the singularity of stakes in the various fields in which they conflict.

For the protagonists of the revivalist movement—whether advocating for changes in government policy and legislation, influencing the education of Muslim children, arbitrating disputes in Muslim communities or acquiring political power in local government—the stakes are the same: The embodiment of a distinct Islamic worldview and associated values within the social and political structures of the British state, and within the cognitive structures of its people. This involves the religious identity not only of Muslims and Muslim social institutions, but also—on a timescale of no immediate concern to them—of would-be Muslims and would-be Muslim social institutions. For the authorities of the state, including central and local government, the stakes involve the protection of the liberal democratic worldview and associated values within Britain’s social and political order, as well as in the minds of its citizenry.

The conflict in which the revivalist movement in Britain is engaged is networked or distributed throughout the social order in various fields, including education, media, governance and law. The *raison d’être* of the work of all revivalists is to defend and promote Islam as a way of life in Britain. This includes an epistemology and an ethics—an approach to knowledge and a moral code—that conflicts with the liberal democratic status quo and the powers that preside over it. Because a way of life has a multiplicity of expressions—such as how people educate their children and how they settle disputes—there is a multiplicity of antagonisms or potential antagonisms with the authorities protecting the liberal democratic status quo where these individuals and groups are active. These include the subtle contention of ‘British values’ in campaigns to influence government policy or law, for example in MCB and others’ efforts seeking the criminalisation of ‘blaspheming’ Islam or special

provisions for Muslim schoolchildren in state schools.¹ They also include more confrontational campaigns agitating Muslim sentiment against the government, for example in CAGE and FOSIS's collaborative work in British universities undermining its counter-radicalisation strategy, *Prevent*.²

According to Lorenzo Vidino, all global Muslim Brotherhood organisations in the West possess two goals. The first, he says, is 'the preservation of an Islamic identity among Western Muslims'.³ This alludes to a crucial feature of the movement. But these groups, as this thesis has shown, do not simply seek to 'preserve' Muslim identity. They seek to define and practically engineer it. If there is something as an Islamic identity of Muslims in the West perceived in need of protection from the corrupting influences of decadent secular culture, then it is also something that is contested between Muslims with very different perceptions of their faith and its role in contemporary Western societies. Muslim identity is not something to be taken for granted, but something that is actively produced and contested within a web of often-conflictual relationships.

The second goal that Vidino sees them as possessing is to become the official or *de facto* interlocutors for Muslims in their respective countries.⁴ This claim also intimates an important point, but it is somewhat concealed by a slight empirical inaccuracy: Not all groups in the movement aspire to represent Muslims' interests to the state authorities officially or unofficially. In Britain, some groups, such as the UK Islamic Mission and the Islamic Forum of Europe, do not have any communicative channels to the government and prefer to work within Muslim communities, leaving MCB to act as the primary interlocutor and other groups, such as the Association of Muslim Schools UK to represent Muslim needs in specialist fields such as education.

¹ See, for example, Murtaza Ali Shah, 'Muslims call for change in UK blasphemy laws', *The International News* (Pakistan), November 14, 2012. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-142770-Muslims-call-for-change-in-UK-blasphemy-laws>. See also Association of Muslim Lawyers (2003b), n.18.1.1.

² See, for example, Stuart (2015).

³ Vidino (2011), p.10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.12-13.

Nevertheless, whilst only some groups have an official or unofficial intermediary role with the state, *all* of the individuals and groups comprising the movement are engaged in symbolic work that might be thought to ‘represent’ Islam and Muslims, whether in relation to the state or within Muslim environments. Yet, in the same sense in which these actors are engaged in engineering (rather than merely protecting) Muslim identity, they are also engaged in determining (rather than merely representing) Muslims’ needs. Strictly speaking, the revivalist actors—who may be public interlocutors, local community activists below the radar of media interest, or both—are involved in a symbolic struggle not to *represent* Islam as a way of life, but to *present* it as such.

Vidino’s two goals highlight two key aspects of the revivalists’ struggle, one relating to Muslim communities and the other relating to the secular authorities. We must add that these two aspects are linked. For the revivalist movement in Britain, the struggle within Muslim milieus is arguably more important than that in the social and political mainstream. Muslims are viewed by revivalists as an important vanguard for *da’wa* and bringing Islam to the British people, so activities that impart a certain Islamic worldview and set of values which can affect concentrations of Muslims are particularly significant. But this struggle is inevitably connected with the state, since the state is the guardian of policies, regulations and laws that affect Muslims as a distinct ‘community’ and that affect them as citizens of the state along with everyone else. Much of the work of the revivalist movement focuses on Muslims, but this necessarily involves a relationship with the state, not just as the regulator of policy that affects British Muslims as British citizens, but also as ‘the ultimate source of symbolic power’ that protects a dominant worldview and associated values perceived to be antagonistic or obstructive to Islam as a way of life.⁵

Re-thinking ideology and the ‘battle of ideas’

This thesis is the first work to explicitly examine whether the individuals and groups sometimes identified as participationist Islamists in Britain collectively comprise a social movement. In much of the relevant academic and think tank literature, a

⁵ Swartz (2013), p.141.

movement is tacitly assumed to exist through their classification as such. What supposedly explains such ascription is the unquestioned view that they share a political ideology whose goal is an Islamic state, as well as a gradualist, bottom-up methodology. As this thesis has shown, however, these individuals and groups generally consider the Islamic state not as a goal but as a reward, as a natural outcome of a society infused with Islamic values.

Whilst ‘Islamist’ does not really apply to the revivalist movement, neither does the term ‘post-Islamist’, which involves a conscious and explicit rejection of the Islamic state as a model of government. Revivalists in no way eschew what they view as the inevitable long-term result of their *jihad* for an alternative society, but neither do they prioritise it as an objective. Their immediate concerns are *not* a mere means to this end but, rather, goals in themselves. These include education for Muslim children in accord with teachings from the Qur’an and *sunna*, national legislation that prohibits the ‘vilification’ of Islam and its prophet Muhammad, and the arbitration of disputes between Muslims under *shari’a*.

Just as the term ‘Islamist’ is somewhat misleading, the classification of these individuals and groups as ‘participationist’ is likewise problematic. It is predicated upon their distinction from ‘rejectionists’, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, with the assumption that they both share the same goal—an Islamic state. Their most important point of difference is deemed to be in their choice of methods, which is secondary to what binds them. This, however, not only overplays the importance of the goal of an Islamic state, but also underestimates the importance of their approaches, which are, in fact, integral to their particular Islamic worldview and identity. Far from being merely incidental to their religiously conceived long-term goal of a society based on Islam, the revivalists’ approach to spreading their religion through education, advocacy and participation in secular politics, as well as their rejection of cultural isolation and violence, is a key constitutive element of their political ideology and religious solidarity.

Just as the notion of an Islamic state is overemphasised by both political analysts and British government leaders, so is the notion of ideology to make sense of what drives and unites politically active Muslims in Britain, including ‘non-violent extremists’. Not only are the specific characteristics of these groups’ ideology

sometimes mischaracterised, the underlying concept of ideology that is used is inherently doctrinaire and therefore falls short of the target.

Mischaracterising 'Islamism'

In a landmark speech on July 20, 2015, David Cameron outlined the government's new five-year counter-extremist strategy, which was subsequently published in October 2015. He stated, 'The root cause of the threat we face is the extremist ideology itself'.⁶ Several months earlier, in September 2014, Home Secretary Theresa May asserted, 'We need to defeat the ideology that lies behind the [terrorism] threat' and outlined this ideology as follows:

The extremists believe in a clash of civilisations—a fundamental incompatibility between Islamic and Western values, an inevitable divide between 'them and us'. They demand a caliphate, or a new Islamic state, governed by a harsh interpretation of Shari'ah law. They utterly reject British and Western values, including democracy, the rule of law, and equality between citizens, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, religion or sexuality. They believe that it is impossible to be a good Muslim and a good British citizen. And they dismiss anybody who disagrees with them—including other Muslims—as non-believers.⁷

This description of the ideology Britain faces from what the government calls 'Islamist extremism' is derived from the report of the prime minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism, *Tackling extremism in the UK*, published in December 2013.⁸ It is repeated in the new *Counter-Extremism Strategy*. It blurs many important points of contention that divide those considered as Islamists. In relation to the 'non-violent extremists' of the global Muslim Brotherhood it is, in fact, wrong on almost every point.

Whilst violent jihadist groups liberally cast other Muslims as apostates, reject Western values and prioritise the attainment of an Islamic state, the revivalist Brothers, as this thesis has shown, believe some Western values *are* Islamic values,

⁶ 'Extremism: PM speech', British Government website, July 20, 2015.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech>.

⁷ 'A Stronger Britain, Built On Our Values', British Government website, March 23, 2015.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-built-on-our-values>.

⁸ Cabinet Office (2013), pp.1-2.

assert the compatibility of Muslim and British identity, and reject the notion of a clash of civilisations. This is because, unlike the militant jihadists, they view Islam as a way of life that can and should be propagated from *within* secular, liberal democratic societies. Unlike the jihadists and the ‘non-violent’ rejectionists, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, they do not reject democracy as an electoral system and encourage Muslims to vote, although they idealise the *shari’a* as the model for government policy and law for their prophesised situation of a Muslim majority. They tend to believe that Muslim identity can accommodate national identity, as long as the latter does not determine the former. Rather than rejecting and isolating themselves from non-Muslim culture and identity, the revivalists are generally disposed to transforming it from within. This is not merely tactical, since it is linked to their mission of *da’wa*. And as mentioned, an Islamic state is a secondary concern in relation to an Islamic society.

Given the importance that the government places upon ‘non-violent extremism’ as a stepping-stone to ‘violent extremism’, the error in classifying them ideologically with other ‘Islamists’ is a grave one. By conflating distinct forms of Islamic activism under the heading of ‘Islamist extremism’, the government makes itself an easy target of criticism by Muslim activists and their sympathisers who can quite readily reject its faulty accusations. This risks undermining the government’s symbolic and moral authority to make judgments of Muslim groups and pronounce upon national values.

Beyond ideas: a conflict of culture

The government’s understanding of the ideology of ‘Islamism’ as expressed by Home Secretary May and the new *Counter-Extremism Strategy*—particularly of ‘non-violent extremism’—is empirically flawed. But its very reference to ideology carries problems of its own. This is because the conflict with what it calls ‘Islamist extremism’, violent or non-violent, is typically viewed as a ‘battle of ideas’ that may be resolved through the triumph of reason. Such a view expresses a very limited understanding of the ‘battleground’, and thus the resolvability, of the conflict.

In the *Counter-Extremism Strategy*, David Cameron refers to the ‘fight against Islamist extremism’ not only as ‘one of the great struggles of our generation’, but

also a ‘battle of ideas’ in which ‘the case’ for British values has to be made.⁹ Unsurprisingly, this view is shared by a number of ‘counter-extremism’ analysts and government advisers, including Ed Husain, the co-founder of Quilliam, a think tank that advised the government’s counter-extremism strategy. Husain writes, ‘Winning the long-term battle of ideas against Islamist radicals is the only solution. Muslim and other communities are in dire need for support to defeat the ideology that produces terror.’¹⁰ Maajid Nawaz, Quilliam’s chairman, asserts that the organisation ‘works to critique and *refute* this ideology wherever it is found’.¹¹ He states that ‘Islamism the ideology must be intellectually terminated’.¹² A similar perspective is expressed by Rashad Ali, the director of another London-based ‘counter-extremism’ think tank, Centri. In criticising the government’s new proposals to introduce banning orders on alleged ‘extremist’ groups, Ali states:

The Government is obsessed with legislation but this is not something you can defeat by legislation. *It is a battle of ideas and we have to defeat these ideas by argument ...* What we need, far more than any new law, is a *counter-argument* and a policy which can inspire [Muslim] society to defeat extremist *ideas*.¹³

Ali put this view into practice by co-authoring a theological ‘rebuttal’ of jihadist ideology, drawing upon Islamic sources to question the jihadist interpretation of the Qur’an and other scriptures.¹⁴

Ideas and ideals undeniably form part of the phenomenon of ‘Islamist extremism’, whether violent jihadism, non-violent rejectionism, or non-violent revivalism. But what this approach fails to grasp is that what is considered as an ideological battle is not equivalent to the rational competition between rival ideas settled through the

⁹ ‘Prime Minister Foreword’, HM Government (2015a), p.5.

¹⁰ Ed Husain, ‘Taking passports would only raise the jihadist threat’, *The Evening Standard*, September 2, 2014. <http://www.standard.co.uk/comment/ed-husain-taking-passports-would-raise-the-jihadist-threat-9706097.html>.

¹¹ Maajid Nawaz, ‘The Way Back from Islamism’, The Washington Institute, July 16, 2008. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-way-back-from-islamism>.

¹² Maajid Nawaz, comment on Facebook post, July 7, 2015. <http://tiny.cc/mnawaz-ideology-20150707>.

¹³ Andrew Gilligan, ‘How banning radical Islamists will play right into their hands’, *The Telegraph*, May 31, 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11641188/How-banning-radical-Islamists-will-play-right-into-their-hands.html>.

¹⁴ Ali and Stuart (2014).

logic of reason. With Islamic revivalism in Britain, the government is engaged not in a contest of argument and counter-argument, but in a conflict of worldviews and values waged upon different levels of consciousness and acted out in practice in social settings.

The notion of a ‘battle of ideas’ in which ‘extremists’ might be ‘de-radicalised’ through the rebuttal of certain ideas ignores the complex, unconscious and social factors that enable the production, meaningfulness and appeal of such ideas. Such factors include a taken-for-granted worldview and an associated set of values. The primary battleground that makes ideological warfare possible is at the level of what Pierre Bourdieu calls the *habitus*, the unconsciously embodied dispositions and ‘mental structures’ through which people apprehend the social world as natural and self-evident. These are generated socially in experience, inculcated through a mixture of subtle processes and overt methods.

The most important pre-dispositions that enable the embrace of a certain ideological outlook include a range of unquestioned distinctions through which an in-group and others outside the group are relatively viewed and judged. The basis of the Islamic revivalist outlook is a vision of humanity clearly divided between Muslims and non-Muslims. Although Muslims are viewed within the broader family of humankind, they are distinguished internally, since only Muslims have embraced the truth of revelation and possess the divine duty to spread Islam, albeit through non-coercive means. Non-Muslims may or may not be explicitly cast as inferior, but Islam is deemed as a superior way of life that will one day prevail and, as carriers of the message of Islam, for revivalists there is an implicit but distinct sense of superiority in Muslim identity.

An important factor that enables such an outlook to take shape in consciousness as an ideology—in addition to a shared set of tacitly held dispositions and perceptual categories expressed in everyday social settings—are specific social and political constraints perceivable as *grievances*. Cameron is wrong to dismiss what he calls ‘the grievance justification’ and focus only on ‘ideology’.¹⁵ Revivalists are quite genuine in pointing to certain grievances, such as British foreign policy in Iraq, as

¹⁵ ‘Extremism: PM speech’.

motivating Muslim dissent and even terrorism. Eliza Manningham-Buller, former director-general of MI5, recognised this in 2010 when she told the Chilcot inquiry that Britain's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan had 'radicalised' Muslims who saw such involvement as 'an attack upon Islam'.¹⁶

However, critics of the government, such as Arun Kundnani, who altogether reject the role of ideology or religious belief as an explanatory factor for understanding Muslim dissent and even terrorism are equally mistaken.¹⁷ Positing religious ideology and political grievances as two alternative factors that might explain Muslim dissent, radicalisation or violence, as Cameron and Kundnani both do in their own ways, sets up a false choice. The political grievances of non-violent Muslim activists or Islamist terrorists are perceived *through* the lens of a religious ideology or worldview. This is exemplified by the martyrdom video of Ibrahim Savant, one of the terrorist cell caught by the British police plotting to blow up transatlantic airliners in 2006. After complimenting his co-plotters' rants about British and American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, he added, 'I, Savant, have sacrificed my life cheaply, within the sake of Allah, not to save myself from a life of trials and tribulations but to fulfill a covenant and promise with Allah the almighty, and *to make his din* [religion and way of life] *reign supreme*'.¹⁸

Crucially, for an ideology to take shape and for religious identity to become politicised—whether this leads to non-violent or violent conflict with the prevailing cultural and political orthodoxy—grievances need to be articulated as such by an elite of professional activists and ideologues. The entertainment of an ideology and the recognition of oneself as part of an oppressed group depends upon the trust willingly invested in the symbolic authority of the figures articulating an ideological vision of the group, its oppression and its struggle. So, any effort to combat an ideology needs to undermine the value of this kind of symbolic investment and not just the value of the ideas propagated. The 'battle of ideas' is better thought as a battle for symbolic power, which commands the recognition of certain social and

¹⁶ Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Former MI5 chief delivers damning verdict on Iraq invasion', *The Guardian*, July 20, 2010. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/20/chilcot-mi5-boss-iraq-war>.

¹⁷ See Kundnani (2015).

¹⁸ BBC News, "'Suicide videos': What they said', April 4, 2008, emphasis added. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7330367.stm.

political realities, including cultural identity. The key is not so much the assent of individuals and groups to certain *ideas* that conflict with liberal democracy. It is, rather, their assent to an *alternative authority* that pronounces the value of such ideas. It is their deference to an alternative, unquestioned source for the legitimization of ideas and values, one with which they can collectively identify.

This is not the simple result of a rational calculation, but of a symbolic and psychological investment in an alternative source of cultural and political legitimization, enabled by pre-political, cultural dispositions and a context of cultural strain. From another perspective, this entails a symbolic and psychological *disinvestment* from the cultural and political orthodoxy, which cannot be fully explained by reference to specific unfavourable social norms or government policies. A loss of faith in liberal democratic culture and its political system may facilitate a new-found or rejuvenated faith in Islam as an alternative way of life and form of governance. But this is not the simple result of a rational calculation. It is the outcome, rather, of a more inclusive psychological transformation occurring within fields of social activity involving competing symbolic authorities.

Symbolic struggles are inextricable from practical struggles. Thus, it is a serious error to locate this ideology solely in the heads of individuals and assume its *modus operandi* consists in ideas and arguments. David Cameron states, ‘What we are fighting, in Islamist extremism, is an ideology. It is an extreme doctrine. And like any extreme doctrine, it is subversive’.¹⁹ But the ideology that the government is concerned with as a possible pathway to violent jihadism is part of a larger, *cultural* problem. Underlying its conscious elaboration as a doctrine, it is expressed in practice throughout numerous fields of social activity. This thesis has only highlighted local government, education, and arbitration, but there are undoubtedly other fields, for example, involving charities, prisons, mosques, and universities.

Tackling it, as the government wishes to do, will be partial at best if it is treated simply as a doctrine. A more complete approach requires a conceptual leap from preventing ‘extremism’ as a precursor to ‘radicalisation’, which is focused on vulnerable individuals, to preventing the subversion of liberal democratic culture, which concerns vulnerable institutions, governmental and non-governmental, and

¹⁹ ‘Extremism: PM speech’.

groups. It is not just ‘ideas which are hostile to basic liberal values such as democracy, freedom and sexual equality’ that matter, but their embodiment in social institutions and cultural practices that are hostile to those very things.

Political and cultural subversion

The social movement of Islamic revivalism in Britain is subversive, but not in the sense as traditionally conceived by the British government or the few academics that have written about Islamist subversion. That is, it is neither primarily geared to overthrowing parliamentary democracy, nor primarily a problem in presenting a conduit for violence.²⁰ It is subversive in the sense of presenting an organised but decentralised programme of cultural propagation whose success entails the undermining or transformation of liberal democratic values and institutions. The British government has begun to articulate the importance of safeguarding what it refers to as ‘British values’ and the ‘British way of life’, and, in doing so, implicitly recognises the threat of subversion from ‘non-violent Islamist extremism’. But so far it has not utilised the term subversion. To do so would require a radical re-conception of subversion from its Cold War-era formulation.

Today, the official view of the British government on subversion remains framed by the concerns of the era in which the term first entered the modern political vocabulary. Subversion was defined in 1975 by the Labour Minister Lord Harris of Greenwich, as activities ‘which threaten the safety or well being of the state and which are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means’.²¹ This definition remains today as it appears in the Security Service Act of 1989. Although it does not use the word ‘subversion’, the Act directly borrows Lord Harris’s terms to define the function of the domestic security service, MI5, as follows:

The function of the Service shall be the protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from

²⁰ See, for example, Kilcullen (2007), Roseneau (2007), and Clutterbuck and Rosenau (2009).

²¹ Gill (1994), p.120.

the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions *intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means*.²²

Thus, included in the legal definition of the role of MI5 is the protection of national security from subversive threats. The Act relates these to the protection of ‘parliamentary democracy’ and, in doing so, considers the system of government (or in David Maxwell-Fyfe’s terms, the state) as the key target for subversive threats to national security.²³ This focus on the political system of the state, and blindness to the cultural edifice of liberal democratic values that underlies it, is out-dated. But it is understandable. The key concern at the time of the Act’s drafting was of Britain being subverted by, and into, an undemocratic, authoritarian Communist regime. This concept of subversion has not changed in the official view of the security service, so the only possible kind of subversive threat is equivalent to a Communist one.²⁴ Accordingly, in MI5’s view, there is no threat of subversion in Britain today. ‘Since the late 1980s,’ it states, ‘especially following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet communism, the threat from subversion has declined. It is now considered to be negligible. We do not currently investigate subversion.’²⁵

A gradual recognition of cultural subversion

Despite the government’s official neglect of reassessing or updating the concept of subversion, in the last eight or so years it has begun to recognise, albeit implicitly, the need to protect against cultural forms of subversion, as presented by Islamic revivalism, one form of what it calls ‘non-violent Islamist extremism’. The origins of this recognition can be traced to the publication of Britain’s *National Security Strategy* in 2008, which marked a significant break from the decades-old paradigm influenced by Cold War concerns.²⁶ David Omand describes the most fundamental

²² *Security Service Act*, 1.(2), emphasis added.

²³ In 1952, the British Home Secretary Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe stated that the task of MI5 was to defend the country from both internal and external threats, including subversion: ‘MI5’s task is the defence of the realm as a whole, from external and internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of persons and organisations whether directed from within or without the country which may be judged to be *subversive* of the State.’ See Gill (1994), p.119, emphasis added.

²⁴ ‘Subversion’, MI5 website. <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/other-issues-former-threats/subversion.html>.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Cabinet Office (2008).

shift in the strategy as ‘the definition of security itself’.²⁷ This is expressed in the document as one from a state-centric concept of security to what Omand describes as a new ‘human view of national security’ in which people and communities are central. The strategy explicitly emphasises the protection of the state’s citizens and their ‘way of life’.²⁸ This new broader concept of national security remains central to the current version of the strategy, which states: ‘Above all, we act to maintain our way of life: to protect our people and the freedoms we have built for ourselves, and the values of our society and institutions’.²⁹ The strategy talks about ‘core values [that] are not open to question’, and lists them as ‘the rule of law, democracy, free speech, tolerance and human rights’.³⁰

The importance of protecting or, more accurately, promoting British core values, such as universal human rights, equality before the law and democracy, came into sharper focus with the revision of the government’s counter-radicalisation strategy, *Prevent*. A previous iteration of *Prevent* in 2009 acknowledged the importance of challenging views ‘which fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardise community cohesion’.³¹ The spread of ‘non-violent extremism’, including a rejection of secular society and democratic government, was acknowledged as a problem, but primarily for creating ‘a climate in which people may be drawn into violent activities’.³² The importance of combating ‘extremist (and *non-violent*) ideas’ continues to be recognised in the latest iteration of *Prevent*, published in 2011, again from the point of view that they are ‘part of a *terrorist* ideology’.³³ *Prevent*’s conception of ‘non-violent extremism’ as a conduit to terrorism—and not as a problem for Britain’s ‘way of life’—is understandable given its counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism focus.

²⁷ Omand (2009), p.4, emphasis added.

²⁸ Cabinet Office (2008), pp.3-4.

²⁹ Cabinet Office (2010), p.22.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.23, 4.

³¹ HM Government (2009), p.15.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Home Office (2011), p.6, emphasis added.

However, since the latest revision of *Prevent*, the government has begun to view the importance of countering non-violent extremism beyond its function as a pathway to violence. It has begun to view non-violent extremism as a problem in itself or, put differently, as producing a range of problems affecting British values and key public institutions, as well as social integration.

New teachers' standards were introduced in 2012 which stipulate that 'teachers must not undermine fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect, and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs'.³⁴ In November 2014, all schools were subject to a new duty to 'actively promote' these values to enhance the 'spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils' and guard against 'extremism'.³⁵ Complementing this effort to positively strengthen 'British values' and Britain's liberal democratic culture, the 'Prevent duty', introduced in 2015, places an onus on schools and other public institutions to be prepared to combat 'extremist ideology' and prevent radicalisation. In December 2013, schools, universities and prisons were all identified by the Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism as institutions vulnerable to 'the ideology of Islamist extremism'.³⁶

In July 2015, clearly signalling that the government was taking 'extremism' seriously as a problem beyond its connection to terrorism, Cameron stated the importance of combatting '[i]deas which are hostile to basic liberal values such as democracy, freedom and sexual equality ... [and] which actively promote discrimination, sectarianism and segregation'.³⁷ This point of view is now being incorporated into government strategy. The Home Office, for example, plans an independent investigation into *shari'a* councils with regard to their impact on women's rights.³⁸ Also demonstrating the strategic incorporation of this awareness,

³⁴ Department for Communities and Local Government (2011), p.17.

³⁵ 'Guidance on promoting British values in schools published', British Government website. November 27, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/guidance-on-promoting-british-values-in-schools-published>.

³⁶ Cabinet Office (2013), p.1.

³⁷ 'Extremism: PM speech'.

³⁸ 'Theresa May speech A Stronger Britain, Built on our Values: A New Partnership to Defeat Extremism'.

the government has recently created the Extremism Analysis Unit (EAU) in the Home Office to study and combat both violent and non-violent forms of ‘extremism’. This point of view is also being incorporated in the government’s plans to introduce a new Counter-Extremism Bill to confront those ‘who seek to undermine democracy or use hate speech in public places’.³⁹ *The Guardian* reports that this new bill will introduce new legal powers to limit the ‘harmful activities’ of ‘extremist’ individuals who, in the words of the bill, pose a ‘threat to the functioning of democracy’.⁴⁰

This remarkably resembles the understanding of *subversion* first articulated by Lord Harris that appears in the Security Service Act of 1989 as activities ‘which threaten the safety or well being of the state and which are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy’.⁴¹ Indeed, Cameron has referred to ‘extremism’ as a ‘subversive’ doctrine.⁴² As Charles Moore observes, the government remains uncomfortable with the word ‘subversion’, but its new *Counter-Extremism Strategy* does use the word ‘entryism’ as a problem affecting public institutions.⁴³ The EAU will apparently lead the development of a ‘counter-entryism’ strategy for key British public bodies. In all but name, this amounts to *counter-subversion*. But the subversion presented by the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain, contrary to Cameron’s description, is not just a doctrine: It is a practice, or set of practices, including how children are taught in Muslim schools and how women are treated in *shari’a* courts.

The *Counter-Terrorism Strategy* states, ‘Extremists have attempted ... to *subvert* our democratic processes’, but the examples it provides refer solely to the efforts of rejectionist groups to dissuade Muslims from voting and the vocal rejection of the

³⁹ ‘Counter-Extremism Bill - National Security Council meeting’.

⁴⁰ Patrick Wintour, ‘David Cameron to unveil new limits on extremists’ activities in Queen’s speech’, *The Guardian*, May 13, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/may/13/counter-terrorism-bill-extremism-disruption-orders-david-cameron>.

⁴¹ Gill (1994), p.120.

⁴² ‘Extremism: PM speech’.

⁴³ Charles Moore, ‘Islamists only want one thing. We cannot appease them’, *The Telegraph*, July 3, 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11717180/Islamists-only-want-one-thing.-We-cannot-appease-them.html>. See also HM Government (2015a), p.19.

principles underpinning democratic processes.⁴⁴ This fails to acknowledge the subversion of Islamic revivalism in Britain, which is not just the undermining of democracy in public speech: It is the undermining of liberal democratic culture through an attempt at influencing perception and regulating action. This presents a problem that isn't captured in the security service's out-dated official view of subversion: It presents a problem not so much for parliamentary democratic government but for *a way of life*, a phrase first highlighted in the *National Security Strategy*.

Yet, there is no trade off between securing a way of life and the state: The cultural subversion of the revivalist movement involves not just the undermining of a way of life. It also involves undermining the state as the primary power that legitimates this way of life both practically, in the political and legal structures of society, and symbolically, in the cognitive structures of the people.

The revivalist movement, as this thesis has shown, is both cultural and political. It is opposed not merely to a particular culture—progressive, liberal democracy—but to the social and political institutions of this culture. Contrary to the government's view, these 'extremists' do not 'demand a caliphate, or a new Islamic state'.⁴⁵ But they are nevertheless concerned with obtaining political authority. They may not aim at toppling Britain's liberal democratic political system, but they are concerned with attaining political power as it relates to the governance of everyday practices—as apparent in education and arbitration—and the symbolic capacity to structure knowledge and belief in line with their religious worldview.

Some considerations for the future

The British government's conflict with 'non-violent Islamist extremism' is likely to continue for many years to come. Several factors compound the importance of understanding this conflict: Muslim attitudes to integration and Muslim demographics.

⁴⁴ HM Government (2015a), pp.12-13.

⁴⁵ 'Theresa May speech A Stronger Britain, Built on our Values: A New Partnership to Defeat Extremism'.

Recent polls consistently show a significant minority of Muslims in Britain desire *shari'a* law. In a poll conducted in 2006 by GfK NOP Social Research, despite 94% of British Muslims expressing the desire not to live separately from non-Muslims, an average of 30% of Muslims expressed the desire to live under *shari'a* rather than British law, peaking at 34% of 18-24 year olds.⁴⁶ Just over a quarter wanted to see Britain as an Islamic state. In the same year, a poll conducted by ICM for *The Sunday Telegraph* showed that 40% of British Muslims want *shari'a* introduced into parts of Britain.⁴⁷ Similar findings were found in a poll commissioned by Policy Exchange in 2007, which found that an average of 28% of Muslims wanted to live under the *shari'a*, peaking at 37% of 16-24 year olds.⁴⁸ In 2008, YouGov conducted a poll for the Centre for Social Cohesion at 12 universities, which found that 40% of Muslim students supported the introduction of *shari'a* into British law for Muslims.⁴⁹ And, most recently, a survey conducted by ICM for Channel 4 published in April 2016 found that 23% of British Muslims would prefer parts of Britain governed by *shari'a* rather than British law.⁵⁰ The survey, which used a control group to compare Muslim and non-Muslim attitudes, found 'a chasm ... between those Muslims surveyed and the wider population on attitudes to liberal values on issues such as gender equality, homosexuality and issues relating to freedom of expression'.⁵¹ It also revealed 'significant differences on attitudes to violence and terrorism'.

These attitudes are a source of concern that is likely to grow as Britain's Muslim population grows. According to the Office for National Statistics, Britain's Muslim population has grown ten times faster than the general population over the last

⁴⁶ GfK NOP Social Research (2006).

⁴⁷ *The Sunday Telegraph*, 'Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want sharia law in UK', February 19, 2006. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1510866/Poll-reveals-40pc-of-Muslims-want-sharia-law-in-UK.html>.

⁴⁸ Mirza, Senthilkumaran and Ja'far (2007).

⁴⁹ Thorne and Stuart (2008).

⁵⁰ Channel 4, 'C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think', Channel 4 website, April 11, 2016. <http://www.channel4.com/info/press/news/c4-survey-and-documentary-reveals-what-british-muslims-really-think>. For the full survey report, see 'ICM Muslims survey for Channel 4', ICM website, April 11, 2016. <http://www.icmunlimited.com/polls/icm-muslims-survey-for-channel-4/>.

⁵¹ Channel 4, *ibid*.

decade, from 1.6 million in 2001 (when the British Census first began to measure religion) to 2,869,000 in 2010.⁵² Demographers expect this trend to continue. In January 2011, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life projected that by 2030 Britain will have a Muslim population of 5.5 million, roughly 8.2% of the total population.⁵³ That is almost double its 2010 figure of 2.8 million, at 4.6%. Most of this increase will occur in areas where Muslims are concentrated, in cities such as Bradford and Oldham.⁵⁴ According to a study presented to the Royal Geographical Society in 2005, the proportion of Britons of Muslim Pakistani origin living in ethnic enclaves had already trebled in the previous ten years.⁵⁵

Given these considerations, the problems presented by ‘non-violent Islamist extremism’ in Britain—from social segregation to jihadist terrorism—are likely to become more acute. This thesis cannot present policy recommendations to tackle this range of problems. But it can conclude by making several observations that might be useful for the government to consider for the development of its efforts to counter extremism.

The government’s official understanding of ‘Islamism’ fails to acknowledge key differences not just between violent jihadists and non-violent Islam-inspired groups, but also between non-violent groups that reject political participation and those that support it. In all of its announcements and reports—including *Tackling extremism in the UK* and its *Counter-Extremism Strategy*—it blurs all of these groups under the heading of ‘Islamist extremism’. By articulating a more sophisticated understanding of Muslim activism, the government can avoid making false claims about certain groups or individuals, for example, regarding the importance of an Islamic state. It

⁵² Richard Kerbaj, ‘Muslim population “rising 10 times faster than rest of society”’, *The Times*, January 30, 2009. <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article1937685.ece>.

⁵³ For the Pew Forum report, see ‘The Future of the Global Muslim Population, Projections for 2010-2030, Analysis’, Pew Forum website, January 27, 2011. <http://www.pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe.aspx>.

⁵⁴ Ed West, ‘Here's one story the Right-wing media didn't make up: in 2030 Britain will be 8.2 per cent Muslim’, *The Telegraph*, January 28, 2011. <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/edwest/100073893/heres-one-story-the-right-wing-media-didnt-make-up-in-2030-britain-will-be-8-2-per-cent-muslim/>.

⁵⁵ David Adam, ‘UK Asians isolated in city enclaves’, *The Guardian*, September 1, 2005. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/sep/01/race.world>.

can target its criticisms more precisely and minimise the sting to its credibility that erroneous generalisations encourage.

Furthermore, by being much more specific about national values and laws—for example, those relating to women’s rights—the government can make it more difficult for ‘extremist’ groups to deploy liberal concepts, such as ‘equality’, in a general way whilst concealing the radically different meaning such concepts have in their alternative worldview. This will, however, have the effect of forcing a clash of cultures onto the public stage.

Combating this worldview is important for the government, but the conflict that the global Muslim Brotherhood is engaged in is greater than a ‘battle of ideas’ that may be won by theological counter-arguments. The challenge is far bigger and more complex. It is a conflict of schemes of perception and moral judgement, and so necessarily involves the cultural institutions and forms of social practice that inculcate and reinforce them. Such institutions may include mosques, Muslim schools, study groups, community organisations, charities, *fatwa* councils and *shari’a* courts. This isn’t to say that these institutions necessarily radicalise individuals. It is, rather, to say that they may foster a collective habitus for Muslim children and young adults in which distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims, between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ Muslims, and between men and women are prominent and unconsciously naturalised.

Most importantly, these institutions may help foster a collective Muslim identity that is deemed prior to any other form of social identification. Such an identity is one that elevates the collective above the individual, as encouraged by the European Council of Fatwas and Research (ECFR), which advises European Muslims that the integrity of the collective Muslim *umma* ‘comes before anyone’s individual rights’.⁵⁶ The kind of Muslim identity that ECFR and many other revivalist bodies engineer is not necessarily political, but it may serve as the seed for a politically activist mentality that consciously opposes Western liberal values and institutions.

The government’s acknowledgment of the cultural factors in the development of ‘extremist’ Muslim attitudes opens policy avenues that are far from risk-free. Many

⁵⁶ *Fatwas of the European Council for Fatwa and Research* (2002), p. 31.

new problems and challenges arise, including the entire matter of faith schooling. Any government scrutiny of Islamic institutions is bound to provoke accusations of ‘Islamophobia’ from individuals and groups already active in the revivalist movement.

For the government’s ‘battle of ideas’ to be effective, it has to target the symbolic authority of the key ‘extremist’ ideologues and activists. The official understanding of the ideology or worldview of so-called ‘Islamist extremists’ will provide an insufficient basis for the development of an effective strategy to counter ‘extremism’ if it does not incorporate into its analysis not only the cultural enabling environment, but also the sources of the ideologues’ symbolic credibility. Research into this area—that identifies the key actors, their core messages and, most importantly, what gives them their social appeal—would fill an important knowledge gap.

The government could also acknowledge that grievances play a role in agitating Muslim ‘extremism’, including attacks on the symbolic authority of the state and terroristic attacks on its people. Grievances contribute to the symbolic credibility of key ideologues, but are in turn amplified by such leaders. Grievances depend upon certain ways of perceiving and evaluating the world, but also foster them. So it is important for the government to take them seriously. A greater openness to discuss grievances may allow the authorities to engage with Muslim sentiment and not just ‘Islamist’ ideology into which such sentiment may become channelled. Greater openness may also enable the authorities to distinguish between the legitimate criticism of government policy—where differences of view on the facts or on the value of certain actions may be disputed—and attacks on the legitimacy of the state that emanate from a radically different worldview whose source is an alternative, higher authority.

Perhaps the most important thing for the government to acknowledge is that the protection of liberal democratic values and universal human rights cannot occur simply through a battle of ideas or a war of words. They are to be protected in practice in numerous fields of social activity, including, most importantly, education. How they are to be protected is one of the most important challenges that

the government, as their primary champion, faces in the coming decades. There are plenty of avenues of research yet to be conducted to help inform such a task.

This thesis has shown that an organised network of revivalist individuals and organisations are active in institutionalising an alternative worldview and set of values within Muslim milieus, but it has probably only scratched the surface. The extent to which further Trojan Horse operations are underway in places other than Birmingham has not been the subject of serious scrutiny. The impact of Muslim schools on children's attitudes to social integration is likewise understudied. Far more can be learned about the extent to which *shari'a* councils, as well as online *fatwa* forums, play a role in Muslim communities and their impact on the human rights of women and children. Another potentially useful line of inquiry includes the role of social media in the formation of Muslim identity antagonistic to the liberal democratic values of British society and the British state. Many of the key individuals in the revivalist movement are also engaged in community work at the local level, but the extent to which they have an influence on local communities, and the way in which they do so, is unclear. The size of the social and cultural support base of the global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain thus presents another potentially useful research topic. This thesis may hopefully serve as a starting point for some of these lines of inquiry.

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Appendix 1

Brief biographies of interviewees

Suhaib Hasan bin Abdul Ghaff

- Secretary, Islamic Sharia Council
- Senior imam, Green Lane Mosque
- Executive Committee member, Board of Trustees, Muslim Aid
- Member, European Council for Fatwa and Research
- Member, International Union of Muslim Scholars
- Former president, Ahl-e-Hadith

Usama Hasan

- Senior researcher in Islamic Studies, Quilliam

Mohammed Abdul Aziz

- Senior Muslim adviser, Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG)
- Director, Faithwise
- Former researcher, Islamic Foundation
- Founding CEO of the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism and the British Muslim Research Centre
- CRE commissioner (2004-2007)
- Member, Equality and Diversity Forum
- Member, government's steering group on the Commission for Equality and Human Rights

Muhammad Abdul Bari

- Chairman of East London Mosque
- Secretary of Board of Trustees, Muslim Aid
- Chair, National Council, Muslim Council of Britain (2014-2016)
- (Elected) Central Working Committee member, Muslim Council of Britain (2010-2012)
- Former secretary general, Muslim Council of Britain (2006-2010)
- Founding president, Islamic Forum of Europe

Daud Abdullah

- Director, Middle East Monitor
- (Elected) Central Working Committee member, Muslim Council of Britain (2010-2012)
- Former deputy secretary general, Muslim Council of Britain (2008-2010)

- Former assistant secretary general, Muslim Council of Britain (2003-2006)
- Former senior researcher, Palestinian Return Centre
- Trustee, Centre for the Study of Terrorism
- Chairman and khatib, Masjid Annoor, Acton

Iftikhar Ahmad

- Founder, the London School of Islamics (one of the first Muslim schools in Britain)

Anas Altikriti

- Director, Cordoba Foundation
- Trustee, Centre for the Study of Terrorism
- Founding member, British Muslim Initiative (2007)
- Founding member and former president, Muslim Association of Britain (2004-2005)
- Translator, European Council for Fatwa and Research

Irshad Baqui

- Executive Director, Islamic Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

- Head of research, Cordoba Foundation (and editor, *Arches Quarterly*)
- Media and research secretary, Islamic Forum of Europe
- Director of training, Centre for the Study of Terrorism (and assistant editor, *Islamism Digest*)
- Trustee, East London Mosque
- Founding committee member, National Interim Committee of Muslim Organisations (precursor of the Muslim Council of Britain)
- Former president, Young Muslim Organisation UK (Britain's oldest youth Islamic movement)
- Founding member, European Platform (headed by Tariq Ramadan)
- Co-ordinator, Global Civilisations Study Centre
- Founding director, Muslim Community Radio

Omer El-Hamdoon

- President, Muslim Association of Britain

Dilwar Hussain

- Founding chair, New Horizons
- Senior programme adviser, Institute for Strategic Dialogue
- Research fellow, Lokahi Foundation
- Associate of the Centre for Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge.
- Former head of the Policy Research Centre, Islamic Foundation (2007-2013)
- Former president, Islamic Society of Britain (2011-2013)
- Specialist adviser to the CLG/HOC Inquiry into Preventing Violent Extremism (2010)
- Member, Preventing Extremism Together workgroups, Home Office
- Former commissioner, Commission for Racial Equality (2006–2007)

Tehmina Kazi

- Director, British Muslims for Secular Democracy
- Former project officer at the Equality and Human Rights Commission

Shiraz Maher

- Senior research fellow and head of outreach at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, Kings College London

Sheikh Maulana Abu Sayeed

- Chairman, Islamic Shariah Council
- President, Dawatul Islam UK & Eire
- Member, European Council for Fatwa and Research
- Member, International Union of Muslim Scholars
- Teacher, Dar ul-Umma Secondary School, London
- Khatib, Darul Ummah Mosque

Ibrahim Mogra

- Assistant secretary general, Muslim Council of Britain
- Vice chair and trustee, Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board

Farooq Murad

- Director, Islamic Foundation
- Former secretary general, Muslim Council of Britain (2010-2014)
- Trustee, Muslim Aid
- Former chair, Muslim Aid (2004-2008)
- Former president, Islamic Society of Britain

Suleman Nagdi

- Founder member, Muslim Burial Council of Leicestershire
- Public relations officer, Federation of Muslim Organisations

Anas Shaikh-Ali

- Director, International Institute of Islamic Thought, London

Appendix 2

Data for network diagram produced in *Gephi*

Table 3: Key to individuals and organisations

Below are the names of the individuals and organisations that are included in Figure 1 (page 152), the network diagram of the revivalist movement in Britain. The abbreviations of the names of the individuals and organisations are listed below as they appear both in the diagram and Table 4 (below) from which the diagram was generated. Their full names are also provided.

A) Individuals

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Full name</i>
A.Ali	Azad Ali
AbdulBari	Muhammad Abdul Bari
Abdullah	Daud Abdullah
AbuSayeed	Maulana Abu Sayeed
Ahmad	Khurshid Ahmad
Ahsan	Manazir Ahsan
Alam	Tahir Alam
Altikriti	Anas Altikriti
Ansari	Zafar Ishaq Ansari
Arshad	Shazia Arshad
Asaria	Iqbal Asaria
Azad	Hamid Azad
Aziz	Mohamed Abdul Aziz
Baqui	Irshad Baqui
Begg	Moazzam Begg
Birawi	Zaher Birawi
Dilly	Muhammad Dilwar ('Dilly') Hussain
Dubayan	Ahmad al-Dubayan
F.Ahmed	Farah Ahmed
Faliq	Abdullah Faliq
Faour	Ghassan Faour
Ghaffar	Ashraf Muhammad Abdul Halim Abdul Ghaffar
Haddad	Haitham al-Haddad
Hamdoon	Omer el-Hamdoon
Harrath	Mohamed Ali Harrath
Hasan	Suhaib Hasan

Helbawy	Kemal el-Helbawy
Hewitt	Ibrahim Hewitt
Hussain	Dilwar Hussain
I.Bunglawala	Inyat Bunglawala
Islam	Yusuf Islam
Ismail	Sufyan Ismail
Kazim	Raza Kazim
Khamissa	Edris Khamissa
Khan	Dilwar Hussain Khan
KhanCheema	Mohammed Akram Khan-Cheema
Kozbar	Mohammad Kozbar
L.Ali	Lutfur Ali
Madi	Arafat Madi
Madni	Maulana Sarfraz Madni
Merali	Azru Merali
Mirza	Babar Mirza
Mogra	Ibrahim Mogra
Mohammed	Jahangir Mohammed
Mukadam	Mohamed Mukadam
Munir	Ibrahim Munir
Murad	Farooq Murad
Parvez	Zahid Parvez
Qaradawi	Yusuf al-Qaradawi
Rabbani	Muhammad Rabbani
Rahman	Lutfur Rahman
Rawi	Riyadh al-Rawi
S.Bunglawala	Shenaz Bunglawala
Sacranie	Iqbal Sacranie
Sadiq	Asif Sadiq
Sahin	Abdullah Sahin
Saleem	Amjad Saleem
Sarwar	Ghulam Sarwar
Sawalha	Mohammad Sawalha
Seddon	Mohammad Siddique Seddon
Shadjareh	Massoud Shadjareh
Shaikh	Anas al-Shaikh
Shoukri	Arafat Madi Shoukri
Siddiqui	Abdur Rashid Siddiqui
Tamimi	Azzam Tamimi
Thomas-Johnson	Amandla Thomas-Johnson
Thompson	Ahmad Thompson
Uddin	Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin
Wasti	Syed Tanzim Wasti

B) Organisations

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Full name</i>
Alt.L.Inq	Alternative Leveson Inquiry
AML	Association of Muslim Lawyers
AMSUK	Association of Muslim Schools UK (AMS-UK)
AMSS	Association of Muslim Social Scientists
AST	Al-Aqsa School Trust
BMI	British Muslim Initiative (BMI)
Cage	Cage Prisoners
Committee	Coordination Committee of Islamic Organisations
Cordoba	Cordoba Foundation
CMA	Centre for Muslim Affairs
CST	Center for the Study of Terrorism
Dawatul	Da'watul Islam UK & Eire
ECESG	European Campaign to End the Siege on Gaza (ECESG)
ECFR	European Council of Fatwa and Research (ECFR)
ELM	East London Mosque
FEMYSO	Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO)
FIOE	Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE)
FOSIS	Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS)
IBERR	International Board of Educational Research and Resources (IBERR)
ICC/LCM	Islamic Cultural Centre / London Central Mosque
iERA	Islamic Education and Research Academy
IFE	Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE)
IHRC	Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC)
IIIT	International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)
IMUS	International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS)
INCEIF	International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF)
Interpal	Palestinian Relief and Development Fund
Int.Ikhwan	International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood
ISB	Islamic Society of Britain (ISB)
ISF	Islamic Shakhsiyah Foundation
IslamExpo	Islam Expo
IslamicFnd	Islamic Foundation
M.W.House	Muslim Welfare House
MAB	Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)
MCB	Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)
MEMO	Middle East Monitor (MEMO)
MEND	Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) - formerly iEngage
MET	Muslim Educational Trust (MET)
MINAB	Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB)
MRDF	Muslim Research and Development Foundation (MRDF)
MSF	Muslim Safety Forum (MSF)
MTEC	Muslim Teachers and Educators Committee (MTEC)

MuslimAid	Muslim Aid
MuslimLawyersEur	Muslim Lawyers (Europe)
NAMP	National Association of Muslim Police
NICMU	Interim Committee for Muslim Unity (NICMU)
Nida	Nida Trust
P.V.E.Trust	Park View Educational Trust
PRC	Palestine Return Centre (PRC)
Ramphal	Ramphal Institute
ShariaCouncil	Islamic Sharia Council
UG	Union of Good (UG)
UKBSC	UK Board of Sharia Councils (UKBSC)
UKIM	UK Islamic Mission (UKIM)
YMOUK	Young Muslims Organisation UK (YMOUK)
YMUK	Young Muslims UK (YMUK)

Table 4: Relationships between individuals and organisations

Table 4 was produced during research for Chapter 3, which describes the network of Islamic revivalist organisations and individuals. Whilst it is not exhaustive, it is perhaps the most comprehensive data set available for the relationships between the organisations and individuals comprising the network.

Each row in the table below identifies a link between an individual and an organisation (or two individuals or two organisations). The two linked parties appear in the Source and Target columns. *Gephi* uses the data in these two columns to produce the network diagram as seen in Figure 1. ‘Link type’ refers to one of several kinds of relationship: (1) a working relationship (‘Work’), where an individual has worked or is working for an organisation or is involved in an organisation as a trustee; (2) a collaborative relationship (‘Collab’), where two organisations or an individual and an organisation have worked together on projects or events; (3) an affiliation (‘Affiliate’), where one organisation is connected to another as an affiliate or mutually recognised long term partner; or (4) a personal relationship (‘Personal’), such as close friends, spouses or relatives.

The ‘Notes’ column provides a brief description of the relationship, and the ‘Sources’ column provides website addresses where many of the relationships were ascertained. These sources are by no means exhaustive, but are particularly useful to clarify formal trustee and director positions in organisations.

<i>Source</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Link type</i>	<i>Notes</i>	<i>Sources</i>
A.Ali	ELM	Work	Member	http://www.islamchannel.tv/PresenterProfiles.aspx
A.Ali	IFE	Work	Community affairs co-ordinator	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMVKVNv-8_U
A.Ali	IslamChannel	Work	Presenter, 'Your Views on the News'	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMVKVNv-8_U
A.Ali	MCB	Work	Chair of membership committee; member of CWC	http://web.archive.org/web/20080703170508/http://www.mcb.org.uk/chomepage.php?com_id=13 ; http://www.islamchannel.tv/PresenterProfiles.aspx
A.Ali	MEND	Work	Head of Community Development & Engagement	http://mend.we-convey.com/advocacy/about-us/ ; http://iengage.uk.net/about-us/engage-team/
A.Ali	MSF	Work	Founding chairman. 'currently leads on the Counter Terrorism workstream for the Forum'	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/7908273/Police-Muslim-forum-headed-by-Islamic-extremist.html ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMVKVNv-8_U ; http://www.islamchannel.tv/PresenterProfiles.aspx
AbdulBari	Alt.L.Inq	Collab	Campaign signatory	http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press
AbdulBari	Committee	Affiliate	Individual rep	Interview with Faliq
AbdulBari	ELM	Work	Chairman 2002-2013	http://www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/content/management
AbdulBari	IFE	Work	Founding president	http://www.naba.org.uk/Content/articles/Diaspora/606_McRoy_Bari_MCB.htm
AbdulBari	MCB	Work	Former secretary general 2006-2010; elected national council member 2014-16; chair for national council meetings 2014-16	http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslim-council-of-britain-elects-new-leadership-and-discusses-british-values/
AbdulBari	MuslimAid	Work	Secretary of board of trustees	https://www.muslimaid.org/about-us/governance/
AbdulBari	Nida	Work	Patron	http://www.amanaparenting.com/?page_id=2
AbdulBari	Ramphal	Work	Patron	http://www.amanaparenting.com/?page_id=2
Abdullah	BMI	Work	Representative	http://ihrc.org.uk/news/comment/11381-muslim-community-rejects-the-states-criminalisation-of-islam-and-condemns-moves-to-silence-legitimate-critique-and-dissent-
Abdullah	CST	Work	Trustee 2010	http://web.archive.org/web/20101028031948/http://www.cfsot.com/index.php?thm=staff
Abdullah	FOSIS	Collab	Event speaker	http://standforpeace.org.uk/federation-of-student-islamic-societies-fosis/#_edn6
Abdullah	MCB	Work	Former assistant secretary general (2003-2006); (elected) central working	http://web.archive.org/web/20120224112001/http://www.mcb.org.uk/comm_details.php?heading_id=105&com_id=1

			committee member (2010-2012)	
Abdullah	MEMO	Work	Director	https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/blogs/132-dr-daud-abdullah
Abdullah	PRC	Work	Former researcher	http://www.palestine-conference.net/2014/speakers/28-dr-daud-abdullah
AbuSayed	Dawatul	Work	President	http://www.darulummahmosque.org.uk/khatib-imam/abu-syed/
AbuSayed	ECFR	Work	Member of ECFR	Interview with Sayyed
AbuSayed	IUMS	Work	Member	Interview with Sayyed
AbuSayed	MCB	Work	National council member (national affiliate) 2014-16	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/leadership/
AbuSayed	ShariaCouncil	Work	Chair and trustee	http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1003855&SubsidiaryNumber=0
Ahmad	AMSS	Work	Member of AMS UK advisory board (2002, 2011)	http://www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf/AMSSUK%20MEiE%20Conf%20Sep2002%20-%20booklet.pdf ; http://web.archive.org/web/20110911192237/http://www.amssuk.com/aboutus.html
Ahmad	Committee	Affiliate	Individual rep	Interview with Faliq
Ahmad	IIPT	Work	Adviser	http://web.archive.org/web/20050305182626/http://www.ii-pt.com/web/advisors.htm
Ahmad	IslamicFnd	Work	Chairman	http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/user/BoardofTrustees.aspx
Ahsan	IslamicFnd	Work	Director general	http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/user/BoardofTrustees.aspx
Ahsan	MCB	Work	Elected national council member 2012-14, 2014-16, former chair of inter-faith relations	http://web.archive.org/web/20120224112001/http://www.mcb.org.uk/comm_details.php?heading_id=105&com_id=1 ; http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/leadership/ ; http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslim-council-of-britain-elects-new-leadership-and-discusses-british-values/ ; http://web.archive.org/web/20110518062906/http://www.mcb.org.uk/chomepage.php?com_id=20
Ahsan	MINAB	Work	Chair of Membership committee 2011	http://web.archive.org/web/20110505235523/http://www.minab.org.uk/about-us/committees
Ahsan	NICMU	Work	Founder of MCB	Interview with Faliq
Alam	AMSUK	Work	Executive committee (shura council) member 2008-09; vice chair	http://www.ams-uk.org/general/chairman's%20report%202009.pdf ; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationopinion/10700041/Muslim-extremists-and-a-worrying-lesson-for-us-all.html
Alam	MCB	Work	Former assistant secretary general 2006-2008; former chair of education committee 2006-2008	http://web.archive.org/web/20080703170529/http://www.mcb.org.uk/committee/21.php ; http://web.archive.org/web/20080703170503/http://www.mcb.org.uk/chomepage.php?com_id=12 ; http://www.ihrc.org.uk/events/5571-Educating-Muslims-in-Britain

Alam	MTEC	Collab	Event speaker 2011	http://www.ihrc.org.uk/events/5571-Educating-Muslims-in-Britain
Alam	P.V.E.Trust	Work	Former director and chair of board of trustees, until resignation July 2014	http://web.archive.org/web/20140703095038/http://www.pvet.co.uk/governance
Altikriti	Alt.L.Inq	Collab	Campaign signatory	http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press
Altikriti	BMI	Work	Co-founder	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/anas-altikriti/
Altikriti	Cordoba	Work	CEO; director	http://thecordobafoundation.com/attach/Staff%20Profiles.pdf ; http://companycheck.co.uk/company/07006885/THE-CORDOBA-FOUNDATION-LIMITED/directors-secretaries
Altikriti	CST	Work	Trustee 2010 (still?)	http://web.archive.org/web/20101028031948/http://www.cfsot.com/index.php?thm=staff
Altikriti	Faliq	Personal	Associates	Interview with Faliq
Altikriti	IslamExpo	Work	Listed director	http://companycheck.co.uk/company/05275366/ISLAM-EXPO-LTD/directors-secretaries
Altikriti	MAB	Work	Former spokesman and then president (2004-05)	http://www.theguardian.com/global/2007/jun/03/resource2
AML	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member organisation	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
AMSUK	IBERR	Affiliate	AMS provides address for IEERR	http://web.archive.org/web/20130420060710/http://www.iberr.co.za/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=14
AMSUK	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member organisation	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
AMSUK	MTEC	Affiliate	Listed partners	http://www.mtecuk.org/organisations.php
Ansari	AMSS	Work	Fellow at US branch of AMSS	http://www.mef-ca.org/mef-ad-board.html
Ansari	IslamicFnd	Work	Member of board of advisers	http://www.mef-ca.org/mef-ad-board.html
Arshad	Alt.L.Inq	Collab	Campaign signatory	http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press
Arshad	MEMO	Work	Events, Press & Parliamentary Officer	https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/about-us
Asaria	IHRC	Work	Provided web service	http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/1008
Asaria	IIPT	Work	Provided web service	http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/214
Asaria	IslamicFnd	Work	Adviser on Advisory Board	http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/user/NewsDetails.aspx?Id=47
Asaria	MCB	Work	Former chair of the business and economics committee 2001; special advisor on business & economic affairs to MCB secretary general (since 2005); natinal council member 2012-14; also provided web service	http://web.archive.org/web/20020213230840/http://www.mcb.org.uk/mcbnewsletter3 ; http://web.archive.org/web/20130530002853/http://www.mcb.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=76 ; html; http://www.oxfordislamicbankingandfinance.com/#!upcoming-events/galleryPage ; http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/1008

Asaria	MIHE	Work	Lecturer	http://www.mihe.org.uk/node/147
Asaria	MuslimAid	Work	Provided web service	http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/293
Asaria	Ramphal	Collab	Event speaker 2014	http://www.ramphalinstitute.org/islamic-finance-for-development.html
Azad	MuslimAid	Work	Chief Executive	http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/muslim-aid-promotes-hamid-azad-chief-executive/management/article/1289090
Aziz	AMSS	Work	Executive committee member AMS UK (2002)	http://www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf/AMSSUK%20MEiE%20Conf%20Sep2002%20-%20booklet.pdf
Aziz	ELM	Work	Honorary trustee	http://hurryupharry.org/2010/06/07/is-dclg%E2%80%99s-senior-muslim-advisor-mohammad-abdul-aziz-an-islamist-supporter/
Aziz	IslamicFnd	Work	Former researcher	http://hurryupharry.org/2010/06/07/is-dclg%E2%80%99s-senior-muslim-advisor-mohammad-abdul-aziz-an-islamist-supporter/
Aziz	MCB	Work	Was adviser to Sacranie. Also MCB representative on Equality and Diversity Forum of Department of Trade and Industry 2006.	Interview with Aziz; http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/may/04/muslimcouncilrejectsgaydia
Aziz	YMOUK	Work	Former executive committee member	http://hurryupharry.org/2010/06/07/is-dclg%E2%80%99s-senior-muslim-advisor-mohammad-abdul-aziz-an-islamist-supporter/
Baqi	ISB	Work	Active member'	Islamic Foundation newsletter, November 2005.
Baqi	IslamicFnd	Work	CEO	Islamic Foundation newsletter, November 2005.
Begg	Cage	Work	Director of outreach	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11442602/Cage-the-extremists-peddling-lies-to-British-Muslims-to-turn-them-into-supporters-of-terror.html
Birawi	MAB	Work	Listed director (2000-2003)	http://companycheck.co.uk/director/906905524/MR-ZAHER-BIRAWI
Birawi	PRC	Work	Listed director until 2009, trustee	http://www.propagandistmag.com/2010/10/20/big-british-left-liberal-blind-spot ; http://companycheck.co.uk/director/906905524/MR-ZAHER-BIRAWI
BMI	IslamExpo	Collab	Official supporters	http://www.islamexpo.com/
Cage	FOSIS	Collab	FOSIS hosted Cage events	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11442602/Cage-the-extremists-peddling-lies-to-British-Muslims-to-turn-them-into-supporters-of-terror.html . See also HJS report on Cage.
Cage	iERA	Collab	Joint event on "the limits of free speech", February 2015	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11442602/Cage-the-extremists-peddling-lies-to-British-Muslims-to-turn-them-into-supporters-of-terror.html
DawahProject	IslamChannel	Affiliate	Established to support Islam Channel	http://www.thedawahproject.com/about-us/
DawahProject	Nida	Collab	Event partner, Fair 2013	http://nidatrust.org.uk/content/view/188

Dawatul	Committee	Affiliate	Unsure of rep	Interview with Faliq
Dawatul	MCB	Affiliate	Founding member and affiliate	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
Dawatul	ShariaCouncil	Affiliate	Founding organisation	http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/
Dilly	Cage	Collab	Advocate for Cage	Stuart (2015), pp. 26-27.
Dubayan	ICC/LCM	Work	Director	http://www.iccuk.org/page.php?section=about&page=trustees
Dubayan	M.W.League	Work	Trustee	http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1154139&SubsidiaryNumber=0&TID=11182227
Dubayan	UKBSC	Work	Trustee	http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1154139&SubsidiaryNumber=0&TID=11182227
ELM	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
F.Ahmed	ISF	Work	Director of education and founding trustee	http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=66&Itemid=88
Faliq	AbdulBari	Personal	Associates	Interview with Faliq
Faliq	Abdullah	Personal	Associates	Interview with Faliq
Faliq	Alt.L.Inq	Collab	Campaign signatory	http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press
Faliq	Altikriti	Personal	Associates	Interview with Faliq
Faliq	CMA	Work	Former director	http://companycheck.co.uk/company/05973664/CENTRE-FOR-MUSLIM-AFFAIRS/directors-secretaries
Faliq	Committee	Affiliate	Rep of IFE	Interview with Faliq
Faliq	Cordoba	Work	Head of research	http://thecordobafoundation.com/attach/Staff%20Profiles.pdf
Faliq	CST	Work	Director of training	http://web.archive.org/web/20101028031948/http://www.cfsot.com/index.php?thm=staff
Faliq	ELM	Work	Trustee	https://www.soas.ac.uk/politics/events/muslimgovtconf/participants/#AbdullahFaliq
Faliq	IFE	Work	Director of media and public relations. Former deputy secretary. Trustee of IFE Trust	Interview with Faliq; http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1121050&SubsidiaryNumber=0&TID=2504516
Faliq	Khan	Personal	Associates	Interview with Faliq
Faliq	Kozbar	Personal	Associates	Interview with Faliq
Faliq	MCB	Work	Member of Europe and International Affairs Committee	Interview with Faliq
Faliq	NICMU	Work	Founder of MCB	Interview with Faliq
Faliq	YMOUK	Work	Former president	https://www.soas.ac.uk/politics/events/muslimgovtconf/participants/#AbdullahFaliq
Faour	Interpal	Work	Trustee	http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1040094&SubsidiaryNumber=0&TID=671037

Faour	PRC	Work	Listed director, trustee	http://www.propagandistmag.com/2010/10/20/big-british-left-liberal-blind-spot ; http://companycheck.co.uk/company/03219238/THE-PALESTINIAN-RETURN-CENTRE-LTD/directors-secretaries
FIOE	ECFR	Affiliate	ECFR was created by FIOE	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/The-Federation-of-Islamic-Organizations-in-Europe.pdf
FIOE	FEMYSO	Affiliate	FEMYSO is the student arm of FIOE	
FOSIS	Cage	Collab	Joint events	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11442602/Cage-the-extremists-peddling-lies-to-British-Muslims-to-turn-them-into-supporters-of-terror.html
FOSIS	FEMYSO	Affiliate	Member	http://www.femyso.org/about/members/fosis
FOSIS	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
FOSIS	MEND	Collab	Listed supporter of MEND	http://iengage.uk.net/
FOSIS	MSF	Affiliate	Members	http://web.archive.org/web/20120402092750/http://www.muslimsafetyforum.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53
Ghaffar	M.W.House	Work	Raised money for International org of the MB through MW House	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/ibrahim-munir/
Haddad	ELM	Collab	Frequent speaker	http://hurryupharry.org/2012/02/07/haitham-al-haddad-will-not-appear-at-lse-isoc/
Haddad	FOSIS	Collab	Speaker at events, including a 2011 dinner event and closed door study circles (halaqa)	https://www.youtube.com/watch?x-yt-cl=84503534&x-yts=1421914688&v=2ktXCZDP2EM ; http://standforpeace.org.uk/federation-of-student-islamic-societies-fosis/#_edn6 https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1_NmW_0_xkh7MMgAW1m76jgkpXaIrFR76OXu1nw1lgUo/viewform?formkey=DFHMXZZVXZiVUFfLW9uNV9FbINyckE6MQ
Haddad	iERA	Work	Former adviser	http://standforpeace.org.uk/islamic-education-and-research-academy-iera/
Haddad	MRDF	Work	Former chairman and trustee	http://www.mrdf.co.uk/shaykh-dr-haitham-al-haddad-retires/
Haddad	ShariaCouncil	Work	Judge	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16522447
Hamdoon	Alt.L.Inq	Collab	Campaign signatory	http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press
Hamdoon	Committee	Affiliate	Rep of MAB	Interview with Faliq
Hamdoon	M.W.House	Work	Trustee	http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=271680&SubsidiaryNumber=0
Hamdoon	MAB	Work	President and trustee (MAB Charitable Trust)	http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1147031&SubsidiaryNumber=0&TID=11147348
Hamdoon	MCB	Work	Elected national council member 2014-16	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/leadership/

Hamdoon	MINAB	Work	Vice-chair and trustee	http://web.archive.org/web/20140605083913/http://minab.org.uk/about-us/bta; http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1135814&SubsidiaryNumber=0
Harrath	Alt.L.Inq	Collab	Campaign signatory	http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press
Harrath	DawahProject	Work	Founder, trustee and listed director	http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1133424&SubsidiaryNumber=0; http://companycheck.co.uk/director/911525828/MR-MOHAMED-ALI-HARRATH
Harrath	IslamChannel	Work	Listed director	http://companycheck.co.uk/director/911525828/MR-MOHAMED-ALI-HARRATH
Harrath	MEND	Work	Trustee (of iEngage, MEND's former guise)	http://www.hurryupharry.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/engage.pdf; http://companycheck.co.uk/company/06743280/IENGAGE/directors-secretaries
Harrath	Shadjareh	Collab	Jointly participated in meetings, eg, Hizb-ut Tahir meeting 2011	http://hurryupharry.org/2011/02/25/mohamed-ali-harrath-and-hizb-ut-tahrir/
Hasan	ECFR	Work	Member of ECFR	Interview with Hasan; http://ecfr.org/new/members/page/2/
Hasan	IslamChannel	Work	Presenter of 'Journey Through the Quran'	http://www.islamchannel.tv/ProgramDetail.aspx?id=15&date=3/1/2010
Hasan	IUMS	Work	Member	Interview with Sayyed
Hasan	MCB	Work	Spokesman' - need to verify	http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/anne-marie-waters/sharia-law-extremism-the_b_2668212.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I_UxSeQUWmE
Hasan	MuslimAid	Work	Vice-chair of board of trustees	https://www.muslimaid.org/about-us/governance/
Hasan	ShariaCouncil	Work	Secretary and trustee	http://www.theguardian.com/law/video/2011/mar/09/islam-sharia-council-divorce; http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1003855&SubsidiaryNumber=0
Helbawy	CST	Work	Founder and chairman	http://web.archive.org/web/20101028031948/http://www.cfsot.com/index.php?thm=staff
Helbawy	M.W.House	Work	Founder	http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5353/uk-interfaith-extremism
Helbawy	MAB	Work	Co-founder and listed director (1998-1999)	http://companycheck.co.uk/company/03502114/MUSLIM-ASSOCIATION-OF-BRITAIN-LTD/directors-secretaries
Hewitt	AMSUK	Work	Founder and executive committee (shura council) member 2008-09	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/2014/04/23/uk-muslim-brotherhood-leader-head-school-receiving-taxpayer-money-ibrahim-hewitt-adulterers-stoned-death/; http://www.ams-uk.org/general/chairman's%20report%202009.pdf
Hewitt	AST	Work	Trustee	http://opencharities.org/charities/1072676
Hewitt	FOSIS	Collab	Hewitt a speaker at FOSIS events	http://standforpeace.org.uk/federation-of-student-islamic-societies-fosis/#_edn6
Hewitt	IBERR	Work	Trustee	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/wiki/ibrahim-brian-hewitt/

Hewitt	Interpal	Work	Trustee	http://opencharities.org/charities/1040094 ; http://web.archive.org/web/20130116045559/http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/ibrahim-hewitt
Hewitt	ISF	Work	Adviser	http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=111 ; http://web.archive.org/web/20140219084045/http://www.isfnet.org.uk/index.php/advisors.html
Hewitt	Islam	Work	Former secretary for Islam	http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/12897
Hewitt	MCB	Work	Assistant sec general and nationally elected CWC member 2002-04, 2004-06	http://web.archive.org/web/20050214094055/http://www.mcb.org.uk/cwc.html ; http://web.archive.org/web/20050604004225/http://www.mcb.org.uk/
Hewitt	MEMO	Work	Senior editor	https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/component/content/article/133-ibrahim-hewitt/4538-ibrahim-hewitt
Hewitt	MET	Work	Assistant director of MET 1989-1994	http://www.hurryupharry.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/ibrahim-hewitt.pdf
Hewitt	MINAB	Work	Public Affairs committee member 2011	http://web.archive.org/web/20110505235523/http://www.minab.org.uk/about-us/committees
Hussain	ISB	Work	Former president 2011-2013	https://www.linkedin.com/in/dilwar
Hussain	IslamicFnd	Work	Former head of research	https://dilwarh.wordpress.com/about/
I.Bunglawala	MCB	Work	Former assistant secretary general 2006-2008; former media secretary; nationally elected member of the CWC 2004	http://web.archive.org/web/20080703170529/http://www.mcb.org.uk/committee/21.php ; http://web.archive.org/web/20050604004225/http://www.mcb.org.uk/
I.Bunglawala	MEND	Work	CEO (of iEngage, MEND's former guise)	http://www.hurryupharry.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/engage.pdf
I.Bunglawala	S.Bunglawala	Personal	Kin	http://archbishop-cranmer.blogspot.com/2011/03/engage-blasts-idiot-cameron.html
I.Bunglawala	YMUK	Work	Member (1987)	http://www.theguardian.com/global/2007/jun/03/inayatbunglawala
IBERR	Nida	Collab	Event partner, Fair 2012	http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/news/newsletter_summer_2012.pdf
IBERR	Nida	Collab	Jointly involved in the design and provision of teacher training for Muslim teachers in Britain	http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84
iERA	Cage	Collab	iERA and Cage held a joint event on “the limits of free speech” in February 2015	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11442602/Cage-the-extremists-peddling-lies-to-British-Muslims-to-turn-them-into-supporters-of-terror.html
IFE	ELM	Affiliate		
IFE	Interpal	Collab	Had joint dinner event 2012	http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100200020/east-london-mosque-condemns-homophobia-yet-advertised-four-anti-gay-speakers-last-month-alone/
IFE	IslamExpo	Collab	Official supporters	http://www.islamexpo.com/

IFE	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
IFE	MSF	Affiliate	Members	http://web.archive.org/web/20120402092750/http://www.muslimsafetyforum.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53
IFE	YMOUK	Affiliate	YMO formed from IFE	http://www.islamicforumeurope.com/live/ife.php?doc=yomo
IIIT	AMSS	Affiliate	Both headed by Anas al-Shaikh	
IIIT	IslamicFnd	Collab	Distributor for IIIT books	
Interpal	UG	Affiliate	A member at least up until 2012; then had to disassociate itself from UG by government order	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/27722114-The-Union-of-Good-A-Global-Muslim-Brotherhood-Hamas-Fundraising-Network-NEFA-Foundation.pdf
ISB	FEMYSO	Affiliate	Member	http://www.femyso.org/about/members/isb
ISB	MSF	Affiliate	Members	http://web.archive.org/web/20120402092750/http://www.muslimsafetyforum.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53
ISF	IBERR	Collab	Jointly involved in the design and provision of teacher training for Muslim teachers in Britain	http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84
ISF	Nida	Collab	Jointly involved in the design and provision of teacher training for Muslim teachers in Britain	http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84
Islam	AMSS	Work	Member of AMS UK advisory board (2002, 2011)	http://www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf/AMSSUK%20MEiE%20Conf%20Sep2002%20-%20booklet.pdf ; http://web.archive.org/web/20110911192237/http://www.amssuk.com/aboutus.html
Islam	IBERR	Work	Founder and chairman	http://web.archive.org/web/20130420060710/http://www.iberr.co.za/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=14
Islam	MCB	Work	Former treasurer 1998	http://www.mcb.org.uk/mcb-hosts-luncheon-meeting-with-jack-straw/
Islam	MuslimAid	Work	Founder, since retired from MA	http://www.peacstv.tv/en-gb/speakers/yusuf-islam
Islam	UG	Work	Trustee (still?)	http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/ShowCharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=250275&SubsidiaryNumber=0
IslamicFnd	AMSUK	Collab	Participated in AMS annual conference 2012	http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/NewsLetters/issue41-Final-low.pdf
IslamicFnd	Committee	Affiliate	Unsure of rep	Interview with Faliq
IslamicFnd	FEMYSO	Affiliate	Involved in creation of FEMYSO	http://www.femyso.org/about/history
IslamicFnd	FIOE	Collab	FIOE formerly based at Markfield	http://www.islamicfinder.org/phone/getitWorld_phone.php?id=26398
IslamicFnd	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/

IslamicFnd	MIHE	Affiliate	MIHE created by Islamic Foundation	http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/user/marfieldinstitute.aspx
IslamicFnd	Nida	Collab	Participated in Nida fair 2012	http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/NewsLetters/issue41-Final-low.pdf
Ismail	MEND	Work	Founder and managing director	http://mend.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/MEND_Activity_Report_2014_Low_Res.pdf
J.Mohammed	Cage	Collab	Speaker at events	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BN1b-B_V-UA
J.Mohammed	CMA	Work	Director	https://jointmuslimstatement.wordpress.com/
Kazim	IHRC	Work	Spokesman and trustee	http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1106120&SubsidiaryNumber=0&TID=2961658
Khamissa	IBERR	Work	Staff	http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=111
Khamissa	ISF	Work	Adviser	http://isf.education/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=111
Khan	Committee	Affiliate	Rep of IFE/ELM	Interview with Faliq
Khan	ELM	Work	Executive director since 2002	http://www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/content/management
Khan	IFE	Work	Central president	http://www.islamicforum europe.com/live/ife.php?doc=articleitem&itemId=536
KhanCheema	AMSUK	Work	Founder	http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5696/full
KhanCheema	IBERR	Work	Former chief exec of IBERR	http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/news/newsletter_summer_2012.pdf
KhanCheema	Nida	Collab	Keynote speaker 2012	http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/news/newsletter_summer_2012.pdf
Kozbar	BMI	Work	Listed director	http://companycheck.co.uk/company/05703363/BRITISH-MUSLIM-INITIATIVE-LIMITED/directors-secretaries
Kozbar	IslamExpo	Work	Project director	http://www.onislam.net/english/news/europe/444079
Kozbar	MAB	Work	Vice-president (2014), listed director (2002-2010)	http://www.mabonline.net/tony-benn-passes-away/ ; http://companycheck.co.uk/company/03502114/MUSLIM-ASSOCIATION-OF-BRITAIN-LTD/directors-secretaries
Kozbar	MCB	Work	CWC member 2004; National council member (national affiliate) 2014-16	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/leadership/
L.Ali	CMA	Work	Former chair	http://companycheck.co.uk/company/05973664/CENTRE-FOR-MUSLIM-AFFAIRS/directors-secretaries
L.Ali	Rahman	Collab	Rahman secured Ali's job in Tower Hamlets	http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgiligan/100060409/britains-islamic-republic-full-transcript-of-channel-4-dispatches-programme-on-lutfur-rahman-the-ife-and-tower-hamlets-the-full-transcript/
M.W.House	Int.Ikhwan	Affiliate	MW House used by International org of the MB to 'cover its work'	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/ibrahim-munir/
M.W.House	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member organisation	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
M.W.House	MSF	Affiliate	Members	http://web.archive.org/web/20120402092750/http://www.muslimsafetyforum.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53
M.W.House	ShariaCouncil	Affiliate	Founding	http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/

			organisation	
M.W.League	ELM	Collab	ELM one of thee 'important' links on MWL website	http://www.mwlo.org.uk/
M.W.League	ShariaCouncil	Affiliate	Founding organisation	http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/
MAB	FEMYSO	Affiliate	Member	http://www.femyso.org/about/members/mab
MAB	IHRC	Collab	Supporting organisation for event	http://www.mcb.org.uk/institutional-islamophobia-conference-examine-state-racism-social-engineering-muslim-community/
MAB	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member organisation	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
MAB	MSF	Affiliate	Members	http://web.archive.org/web/20120402092750/http://www.muslimsafetyforum.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53
Madi	ECESG	Work	Chairman	http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/145361#.VMT8i3DLcjk
Madi	PRC	Work	Trustee	http://www.propagandistmag.com/2010/10/20/big-british-left-liberal-blind-spot
Madni	IslamicFnd	Work	Adviser on Advisory Board	Islamic Foundation newsletter, October 2011
Madni	MCB	Work	MCB representative in MINAB	
Madni	MINAB	Work	Chair and trustee	http://web.archive.org/web/20140605083913/http://minab.org.uk/about-us/bta; http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/ShowCharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1135814&SubsidiaryNumber=0
Madni	UKIM	Work	Former president, trustee	http://ukim.org/ukimdata/newsletters/UKIM-NewsLetter_2012-10.pdf; http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/ShowCharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=250275&SubsidiaryNumber=0
MCB	IHRC	Collab	Supporting organisation for event	http://www.mcb.org.uk/institutional-islamophobia-conference-examine-state-racism-social-engineering-muslim-community/
MCB	MEND	Collab	Listed supporter of MEND	http://iengage.uk.net/
MCB	MSF	Affiliate	Members	http://web.archive.org/web/20120402092750/http://www.muslimsafetyforum.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53
MCB	MTEC	Affiliate	Partners	http://www.mtecuk.org/organisations.php
MCB	MTEC	Collab	Supporters of event 2011	http://www.ihr.org.uk/events/5571-Educating-Muslims-in-Britain
MEND	IFE	Collab	Joint event on Islamophobia 2014	http://mend.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/MEND_Activity_Report_2014_Low_Res.pdf , p16.
Merali	IHRC	Work	Co-founder, spokesperson and head of research	http://www.ihr.org.uk/blogs/arzu; http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jun/21/gender.september11
Merali	MTEC	Collab	Event speaker 2011	http://www.ihr.org.uk/events/5571-Educating-Muslims-in-Britain
Merali	Nida	Collab	Event speaker 2011	http://www.ihr.org.uk/events/5571-Educating-Muslims-in-Britain
MET	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member organisation	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/

MIHE	Nida	Collab	Provided course, 'History of Islamic Education: Past, Present and the Future' 2012	http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/news/newsletter_summer_2012.pdf
Mirza	Nida	Work	Vice-chair and director of education	http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/news/newsletter_summer_2012.pdf
Mogra	AST	Work	Trustee	http://opencharities.org/charities/1072676
Mogra	IslamicFnd	Work	Adviser on Advisory Board	Islamic Foundation newsletter, October 2011
Mogra	MCB	Work	Assistant secretary general; national council member 2014-16	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/leadership/
Mogra	MINAB	Work	Vice-chair and trustee	http://web.archive.org/web/20140605083913/http://minab.org.uk/about-us/bta; http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/ShowCharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1135814&SubsidiaryNumber=0
MRDF	Cage	Collab	Ran a joint campaign against the new Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, now passed into law.	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11442602/Cage-the-extremists-peddling-lies-to-British-Muslims-to-turn-them-into-supporters-of-terror.html
Mukadam	AMSUK	Work	Former chairman	http://ams-uk.org/events-1/2012-2/overview/
Munir	Int.Ikhwan	Work	Secretary general; London spokesman	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/ibrahim-munir/
Murad	Alt.L.Inq	Collab	Campaign signatory	http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press
Murad	ISB	Work	Former president	http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslim-council-of-britain-elects-new-leadership-and-pledges-to-build-alliances/
Murad	IslamicFnd	Work	Director since 2014 and trustee	http://issuu.com/islamicfoundation/docs/issue_44-newsletter ; http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/user/BoardofTrustees.aspx
Murad	MCB	Work	Former secretary general 2010-2014; elected national council member 2014-16	http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslim-council-of-britain-elects-new-leadership-and-discusses-british-values/
Murad	MuslimAid	Work	Trustee and former chairman	https://www.muslimaid.org/about-us/governance/
Murad	UKIM	Collab	Speaker at events, including UKIM's 50 year anniversary; event speaker 2011.	http://theislamicfarrightinbritain.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/ukim-annual-convention-2012.jpg ; http://ukim.org/ukimdata/167/167_convention-programme
Murad	YMUK	Work	Former president	Trends Magazine
MuslimAid	FOSIS	Affiliate	An 'official partner'	http://www.fosis.org.uk/
MuslimAid	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member organisation	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
MuslimAid	Nida	Collab	Sponsor of conference, 'Islamic Education in the Western Context; challenges & opportunities'	http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/docs/conference_programme3.pdf

			2013	
MuslimAid	Nida	Collab	Event partner, Fair 2013; sponsor, event	http://nidatrust.org.uk/content/view/188; http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/docs/conference_programme3.pdf
MuslimAid	UG	Affiliate	Member of UG's 101 Days Campaign. Banned by Israel as part of UG.	http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2008/pages/defense%20minister%20signs%20order%20banning%20hamas-affiliated%20charitable%20organizations%207-jul-2008.aspx; http://www.globalmbwatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/27722114-The-Union-of-Good-A-Global-Muslim-Brotherhood-Hamas-Fundraising-Network-NEFA-Foundation.pdf
NAMP	IHRC	Collab	NAMP requested Muslims to report crimes to IHRC	http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/douglas-murray/100023218/the-government-should-ignore-the-national-association-of-muslim-police/
NAMP	MEND	Collab	Jointly held conference on Islamophobia Nov 2014	http://mend.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/MEND_Activity_Report_2014_Low_Res.pdf
Nida	IBERR	Collab	Supporters of event	http://www.ihr.org.uk/events/5571-Educating-Muslims-in-Britain
Nida	MAB	Collab	Nida provided leaders training for MAB 2012	http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/news/newsletter_summer_2012.pdf
Nida	MTEC	Affiliate	Partners	http://www.mtecuk.org/organisations.php
Nida	RegentsPkMosque	Nida	Regular venue for courses	
Parvez	ISB	Work	Former president (1996-98)	http://kitaabun.com/shopping3/product_info.php?products_id=1805; http://www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf/2ndAMSUK%20conference%20Oct2000%20-%20booklet.pdf
Parvez	IslamicFnd	Work	Trustee	http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/user/BoardofTrustees.aspx
Parvez	MCB	Work	Nationally elected member of the CWC 2004	http://web.archive.org/web/20050604004225/http://www.mcb.org.uk/
Parvez	MIHE	Work	Trustee and director of MIHE	http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/User/BoardofTrustees.aspx
Parvez	MuslimAid	Work	Trustee	https://www.muslimaid.org/about-us/governance/
Parvez	UKIM	Work	Former president, trustee	http://ukim.org/ukimdata/newsletters/UKIM-NewsLetter_2012-10.pdf; http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/ShowCharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=250275&SubsidiaryNumber=0
Parvez	YMUK	Work	Former president (1988-89)	http://kitaabun.com/shopping3/product_info.php?products_id=1805; http://www.amssuk.com/docs/pdf/2ndAMSUK%20conference%20Oct2000%20-%20booklet.pdf
PRC	ECESG	Affiliate	PRC is one of the NGOs comprising the ECESG coalition	http://web.archive.org/web/20090426145828/http://www.savegaza.eu/index.php/About-Gaza/NGOs.html
Qaradawi	ECFR	Work	Chairman	http://e-cfr.org/new/members/

Qaradawi	IIPT	Work	Adviser	http://web.archive.org/web/20050305182626/http://www.ii-pt.com/web/advisors.htm
Qaradawi	IUMS	Work	President	http://iumsonline.org/en/default.asp?MenuID=42&MenuSubID=55
Qaradawi	UG	Work	Chairman	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/27722114-The-Union-of-Good-A-Global-Muslim-Brotherhood-Hamas-Fundraising-Network-NEFA-Foundation.pdf ; http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_7915000/7915916.stm
Rabbani	Cage	Work	Managing Director	http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5677/tower-hamlets
Rabbani	IFE	Work	Training provider and senior activist	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/7333487/Inextricably-linked-to-controversial-mosque-the-secret-world-of-IFE.html
Rabbani	YMOUK	Work	Trustee	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/7333487/Inextricably-linked-to-controversial-mosque-the-secret-world-of-IFE.html
Rahman	IFE	Collab	IFE supported Rahman's rise to the mayorship of Tower Hamlets in 2010	http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgiligan/100060409/britains-islamic-republic-full-transcript-of-channel-4-dispatches-programme-on-lutfur-rahman-the-ife-and-tower-hamlets-the-full-transcript/
Rawi	FOSIS	Work	Was president 93	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federation_of_Student_Islamic_Societies
Rawi	M.W.House	Work	Trustee	http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=271680&SubsidiaryNumber=0&TID=11372985
Rawi	MAB	Work	Listed director (2010-2014)	http://companycheck.co.uk/company/03502114/MUSLIM-ASSOCIATION-OF-BRITAIN-LTD/directors-secretaries
Rawi	MuslimAid	Work	Trustee	https://www.muslimaid.org/about-us/governance/ ; http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=271680&SubsidiaryNumber=0&TID=11372985
RegentsPkMosque	ShariaCouncil	Affiliate	Founding organisation	http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/
S.Bunglawala	MCB	Work	Vice-Chair of the Europe and International Affairs Committee 2011	http://archbishop-cranmer.blogspot.com/2011/03/engage-blasts-idiot-cameron.html
S.Bunglawala	MEND	Work	Head of research	http://mend.we-convey.com/advocacy/about-us/ ; http://iengage.uk.net/about-us/engage-team/
Sacranie	MCB	Work	Founding secretary general; elected national council member 2014-16	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/leadership/
Sacranie	MEND	Work	Trustee (of iEngage, MEND's former guise)	http://www.hurryupharry.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/engage.pdf ; http://companycheck.co.uk/company/06743280/IENGAGE/directors-secretaries
Sacranie	MuslimAid	Work	Trustee	https://www.muslimaid.org/about-us/governance/
Sacranie	NICMU	Work	Founder of MCB	
Sacranie	Ramphal	Collab	Event speaker 2014	http://www.ramphalinstitute.org/islamic-finance-for-development.html

Sadiq	NAMP	Work	President	https://uk.linkedin.com/pub/asif-sadiq/14/58b/b8a
Sahin	MIHE	Work	Head of research and senior lecturer in Islamic studies and education	http://www.mihe.org.uk/abdullah-sahin
Sahin	Nida	Collab	Keynote speaker 2013; course deliverer 2012: 'History of Islamic Education: Past, Present and the Future'	http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/docs/conference_programme3.pdf ; http://nidatrust.org.uk/uploads/news/newsletter_summer_2012.pdf
Saleem	Cordoba	Work	Former comms officer	http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/amjad-saleem/
Saleem	MCB	Work	Nationally elected member of the CWC 2004	http://web.archive.org/web/20050214094055/http://www.mcb.org.uk/cwc.html
Saleem	MuslimAid	Work	Former country director Sri Lanka	http://irdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Going-beyond-the-Rhetoric-The-Muslim-Aid_UMCOR-Partnership-in-Sri-Lanka-by-Amjad-Saleem-.pdf
Sarwar	MET	Work	Director and chair	http://web-eab.wix.com/met#!__page-0
Sarwar	MuslimAid	Work	Trustee; former treasurer 2008	https://www.muslimaid.org/about-us/governance/ ; https://www.muslimaid.org/download/1033/
Sawalha	BMI	Work	President 2010 (still?); listed director	http://bminitiative.net/component/k2/item/340-mohammad-sawalha-v-the-spectator-1828-publishing-limited-and-melanie-phillips ; http://companycheck.co.uk/company/05703363/BRITISH-MUSLIM-INITIATIVE-LIMITED/directors-secretaries
Sawalha	IslamExpo	Work	Former listed director (until Sept 2013)	http://companycheck.co.uk/director/907110890
Sawalha	M.W.House	Work	Former listed director (2000-2007)	http://companycheck.co.uk/director/907110890
Sawalha	MAB	Work	Co-founder, former listed director (2000-2008)	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/2010/02/06/recommended-reading-muhammad-sawalha-profile/ ; http://companycheck.co.uk/director/907110890
Sawalha	MCB	Work	Nationally elected member of the CWC 2004	http://web.archive.org/web/20050604004225/http://www.mcb.org.uk/
Seddon	AMSS	Work	Executive committee member AMS UK (2011)	http://web.archive.org/web/20110911192237/http://www.amssuk.com/aboutus.html
Seddon	IslamicFnd	Work	Former researcher	See bio in 2012, Muslim Youth: Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations, edited by Mohammad Siddique Seddon
Shadjareh	Alt.L.Inq	Collab	Campaign signatory	http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press
Shadjareh	IHRC	Work	Chairman	http://www.ihr.org.uk/multimedia/video/10163-massoud-shadjareh-human-rights-activism
Shadjareh	Merali	Personal	Married	
Shaikh	AMSS	Work	Chairman	http://www.amssuk.com/news.html

Shaikh	IIIT	Work	Director	http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/anas-al-shaikh-ali
ShariaCouncil	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
ShariaCouncil	UKBSC	Affiliate	Affiliated member	Interview with Abu Sayeed
Siddiqui	IslamicFnd	Work	Vice-chair of board of trustees	http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/NewsLetters/inssue39-Final-low2.pdf
Siddiqui	MIHE	Work	Member of board of directors	http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/NewsLetters/inssue39-Final-low2.pdf
Siddiqui	UKIM	Work	Former general secretary	http://www.emel.com/article?id=109&a_id=2894
Tamimi	BMI	Work	Representative 2006 (still?)	http://bminitiative.net/component/k2/item/5-british-muslim-initiative-demonstration-for-lebonon
Tamimi	FOSIS	Collab	Series lecturer 2008	http://ireland.fosis.org.uk/news/projects/1069-azzam-tamimi-political-seminar
Tamimi	IIP	Work	Director	http://web.archive.org/web/20091229015058/http://www.ii-pt.com/reviews/Dr%20Azzam%20Tamimi.pdf ; http://web.archive.org/web/20050305182626/http://www.ii-pt.com/web/advisors.htm
Tamimi	MAB	Work	Co-founder	http://www.globalmbwatch.com/wiki/azzam-tamimi/
Tamimi	MIHE	Work	Lecturer 2000-2004	http://web.archive.org/web/20091229015058/http://www.ii-pt.com/reviews/Dr%20Azzam%20Tamimi.pdf
Thomas-Johnson	Cage	Work	Spokesman	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11442602/Cage-the-extremists-peddling-lies-to-British-Muslims-to-turn-them-into-supporters-of-terror.html
Thomas-Johnson	FOSIS	Work	Former press officer	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11442602/Cage-the-extremists-peddling-lies-to-British-Muslims-to-turn-them-into-supporters-of-terror.html
Thompson	Alt.L.Inq	Collab	Campaign signatory	http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jan/23/inquiry-into-anti-islam-press
Thompson	AML	Work	Co-founder 1993; deputy chairman	http://www.gatewaytodivinemercy.com/hajj-ahmad-thomson.html ; http://www.wynnechambers.co.uk/pdf/JourneytoIslam.pdf
Thompson	MuslimLawyersEur	Work	Secretary	http://www.gatewaytodivinemercy.com/hajj-ahmad-thomson.html
Thompson	ShariaCouncil	Work	Committee member	Interview with Abu Sayeed
Uddin	ELM	Work	Vice-chairman until 2010	http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100151195/chowdhury-mueen-uddin-to-be-charged-with-war-crimes-5/
Uddin	IFE	Work	Co-founder	http://www.spittoon.org/archives/2996
Uddin	IslamicFnd	Work	Former deputy director (1995-2005)	http://archive.frontpagemag.com/Printable.aspx?ArtId=9728 ; http://trialbyjeory.com/tag/dawatul-islam/
Uddin	MCB	Work	Co-founder	http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-22959927
Uddin	MINAB	Work	Membership committee member 2011	http://web.archive.org/web/20110505235523/http://www.minab.org.uk/about-us/committees

Uddin	MuslimAid	Work	Trustee and former vice-chairman	http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgiligan/100151195/chowdhury-mueen-uddin-to-be-charged-with-war-crimes-5/ ; http://web.archive.org/web/20050816140705/http://www.muslimaid.org/docs/AR01.pdf
UKIM	Dawatul	Affiliate	Created by UKIM	
UKIM	FOSIS	Collab	UKIM speakers participate in FOSIS organised tours	http://fosis.org.uk/blogs/north/470-north-blog-november-2008
UKIM	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
UKIM	MET	Affiliate	UKIM established MET	
UKIM	MSF	Affiliate	Members	http://web.archive.org/web/20120402092750/http://www.muslimsafetyforum.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53
UKIM	YMUK	Affiliate	Used UKIM's mosque network upon founding in 1984	
Wasti	MCB	Work	Chair of international affairs committee 2002; nationally elected member of the CWC 2004	http://web.archive.org/web/20050217053354/http://www.mcb.org.uk/mcbnewsletter8.html ; http://web.archive.org/web/20050604004225/http://www.mcb.org.uk/
Wasti	MuslimAid	Work	Trustee	https://www.muslimaid.org/about-us/governance/
Wasti	UKIM	Work	Founder and former secretary general	http://archive.muslimnews.co.uk/awards/index.php?page=2005/twasti ; http://www.emel.com/article?id=109&a_id=2894
YMOUK	MCB	Affiliate	Affiliated member	http://www.mcb.org.uk/about-mcb/affiliates/
YMOUK	MSF	Affiliate	Members	http://web.archive.org/web/20120402092750/http://www.muslimsafetyforum.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53
YMUK	FEMYSO	Affiliate	Involved in creation of FEMYSO	http://www.femyso.org/about/history
YMUK	ISB	Affiliate	ISB became YMUK's parent organisation in 1994	